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2Abstract
This is a study of the political relations between British 
India and Nepal from the death of the first Rana prime Minister of
Nepal, Maharaja Jang Bahadur, in 1877 to the Anglo-Nepalese Treaty of
1923* It seeks to show the interaction of the British and Nepalese 
diplomacy, of the challenge of the one and the reaction of the other, 
leading finally to the evolution of a spirit of compromise and adjust­
ment of mutual interests for the sake of the mutual benefit of the two
governments•
The first chapter, a prologue, contains a brief survey of the 
land and the peoples of Nepal and the main trends of their governments 
relations with British India between 1767 an(* 1877* The next two chap­
ters deal with three main issues : Nepalfs policy of restricting the 
movements of the British Resident, the question of the recruitment of 
G-urkhas in the British Indian Army, and the British policy of supplying 
arms to Nepal to facilitate gurkha recruitment, Nepal»s relations with 
China and Tibet and how they influenced the British attitude to Nepal 
and their policy in Tibet have been studied in the three following 
chapters. The circumstances leading to the Treaty of 1923 and its impor­
tance from the Nepalese and British points of view form the subject of 
the next-the seventh-chapter. Finally, I have attempted in the last 
chapter an assessment of the British influence on Nepal, its extent and 
intensity.
In writing the thesis, extensive use has been made of unpublish­
ed materials in the United Kingdom, India and Nepal, a full list of 
which has been provided in the bibliography.
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The British government in India recognised-as do the present Indian 
government-that in Nepal lay the fulcrum of Indians North-East frontier, 
and the security of this frontier necessitated good relations with the 
government at Kathmandu* Nepal’s geographical position, giving her oomm- 
and of the most exposed section of the Indian frontier and the "financial 
heart" of British India, her military strength derived from the local 
population, the Gurkhas, among the world’s best fighters, her tradition 
of military expansion and proud independence-all this made it clear to 
the British that the Nepalese were a force to reckon with; they could be 
a danger to India, if alienated, and a source of strength, if befriended*
By the second ddcade of the 19th century the British had succeeded 
in establishing regular diplomatic relations with the Nepalese govern­
ment and in restraining their expansion which had jeopardised British 
economic and political interests. Thereafter these relations steadily 
improved, mainly because of the friendly policy of the Rana regime at 
Kathmandu, which valued British support as an essential means of stren­
gth. By the year 18771 when the founder of this regime, Maharaja Jang 
Bahadur, died, the British could look: upon the Nepalese as good neigh­
bours, if not as intimate friends. Prom 1877? the main trend in Anglo- 
Nepalese relations was towards greater understanding, closer cooperation 
and interdependence between the two governments, gradual coordination of 
their respective interests, adjustment of their attitudes and policies 
in order to promote these interests and assumption of reciprocal obli­
gation to defend them from external threats. By the twenties of the present 
century the British in India could depend upon the Rana government as
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trusted allies, as one of the main bastions of British rule in India* The 
Ranas, for their part, not only used their alliance with the British to 
consolidate their power, hut by the Treaty of Friendship (1923) secured 
a great political object-a guarantee that British alliance would not 
lead to the disappearance of Nepalfs independence* in the following pages 
I have tried to trace these developments in the political relations bet­
ween the governments of British India and Nepal in 1877-1923* together 
with an analysis of the circumstances in which these developments took 
place and the factors influencing and at times determining their course* 
The present work, it may not be out of place to mention here, is a seq­
uel to my first doctoral dissertation completed in 1962 at the Indian 
School of International Studies, New Delhi,in which I studied the main 
trends in Anglo-Nepalese political relations between 1837 and 1877*
The study is based almost solely on the contemporary records 
and documents of the British government at various levels, some of which 
like those of the post-1914 period have only recently been made accessi­
ble to research. Full use has also been made of the private papers of 
the Viceroys, Residents and others who were responsible both for the 
formulation of the British policy towards Nepal as well as for its appli­
cation.
It has been my object, whenever possible, to show how British 
policy towards the Nepalese government set off a reaction in the latter, 
and how the success or failure of that policy depended, to a large extent, 
on the nature of that reaction. This attempt at projecting the Nepalese 
point of view would have been far more successful had I been able to uti­
lise the contemporary documents of the Nepalese government at Kathmandu.
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However, only a few of these documents, which it must be made clear here, 
all belong to the pre-1877 period-and which I collected at Kathmandu in 
1961 while working on my earlier dissertation-have been used; so also 
some Nepalese language materials, books and magazine articles, some of 
which I had gathered before taking up the present study and some in the 
course of my subsequent research* I have also found a few Bengali and 
Hindi books helpful*
Political relations between British India and Nepal were not, 
until very recently, a popular subject for historical research s the 
only published works, until a few years ago-of1 which a list has been 
given in the bibliography-were those written b£ British officers serving 
At Kathmandu, which although useful as contemporary accounts, fail to 
present any objective view of these relations, free from personal and 
official bias* The several military handbooks on Nepal that exist were 
written for the British recruiting officers with the specific object of 
acquainting them with^&anners and customs of the Gurkhas, and thereby 
facilitating their official duties* Then there are histories of the 
vatious Gurkha regiments, which, as their titles suggest, were not meant 
to serve any purpose other than that of giving detailed accounts of the 
birth of the regiments and the military engagements they went through*
The very few private individuals lucky enough to have had a glimpse of 
Nepal, a forbidden land, as holiday makers or big game hunters have left 
us their accounts of what could at best be called first hand but sketchy 
impressions of a country, weird and yet charming* A comprehensive history 
of Nepal was a long-felt need which was not met until 1908 when the famous 
orientalist, Sylvain Levi, brought out his monumental Le Nepal* But Levi
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neither attempted-nor under the existing circumstances was it possible 
for him-to write a detailed narrative of Anglo-Nepalese political rela­
tions. We get such a narrative for the first time in Perceval Landon*s 
two-volume Nepal, which for its range and reliability of information 
still holds the field as perhaps the best authority on the history of 
Nepal. But then, with all its merits, Landon’s work lacks the main fea­
tures of historical research : a critical analysis of events, a dispa­
ssionate assessment of personalities and an objective treatment of facts* 
It reads like an eulogy of the Rana rule and more obviously as a panegy­
ric of his personal friend, Chandra Shamsher, the then Rana prime Minis­
ter, whose loyalty, goodwill and cooperation were much valued by the 
British government for several political and other reasons. A few other 
works, mostly on the Gurkhas, followed, their authors being ex-officers 
of the Gurkha regiments, and all extolling the Rana regime. Some remini­
scences of British c Envoys in Nepal appeared in the late thirtees and 
forties, all expressing fear that the rising: tide of Indian nationalism 
was certain to endanger the basis of the existing relations between the 
governments of India and Nepal. Simultaneously a few works were written 
by anti-British elements in India and anti-Rana elements living in exile 
in India, assailing the Rana alliance with the British.
prom the 1950*s Nepal has attracted international attention, 
and for two main reasons-the fall of the Rana regime with the consequent 
disappearance of the traditional isolation of the country; and the recent 
political developments in the Himalayan region following the rise of 
Communist China and its absorption of Tibet, with the resultant threat to 
Nepal*s as well as India*s territorial security and political stability.
The contemporary interest ig Nepal is a part of the wider interest in 
India's Himalayan frontier; it is intimately related to and, in fact, 
stems from the exigencies of international power politics; Nepal is seen, 
like other such small states on the periphery of China, as a buffer to 
ward off the expansion of aggressive communism in Asia, as a state in 
whose strength and stability the free world has a vital stake* Consequent- 
Nepal's geopolitical setting and vulnerability to influences and 
pressures from her northern and southern neighbours, her political experi­
ments and economic aspifcations, her slow social changes and cultural 
adaptations have, of late, been receiving wide attention* so have Nepal's 
foreign relations in their recent phase, her attempts to balance India 
and China with a view to avoiding domination by either, to ramify her 
external contact and play, as far as her means permit it, a role in the 
current South Asian politics. But then, it must be pointed out, that no 
satisfactory account is yet available of the historical basis of Nepal's 
attitude to external relations, the factors influencing the evolution of 
her policy towards China and India, in particular, and guaranteeing its 
continuance. British officers with official duties on the North-East fron­
tier of India knew of Nepal's links with China, Tibet, Bhutan and Sikkim 
and their implications, but political considerations and official restric­
tions dictated their reticence in these matters* However, recent studies 
by scholars like Alastair Lamb have ably portrayed Nepal as a factor in 
Anglo-Tibetan relations and traced the use the British made of Nepal in 
promoting their interests in Tibet. Yet, there still remains much scope 
for analysing the Nepalese point of view in Anglo-Tibetan relations, the 
main Uffepalese interest in maintaining, despite British uneasiness, their
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traditional connexion with China and Tibet,and the Nepalese reaction to 
British policy towards China and Tibet* That Nepal for the sake of her 
own interests played an important iole in Himalayan politics in the past 
has not been given sufficient attention before. However, it must be point­
ed out that my purpose in tracing the history of Nepal*s relations with. 
China and Tibet is to emphasise how they influenced the course of Nepal*s 
relations with British India*
A most welcome trend in modern Nepal is seen in the deve­
loping intellectikal conciousness of her people, their growing awareness 
of their country*s rich heritage and their keenness to identify and 
interpret its various facets* The need for historical research has been 
felt and the still limited facilities available have yielded encouraging 
results. Scholars* interests, however, are largely centred in illumina­
ting the dark recesses of Nepal*s history, in preserving, collecting 
and deciphering old inscriptions, in identifying the older place names 
and in establishing the historicity of the ancient kings of Nepal and 
their exploits by painstaking scanning through odd references in contem­
porary documents and a plethora of legends, myths and folklore. The few 
who have written on the modern period of Nepalese history have mostly 
confined themselves to the pre-Rana period, their main themes being the 
deeds of Nepalese kings and statesmen. Still fewer-of whom D.R.Regipi, 
some time Foreign Minster of Nepal, is the most known-in dealing with 
Nepalese history have touched on British, relations with Nepal in the 
pre-1877 period, but their claim to originality lies not so muck in find­
ing of new facts as in giving some important events a patently national­
istic interpretation.
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Less than twenty years ago Nepal was one of the forbidden lands of 
the world. It was a closed country partly because its rmlers wanted to 
keep it so and partly because of geographical factors limiting its 
intimate external contact, Nepal is completely landlocked; it lies en-
O 0
sconced in the southern slopes of the Himalayas between 80-88 east
alongitude and 26-30 north latitude, To the north lies Tibet, now a pro­
vince of China, and to the south and west India; in the east Nepal’s 
boundary marches with Sikkim. Nepal is a small country-about 55*000 
square miles in extent; east to west the land is about 555 miles long, 
and north to south its breadth varies at places from 80 to 155 miles. The 
population by the latest reckoning (1962) is about ten million, since it 
is conterminous with China and provides an access to the indo-gangetic 
plain, riepal occupies an important place in India's political and strate­
gic considerations.
geographically Nepal has three zones; from north to south they are 
the great Himalayas, the Inner Himalayas and the ferai. The great
Himalayan region is one of the world's most mountainous tracts, having
1
some of the highest peaks of the world.
But for a few chinks in the form of passes this stupendous natural
1. Hverest (29*028 ft.), Hanchanjangha (28,156 ft,), Dhaulgiri (26,826 ft.), 
gosainthan (26,^ 05 ft.) and Nanda Devi (25*700 ft.).
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rampart would have kept the Nepalese shut off from their northern 
neigbbours-the '.Tibetans* Of these passes, six-Taglakhar ($aglakot), 
Mustang, Kerung, Kuti, Hatia and Wallungchung^ -have been used for 
centuries as trade routes* None of these passes, hdjjever, because of' 
t&eir height, is free from, ice-clogging for most of the year. The 
region has^xtremely cold climate and a very sparse population.
Below this is the Inner Himalayan region, an intricate 
system of ranges, fifty miles broad, with peaks clad either in snow 
or forest depending on their altitude* Lower still, running parall­
el to the Himalayas are the Churia hills, a sandstone range, geolo­
gically an extension of the Siwalik range of India. Timber and 
•Savana grass grow here. Cooped up between the hills: are many valleys, 
the main centres of human habitation and intensive cultivation.
The Terai. which follows is a twenty-mile broad lush green 
plainland skirting almost the entire southern boundary of Nepal. Its 
northern portion being swampy is one of the worldfs most malarious 
regions. For long it was regarded by the Nepalese government as a 
natural defence from the Indian side. The southern portion of the 
Terai. parts of which were also once marshy and unhealthy has been 
gradually reclaimed. It is now thoroughly cultivated and densely 
populated-258 men per square mile: . 83 per cent of the total area of 
Nepal is hilly where live 71 per cent of its1 population; in the 
Terai live 29 per cent. Fconomically it is the most valuable region 
of the country.
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Hill upon hill divide the country; the numerous rivers
a,nd streams intersect the land still more* From west to east the
main rivers of Nepal are the Kali, Karmall, Rapti, Gandak, Bagmati,
Kosi and Mechl. All. swirl down the high mountain ridges towards the
plains of India, and each had many tributaries, The numerous hills
2
and rivers make intraregional communication extremely difficult* 
Geographically Nepal is a land of variety, no less so 
ethnically and culturally. Nepal has evolved through the centuries 
a complex racial and cultural pattern with two predominant strands 
in it* the Indo-AryaJi and the Tibeto-Mongoloid. Generally speaking, 
the former element is markedly seen in the peoples who live in 
the southern edge of the country abutting on India. The latter ele­
ment is discernible In the inhabitants of the high Himalayas border­
ing on Tibet-the Sherpas and Bhotias, for instance. In between are 
the races who have both these strands-in varying proportion-in 
their physiognomy, social habits, customs and language. These people
2. For the geography of Nepal see P.P.Karan, Nepal, A Cultural and 
Physical Geography. P.P.Karan and V/.Li.Jenkins, The Himalayan 
Kingdoms ; Bhutan, Sikkim and Nepal, pp.79-88* E.Vansittart, 
Gurkhas , pp.1-6. Ministry of Defence (U.K.), Nepal and the 
Gurkhas, pp.1-15* Imperial Gazetteer of India (1908 edn.); 
Afghanistan and Nepal, pp.91-3* F.Tucker, Gorkha, The Story of 
the Gurkhas of Nepal, pp.1-9. H^A.Oldfield, Sketches from Nipal,
I, pp.1-17* fek Bahadur Kfiotfrdi, Nepal;A Glimpse* S.G.Burrard 
and H.H.Hayden, Sketch of the Geography and Geology of the Hima­
layan Mountains and Tibet (4 Vols.) *UB.Northey and G.J.Morris, 
The Gurkhas, p p . N o r t h e y ,  The Land of the Gurkhas, pp.17- 
30. O.H.K.Spate, India and PakistansAGeneral and Regional Geog­
raphy, pp.405-13* B.H.Hodgson, "On the Physical Geography of the 
Himalaya", J.A.S.B., August 1849* PP*761-88. K.Mason, "A Note on 
the Nepal Himalaya", The Himalayan Journal, 1934* pp.81-90.
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who live in the western and central regions of the country are the
martial tribes of Nepal, the Magars, Gurungs, Khas and Thakurs, known
in Nepal by their generic name, the Parbatiyas (High landers) and in
2A
India as the Gurkhas. Then, there are the Kirantis, Sunwars, Rais
and Limbus, tribal peoples with their own culture. In Nepal intraregion-
al isolation caused by geographical factors has prevented acculteration
between the various tribal and ethnic groups and preserved the great
3
diversity in its population.
v
Kathmandu is the capital of Nepal; together with two
adjacent towns-Patan and Bhatgaon-it lies in what is known as the Nepal
valley, The valley, surrounded by mountains, with a varying altitude
of five to eight thousand feet, has long been-and in every sense-the
hmb of the country. Originally Nepal meant this valley alone, the
4
other parts of the country having their local names.
The Kingdom of Nepal as we know it today does not have 
a very long history s it is about two hundred years old. But then, 
the various political units which were welded to compose this King^ -
2A. “Gurkha" is the generic name for all the Nepalese serving in the 
Indian army though, strictly speaking, it should apply to only 
those who belonged to Gorkha, the ancestral home of the Gurkha 
Kings of Nepal, about fifty miles west of Kathmandu. In the Bri­
tish Indian army, too, all the Nepalese were called Gurkha. E.Van- 
sittart, Notes on Gurkhas, p.10. iflLJ.M*Spaight* "The Name ’Gurkha*',1 
J.R.C.A.5-, April 1941, pp.200-03*
3. For the races in Nepal see Karan, op.cit., pp.63-6. Vansittart,
Gurkhas, pp.6-10, 46-143, "The Tribes, Clans and Castes of Nepal",
, 1894, pp.213-49* B.Hodgson, "Origin and Classification of 
the Military Tribes of Nepal", J»A«3»B.», May 1833, pp.217-24. Nor­
they and Morris, op.cit., pp.63-73, 90-104, 117-36, 156*202, 213-47, 
256-60. C.Von Furer-Haimendorf, The Sherpas of Nepal. Northey. op.cit., 
pp.92-114* G.S^ Nepali, The Newars. H.Kihara, ed., Peoples of Nepal 
Himalaya.
4. D.Wright, History of Nepal, pp.2-24* W•Kirkpatrick, An Account of 
the Kingdom of Nepal, pp. 157-65* F,Hamilton (Buchanan), An Account 
of the Kingdom of Nepal, pp.205-10.
20
dom do have local histories, dating hack to remoteat j^xjurixxtecx
x£ antiquity* These histories mayM be read in the Nepali Vamsa- 
valis (genealogical chronicles) which, however, are a happy amal-
5
gam of fable, fiction and fact^ .
Modern Nepal is a late 18th century creation by a
people who now rule the country-the Gurkhas* The ancestors of
these people were Indian immigrants-mostly princes from Rajputana
and their numerous followers who fled their country in the 13 th-
14th centuries to escape Muslim domination* The immigrants made
the Nepalese hills their new home; they trained the fierce local
population in arms and raised troops* Among the local womenfolk
they raised families; they both influenced and adopted the local
social habits, customs and practices; a mixed race with a mixed
culture was born with militarism, as its predominant trait* In
course of time they established kingdoms of various size in
central and western Nepal; they fell out with each other and
fought* One of these new kingdoms was Gorkha, about fifty miles
6
west of Kathmandu.
5* Wright, op*cit», pp.77-284*
6. For the history of the numerous petty kingdoms in Nepal prior 
to their conquest b$ the Gurkhas see D*R*Regmi, Modern Nepal, 
pp.1-42. Hamilton, dp.cit*, pp.237*90*
For the early history of the Gurkhas see Regmi, op* 
cit*, pp.13*26. Wright, op.cit*, pp.273*81• Oldfield, op.cit*,1, 
pp.277*9* Hamilton, op.cit*,pp.9*60* Mss.Hodgson (India Office 
Library), Vols*17» 18. Sylvain Levi, Le Nepal; Etude Historique 
D'un Royaume Hindon (Type-written English translation, 2 Vols.,
I.C.W.A. library, New Delhi), I, pp.320-56.
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II
In 1742 Prithvinarayan Shah asvended the throne of Gorkha and 
launched the state upon more than thirty years of unceasing war. 
and expansion until he conquered the whole territory between Gor- 
kha in the west and the river Tista in Sikkim in the east* In 17&7 
Prithvinarayan invaded and besieged the Nepal valley when he faced 
the opposition of a power for whom he had a feeling of mingled
7
admiration, envy and fear-the British.
The Nepal valley was then divided into three kingdoms,
Kathmandu, Patan and Bhatgaon, ruled by three squabbling princed of
7A
the same family-the Mallas. The King of Kathmandu, Jayprakash 
Malla, appealed to the Bast India Company for help against the 
besieging Gurkhas.
The Company responded to the appeal out of mainly comm­
ercial considerations. ‘Through the Nepal valley lay the accustomed 
trade route between the |ndo-<jjangetic plain and Tibet; the valley 
was an entrepot of Himalayan and trans-Himalayan commerce where 
traders from. Kashmir, northern and eastern India, Bhutan, Assam, 
Tibet and China brought their wares. Wool, borax, gold and gold 
dust, musk, sulphur and antimony from Tibet reached Bengal and nor­
thern India through the Nepalese route. Of the Nepalese exports to
7* For the life of Prithvinarayan see L.S.Baral, Life and Writings 
of Pritlxjnarayan 5hah, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, London, 19^ 4*
S.V.Syenvali, Prithvinarayan Shah. Regmi, op.cit,, pp.42-103* 
7A. For the history of the Mallas see Balchandra Sharma, Nepalko.. 
Aitihasik Ruprekha, pp.128-96. P.Landon, Nepal, I, pp*35“58*
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India rice, timber, hides and cardamom formed the main items. Cotton
and silk manufactured goods, metals and utensils, tobacco, spices,
sandalwood, coral and other semi-precious stones were sent from
India to Nepal and Tibet. 'This trade,which had flourished under the
fostering care of the Mallas,was disrupted by the Gurlha invasion
8
of the Nepal valley.
The East India Company was interested not only in 
idle development of Bengal's trade with Nepal but in its extension 
to western China through Kathmandu and Lhasa. Obstruction and 
harassment by the Canton authorities made the Comps,ny*s trade with 
China by the sea route rather a difficult operation and, therefore, 
an alternative overland trade route to China was a very desirable 
object. Besides, the supply of gold from Tibet and Nepal was vital 
for the Company when Bengal was faced with a severe scarcity of
9
specie which the Company needed for its China trade.
The Company sent an expedition in October 17&7 
under one Major George Kinloch, the object being to forestall the 
Gurkha conquest of the Nepal valley. Kinloch, however, was defeated
8. On Nepal and Tibet's trade with Bengal see Kirkpatrick, op.cit., 
pp.203-10. C.Markham, Narrative^  of the Mission of George Bogle 
to Tibet and of the Journey of Thomas Manning to Lhasa, pp.liv, 
xcix, cxxiii, 50, 53, 124-8, 148, 203-5* Alastair Lamb, Britain 
and Chinese Central Asia, The Road to Lhasa, 17&7 to 1905, PP*5U
7, 336-42. S.Cammann, Trade through the Himalayas. 3.C.Sarkar, 
"Some Notes on the Intercourse of Bengal with the Northern Coun­
tries in the second half of the 18th century**, P.I.H.R.C., Cal­
cutta, December 1930, Vol.XIII, pp.99-109*
9* K.C.Chaudhuri, Anglo-Nepalese Relations, pp.15-6. Lamb, op.cit., 
pp.5-8.
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by the Gurkhas and was obliged to return from the foothills, Prithvi­
narayan conquered the valley in 1768-9, with his heart full of bitte­
rness and ill-feelings towards the Company, The Indo-Tibetan trade 
route through Kathmandu was virtually closed which obliged the Com­
pany to turn to an alternative route through Bhhtan and to send
9A
missions to Tibet seeking trade facilities. Prithvinarayan, for his
part, tried hard to dissuade the Tibetan and Bhutanese authorities
10
from entertaining the Company's projects.
The Gurkhas went on with their military expansion. By 
the turn of the century they had conquered the entire hill country 
between the rivers Mahakali on the west and Tista am the east. Bet­
ween 1708 and 1792 Tibet was at'tacked twice f re suiting in the inter­
vention of China as Tibet's protector. Fear of China led the Gurkhas 
to seek . military assistance from the Company after siggning with 
it a commercial treaty. Promotion of trade was the general object
of the treaty and the levy of a reciprocal import duty of 2-J- per
11
cent its main provisioh. The Tibetans, too, asked the British for 
military help. However, for fear of annoying the Chinese and thereby 
injuring the Company's China trade, Lord Cornwallis, the Governor-
9A. George Bogle was sent to the Tashi Lama in 1774 and Samuel
Turner in 1783. C.Markham', op.cit., S.Turner, An account of an 
Embassy to the Court of the Teshoo Lama in Tibet. Lamb, op.cit.
pp.8-31.
10. For Kinloch*s expedition see Chaudhuri, op.cit., pp.13-32.
N.L.Chatterjee, Vere^ st's Rule in India, pp.21-39* S.C.Sarkar, 
"Thw Nepal Frontier in the second half of the 18th century”, 
P.I.P.CCalcutta, 1939* pp.1607-15.
For Prithvinarayan* s conquest of the valley see Father 
Giuseppe, "Ah Account of the Kingdom of Nepal", Asiatic Hesettrc^  
es, Vol.II, 1790, pp.315-22. Regmi, op.cit., pp.80-89. Markham, 
op.cit., pp. lxxvf, 144, 14Q-9, 157-8*
11. Aitchlson, Treaties, Engagements and Sanads (edn.l90g), II, pp. 
103-5* Chaudhuri, op.cit., pp.62-9.
General , did not give military assistance to either the Gurkhas 
or the Tibetans, and instead deputed Captain William Kirkpatrick 
to Kathmandu* The ostensible object of' the mission was mediation 
in Nepal's disputes with Tibet and China, but its real intention 
was obtaining further commercial concession from the Gurkha gove­
rnment and improving the Company's general relations with that 
government* However, before Kirkpatrick reached Kathmandu in 
March 1793* "kke Chinese army had defeated the Gurkhas and made a 
settlement with them which obliged Nepal to send hereafter quin-
c
quennial tributary mission to Peking. The Nepalese government 
had now no need for the alliance of the Compan^withwhose policy 
they were totally disappointed. Kirkpatrick got at Kathmandu, a luke­
warm reception and soon left, convinced that the Gurkhas had con­
cluded the commercial treaty as a counsel of despair, and that 
when the crisis had passed off, it had become just a scrap of paper 
to them. ‘The Chinese bore- a strong suspicion that the British had 
covertly backed the Gurkhas, which impression partly explained the 
failure of the British commercial mission to China led by Lord 
Macartney (1793)• The Company's trade prospectsin Tibet ware further
blighted when the Chinese practically sealed it off from external con- 
12
tact.
12. For the Gurkha-lb.betan war and its consequences see Regmi, op.
cit.,pp.167-230. D.B.Diskalkar, "Tibeto-Nepalese War, 1788-1793"* 
J.B.O.R.3.,Vol.XIX, Pt.IV1,^ pp.362-91. Turner, op.cit.,pp.437-42. 
Cammann, op.cit.,pp.102-43* C.P.C., X, Letter No.745* B.Acharya, 
ed./'Nepal-Chin Yuddha Sambandhi Samsaran Patra'*, Nepal Samskri- 
tik Parishad Patrika, Varsa 5* Anka 5* Vaisakh, 2011, pp.1-28.
On Kirkpatrick's mission see his Account, op.cit. Chau­
dhuri, op.cit., pp.70-74* P«C,, 18 September 1837* Nos.69-71* 
Report on Political ‘Transactions with Nepal by Dr .A .Campbell. 
Cammann, op.cit.,pp.134-9* Lamb, op.cit., pp.22-31*
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For a decade hereafter the Company kept trying to revive the 
Nepalese trade route by conciliating the C-urkha government; a comm­
ercial mission was sent to Kathmandu in 1795,but it returned un- 
15
successful, This was followed some years later by the adoption of
political measures under seemingly favourable circumstances,
A# the beginning of the 19th century political conditions in 
orthe durbar ACourt of Kathmandu.were unstable. The powerful nobles 
fmrst obliged the King, Ran Bahadur Shah, an extremely cruel and 
dissipated man, to abdicate and retire to Benaras, and then fought 
among themselves* for power. Out of this scramble a party, called 
the Pandes, emerged strongest; its leader, Damodar Pande, became 
the Ivlukhtiyar (Minister),
The Company made full use of the opportunity. Ran Bahadur at 
Benara3 was given large sums of money for his maintenance together 
with hints of support for regaining his power. To prevent this res­
toration the Pandes placated the British with a treaty • in Octo­
ber 1801 the declared object of which was to establish cordial rela-
14
tions between the two governments. In accordance with the treaty, 
Captain V/.D.Knox was sent to Kathmandu as the first British Resident 
in the Court of Nepal,Knox had secret instruction: to gradually
1-3• Chaudhuri, op,cit,, pp.76-96. I)#C.Ganguly, ed,, Select Docu­
ments of the British period of Indian history (in the collec­
tion of the Victoria Memorial Hall, Calcutta), pp.133-6. G.N. 
Saletore, "Indian Trade Delegation to Kathmandu", PIHRC, Vol. 
XXXII, part II, Patna, 1956, pp.10-12.
14* Aitchison, op.cit., pp.105-08. Chaudhuri, op.cit., pp.106-17, 
Campbell's Report, op.cit.
26
establish British influence in the Nepalese durbar through the 
ruling party which valued the British alliance as a source of 
strength. However, Knox's arrival and his close relations with 
Damodar Pande and his men made the latter unpopular with all those 
in the dorbar who feared that definite relations with the British 
as established by the treaty might lead to their domination and 
consequent loss of Nepal's independence. In early 1803 the 
eldest queen of Ran Bahadur returned to Kathmandu and took the 
leadership of anti-British elements in the durbar. The latter qui­
ckly gained ascendancy, made the latest treaty a dead letter and 
obliged Captain Knox to return to Calcutta in March 1803. The 
treaty was formally rescinded in January 1^04, and Ran Bahadur
15
soon got back to Kathmandu. Ran Bahadur made one of his trusted 
followers, Bhimsen Thapa, the Minister, under whose able adminis­
tration political stability was restored and, by progressive acqui­
sition of territory, Nepal emerged as the most powerful Himalayan
state; it extended from the river Sutlej in the west to the Tista 
16
in the east. Nepalese territorial expansion posed a grave security
problem for the Company. Jith^years the Nepalese menace to the Com­
pany's territory increased; disputes on the frontier tracts nrulti
plied, leading to bloody incidents. The Nepalese made nibbling
15. For Ran Bahadur's career and Knox's residency see Campbell's
Report, op.cit. Chaudhuri, op.cit., pp.119-41* Chittaranjan
Nepali, General Bhimsen Thapa Ra Tatkalin Nepal, pp.1-23. Levi, 
op.cit.,11, pp.315-21. Landon, op.cit.,1, pp.70-75* Oldfield, 
op.cit., pp.289-91* Tuker, op.cit., pp.64-70. R.M.Martin, The 
Despatches of the Marquess of ,/ellesle.y, IV, p.l6. K.K.Datta, 
Selections from Unpublished Correspondence of the Judge-Magis- 
Hrate and the Judge of Ratna r^u-ibV/, pp. 113-5*
16. For Bhimsen's life see Chittaranjan Nepali, op.cit.
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encroachments; the Company made counter moves* Local officers of 
both the governments met and parleyed and invariably clashed over 
their irreconcilable differences* Remonstrances served only to accen­
tuate mutual bitterness. By 1814 the British were convinced that a 
full scale war and a smashing blow at the Gurkha power could alone 
check its expansion. Lord Moira, the Governor-General, hence, decla-
17
red war on Nepal on 1 November 1814*
The Company won the war in 1816; it was, however, 
a pyrrhic victory* The first casualty of the war was the myth of the 
invincibility of British military power; l6p00 Nepalese with far 
inferior v/eapons dealt a serious blow at the Company^ army more 
than three times larger in number, led by veteran generals and arm­
ed with the latest weapons. A contemporary British authority saw s
In some instances our troops, European and native 
have been repulsed by inferior numbers with sticks 
and stones. In others our troops have been charged 
by the enemy sword in hand, and driven for miles 
like a flock of sheep..* In this war, dreadful to 
say, we have had numbers on our side, and skill 
and bravery on the side of our enemy. 18
17* For the background, course and results of the war see Chaudhuri,
op.cit., pp.142-63. Papers Relating to the Nepaul war, pp.675-
763, Moira to Secret Committee, 2 August 1815. H-T-Prinsep,
History of the Political and MiMtary 'Transactions during the 
Administration of the Marquess of Hastings, 1913-1923, I, pp. 
34-206. Marchioness of Bute, ed., 'The Private Journal of the 
Marquess of Hastings, I, pp.44-54* Summary of the Administra­
tion of the Indian Government from October 1813 to January 1823 
by the Marquess of Hastings, pp.10-19* Military Sketches of the 
Goorka War in India in. ..1814* 1815* 1816 . B.P. SafesgJig-ied., 
Historical Papers Relating to Kumaun, 1809-1842, pp.1-200.
Kumaun District Records, Political, Vol.II, No.47; Vol.IV, No*
49* Letters from Govt, to E-Gardner (1814-5)*
18. Quoted in E-Thompson, 'The Making of the Indian Princes , p.192.
see also J.tf.Kaye, ed., Selections from the Papers of Lord 
Metcalfe, p.186. Kaye, Life and Correspondence of Charles, Lord 
Metcalfe, I, p.296. Morris, op.cit., Foreword by Bruce,pp.xviii-xu.
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The Company had another advantage : "the length of purse".
The treaty of Sagouli (2 December 1815) brought
20
the war to an end. A British Resident was sent to Kathmandu and 
a Nepalese Vakil to Calcutta; the arrangement was expected to have 
laid the basis of a definite and permanent political relation bet­
ween the governments of British India and Nepal. The British object 
was to check Nepalese expansion and to restrain their martial insti-
-Wor*.
nets. One-third of its territory was quieted -ef- Nepal; the entire 
hill country between the Sutlej and Mahakali and nearly the whole 
of the Terai west of the Gandak. The hill lands east of the Mechi 
and part of the Terai between the Mechi and Tista wrested from 
Nepal were made over to the Raja of Sikkim in recognition of his 
services to the British in the war. The Raja was assured of British 
protection-thus sealing off the prospects of Nepalese expansion in 
the east. V/ith the treaty of Sagouli ended the first phase of Bri­
tish relations with Nepal-a phase dominated by British anxiety to
contain an expanding military power which threatened the Company’s
21
commercial interests and the security of its territory.
The treaty established peace and stability in 
Nepalese relations v/ith the British, but no cordiality. Bhimsen who
19. Quoted in E.Thompson, Life of Charles Lord Metcalfe, pp.163-4* 
see also Vansittart, op.cit., pp.31-6. J.B-Fraser, Journal of
a tour through part of the 3nowy range of the Himala Mountains, 
pp. 13-48.f-Smith, Narrative of a Five years’Residence cUe Nepal 
from 1841 to 1845, I* pp.iu-^ ; II, pp./-*?.
20. Aitchison, op.cit., pp.110-12. The durbar delayedAratification 
of the treaty,in consequence of which the war was resumed. It 
continued until Match 1816 when the Nepalese finally submitted 
and accepted the treaty. Landon, op.cit., I, pp.79-30.
21. Papers Relating to Nepaul Jar, pp.764-5» Moira to Secret Commi­
ttee, 5 August 1815, 976. Prinsep, op.cit.,pp.207-8. Aitchison, 
op.cit., pp.94, 522-3 (The treaty of Titalia, 10 February 1817).
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continued as Minister was now convinced of the military superiority
of the British, "a power'1, as he said, "that crushed thrones ldske 
22
potsherds". He also realised that peace with the British was ess­
ential for the consolidation of his regime which had been shaken 
by defeat in the late war. For fear of another and more disastr­
ous war Bhimsen acquiesced in the treaty of Sagouli and the restr­
aints it put on the military ambitions of Nepal* He was anxious to 
remove the sources of discord with the British; he would leave no 
boundary dispute unsettled and no fugitive criminal from British 
India unextradited; he would allow no further Nepalese encroach­
ment on the^British territory* In short, he would not give the
jt4'
British any excuse for quarreling with Nepal again* He kept strict­
ly to the letter of the treaty and wanted the British to do so* He 
desired no favour from the latter nor would he concede any to them* 
He was always on guard, a watchful sentinel of Nepal’s independen­
ce, keeping his government's relations with the British absolute­
ly formal and never allowing them to be closer or more intimate; 
this policy of non-intercourse seemed to him Nepal’s best defence 
against Britain’s political ascendancy.
As an essential measure of security, he kept the 
Nepalese army strong and well prepared for any threat from, the 
south. He was concerned over the gradual reduction of the Indian 
states by the British; he kept up relations with these states by 
secret emissaries and in some cases even by permanent agents.
22. Oldfield, op.cit., I, p.299*
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He intrigued with the states, particularly when they had hostile 
relations with the British government* Nothing, however, came of 
these intrigues* and the British power grew stronger. In a feeling 
of jealousy, fear and despair Bhimsen, then, re sighed himself to 
the safest course left to him : peace with the British; single 
handed the Nepalese government would never again risk a collision
23
with their southern neighbour.
Ihe war with Nepal left some lessons for the 
British as well, Ihey recognised that the Gurkhas were a great 
fighting people who, if befriended, could be as much a source of 
strength for the Indian government as they could be a cause of 
danger, if alienated. Ihe British observed that "we have met with 
an enemy who shows decidedly greater bravery and greater steadiness 
than our troops possess", and that the "Company's soldiers could 
never be brought to resist the shock of these energetic mountain­
eers on their own ground". No wonder, efforts were made to enrol
24
these men in the Indian army.
ihe British policy for two decades after the war 
was one of maintenance of peaceful relations with Nepal by conci­
liation, ; non-intervention in its internal affairs, and ./ reli­
ance on Bhimsen to stabilise the governmental relations between the
23* Ibid., pp.298-9* F.M., Vol.198* PP*192-6, 206-17* Kanchanmoy 
Mojumdar, Indo-Nepalese Relations, 1857-1877* Unpublished Ph.D. 
thesis, Indian School of International Studies, New Delhi, 1962, 
PP*37-42. C.Nepali, op.cit.,pp.158-75*
24* fhon$3on, Indian Princes, op* cit.,p*192. E.Vansittart, Notes 
on Gurkhas, p.20. Kanchanmoy Mojumdar, "Recruitment of the 
Gurkhas in the Indian Army, 1814-1877% J.U.S.I., April-June 
19631 PP*143-53* Baker, op.cit.,pp.86-7. L.R. Jenkins, General 
Frederick Toung, First Commandant of the Sirmur Battalion, pp.
40-52
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two countries* As tlie British were then preoccupied with wars again­
st the Indian powers and administrative reforms they considered it 
politic to handle the Nepalese government gently, to show deferen­
ce to their suspicious and sensitive nature and to acquiesce in 
their policy of haughty aloofness so long as it did not turn into 
active hostility. It was also wise to wink at Bhimsen’s abortive 
intrigues with Indian powers, particularly the M&rathas:; and the 
Sikhs. Ihe Minister’s administrative ability was an acknowledged 
fact; his regime was, therefore, regarded by the British as the
25
safest insurance against political instability at Kathmandu.
Change came in the 1830’s with signs of a domes­
tic revolution in Nepal. ‘Ihe King, Rajendra Vikram Shah, having 
26
come of age, was eager to assume power so long held by the Minis­
ter. He was backed by all those who were jealous of Bhimsen’s long
26a
monopoly of power. Hie anti-Bhimsen elements in the dorbar sought 
to defame the Minister, accusing him of having brought the British 
Resident to Kathmandu and lacking in both the intention and ability 
to recover from the British Nepal’s lost territories.
Ihe British at that time were having a difficult 
time; relations with Russia were cool>and a break with Afghanistan 
was imminent. Ihe court of Ava was hostile, and in many Indian
25. P.O., 2 September 1820, No.11; 29 April 1825, No.30. S.C.,
14 October 1829, No.23* F.M., Vol.198, pp.17-23, 246, Resident 
to Govt., 16 December 182^ .
26. Rajendra Vikrant ascended the throne in 1816 while §, minor; his 
father, Girvanyuddha Vikram (son of Ran Bahadur) had died that 
yeay.
26A. Ihese elements were grouped under several families such as the 
Chautarias or tfre royal collaterals, Gurus who were spiritual 
advisers of the King and his family, fhapas, Pandes, Bashnaits, 
Bishtas and Bohras.
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states restiveness and disaffection were evident; all about there 
was an air of crisis and high events, ihe government in Calcutta 
were naturally worried.
British India’s difficulty was Nepal’s opportu­
nity. Ihe Nepalese government resumed their intrigues with the 
Indian states and also with Ava, China, llbet, Persia and Afghanis-
27
tan ; the Nepalese army grev7 increasingly restless at the prospect
of plundering the opulent British territories* Ihe Resident, Brian 
28
Hodgson , apprehended that Nepal would be a serious problem for
the British at such a difficult time. He sought to convince the
Government that it was wise to anticipate Nepalese hostility in the
near future and to take necessary preventive measures. In the strong 
28A
Nepalese army under the vigorous Minister, Bhimsen, Hodgson saw a 
thorn in the weakest side of British India; and, so, he advised 
the Government to spare no means to render the Nepalese government 
politically and militarily weak, ihe best way to achieve
this object, it seemed to Hodgson, was to support the King in his 
bid for power, to help Bhimsen’s rivals to effect his fall, to let 
loose all the centrifugal forces in the state-in short, to keep the 
Nepalese stewed in their own juice till the British government’s 
troubles were over. Hodgson contended that Bhimsen had kept peace
27* Kanchanmoy Mojumdar, “Nepal’s Relations with Indian States,
(1800-50)", J.I.H., August 1965, pp.415-60.
28. See i/.W.Hunter, Life of Brian Houghton Hodgson  ^Notes of the
Services of B.H.Hodgscbn collected by a Friend.
28A. In 1816 the regular army of Nepal numbered 10,000 men; in 1817,
8,533; in 1819, 12,000; in 1824, 12,690; in 1825, 11,710; in 
1832, 14,530; in 1838, 16,195* Ihe system of annual rotation 
in the army recruitment enabled the Nepalese government to treble 
the number of active soldiers in a few months’ time, F.M.,Vol. 
125, Memorandum relative to the Gurkha Army, 14 February .1825 • 
Qot. Political, 24 October 16j4, No. 13.
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with the British in order just to consolidate his regime, to consent 
ve its strength and then to use it against the 3ritish at their 
weakest moment; such a moment, he warned, had come now and soon the
29
Nepalese army would descend to India,
'Ihe anti-Bhimsen elements, strengthe&ed by Hodgson’s 
covert support, brought about Bhimsen’s fall in July 1837* there­
after- the Court of Kathmandu was plunged into anarchy and violent 
contest for power, the army being the strongest element in the 
state, its warlike spirit was stimulated by the contending parties, 
who offered the troops alijhelp in realising their cherished ambit­
ion : invasion of the British territory and conquest of the plain 
lands as far as the Ganges, In 1839* tortured by his sworn enemies, 
the Pandes, Bhim. sen, in utter desparation, took his own life. In
February 1840 Ranjang Pande became the Minister, vowing a war with
30
the British; anti-British spirit at Kathmandu rose to fever heat, 
ihe Indian government, sorely plagued with problems 
such as the Af^ian war, hostile disposition of the King of Ava and 
the*uneasy neutrality*of the Court of Lahore, became seriously con­
cerned over the Nepalese situation, ihe Governor-General, Lord Auck-
29* Hunter, Life of Hodgson, o£2cit,,pp.100 et.seq, Campbell•s
Renort, op,cit,, B.C., 5 March 1833* No,24; 28 June 1833* No*11; 
P«C,, 12 June 1834* No,140; 10 July 1834* No,144; 9 October 1834, 
No,17* S.C,, 18 September 1837* No,69* F.M,, Vol.151* Hodgson 
to f.Iacnaughton, Political 3ecy,, 2 July 1833* Vol,152, same to 
same, 13 August 1833* Vol*154* same to same, 3 December 1833*
30, Campbell’s Report, op,cit,> 3.C.,18 January 1841, No,74* Excer­
pts from the letters of the Resident,,, to Govt, from 1830 to 
1840 by J,R.£Lckell, A.sst,Resident, ihe Friend of India, 2, 16 
May 1839* 22 August 1839* H  February 1841*
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land's advisers in the Supreme Council urged him to send a punitive 
expedition to Nepal; hut the Governor-General would not take the 
risk until his hands were freer1; a war with Nepal, he feared, might 
he a signal for1 the disaffected and sullen Indian princes to rise
31
against the British. Instead, Auckland exerted strong political
pressure on the King of Nepal and threatened him with invasion of
his country. Ihe King was eventually obliged to concede w&at Hodg^ -
son wanted s dissolution of the Pande Mins try and constitution of
a "peace ministry" with nobles who had been bought over by the
Resident by bribery and promises of support in their craving for
power. Ihe "peace ministry" lasted for three years from October 18-
32
40 in the face of bitter hostility of the Pandes. In the autumn of 
1842 the Afghan war was over. Lord Ellenborough who succeeded Auck­
land rejected the latter*s interventionist policy and recalled Hodg­
son in December 1843* Since this policy was found to have reinforced 
rather than removed the anti-British spirit in the durbar, Ellen­
borough thought it prudent to revert to the earlier policy of non-
33
involvement in Nepal's internal affairs.
31. P.C.,18 September 1837> No.72. B.C., 18 December 1839t Nos.67-73* 
Governor^General to Secret Committee, No.21, 10 September 1838, 
same to same, No.3* 7 February 1839* Prifrate Letter Books of 
Auckland, Vol.4, P*99» Auckland to Hobhouse, 19 September 1838, 
p.62, Colvin to Hodgson, 28 August 1838, p.225i Auckland to 
Hobhouse, 18 November 1838, But. Mus. Addl.Mss., No.37694* P.C.,
11 November 1853? No.23, A Narrative of principal events in 
Nepal from 1840 to the end of 1831, by Capt.Nicholetts, Asst. 
Resident.
32. Ibid.
33* Hodgson Mss.(Bod^ian Library), Vol.9> P*30, Hodgson to his father, 
29 July 1842; Vol.l6, p.5, Hodgson to his mother, 30 May 1842. 
Hunter, op.cit., pp.204-34. A.Law, ed., India Under Lord Ellen- 
borou^h,pp.109>195-200. A.R.Imlah, Lord Ellenborough, pp.151-4*
H.B.Edwardes and H,Merivale, Life of Sir Henry Lawrence, pp.321- 
23* J.f.Nheeler, Diary of Events in Nepal, 1841 to 184^, p.39*
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For a year and a half' after Hodgson's recall Nepal had a generally
peaceful government under Matabar Singh Thapa,. a nephew of Bhimsen
and well disposed to the British. In May 1845 Matabar was killed
in a plot made by the King, his queen and some nobles who feared
that the Minister was aspiring fir absolute power like his uncle.
Then followed a year of palace intrigues, assassinations and poli- 
34
tical chaos.
Out of the welter of confusion emerged a strong man, Jang 
Bahadur' Rana,who clinched power by massacring about thirty influen­
tial nobles on the night of 14 September 1846. For one hundred and . 
five years his family, the Ranas, rmled Nepal in a despotic sway. 
Jang Bahadur was known to both Hodgson and his successor, Henry 
Lawrence, as a promising young man, courageous, shrewd,ambitious 
and utteily unscrupulous; he was from the beginning friendly to 
the British; he had persuaded the Nepalese government to offer 
troops to the British in their war against the Sikhs in 1845-6. 
Peace and friendship with the British wevfc the fundamental feature 
of Jang Bahadur's policy and gaining their favour his principal
35
object. During the second Anglo-Sikh war (1848-9) Jang Bahadur 
offered military assistance to the British government and was 
disappointed to find his offer declined. In 1850 he went to Bng-
34* Nicholett's Narrative, op.cit. fuker, op.cit., pp.112-8.
tfheeler, op.cit., pp^ 55"70.
35* Pudma Jang Bahadur Rana, Life of Maharaja Sir Jan# Bahadur 
Rana of Nepal. Pratiman 'Thapa, Life of Jang Bahadur. Jagan 
Mohan Varma, Rana Jang Bahadur. B.C., 31 October I846, Nos. 
151-60. Oldfield, op.cit., I, pp.356-68. Governor-General to 
Secret. Committee, No.44, 4 October 1846. P.V.Rana, Nepali 
Rana Gharanako Sankhipta Yamsavali.
36
land where he was greeted by Queen Victoria, Lord Russell, the 
Prime Minister, and the Directors of the East India Company; he 
was treated as the representative of an independent state friendly 
to the British government. He returned home impressed by the power 
and resources of Britain and convinced of the wisdom of living in 
friendly relations with her and benefiting thereby. 'The trip broad­
ened his mental outlook as reflected in hi3 legal reforms which
the Indian government, then under Lord Dalhousie, both supported
36
and appreciated. In 1855 he made an extradition treaty with the
British which defined the extraditable offences and regularised the
37
procedure for surrendering criminals. Steps were also taken to 
improve the police administration on the border. The Indian govern­
ment, for their part, adhered to their policy of non-intervention 
in Nepal's internal affairs and were happy over the steady consoli­
dation of the Rana regime. In 1351 they took charge of some cons­
pirators against Jang Bahadur's life and kept them as state prison- 
38
ers in India. The first decade of Jang Bahadur's rule saw mutual 
cooperation and the gradual growth of goodwill between the goverh- 
ments of India and Nepal.
A crucial test of this happy relation came in 1857-9
36. P.J.B.Rana, op.cit., pp.100-152. Ganda Singh, ed. Private
Correspondence Relating to the Anglo-Sikh wars, p,l6b. L.Oli- 
phant, Journey to Kathmandu. O.Cavenagh, Rough Notes on the 
State of Nepal, Its Government, Army and Resourees; Reminiscen­
ces of an Indian Official,pp.106-90. K.Dixit, ed., Jang Baha­
dur ko Vilayat Yatra, S.C., 24 June 1848, Nos.64-5; 27 January 
1349, Nos.60-2. H3P , Br.Mus.Addl.Mss.36476, P*332, Dalhousie 
to Hobhouse, 22 January 1849* P.C«, 4 October I85O, Nos.1-14* 
37* Aitchison, op.cit., pp.118-30. P.C., 21 April 1854, Nos.18-23;
28 July 1854, Nos. 27-8; 23 February 1855, Nos.18-9.
38. P.J.B.Rana, op.cit., pp.155-62. B.C., 28 March I85I, Nos.12-20;
25 April 1851, Nos.11-2; 30 May 1851, Nos.25-31*
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Y/hen the Indian Mutiny shook the British rule in its very founda­
tion. Overruling1 his advisers who urged either siding with the 
refoels or waiting upon events, Jang Bahadur lent the fullest 
assistance to the British. In June 1857 he sent six thousand Nepali 
troops to resjbre British authority in the disturbed aread of the 
North western Provinces and Bihar. In December he personally came 
to India with nine thousand Nepali troops for the relief of Luck­
now. 'Ihe Mutiny strengthened the bond between Jang Bahadur and the 
British who were grateful to him for his active support when his 
brothers and others in the durbar wanted him to take advantage of 
the British troubles. As a reward for his services, Jang Bahadur 
was made a G-.C.B.; the whole of the low lands between the Kali and 
Rapti and those lying between the Rapti and the district of Gorakh­
pur which had been wrested from Nepal in 1816 was restored to her. 
British prestige in Nepal considerably increased after the Mutiny; 
the Nepalese were impressed by the determination and the military 
skill with which the British overcame their gravest troubles. Jang 
Bahadur*s position was further strengthened : never before Ead he 
loomed so large as an ally of the British; he had shpwn the Nepal­
ese that friendship with the British had earned Nepal territory
while the earlier policy of enmity had brought her nothing but trou-
39
bles and confusion.
39* Kanchanmoy Mojumdar, "Nepal and the Indian Mutiny’', 1357“58", 
Bengal:Past and Present, January-June 1966, pp.13-39? "Later 
Days of Nana Baheb", 3engal:Past and Present, July-December 
1962, pp.96-107. J.W.Kaye and G.LIalleson, History of the Indian 
Mutiny, 1857-8, II, p.3115 IV, pp.221-38; V, pp.198-208.N.R. Vol. 
8, Letters From Officers Commanding Field Forces on the Nepal 
Frontier (1858-60). Aitchison, op.cit., (edn.1929), XIV, pp.71-2. 
P.C.Gupta, Nana Bahib and the Rising of Cawnpore, pp.171-203.
The next two decades saw the two governments settling
boundary disputes caused mainly by the changing course of rivers.;
A supplementary extradition treaty was concluded in 1866 for better
40
control of crimes in the border:'.: territories#
However, there were some flies in the ointment. Jang 
Bahadur was not content with the absolute power he had been enjoy­
ing since he became the Prime Minister, and so he tried to depose 
the powerless King and assume the "dd jure sovereignty11. In this 
attempt he met with consistent opposition of the British govern­
ment who believed that if he became the King he would be more
So
presumptuous and^difficult to manage. Besides', British experience 
with Ran Bahadur suggested that even a powerless King could prove 
a political asset. Jang Bahadur was disappointed and sometimes 
fell out with the Resident, George Ramsay, on this issue. In Aug­
ust I856 he wrung from the King a sanad declaring the Ranas the 
hereditary Prime Ministers of Nepal with de facto soVezjign power; 
it was also provided that Kaski and Lamjung, two principalities 
in central Nepal, would be the personal duchies of the Prime Mini­
sters of Nepal, who were also given the title Maharaja; the Kings
41
heteafter assumed the titje Maharajadhiraja.
Jang Bahadur never abandoned the traditidhKyexclusive
policy of the Nepalese government; his distrust of the British was
deep, though never openly shown; so was his fear of them, though
equally concealed. He could not get over his belief that intimacy
40. 'Aitchi^ dn, p.75* F.P-At., April i960, Nos.497-501; December 18^ 3,
Nos.331-5; December I864,Nos.255-7; May 1870, Nos.229-35; Octo­
ber 1871, Nos.654-76; AugustIO73, Nos.29-44.
41. P.J.B.Rana, op.cit., pp.192-6* [Continued 6n the next page^ J
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with the British might lead to their ascendancy* The fate of Oudh 
and Sikkim seemed to him glaring examples of how militarily weak 
states, in spite of their allegiance to the British, could lose 
their independence and integrity at their suzerain)s hands. Nepalis 
best defence, Jang Bahadur felt like his predecessors, lay in her 
isolation and non-intercourse with foreigners. The appurtenances of 
British civilisation were to him but means for the political ener­
vation of Nepal. He wanted Nepal to develop her institutions in her 
own way and own time ; she would have but a few trappings of moder­
nism. Although absolute isolation from the British was neither 
politic nor possible, Jang Bahadur would have only that much, rela­
tion with them as he considered essential for his own interests. 
That is why whenever the British government approached him for 
commercial facilities and unrestricted movement of themr Resident 
they found Jang Bahadur consistently opposed to these proposals.
He seemed to believe in the adage : "with the Bible comes the bann-
42
er, and with the merchant comes the musket".
On the whole, however, British Indians relations 
with Nepal were^  far' more friendly in Jang Bahadur’s time than 
ever before. The key stone of these relations was mutual confi­
dence which was developing through understanding and adjustment on
41 Continued from the previous page] B.C., 29 August I856, Nos. 
51-6, 63* Governor-General to Secret Committee, No.24» 10 June 
1858. N.H., Vol.12, Ramsay to Edmonstone, Foreign Secy., 7* IT 
August I856; Vol. 13* Resident to Govt., 5 January 1866. F.P-A, 
Eovember I864, No.535 May 1865, No.181.
42. S.C., 25 February 1859* No. 17* Ikbal Ali Shah., Nepal; the Home 
of the Gods, p*50* F.P-A,~August I864, No.51; January 1874* 
No.l. see also Chapter II, pp.46-7.
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•the part of both the governments. The Nepalese government gave up 
their earlier policy of military expansion which endangered the 
security of the British territory; there were no more intrigues 
and such other hostile activities. The Indian government, for their 
part, valued Jang Bahadur’s strong and friendly regime which had 
kept the turbulent military tribes of Nepal in leash. They acqui­
esced in the Nepalese policy of self-isolation and limited inter­
course and kept their hands off the internal affairs of Nepal. 
Indeed, in Jang Bahadur’s rule the foundation of stable relations 
between the governments of India and Nepal were laid. But then, 
whether these relations would improve or deteriorate depended as 
much on the Nepalese government’s attitude as on that of the 
Indian government in the years following the death of Jang Baha­
dur.
41
C H A P T E R  T W O
RANUDDIP SINGH AND NEPAL*3 POLICY OF EXCLUSION
42
I
Jang Bahadur died on 25 February 1877 peacefully, though rather 
suddenly. Almost imm%iately afterwards, there appeared sighs of a 
domestic revolution at Kathmandu which, the British government wanted to 
exploit with a view to increasing their influence in the Nepalese gover­
nment.
Jang Bahadur was succeeded by his eldest surviving brother, Ranu- 
ddip Singh,whose old age and physical infirmity were matched by a slow 
and weak mind. Ranuddip had none of his brother's resolution and ruth­
lessness, his boldness and enterprise. Indolent, pleasure-loving and 
given to drift, with years he became increasingly conservative and hide­
bound. Fortunately for him he had the loyal support of his youngest 
brother, Dhir Shamsher, who, in the words of the contemporary Resi­
dency surgeon, Dr.G-.Gimlette, was "active, resolute, able, absolutely
1
fearless and unscrupulous". Dhir was the strong man of Nepaltand real 
power soon passed into his hands while Ranuddip retained only nominal 
authority.
Jang Bahadur's sons, particularly the eldest, Jagat Jang,
were ambitious and intriguing but incautious. Their popularity with
2
the army and close relations with the royal family made them formida­
ble rivals of Ranuddip. But then, in Dhir they found more than their
3
match.
1. Gr.H.D.Gimlette, Nepal and the Nepalese, p.l68.
2. Three of Jang Bahadur's daughters were married to the Heir Apparent 
to the throne. Jagat Jang matried a daughter of the King. Daniel 
Wright, History of Nepal, p.68.
3* F.P-A, May 1877* Nos.36-56, Dept.Notes, F.Henvey, Offg.Resident; to 
T.Thornton, Offg.Foreign Secy., 1 March 1877* F.0.766/1, Nepal: 
Miscellaneous, 1880-1929* Grirdlestone's Note (1885).
That; a struggle for power would follow Jang Bahadur’s death 
was anticipated "by the British, government who knew that political chan­
ges in Nepal were rarely accomplished peacefully, and that these chan­
ges could bring about an undesirable change in the Nepalese governments
attitude towards the British. Daniel Wright, the Residency sufeeon, for
4
instance, had predicted a succession of bloody coupd. So had Richard
Temple, the Lieutenant-Governor o#'Bengal, who had visited Kathmandu
less than a year before Jang Bahadur’s death. Temple thought that Dhir
would ultimately clinch powei|by killing Ranuddip. Temple also believed
that: an anti-British party existed at Kathmandu whose principal members
were Ranuddip, Dhir and three sons of Jang Bahadur. These men, Temple
had reported to Lytton, the Viceroy, entertained no scheme of active
hostility towards the British but they did show
rather a dread of our political progress, a suspicious 
watching of all our actions, a distrust of our ultimate 
intentions, a desire to do without us and other like 
sentiments.
However, this feeling of mingled suspicion and fear, Temple conceded,
was not unjustified from the Nepalese point of view, for
there is, indeed, much in our inevitable career and 
destiny to cause such a feeling among Asiatics. 5
For sometime after Jang Bahadur #s death the situation at Kathmandu
remained"grave”5 Jang Bahadur’s sons were likely to challenge their
uncle. "A row is undoubtedly on the cards", the Officiating Resident,
4. Wiight, op.cit., pp.68-9.
5« TP, A-3> Temple to Lytton, 23 May 1876. R.C.Temple, ed., Journals 
Kept in Hyderabad, Kashmir, Sikkim and Nepal by Sir Richard Temple, 
II, pp.249-62.
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F.Henvey, reported, "and as the common saying is... Jang Bahadur's tur­
ban is too big for Ranuddip Singh; prolonged tenure of power by the 
latter is not- to be looked for”. Neither Jang Bahadur's brothers nor 
his sons, it appeared to Henvey, were friendly to the British. Not that 
he feared
"any open manifestation of hostility" on their part, but 
"only we must not. assume that now Jang has gone, we have 6 
a stout and faithful friend at our backs in time of danger'J
The time of danger was not slow in coming and of this, it appears,
Lytton himself had a premonition. Lytton was about to take a vigonous
step towards Afggianistan and looked at. the Nepalese situation very much
6a
in the same spirit as Auckland did during the first Anglo-Afgfran war.
In Lytton*s mind the situation at Kathmandu in 1877 resembled that in 
1837*8 * sudden replacement of a strong authority by a weak one,and 
the probability of a violent scramble for power. And the result could 
well be the same s prolonged political confusion, aggravation o# Nepal­
ese militarism, and a threat to India's security when the British were 
engaged in Afghanistan. Jang Bahadur had not only appreciated Lytton's
Afghan policy but had even offered to go to Kabui as the British govern-
7
ment's emissary to mediate with Sher Ali. But his reportedly anti-
British successors, so it seemed to Lytton, might exploit the Indian
government's difficulties with the Amir. As a precautionary measure,
therefore, Lytton-very much like Auckland-sought to increase British
influence at Kathmandu to make sure, in Henveyfs words, that Nepal did
F.P-A, May 1877. No.55. Henvey to Thornton. 1,7.11.22 March 1877•
7« L£» 519/1* Lytton to Salisbury, 22 July,18 September 1876, Lytton
to Grirdlestone, the Resident, 27 August 1876, Lytton to Beaconsfield, 
18 September 1876, Grirdlestone to Lytton, 13 September 1876.
6a . see Chapter I, p^ ,^ 2-4#
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8
not become "a sone on our backs in times of real danger*#* Lytton* s 
idea-again like Auckland*s-was to strengthen the position of the Resi­
dent and his influence in the Nepalese durbar. This, however, was not 
easy to accomplish in face of the Nepalese government’s stubborn oppo­
sition#
The Nepalese government had accepted a British Resident in 1816: 
but only under duress-only after General David Ochterlony had sternly 
warned them s "either Jou have a Resident or a war"# This broke Bhimsen’s 
obduracy, but. he also saw to it that this instrument of intrigue, inter­
ference and subversion remained absolutely ineffective# The Nepalese 
government-, therefore, allowed the Resident a life no better than a 
prisoner's# He was suspected and constantly watched; his residence was 
closely guarded to prevent communication with anybody; his movements 
were rigidly restricted to a few miles inside the Nepal valley, and spies 
dogged his steps wherever he went# His relations with the Nepalese gover­
nment were strictly formal; the officers were cold, aloof and even offen­
sive. The Nepalese government spared no effort to convince the Resident 
that he was most unwelcome# The earlier Residents were exasperated by 
this frustrating and humiliating treatment, but after a few ineffectual 
representations resigned themselves to it, considering that the paramo­
unt object of the British government then was to conciliate their extre­
mely sensitive and suspicious nei^ ibour# In time, the British hoped, the
9
Nepalese would overcome their jealousy and fear of Britain#
8# F.S-A, December 1877* Nos.104-33* Dept.Notes, Henvey to Thornton,
26 August 1877* LP* 518/2* Lytton to Salisbury, 3 October 1877•
9# S.C., 4 May 1816, Nos.69-70; 11 May 1816, Nos.32-3. PJ3., 10 July
1818, No.87; 12 February 1833* No#l60# H#01dfield, Sketches From 
Nipal, I, pp.299-302. Chittaranjan Nepali, General Bhimsen Thapa 
Ra Tatkalin Nepal, pp.319-21.
46
However, it proved an illusory hope* Hodgson, having found the
situation unchanged,made vigorous efforts to improve his position until
it became an issue with the durbar. "Rather than suffer the continuance
of the present system", Hodgson urged the Government,
"we had better withdraw, resume the Terai and stop all 
intercourse* This would bring the Nepalese to reason 
in six months* I dare stake my life and honour on this 
issue*" 18
Ultimately, however, he had to give up the attempt; the Government were 
in no doubt that only a full-scale war with Nepal and a complete victor^ 
could break her exclusive policy; but then, such a war had many risks* 
Hodgson’s pressure only confirmed the Nepalese government’s fear of the 
Resident which his activities after- Bhimsen’s fall further reinforced*
During Jang Bahadur’s rule, with the general improvement in the 
relations between the two governments, the Resident’s position also 
improved to some extent* Greater courtesy was shown to him; at times 
even his advice was solicited by Jang Bahadur and acted upon* A certain 
informality grew up in the Prime Minister’s dealings with the Resident. 
The latter and his staff were invited to social celebrations and hunting 
parties sent very often to the Terai. The Resident was allowed to go to 
the Terai. to inspect the boundary pillars and settle issues like the ex­
tradition of criminals* Places immediately across the Nepal valley were
11
also thrown open to him.
But the generally exclusive policy was neither given up nor 
relaxed. The Resident continued to be spied upon, though less openly
10. F.S-A, December 1877* No.119* Note on the position of Resident in 
Nepal.
11. Ibid*- Wright, op.cit*, pp*71-3«
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and, hence, less offensively. Jang Bahadur#s excuse was s the Resid­
ent’s dignified position justified such security measures. The Resi­
dent’s reqests for free movement were turned down as before but with 
extreme politeness and always on grounds of supposed administrative 
difficulties. Jang Bahadur pleaded that prejudices against the Bri­
tish were still very strong in the Nepalese people and that he could 
not override them: without imperilling his regime and life. In 186$, 
in justifying the exclusive policy, Jang Bahadur told Colonel George
We desire to preserve our independence. We attribute 
that independence solely to our own peculiar policy 
(You may call it selfish, if you like, but we cannot 
alter it to please you) • We know that you are the 
stronger power. •. • You, can force us to change our policy. 
You can take our country if it pleases you to do do, 
but we will make no change in that policy, owing to 
the strict observance of which, we believe, that we 
have preserved our* independence as a nation to the 
present time. 12
These pleas could not alter the Indian government’s impression that 
"no former Prime Minister of Nepal has shown himself more intractable 
upon this point than the late Jang Bahadur". Of 55000 square miles 
of territory, Henvey pointed out, only about 300 miles were open to
Lytton should seize the "advantage of the present opportunity". 
Ranuddip was much worried over the insinuations in some Indian news
12. F.P-A, August 1864, No.51» Resident to Govt., 6 July 1864*





Little wonder, then, that as soon as Jang Bahadur died,
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papers that he had caused the death of' Jang Bahadur, a friend of the 
British government; he was anxious to convince Henvey that the Nepal­
ese government under him would make no deviation from Jang Bahadur’s 
policy. In such circumstances, hoping that a little pressure would 
bend Ranuddip, Lytton asked Henvey to raise the issue. Lytton’s 
argument was : "if the Nepalese government is so friendly** as Ranu­
ddip professed, "why treat our Resident as a pariah?"; so long as 
the Resident suffered "an undignified position", he added, "it
indirectly tends to keep at a lower level than we could wish our auth-
14
ority not only in Nepal but elsewhere."
The idea, it must be stated, was Lytton’s own, The 
Foreign Secretary, Charles Aitchison, advised him against "irritating" 
the Nepalese when the Afghan issue kept him busy. Henvey, too, before 
he received Lytton* s instruction, had no intention to exploit Ranudd­
ip’s diificulties. Rather, he had asked the Government to show con­
fidence in the new rigime, and one of the ways to do this, he sugges­
ted, was to settle some pending boundary disputes with Nepal in her 
favour. Henvey had even wished he could gag the Indian newspapers
15
writing "alarmist and mischievous" articles on Ranuddip.
On 23 April 1877 Henvey asked Ranuddip for permission 
to go to TaptapanI, some marches north-east of Kathmandu. As antici­
pated, the request was turned down whereupon Henvey scathingly con­
demned the self-insulating policy of ihe Nepalese government. He
14* IbidT, Lytton’s Note. LP, 518/2, Lytton to Queen (Victoria).
24 April 1877* Lytton to Salisbury, 3 October 1877; 518/3* Lytton 
to Salisbury, 1 March 1878.
15* F.S-A, December 1877* Nos.104-33* Dept.Note. F.P-A, May 1877*
Nos.36-56, Dept.Notes, Henvey to Thornton, 22 March 1877*
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vigorously argued for its abandonment while Ranuddip defended it as 
resolutely, contending that he could not gurantee the personal secu­
rity of the Resident if he went to the interior of the country where 
people were very unruly, uncivilised and hostile to foreigners*
Henvey shrugged this off" as but "imaginary terror"; he refused to 
believe that the Rana regime was so weak as not to be able to pre­
vent ihe people from injuring the representative of the British 
government, whose friendship and support were essential for the Ranas 
themselves* Even if there was any personal risk involved in the matter, 
Henvey insisted, "it was small and remote compared with the danger 
of a misunderstanding owing to measures whereby the Resident is 
guarded like a prisoner (Kaidi) and watched like a pickpocket", The 
more Ranuddip resisted, the greater became Henvey*s pressure; he now 
insisted on going not only to Taptapani-which was a nearby place-but 
to Gorkha, Peuthana and Salleana-”the very heart of the state and the
Gurkha power" and, necessarily, the most jealously guarded parts of 
Central 16
N^epal* Henvey wanted Lytton himself to press the King of Nepal 
and, should that prove ineffectual, to adopt retaliatory measures 
such as preventing ihe Nepalese from going on pilgrimage to India* 
Excessive pressure was likely to goad ihe Nepalese government to 
a war with the British but even then, Henvey urged, "the question 
having been formally raided, it should be carried through to the
17
bitter end'*'
16>* F«S-A, December 1877, Nos*106-11, Henvey to Thornton, 29 April 
1877> Henvey to Ranuddip, 29 April 1877* Ranuddip*s Memorandum,
6 May 1877*
17* Ibid*, No*106, Henvey to Thornton, 29 April 1877*
50
Vuniv^ -^ evetjC
Utterly o^bfuooated, Ranuddip still tried to convince Henvey 
that loyalty to the British, government was his firm policy and safe­
guarding the Residents honour and dignity his constant concern; he 
was helpless if the minimum: security measures galled the Resident. 
Above all, Ranuddip added, exclusion of the Resident from the inter­
ior of the country had been Nepal fs traditional policy, that not even 
such- a powerful ruler as Jang Bahadur had dared to change it which, 
every Nepali cherished as the very keystone of his country’s inde- 
dence and integrity and, finally, the earlier Residents had all 
uhderstood how sensitive the people of Nepal were on this matter.
Dhir joined in s the Nepalese Ministers who had made concessions 
to the British had done so at their*peril; Damodar Pande, for instance, 
was killed because of his treaty with the Company (1801) and his 
attachment to Captain Knox; Bhimsen was deposed and disgraced by
Rajendra Vikram for agreeing to the permaneht establishment of the
British Residency at Kathmandu. The Ranas, Dhir pointed out, had 
gone to their limit in accommodating the British wishes, but if they 
contravened the national policy they would be ruined.
"We look to your government*, Dhir entreated, "as 
the Supreme government. We shall do anything in
our power to plfcase it. We are ready with heart
and soul to fight for you. We will give our- blood 
(with effusion), our army, our whole resources, our 
lives... to serve you.... This is not in our power 
to grant."
To show that he wa3 sincere in his loyalty to the British, Ranuddip
came out with, an off er of military assistance if the British were
18
engaged in a war with the Afghans •
18. Ibid.. Nos.112-17* Henvey to Thornton, 22 June 1877, Ranuddip*s 
Memorandum, 10 June 1877*
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To Henvey all this was mere "moonshine”; he "absolutely
tcbites'
refused to yield one jot or trifle of it* ♦ He warned Ranuddip that 
the Viceroy would doubt the Nepalese governments professed friendli­
ness unless they relaxed the restrictions on the Resident* Henvey 
urged that the times had changed and so the durbar should change its 
policy howOever dear it might have been to the Nepalese people* The 
policy had created misunderstanding between the two governments in 
the past and could spark off an open hostility between themf There­
fore, "I wish youy he said, "now in days of profound quiet to get 
rid of evils which may gravely embarrass you in days of: storm” • 
Ranuddip was still unmoved and the reason, as Henvey clearly saw, was 
his fear that if he yielded, his weakness would be exposed and he 
would be "the laughing stock of the country". This weakness, Henvey 
pointed out to Government, "may be our opportunity". Hereafter Hen- 
vey*s tone became more bellicose; he was for an immediate showdown 
with Ranuddip. He believed himself to be in the same situation as 
Hodgson had been on the eve of the first Afghan war; he showed the 
same distrust and fear of Nepal; there was also the same vigorous 
advocacy for bill lying the Nepalese government. He warned the Govern­
ment not to be taken in by Ranuddip* s offer of military assistance 
because such assistance was
good for them(Nepalese government]and not intended 
to be good to us, and indeed it is compatible with 
the deadliest intrigues and most inveterate hostility.
The hope of some territorial reward and the need for releasing the
pent up spirit of the Nepalese army which otherwise would be difficult
to control, Henvey explaimed, provided the impulse to such offers.
In his opinion
there has never “been any friendship in the Nepalese 
mind, hu.t on the contrary hatred, jealousy and distrust* 
Yet they are very cunning, and knowing well that the 
time for action has not come, they feign cordiality 
and meanwhile let us have their soldiers if we are 
fools enough to take them.
Not even Jang Bahadur was "loyal” to the British "in our sense of the
word", Henvey added; self-interest alone motivated his action during
the Mutiny* Henvey was in no doubt that anti-British spirit was too
deep-rooted in the Nepalese government to he "swept away even hy an
autoctatic Minister, much less by a Resident; only one thing could
do it and that is the sic volo sic juheo of the Imperial governments
"I stake my life on it", Henvey urged in a tone reminiscent of Hodgson,
and that "if a day of real danger comes, a day such as 1857» aud there
is not a long-headed man as Sir Jang Bahadur at the head of affairs
19
here, Nepal will he a sore not only on our hacks hut in our vitals?
Lytton appreciated Henvey* s contention hut it was 
patent that the Nepalese were not as pliable as the Viceroy had suppo­
sed. Ho Lytton it seemed that Ranuddip was sincerely afraid of making 
a sudden departure from the national policy, and that he needed time 
to consolidate his power before he could oblige the British. Therefore, 
instead of taking any precipitate action, Lytton just warned Ranuddip
that he should gradually abandon the exclusive policy9or else the
20
Resident would be withdrawn and the issue finally joined.
Henvey was thoroughly vexed; Lytton*s warning, he 
thought, was too mild to have any effect on the Nepalese government
19* Ibid., Nos. 118-9, 155. Henvey to Thornton. 22 June. 26 August 
1877*
20. Ihld., No.120, Thornton to Henvey, 18 July 1877*
to whom forbearance was sheer weakness, Henvey grumbled that having 
assured him of "cordial support*1 in the beginning, Lytton was being 
rather soft to Ranuddip and thereby compromising the Resident1 s posi­
tion, However, Lytton1 s warning had some effect* Ranuddip became 
penitent, apologetic and conciliatory which induced Henvey to change 
his tactics* instead of pressure he tried persuasion. He assured Ranu­
ddip that the Viceroy realised his difficult position and so had made 
only a very moderate demand; he wanted **what every nation was entitled 
to expect, viz, the courteous, liberal and proper treatment of its 
diplomatic agents•" Nepal need not be opened to the "general public”; 
only the Resident be allowed free movement, Henvey asked Ranuddip to 
withdraw the guards around ihe Residency and let him wander about 
freely. The Prime Minister and the Resident, Henvey went on, could by 
joint consultation devise a plan to regulate the Resident's travels 
beyond the existing limits; the limits should, of course, be gradually 
extended, All this could be done, Henvey assured, ”if^  not in one step, 
by degrees”, This placed Ranuddip in a dilemma. His desire to make the 
concession and thereby ingratiate himself with the British government 
was balanced . by his fear that this would give a handle to his enemies 
in the durbar. With extreme hesitancy Ranuddip said in a "Vague and 
enigmatical language and may have meant” that
his devotion being so unbounded, the British government 
ought to support him and engage to preserve him from ruin 
in the event of his acceding to our [British^  wishes*
Henvey replied *
20A
If the Maharaja will meet me half way, I will assuredly 
go not less far to meet him, and he may be confident that
20A, The Prime Ministers of Nepal had the hereditary title of Maharaja; 
the Kings bore the -title^ Maharajadhiraj, see Chapter I, p, 38,
my efforts will be aimed not at embarrassing him to 
do something towards complying with, the Viceroy's expect­
ations with risk to himself or his country.
Ranuddip seemed to have been impressed. Henvey complimented himself
with^almoft won the point. To clinch the issue, he recommended to
the Government that Ranuddip be made a G*C.3.I. which he much coveted.
However, it turned out to be a false dawn. Two weeks later, Ranuddip
denied having given Henvey any hope that the durbar would consider the
British proposal favourably. Henvey flew into a rage for the Prime
Minister's "contemptuous indifference to a grave international dispute".
He argued vehemently; he reasoned, cajoled, thundered, and,finally,
gave up in despair.
"Thus", Henvey reported to Government, "I am constrained 
to admit the failure of my efforts to induce the Gurkha 
government to change its traditional policy in respect 
to the position of the British Resident at this court 
•••• I believe that I have not. succeeded because the 
Nepalese government and people distrust us as they 
have always done, and because they will not abandon 
a policy to which they think the preservation of their 
national independence is due, unless forced or at least 
heavily bribed to abandon it." 21
The issue had obviously reached a dead end; a decisive action on the 
part of the Government was called for because Henvey had no doubt that 
"words unaccompanied by acts they|Nepalese[ simply laugh at".
This placed Lytton in a difficult position; he had not 
anticipated such doggedness on the part of Ranuddip nor, in view of 
the Afghan affairs, could he risk a conflict with Nepal. In such situ­
ation nothing more could be done than to shelve the matter for. the
21. fTs-A, December 1877. Nos.121-53. Henvey to Thornton. 4. 6. 17. 
22, 26, 29 September 1877
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time being with just a warning to Ranuddip* Accordingly, Henvey was
asked^to sternly tell the Prime Minister that "thougfc discussion id
discontinued, the views of the British government remain unchanged,
22
and its demands unwithdrawn"* Lytton also refused to use the G.C.S.I*
as a bait because, he noted, such honours were meant to recognise
services actually rendered to the British government; they would be 
"cheapened” if’ used as "bribes to future good conduct?' on the part of
23
important persons*
The Home government disapproved of Lytton* s irrita­
ting the Nepalese when his hands were full with the Afghan issue* 
Robert Montgomery, a Member of the India Council, strongly held that 
Lytton had blundered in raising the issue at all when it was evident 
from: Henvey* s reports that no persuasion could make the durbar change 
its policy* It was unfortunate, Montgomery regretted, that
the Viceroy, aware of this and with the knowledge 
of the feelings of the Nepal government on this
point, should have made it an open question, leading 
as it has done to irritating discussions and ending 
in a failure* The result is a soreness and estrangement 
on both sides*
Henvey was condemned for exaggerating the issue which the Members of
the Council did not consider as serious as Henvey represented it to
be* Montgomery recalled his conversation with Col .Richard Lawrence,
24
a former Resident who lived for seven years at Kathmandu and who 
"never suffered any inconvenience from the guards deputed to the 
Residency"* Lawrence had told Montgomery that the "guards were ready
22* Ibid., No*128, Thornton to Henvey, 17 October'1877; No.132,
India Secret Letter to Secy* of State, No*44, 14 December 1877* 
23* LP, 518/2* Lytton to Salisbury, 3 October 1877*
24. 1865-72.
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to attend him, if he wished, otherwise they did not*4. Lawrence also 
had "a circle of.' from 20 to 50 miles to move in where he liked.” 
Another Member of the Council, T.E.Perry, corroborated this, obser­
ving- that, during his month-long stay at Kathmandu ”1 certainly did 
not feel myself a prisoner4* • The Members of the Council urged Salis­
bury, the Secretary of State, to strongly censure Henvey; they wonder­
ed how he was sent to an independent court like Nepal when he had no
25
experience of’ service even in a minor Indian feudatory state.
Salisbury, however, had no strong words for Henvey 
whose efforts he did not fcegard “with, the same disfavour” as the 
Members of the Council. In fact, Salisbury would have liked to settle 
the issue because,like Lytton, he, too, believed that the Residents 
position was "not honourable and must diminish our authority.. • as 
similar treatment used to diminish the authority of our representa­
tive in China and Japan". The only consideration was that ”the time 
is not opportune”, and so Salisbury advised Lytton to wait till
“Kabul falls into a war of succession" when ”our elbow room would be 
26.
greater."
This advice had the desired effect on Lytton who agreed that
it was, indeed, "very unwise" to **w|iry” the Nepalese dorbar when
\
"our’ relations with Nepal are substantially good" and"we have nothing
to fear- and very little to desire in that quarter", Henvey was soon
recalled because, in Lytton*s words, he had proved to be "rather
25• PSI, Yol.4» No.£, 51 January 1878, Minutes of Montgomery and 
Perry, Note by the Secy. Political and Secret Dept.
Before being posted td Kathmandu, Henvey served as 
Under Secy, in the Foreign Dept.
26. LP, 518/5, Salisbury to Lytton, 1 February 1878.
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overzealous and impatient, in his struggle for freedom".
Henvey* s successor, so Lytton assured Salisbury, was
28
instructed to "let the question sleep". In fact, however, Lytton*s
policy was "to avoid a rupture and at the same time to keep our
29
demands steadily to the front". In February 1879 the matter was again
raised by the Acting Resident, Col.E.C.Impey, who tried to persuade
Dhir that the abandonment ; of the exclusive policy would be an act
of singular liberalism on the part of the Ranas which would endear
them to the British government as nothing else. Dhir-, however, was 
50
not impressed.
A few days later, -the Resident, Charles Girdlestone, 
during his annual inspection tour of the frontier, made a detour
31
into Deokhar and Dang Valleys where no European had set foot before.
He was immediately involved in troubles with the local officials and 
asked the Government for support. He was determined to"contest the 
point**, and to break the Nepalese isolation once and for all.. He 
urged that the Viceroy deliver- an ultimatum to Ranuddip, warning him 
that if he persisted in his policy, the British government would 
withdraw the Residency and impose an economic embargo on Nepal .Lytton, 
then steweS. in the Afghan juice, was positively angry with Girdlestone*sA
action which was at once unauthorised and provocative. The Resident 
had "got into the scrape, himself", Lytton indignantly noted, "and must
27* Ibid., Lytton to Salisbury, 1 March 1878.
28. Ibid.
29• PSLI. Vol.32, No.28, 3 April 1882, Resident to Government, 24 May 
1881.
30. F.P-A , October 1879* Nos. 49“54, Impey to Lyall, Foreign Secy., 
14 February 1879*
31 • These two valleys are about 140 miles south-west of Kathmandu.
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get; out of it himself. We can give him no support nor can I compli-
32
ment him on his discretion? The Nepalese government, Lytton was 
happy to see, had not only not exploited his Af^ian involvement, but
33
had even made renewed offers of military assistance ; fear of poli­
tical Instability at Kathmandu had also been dispelled thanks to 
Dhir’s strong control of the administration. Nepal, in short, was 
quietr-just as Lytton desired. In such circumstances, it was natu­
rally very annoying for the Government that Girdlestone should try 
to "push a reconaissance" into the forbidden parts of Nepal and 
thereby precipitate an issue which Lytton wanted to keep just 
"simmering". However important the matter mi^it appear to the Resi­
dent from his personal prestige point of view, circumstances were
such that, as A.C.Lyall, the Foreign Secretary,put it, "we must
34
acquiesce in the existing state of affairs",
Girdlestone*s adventure roused strong feelings in the
India Office where the shock of the Kabul massacrsi- had created a
revulsion against what appeared a forward policy in Nepal on the
excuse of breaking down her exclusiveness. The Indian government,
Perry minuted, must recognise that since Nepal was "a thoroughly
independent state", the Resident’s position there was bound to be
different from /feat he enjoyed in the Indian feudatory states. The
Secretary of State, then, made a definitive pronouncement on the
matter. He said that the
object In view, it may be hoped, with the 
exercise of tact and conciliation by the
32. Ibid., Girdlestone to Lyall, 19, 22 February, 12 March 1879, 
Note by Lytton.
53* F«S-A, May 1878, Nos.76-9, Impey to Lyall, 30 April 1878,
Note by Lytton. The offer was not accepted.
34* F.P-A, October 1879, Nos.49-54, Lyall1s Note, Lyall to Girdle­
stone, 6 June 1879*
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officers who may fill the position of Resident, be 
secured In course of time, but it cannot be regarded 
as of such, urgent Importance as to justify menaces or 
constant diplomatic remonstrances with the inevitable 
result of" friction with a neighbour at present not 
ill-disposed, 35
However, the matter did not rest there because Girdlestone kept 
pressing the Government that; the issue involved British prestige 
in Nepal, Meanwhile,a fresh difficulty arose for Ranuddip which 
Girdlestone urged the Government to exploit. In May 1881 the King, 
Surendra Vikram Shah, having died, Ranuddip quickly enthroned his 
own grand nephew, a child of six. He was very anxious to get early 
British recognition fyg? the infant King; there was fear that Jang 
Bahadur1 s sons would challenge their uncle1s action and support 
Prince Narendra Vikran&Cthe late King*s brother) bid for power, 
Girdlestone strongly urged the Government to withhold the recogni­
tion or at least delay it until Ranuddip conceded free movement to 
idle Resident, He also wanted to threaten the Ptime Minister with 
breach of diplomatic relations and economic blockade, "That Is to say*,' 
. he explained,
"I would make isolation as thoroughly a reality to 
the sardars who support the policy of obstruction 
as it is now to the Resident*, • * And in six months 
our object would be gained." 36
Girdlestohe • s suggestion had a mixed reception in the
Indian Foreign department where opinion was divided whether or not
the Government should adopt a tough policy towards Nepal when the
35♦ P3I, Vbl.g, No,l6, 8 April 1880, Perry*s Minute, PSLI, Vol.52,
No,28, 3 April 1882, Note by Political Secy, Minutes of the 
Members of the Political Committee,
36. Ibid,, Resident to Govt. 24 May 1881, 2 June 1881.
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end of" the Afghan war had removed what hitherto had "been the main 
consideration against such policy. Mortimer Durand, the Under Secre­
tary, was convinced, like Girdlestone, that the very purpose of the
Residency was defeated if' the Resident could not move freely and
procure poMtical and military intelligence. Durand, again like 
Girdlestone, had strong distrust of Nepal.
"I regard Nepal with its large and eager army11, he 
noted,1* as an element of greatest political danger.
In the event-never a yery improbable event-of serious 
disturbances in India, that army must be regarded 
aa more likely to act against us than with us. It is 
true that Jang Bahadur’s troops were with us in the 
Mutiny; but the temper of the Nepalese has not chan­
ged for the better since then.... Against the danger
of. Nepalese hostility in such a case we have, I think,
a right to guard ourselves by telling the Durbar 
plainly that we can no longer permit the continuance 
of its present policy and that the existing barrier 
of’ isolation and concealment must be broken dowuM •
He urged that all measures short of war should be taken to settle the 
vexed issue; even a war, he added, could have only one result : com­
plete defeat of Nepal. He agreed with Girdlestone that non-recognition 
of the young King was a “useful lever” in British hands,and an ulti­
matum as suggested by Girdlestone would be “rapidly and entirely
37
effectual”♦
Lyall, on the other hand, was wholly against Durand’s
policy which appeared to him imprudent, unwarranted and dangerous;
morally, too, it was indefensible. He could find no ground to fall
out with the Nepalese government, for
we have no commercial interests in that country, 
and our native subjects enter it at their own risk;
37* Rf. B.MJkddl.Mss. 45576* Vol.LXXXVl. pp.S^-^. Durand’s Note, 
21 August 1881.
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nor does it seem to me humiliating that they should be 
let in as harmless while we are excluded as formidable 
visitors.
Nor was there anything "singular” in this exclusive policy when like
most of the frontier states Nepal maintained
the same system and for the same reason-the universal 
and inveterate conviction that the admission of Euro­
peans within a state is the signal for the gradual 
departure of its independence and integrity.
Nepal, in Lyall*s view, was an independent state and had the right 
to adopt anjp policy to safeguard her interests. In fact, LyalL poin­
ted out, it was in the British interest to keep Nepal "a half-shut 
door”; European merchants and travellers, if allowed free access to 
Nepal might create embarrassing problems for the Nepalese as well as 
the Indian governments. Ripon, the Governor-General, who was against 
any forward policy, "generally agreed” with Lyall. While no demand 
was made to change his policy, Ranuddip was asked to treat the Resi­
dent "with strict courtesy and...recognised etiquette”. Girdlestone 
was also strongly required to be polite in his addresses to the 
Prime Minister. He was further told that
the Governor-General does not consider that there 
are at present sufficient reasons for demanding and
insisting upon such a complete change in the actual
position of the British Resident in Nepal as would 
be involved in the concession to the British Resident 38 
of unrestricted freedom of movement about the country.
Shortly hereafter the new King of Nepal was given recognition. Girdle­
stone bitterly deplored Ripon*s decision; he continued to be "petulant" 
and even to "sneer at the Foreign Off ice" by the "splenetic wording”
35. Ibid.7 pp.586-9? Lyall. and Ripon*s Notes, 24 August 188L. P5LI, 
Vol.32» No.38, 3 &pril 1882, Govt.So Resident, 8 September 1881.
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of his despatches* This earned him censure from Government* Gii*Lesto-
39
ne, thus, failed to “initiate•• • a new go-ahead policy in Nepal'1.
In spite of his many qualities Girdlestone was not
the sort of man to succeed in his diplomatic functions in a state like
Nepal. He had intimate knowledge of Nepalese politics, the result of /; 
39A
long stay. He was gifted with keen political sense, ample courage 
and initiative. He had ideas and enough resolution to carry them out. 
But he lacked sympathy, patience and above all tact and moderation, 
t£e essential requisites to deal with a government,sensitive, suspi­
cious and proud. Girdlestone hated gradualness as timidity and con­
ciliation as weakness. He was, according to his colleague, the Resi­
dency surgeon, Dr. Gimlette, "exceedingly self-centred", irascible, 
quick to find faults and Jslcrt£' in forgetting them. He was unduly 
suspicious of the Nepalese. He refused to recognise that Nepal was 
practically an independent state and his duty was more of an amba­
ssador than of a political agent in an Indian "native state'. Gim­
lette saw that Girdlestone
conceived a very much higher estimate of the impor­
tance of the Resident at the Court of Nepal than 
that held by the Government of India and the World 
at large. 40
He would not concede that Nepal*s fear of British influence was 
genuine, and that his own proceedings increased rather than removed 
that fear-.
39. HP. B.M«Addl.Mss. 43576. Vol.LXXXYI. pp . 590-600. Dent.Notes.
39A. He was the Resident for sixteen years, 1872 tc^ L888.
40. Gimlette, op.cit., p.245.
The Nepalese governments determination to keep the 
Resident's movements closely restricted and the British government's 
determination to remove the; restriction created bitterness between 
the two. 'To Henvey and Girdlestone the improvement of their position 
was a necessity for several reasons. It was the first step, they held, 
to break down Nepal's policy of self-isolation and non-intercourse 
with foreigners which was based upon exaggerated fear and distrust 
of the British; and so long as this policy lasted no normal relations 
could grow between Nepal and India. The Nepalese policy, so the Resi­
dents argued, wasi dangerous as|well. Anti-British feeling was still- 
latent in the Nepalese durbar which might suddenly erupt in the form 
of. active hostility. If so, the Indian government would find themsel­
ves seriously handicapped for want of adequate informations; warlike 
preparations could be carried on in the interior parts of Nepal "with­
out a whisper reaching the ear of the Resident". The latter could 
furnish no reliable intelligence regarding the country's topography, 
routes, army, military installations, economic resources and such 
other facts the knowlege of which was essential for military operations. 
The moral effect on the Indian feudatory states, the Residents conti­
nued, was still more dangerous. These states attributed Nepal's vir­
tual independence and her immunity from the "Innovating touch of the 
Feringhee" to the virtual imprisonment of the Resident and the total 
exclusion of the Europeans. The impression had been fostered that the 
British were afraid of Nepal's military power and so did not dare 
challenge her policy. Further, when the Nepalese freely went to all­
places In India and their Ministers and other dignitaries were given
all facilities during their pilgrimage in India, it was unjust to
deny in Nepal at least like privileges to the Resident, Besides, both
Henvey and Girdlestone averred ; the exclusive policy of Nepal defea­
ted one of the main objects of British rule : spread of civilisation,
the absence of which accounted for the continuance in Nepal of horrid
practices, the sati and slavery. In short, from the British point of 
view Nepal’s policy was anachronistic, artificial, politically danger­
ous and indefensible on every score, British interests needed a change
41.
in this policy at all cost,
However?not all these arguments are tenable. Both Henvey 
and Girdlestone’s fear of Nepalese hostility was certainly overdone. 
Nepal’s policy over the last thirty years had definitely changed; for
D Ithe Ranas, ali^nting the British was like snapping the tap root of 
Owntheir^power. fhe Nepalese army, badly trained and lacking in modern 
arms, had little offensive power-and this the British officers, inclu­
ding the Residents, reported from time to time, Richard Lawrence, for 
instance, saw that the Nepalese artillery*"highly inefficient'1; there 
was only one corps of cavalry of one hundred men,11 poorly equipped and 
badly horsed"; Of about one lakh guns and rifles in the magazine atA.
Kathmandu which were of "all dates and every description" "many would
be found to be useless^ the percussion caps and gun powder were locally
manufactured,but"neither of good quality1*, fhis was in November 1870.
About three years later, Captain J.Biddulph saw the Nepalese infantry
41* ff«3-A, December 1877* Nos.104-33* Henvey’s Letters to Govt. op. 
cit. PSLI, Vol.32, No.28, 3 April 1882, Girdlestone to Govt.,
24 May 1881, 20 June 1881. F.P-A, October 1879* Nos.49-54, 
Girdlestone to Govt., op.cit. Gimlette, op.cit., pp.87-90.
armed with locally made Enfield rifles whose 11 locks are bad and liable 
to get easily out of order”; "the arms themselves were kept badly”; it 
was unlikely that the rifles "would make good shooting”? the troops 
were also badly trained. The two "small rifled guns" which Biddulph 
saw were "turned out more as an experiment than for service"; the 
can**on-manufacturing establishment was "very small... and its produc­
tive power extremely limited1.1 The want of machinery for boring rifles 
and making cartridges was "an insuperable obstacle" to the production 
of good rifles and enou^i ammunition for target practice. As for the 
officers, their professional knowledge "generally is not worth 
commenting upon". Wright described the Nepalese rifles and cannon as 
"very useless" and the accoutrement of the troops "of the most 
miserable and dirty description". With "very poor'1 weapons and,particular 
ly," rusty and dirty-looking" rifles, p^ rttEFn^ iirly, the Nepalese army, he 
added, would prove of doubtful utility against European tropps; the 
officers were "in general uneducated and ignorant young men"-all
Ranas. Temple held that notwithstanding all their qualities, the
if opposed
Nepalese troops "would be quickly destroyedAin the open field to 
a civilised enemy". Impey saw the same "badly equipped" artillery 
and no cavalry; the troops wereVver drilled, badly set up, look 
slovenly and slouching"; target practice was"neglected"; arms were 
"carelessly kept, rust eaten,and the ammunition locally manufactured 
was bad"; in short, the "men though good material, are badly armed 
and badly trained in the use of their fire arms". The Army Organi­
sation Commission (1879) regarded a war with Nepal as "a contingency 





[ sufficient for this war-, What is most interesting, Girdlestone him­
self, in a long report on the Nepalese army (December 1883)*positive­
ly discounted any^'fej^i'esV'^.^'ession on India; he had absolutely no 
doubt that in a war with Nepal-” an unlikely contingency"-the British 
would have no difficulty in achieving a quick and complete victory* 
fhe Nepalese army, he pointed out, was maintained not for use against 
the British in India but for maintainig
"the integrity of1 the state and*** the necessity 
of finding congenial occupation for that portion
of. the community which by birth and tradition
affects a soldier*s career"- and this community 
consisted of the Gurkhas-the rulers.
C«*,U7wv*^
Girdlestone*s report fe©£eAout that the Nepalese government maintained 
less troops on the southern border than the British did on their 
side of the frontier. Girdlestone thought ft "highly improbable" 
that the Nepalese would "proprio motu" take the initiative in decla­
ring a war against the British; they knew "how small" were their
economic resources "as compared with ours and how weak for purposes
of attack is an army which like theirs has but little transport and
no cavalry"? their troops could not "bear the heat of the plains"
and "make forced marches below the hills". Even in regard to the 
Resident's position, Girdlestone admitted in the above report, the 
Nepalese government's attitude
though in accordance with its traditional policy, 
wanting in geniality, is rarely less than courteous 
and my experience is that a firm remonstrance suffi­
ces to obtain amends for any intentional incivility.
"Ehere is no reason", he continued, "to fear any such insult as would
call for more serious notice". Strangest of all, Girdlestone himself
now strongly urged the Government to give modern weapons to Nepal-and
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that even free of' cost-* in order to obtain in return Gurkha recruits*
& report on Nepal by Major E.R.Elies, the Deputy Assistant Quarter 
Master General, which was prepared in 1884 in consultation with Gird­
lestone, described the Nepalese army as ’wholly unprepared for war”; 
the organisation of the army was not such ”as to lead us to expect 
any very stubborn resistance” if the British army ever, marched into 
Nepal* The Nepalese armaments, Girdlestone dismissed as ’beneath con­
tempt” • Elies* report concluded with the very optimistic remark that 
another war with Nepal, if it took place, would never be difficult to 
win* Dr .Gimlette observed that the Nepalese government had a ’’very 
wholesome respect for its powerful neighbour”, and that fear and 
suspicion of the British lay at the root of Nepal*s exclusive policy 
which, he admitted, though ”a mistaken one, of course”, was ’not 
without a show of reason”* The fear that the British could occupy the 
Terai, economically the richest part of Nepal, was a powerful deterr­
ent to Nepalese hostility towards the British, and this, too, was not
43
unknown to the Residents who made much of this hostility*
Nor was Nepal an absolutely closed country, the military
42. see Chapter III, pp.81-4*
43* NP, Vol.5/31, Lawrences Memo on the Gurkha Army, 1 November 1870. 
The Nepal Army by J.Biddulph, 6 March 1873 • Wright, op.cit., pp. 
47-9* TP* Al-3* Temple to Lytton, 23 May 1876. PSLI, Vol.21, No. 
101, 13 March 1879* Report on Army of Nepal by Impey, 3 Decem­
ber. 1878. A.P., 1384*^ ,^ 1VolVL1X3 : Report of the Army Organisation 
Commission, pp.20, 47* 55* 186. PEF, Vol.26, 1912, Pile No.2067/ 
1906, Girdlestone *s Note on the possibility of improving our rela­
tions with Nepal, 31 December 1883* W*0. 106/143* Report on Nepal, 
by E.R.Elles, 1884, pp*123-4* 127* Gimlette, op.cit*, pp.87-90.
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and other information^ about which: were . wholly unknown to the Brit­
ish. In fact, however, the British had quite a few meand of probing 
into the interior regions of Nepal* Indian explorers-Pundits, as they 
were called-of the Great Trigonometrical Survey of India had been se­
cretly sent to Nepal, and from their reports various informations had 
44
been culled. Besides, the Residents had their own means of obtaining 
intelligence. Even the strict vigilance of Bhimsen could not prevent 
the enterprising Hodgson from establishing contacts not only with the 
royal family and the aristocracy but with the artisans, merchants, 
priests and other common men. The mass of information on varied aspects 
of Nepalese life, their government, society, religion and culture which 
Hodgson collected during his stay at Kathmandu could be meritlans&i*|ref- 
utation of his own and his successors* argument that it was difficult 
to procure th|s^ information’ in Nepal. Even for those Residents who 
did not cultivate wide contact with the Jfepalese people, collection 
of information was not difficult. The Resident's escorta, Indian 
clerks of the Residency and Indian merchants at Kathmandu all freely 
mixed with the Nepalese people ; many of them went regularly on pil­
grimage: to the hill districts of Nepal. Gurkhas in the Indian army 
on leave in Nepal were another channel of information^ about regions
44* T.G.Montgomerie, Report on the Trans-Himalayan Exploration...
during 1863-67* General Report on the G.T.Survey of India, 1871-2 
to 1873-4* General Report on the Survey of India, 1879-9 to 1887-8. 
C.Wood, Report on Explorations in Nepfll and Tibet by Explorer M-H 
(1885-6). C.E.D.Black, A Memoir on the Indian Surveys, 1873-90*
C*JBl.Markham, Memoir on the Indian Surveys.
45* Th^ s^  informationr in their compiled form -are- to be found in the 
many volumes of Hodgson Mss. in the India Office Library, Bodleian 
Library, Oxford, the Royal Asiatic Society (London and Calcutta) 
and libraries in Paris and elsewhere. For a list of the Mss. see 
W.W.Hunter, Life of Brian Houston Hodgson, pp.337-78*
closed to the British Resident,. Girdlestone supplied the military
authorities with detailed information ; about the best routes through
which a British army could move into Nepal, and Major E, Barrow prepa-
4 6
red a confidential note on these routes in 1884* It is, indeed, 
strange that the Residents complained about the dearth of knowledge 
concerning Nepalese governments military establishments when they 
were well aware that it was in the Nepal valleyAwiere lay the centre 
of the governmental authority^to support which the bulk of' the Nepal­
ese army was stationed in the valley itself . Of the army in the valley 
the Residents had full information; they saw the troops being paraded. 
Both Jang Bahadur and Ranuddip permitted Lawrence, Biddulph, Girdle­
stone and Gimlette to visit the magazines and arsenals, fhe arms 
manufacturing plants believed to exist outside the valley were not
seen by the Residents, but theyj^ Sfeir location, contents and produc- 
47
tion capacity.
46, E.G.Barrow, Memorandum on the Lines of Approach to the Nepal 
Vallejr. See also Elies, op.cit.
47* Impey's Report, op.cit.
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II
The Nepalese government's stubbornness stood them in good stead; 
never hereafter would the British press them to give up their tradi­
tional policy, Ripon* s object was to repair the damage which Lytton* s 
policy had done to the British government's relations with Ranuddip* 
Ripon observed an attitude of noit-interference in Nepal's domestic 
affairs at a time when a contrary policy was advocated by men like 
Durand in the Foreign Department, Ripon*s policy was not to give 
any overt support to the existing regime in Nepal while at the same 
time to prevent its subversion from the British territory by elements 
hostile to the regime. This is why in 1881, for instance, Jagat Jang, 
who escaped from Kathmandu, was given asylum in India but kept under 
close surveillance, ^ fhat year a serious conspiracy was detected at 
Kathmandu the object of which was to violently overthrow the tegime, 
Ranuddip promptly executed twenty of the persons involved,and but 
for Girdlestone*s intercession would have put out the eyes pf Prince 
Narendra Vikram and Bam Vikram (son of Bam Bahadur-, late brother of 
Ranuddip), the two suspected accomplices, Ripon agreed to take charge 
of these two men as state prisoners in India-"an unpleasant duty" under­
taken on purely "humanitarian grounds". But at the same time he strong­
ly censured Girdlestone for having suggested to Ranuddip that the Bri­
tish government would defend his regime, if needed, by armed assistance. 
Girdlestone was blamed by the Viceroy for "active intervention in the 
internal affairs of Nepal" and ^committing the British government to 
an unwelcome responsibility. In the Foreign Department, however, the
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general desire was to let Girdlestone take an "active interest" in
court politics if for no other reason than at least to prevent
48
political assassinations* In October 1884 Dhir died, leaving Ranu­
ddip absolutely helpiess. Girdlestone was in no douht that the Prime 
Minister's days were numbered, and that a violent struggle for power 
which was likely might bring down the Rana regime altogether'* Earlier 
he had reported to the Government thus :
It is not likely that Ranuddip will outlive him (Dhir] 
for he may die at any moment, But should fee survive, 
his chances of dying a natural death would be lessen­
ed* Except his brother, Dhir Shamsher and the priests, 
whose creature he is, he has not a friend* By neglect 
of his duties, he has alienated the people.•• he has 
incurred the animosity of every important sardar in 
the country* • • • With the strong hand of Dhir Shamsher
on his side, he lives in no small dread about his
safety* Without his brother's protection, his enemies 
might be too much for him* 49 
These were prophetic words.
Immediately after Dhir's death, two parties were formed 
in the court,"rather accentuated"-one of Jang Bahadur's sons, popu­
larly called Jang Ranas, the other of Dhir's sons, called Shamsher 
Ranas* Both held Ranuddip in scant regard and each aspired for power 
at the cost of the other* Jagat Jang returned from exile in April 
1885 which set off rumours that Ranuddip,already old and senile,
48. P3LI.Yol'.31. Mo.1(5. 13 February 1882. RP, 1.3.290/8, C.Grant,
Foreign Secy, to Ripon, 11 January 1882, Ripon*s reply, 28 Js.nu-
ary 1882* RP, B«M«Mdl*Mss* 43576, Vol.LXXOT, pp.393-402, Notes
by Ripon, Grant and others in the Foreign Dept, January 1882.
P3I, Vol.8, No.17, 17 March 1882.
49• F»P-A, February 1882, No.285, Girdlestone to Lyall, 50 April 
1881,
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would abdicate in his favour* The Shamshers would never let that happ­
en, On 22 November. 1885 they killed Ranuddip, Jagat Jang and his son* 
Padma Jang and Ranbir Jang, two brothers of Jagat Jang, Dhojnarsing 
and Kedarnarsing, Ranuddip*s nephews, took refuge in the Residency; 
they were followed by Ranuddip*s widow and the sister of Jagat Jang, 
The eldest of the Shamshers, Bir, immediately declared himself the 
Prime Minister, His first act was to assure the Acting Resident, Dr,
Gimlette, that he would be friendly and cooperative wiiiihe British 
50
government.
50. P5LI, Vol.46, No.37* 23 February 1886, Enclo.3-19* Gimlette, 
op.cit., pp.214-32. W.Digby, 1857* A. Friend in Need; 1887, 
Friendship Forgotten. An Episode in Indian Foteign Office 
Adrninistratlon. H»Ballafcine, On India’s Frontier; or Nepal, 
‘The Gurkhas* Mysterious Land, pp.156-60. Sirdar Ikbal Ali 
Shah, Nepal, the Home of the Gods, pp. 118-20. Lockwood de 
Forrest, "A Liitle-Known country afi Asia,A visit to Nepaul", 
The Century, May 1901, pp.74-82.
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C H A P T E R  T H R E E
GURKHA RECRUITMENT AMD 'ARMS SUPPLY TO HEPAL
74
I
The last two decades of the 19th century saw the British
changing their attitude towards Nepal and adopting a new policy :
winning Nepalese confidence hy "liberal concessions". The period
was one of gradual extension of the British sphere of influence
over the border states whose defence became the Indian governments
responsibility. It was also the time when the British government
were trying to pool the military resources of the principal Indian
1
states so as to use them for the defence of India.
The Nepalese government’s internal and external troubles 
at this time made them take an accommodating attitude towards 
the British. The natural tendency of the period was towards an 
adjustment of British needs and Nepalese expectations and of inter­
dependence between the two governments.
1. In 1889 the Imperial service Troops were formed with the armies 
of these states. Lord F.Roberts, Forty-one Years in India, II,
pp.426-8.
The main impulse behind the new British policy was their increa­
sing need for Gurkhas to strengthen the Indian army and face the grow-
2
ing Russiam menace. To obtain Gurkhas the Viceroys, Ripon, Dufferin,
Lansdowne and Elgin, were all prepared to pay the Nepalese government
any reasonable price,
'The Gurkhas were first enlisted in the Indian army during the 
3
Anglo-Nepalese war, which had convinced the British of the great fight­
ing qualities of these men. With the years the demand^or Gurkhas increa­
sed; by 1858 there were already five regiments; besides, in the three 
Assam regiments there were many Gurkhas, In December 1859» for reasons
of economy, recruiting for all Indian troops was strictly forbidden,
4
but the Gurkha regiments were exempt from this ban.
Recruitment, however, was not an easy job. There was no regular 
arrangement with the Nepalese government for the supply of recruits.
The Nepalese government, in fact, never willingly allowed their men to 
take British service because it drained off Nepal's own strength and 
made the British proportionately strong. In such circumstances, recruit­
ment had to be done sub rosa, recruiting agents being sent surreptitiously
2. On Russian advance towards India and Indian defence see G.N.Curzon, 
Russia in Central Asia in 1889 and the Anglo-Russian Question.
3. The men, in fact, were mostly Kumaunis and Garhwalis who surrendered 
to the British army. Kumaun and Garhwal had been conquered by the 
Gurkhas between 1790 and 1805* S-R-C.Williams, Memoir of Dehra Dun, 
pp. 98-140. David Bolt, Gurkhas, pp.51, 53* 57-61.
4* Napier Papers, Vol.5/ 3* Memo by Col.H.Brooke, Asst.Adjutant General, 
21 October 1874*
For the history of the Gurkha regiments see F.Loraine Petre, 
The 1st., King George's own Gurkha Rifles. L.W*Shakespeare, History 
of the 2nd., King Edward's Own Gurkha Rifles, 2 Vols. N.G.Woodyatt, 
Regimental History of the 3rd., Queen Alexandra's Own Gurkha Rifles. 
Tuker, Gorkha, pp.297-300.
into the Nepalese territory; oftener, at fairs in the border towns and 
villages quite a few men were obtained# Gurkhas of the Indian army on 
leave in Nepal also managed to smuggle out some men and were rewarded 
by the Government# British service was popular with the Gurkhas for its 
higher pay and other amenities as well as for the scope it offered for 
active service unavailable in the Nepalese army# The Nepalese government, 
disliked these clandestine proceedings and put every obstacle to what 
they feared a devious scheme of the British to weaken Nepal# The situa­
tion did not improve during Jang Bahadur*s rule. Jang Bahadur professed 
the fullest cooperation, disavowed any restriction and at times did, 
under pressure, even supply recruits who, however, were mostly physically 
unfit. Jang Bahadur evaded British requests for a definite arrangement 
by which, recruitment could be carried on in a regular, systematic and 
aboveboard manner; he would not let the British denude Nepal of her 
martial population-her best means of defence# In such circumstances, the 
British continued with irregular recruiting# In fact, the existing system, 
so the Commanding Officers reported, quite served Hie purpose when the
demand was limited to filling up the vacancies caused by sickness, retire- 
5
ment. and death# But then, the situation was bound to be different when 
an emergency like the Second Anglo-Afgfran war caused a sudden increase in 
the demand#
Jang Bahadur*s death was for the British government an opportunity, 
and the immediate need for at least one thousand Gurkhas for the Afghan 
war gave the military authorities a good excuse to exert "all legitimate
India Military Proceeding, November 1862, No.72^ ; Vol#5/4»
Notes by Lt#Col#R#Sale Hill, Ethnic Elements of Native Army# the 
Gurkhas.# K.Mojumdar, "Recruitmen"^ Gurkhas ... 1814-77"* J#U»3.I», 
April-June 19^3» PP* 143-53*
pressure" on the Nepalese government* Accordingly, Impey took up the 
matter with Dhir Shamsher and tried to persuade him that what the British, 
government wanted was not the regular troops of the Nepalese government 
which Ranuddip had offered, hut the withdrawal of all the existing res­
trictions on the entry of the Gurkhas into British service* The British 
government, Impey added, would undertake to recruit, only through the 
Nepalese government- and to desist from all irregular recruiting. Dhir 
was not impressed; his argument was that, the Gurkhas did not want to 
serve anywhere outside their country, leaving their family behind, and 
that those who had served in India had returned home with their "religion 
damaged". Dhir also strongly objected to the fact that; the British recruit­
ing agents had enticed men from the Nepalese army itself . The Resident, 
was undeterred; after six months of persuasion he managed to get from 
Ranuddip only 559 men of whom as many as 393 were rejected, being mostly 
"the lame, the halt, the maimed and the blind"• The whole proceeding 
cost the Government more than ten thousand rupees. This only confirmed 
the military authorities* impression that it was no use depending on the
7
Nepalese government for the supply of recruits of the required standard.
The Commanding Officers of the Gurkha regiments testified before 
the Army Organisation Commission (1879) that the Gurkha recruiting system, 
was obsolete and uncertain of results. Although "ordinary vacancies" 
could be filled up, any expansion of the corps was "altogether impossible". 
Magars and Gurungs, the best military tribes of Nepal, were the most
"SI F.P-A, February 1879, No s. 245-56* Dept. Notes.
7* Ibid.; March 1880, Nos*95“HO, Dept. Notes. F.P-B, April 1882, No.69.
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difficult to obtain, the Nepalese governments vigilance on them being
the closest* This necessitated either the induction of other“inferior”
tribes-Sunwars and Rais-into the Gurkha regiments or letting these regi-
8
ments remain below their full strength* The problem was well expressed by
Col* Sale Hill, a veteran officer of the First, Gurkhas s
if the Nepal durbar supplies us with recruits similar to 
those lately received, we shall either have to reject them 
at an expense to the state or to flood our ranks with a 
class of men that will deteriorate Goorkha regiments*
The Commanding Officers were unanimous that no good recruits could be
had unless the Nepalese government allowed recruiting agents inside the
Nepalese hill districts or a recruiting depot, at Kathmandu* Otherwise>
the British government should themselves set up permanent recruiting
depots at Kumaun and Darjiling in addition to the existing one at, Gorakh- 
9
pur* Girdlestone, however, was certain that the Nepalese government: would 
reject these proposals, and that if recruiting depots were set up at 
Kumaun and Darjiling, they might interfere with even the supply of Nepal­
ese labourers in the local tea gardens* A better |>olicy, in his opinion, 
was to offer the durbar Mhead money" for every good recruit* Girdlestone 
also suggested that instead of only the Magars and Gurungs, the Commanding 
Officers should enlist / Newars and other less martial tribes of Nepal, 
the peoples of Kumaun, Garhwal and the Punjab hill states as well* The 
military authorities, however, rejected this suggestion because the mixture 
of less martial tribes with the "pure Gurkhas" might affect the efficiency 
of the regiments* In such circumstances, it was decided to go on with the
8* Each regiment had 937 men*
March 1880, Nos*95~HO» Dept* Notes* L*P*, 218/2, Appendix to Rent* 
-^foArmy Organisation Commission, II, pp*629-37« 658-90,747*
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sub rosa operations until the Nepalese government officially objected to
them. Then, Mortimer Durand hoped, the British would get a "good opportu-
10
nity of putting the matter once for all on an acknowledged footing.”
Meanwhile, the Nepalese government were reported to have taken 
more stringent measures. A census was taken of the military tribes of the 
country, a house to house enquiry made and names of all male adults care­
fully noted. The village headmen were asked to prevent men leaving the 
country without the express permission of the durbar. People were warned 
against; taking British service on pain of severe punishment and loss of 
property. Those who had earlier sneaked out were ordered to return home|to 
avoid punishment to their family. Retired Gurkha soldiers found it hard to 
draw their pensions; those who had come home on leave were ordered not to 
return to their job; some were "induced by a combination of persuasion and 
gentle pressure" to leave the British service; some were even executed for 
defying the government orders. It was declared that recruiting agents found
in the Nepalese territory would face death sentence; there were reports of
11
desertions from the recruiting camps ofi the border.
Girdlestone urged that clandestine operations be given up and 
the Nepalese government plainly asked to meet the British requirements. The 
military authorities, however, were against, such a step although they agreed 
that: the recruiting system, was "neither dignified nor satisfactory** and, so, 
"even coercive measures" would readily suggest themselves to break down the 
durbark "unfriendly obstructiveness". But then, too much pressure, it was 
feared, might spark off a war-a very undesirable happening when the Govern-
10. F.P-A. March 1880. Nos.95-110*
11. Gimlette, Nepal and the Nepalese, p. 207# F.P-A, March 1880, No.153* 
F.P-B, April 1882, No.69.
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ment had the Afghan (Campaign. In fact, there were instances
of recruits being still available in "reasonably sufficient numbers" 
and under circumstances of "no usual difficulty". For example, the 
Commissioner of Kumaun, Major Henry Ramsay, had "quietly procured" 230 
Gurkhas of the best, type from western Nepal in a period of only two mon­
ths. The military department, was reluctant to raise the recruitment, 
issue with the durbar because it, would "exaggerate the importance we 
attach to the Gurkha recruits and would probably result in more harm
than good*; therefore,"apparently the best, course to pursue at the pre-
12
sent time is to let things be."
Girdlestone was very disappointed. He held that no good 
recruits could be obtained unless the Resident himself helped in the 
recruiting operations, which he could not do as long as the durbar 
maintained its restrictions oh the Resident’s movement and the Govern­
ment tolerated the durbar’s policy. Girdlestone was clearly making the 
recruitment issue "a peg on which to hang one of his periodical homi­
lies on the generally unsatisfactory nature" of British relations with 
the Nepalese government. It was evident to the Government that Girdle­
stone had taken this issue as an opportunity to avenge the humiliation 
he thought he had suffered at the hands of Ranuddip and Dhir- and so it
seems as though: he were desirous of precipitating 
hostilities with Nepal by asking the durbar to take 
measures which he knows as well as we do they will 
dislike and probably decline.... The position Is irksome 
for a man of Girdlestone*s sentiments, but that cannot 
be helped. He is full of resentment for past slights 
and attempted isolation. 13
12. Ibid., Girdlestone to Govt., 17 December 1881, Government to Girdle
stone, 15 February 1882, Dept. Notes.
13* Ibid., Dept. Notes. F.F-A, September 1883, Nos.343*“Q> Dept. Notes.
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II
Ripon, as already observed, was opposed to a forward policy in
Nepal, but he was not against, an adjustment, of attitude towards the
Nepalese government in order to promote British interests* Am occasion
for such adjustment arose in 1884 when the Nepalese government asked
for arms in preparation for what appeared like a war with Tibet* This
incident synchronised with the Russian occupation of Mervr which lent
urgency to the Indian governments problem, of how to strengthen their
defence without any large addition to the military expenditure. Ripon*s
solution to this problem: was to increase the efficiency of the army
without increasing its bulk; gradual replacement of the less martial
14
peoples in the army by more martial tribes was a means to this end.
The Gurkhas being one of these tribes, naturally Ripon attached "great
importance to obtaining increased facilities for their recruitment" in
Nepal.15 It had already been decided that while all other regiments
should have 852 men, the Gurkha corps would have 912 men in each batta- 
16
lion. Ripon was prepared to give arms to the Nepalese government in 
exchange for Gurkha recruitment facilities.
The idea, Gurkhas for arms, it is interesting to note, was 
Girdlestone1 s brainchild, who maintained that a "policy of mutual conce-
14. The Hindusthani sepoys of the Bengal army and the Madrasis were 
categorised as such people. Roberts, op.cit., pp. 441-2.
15• R.P., 1.3. 290/5, Ripon to Kimberley, Secy, of State, 5 June, 14 
August 1884*
16. BJP, Vol.1892, November 1882, Nos.1592-3. A.P., 1884-^1 ,V6l*hH, : 
East IndiaIArmy System* pp. 543~9*
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ssion" was
not merely called for by the circumstances of the time 
but it is the only one which can put our connection with 
Nepal on a firm; and proper footing.
Girdlestone was concerned that despite all the restrictions pf the 
17
Arms Act (1878) the Nepalese government were piling up arms-and that 
mostly by smuggling from India which was easj" thanks to the open border 
and inadequate police arrangements. The Nepalese dignitaries in their 
frequent pilgrimages to India managed to bring home arms and ammunition 
by hoodwinking, intimidating and bribing the border police. Even Ranu­
ddip Singh was strongly suspected of having done so. Arms manufacturing 
machinery was also believed to have reached Nepal under cover of elec­
trical equipment. This, together with- the employment of skilled Indian 
17A
mechanics, Girdlestone suspected, had lately increased the output, of the 
Nepalese arms factories. The Nepalese government had their agents in In­
dia and even in England who actively helped them in procuring arms by 
illegal means, it also seemed to Girdlestone possible that the Nepal­
ese government might turn to China for arms and mechanics-a development 
not in the political interest of the British government. In such circum­
stances, instead of maintaining the existing arms regulations which had 
proved to be virtually ineffective, Girdlestone would allow the Nepalese 
government to purchase from the British 14p00 rifles in instalments
17. The Arms Act introduced licensing of fire arms throughout India, 
imposed a heavy import duty and made the penalties stringent. The 
ruling princes were exempted from the operation of the Act, they 
being allowed to import arms and ammunition-bat no machinery- in 
"reasonable quantities" for their personal use. C.L.Tupper, Indian 
Political Practice, I, p. 145* S.Gopal, The Viceroyalty of Lord 
Ripon, 1880-1884, pp. 7&-82.
17 A. Rajkrishna Karmakar, a Bengali, was the chief mechanic. He lived 
for thirty years in Nepal. He was also engaged by Amir Abdur Rah­
man to reorganise the Afghan arms factories. J.M.Das, Banger Bahire 
Bangali. Uttar Bharat, pp.539-42.
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together with sufficient ammunition for target practice. By such, 
"timely concession" he expected to secure four important desiderata * 
unrestricted movement of the Resident, facilities for trade, free en­
try of Europeans into Nepal and regular supply of Gurkhas. This, he 
believed, would remove all the existing sources of misunderstanding 
between the two governments, increase Nepal*s confidence in Britain*s
18
friendliness and"transform her into a trustworthy and valuable ally."
Girdlestone saw no danger in this policy. He was convinced 
that the Nepalese government, knew about, the superior power and resour­
ces of the British and would not risk any hostility 5 that the Nepal-
19
ese army, despite its impressive size, was by no means a formidable 
offensive force, and that in the "unlikely contingency of a war with 
Nepal", the British could easily defeat; her by a combination of mili­
tary operations, economic blockade and the occupation of the Terai.
The Nepalese governments attitude during the Mutiny and the recent 
Afghan war made it seem unlikely that they would exploit British diff­
iculties in future. Nepal believed, Girdlestone explained, that
the safety of her dominions is involved in the safety 
of ours; that whatever peril from abroad threatens us 
cannot be a matter of indifference to her.
Nepal would assist Britain in such emergencies because she was
at, heart convinced that were English supremacy to 
cease in India, she could not hope for the same tole­
ration, forbearance and favour from any other power 
that took our place.
18. PEF, Vol.26, 1912, File No.2067/1906, Girdlestone*s Memorandum 
on the possibility of improving our relations with Nepal, 31 Dec­
ember 1883. R.P., B.M-Addl.Mss., 45576, Vol.L&U7I. pTsIe., NOs. 
525-36, Dept. Notes.
19* At Kathmandu alone there were 30 to 35,000 regular troops. W.W. 
Hunter, The Imperial Gazetteer of India1,^ Vll, p. 108.
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Tlie people of Nepal, Girdlestone added, were "tractable, alive to the
benefits of peace and law abiding"; all that they wanted was to be left,
to themselves* Considering all this, Girdlestone concluded, a "policy
of considerate and friendly treatment?* could safely be adopted which.
would turn Nepal into "a real source of strength to us instead of being
20
the nominal ally which she now is"* Coming as they did from one who 
had hitherto urged only a policy of ceaseless pressure on the Nepalese,
these remarks were very significant; and both the Indian and Home gove­
rnments took them as such*
Ripon was impressed. Gurkha recruitment facility was so
important an objective that he was "prepared to make considerable con-
21
cession in order to attain it” • Durand was
fully convinced of the principle..* that it is 
desirable for us to try and win Nepalese confidence
by throwing over our suspicions and strengthening
Nepal instead of minutely watching and checking her 
imports of powder and percussion caps as we are now 
doing. The impending war with Tibet gave us a special 
opportunity as Nepal was very anxious for a supply of 
arms to meet the Tibetans, and I proposed, in short, 
that we should chuck over our present policy and give 
her good arms in return for an engagement which would 
for the future enable us to get Gurkha recruits.22
This, Durand believed, was "rather a bold game" but still "worth play- 
23
ing just now". Such, too, was Roberts* view who was anxious to raise 
immediately five new Gurkha regiments; 14p00 rifles for 5,000 Gurkhas 
and regular supply of recruits by the Nepalese government was, indeed,
20. PER, Vol.26, 1912, File No.2067/l90&» Girdlestone*s Memo,op. cit.
21. Ibid., India Secret Letter to Secy.oi^ tate, No.30, 30 May 1884.
22. DP, Letter Book, April 1884-July 1Q90. Durand to General Chesney,
4 July 1884.




"a valuable exchange” The Home government were willing to make an
immediate gift of 4,000 rifles* It was to them a "truism** that giving
25
modern arms and ammunition to the "independent states" like Afghanistan
and Nepal and obtaining in return "valuable concessions" was better
than maintaining the
restrictions which are vexatious and liable to be 
rendered nugatory as time goes on by the action 
of other powers.
In the case of Nepal the "other power" could be China. The Home govern­
ment thought it "infinitely better" that Nepal should look to the Indian 
government for arms, the supply of which the latter could stop whenever
they wanted, tather than set up arms factories of her own ober which
26
the British, government could have no control.
The Home government’s decision reached Calcutta rather 
late. Meanwhile the dispute between Nepal and Tibet which, had given the
27
Indian government, in Durand’s words, "a golden opportunity" had been 
28
settled. Anticipating this delay, C.Grant, the Foreign secretary, had, 
in fact, urged Ripon to immediately give arms to Nepal, but the viceroy 
did not want to make a "new departure of so much importance in our dea-
29
lings with Nepal without the sanction of the Secretary of state."
24* RBP, X20923, R97/2, Roberts to Girdlestone, 29 February 1884, Same 
to General D.Stewart, 10 June 1884.
25* Between I856 and 1881 the Amirs had been given 19,000 muskets and 
24,000 rifles with enough ammunition. A.P., 1882, Vol.XLVIII,P*449* 
26. PSI, Vol.10, No.15, 18 July 1884* HC, Vol.54, No.683; Vol.65, No. 
680, Dept.Notes.
27* DP, Durand’s Private Letter to the Editor of Pioneer, 7 September
I884.
28. For Nepal’s relations with Tibet see Chapter iv.
29* RP, I•3.290/8, Grant to Ripon, 27 May 1884, Ripon’s reply, 27 May 
1884.
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Dufferin*s policy towards Nepal was much, the same as 
Ripon*s. There was also the same coincidence of British difficulty 
and Nepalese anxiety which promised an adjustment of their respective 
interests. There was on the Viceroy*s part: the same resistance to the 
hardliners-Durand, Roberts and Girdlestone-as shown by Ripon, and the 
same restraint when there were openings for interference in the Nepal­
ese government*s internal affairs.
Dufferin took up the recruitment issue where Ripon had 
left it, The Russian menace with its manifestation in the panjdeh
crisis (1885) necessitated a rapid expansion of the Indian military 
30
establishments A part of the scheme was to raise the second battalion 
of the five existing Gurkha corps; altogether 5,600 Gurkhas were urgently 
required. Since the Gurkhas were thorou^ txly loyal and absolutely depen­
dable, expansion of their ranks, Dufferin saw, was "the cheapest wajF 
of increasing our native army” because it involved no corresponding 
addition "to the British section" of the Indian army to maintain the
31
essential balance.
Ranuddip was then having an anxious time; Dhir*s death 
was followed by increasing pressure on the Prime Minister by his neph­
ews ; Ranuddip was keen on currying favour with the British government 
to strengthen his position. In March 1885 he offered the Viceroy 15000 
Nepali troops for immediate use against the Russians; another 15p00, 
he assured Dufferin, would be kept in "splendid reserve" in Nepal, 
provided the British bore their training expenses. A delegation was
30. IMP, Vol.2557* August 1885, Nos.2822, 2829;Vol»2755V January 1886, 
No.1295* C.E.D.Black, The Marquess of Dufferin and Ava, pp.275-6>.
31 ♦ DPP> Microfilm No.517, Vol.19, Dufferin to Kimberley, 23 March 1885, 
Kimberley to Dufferin, 13, 23 March 1885.PSLI, Vol.44, No. 101, 19 
June 1885, Govt-, to Resident, 17 April I885.
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sent to the Viceroy*s camp at Rawalpindi with this offer# Ranuddip
declared that; he was ready with his "life even for the services of
the British government" • Dufferin politely declined the offer hut
did not miss the opportunity to request Ranuddip to give facilities
32
for Gurkha recruitment#
Then followed a difficult course of negotiation between 
Girdlestone and Ranuddip# The Resident tried all means s persuasion,
temptation and veiled threat# In the end he did. succeed, hut he had
in return
to agree to makeAsome rotwrn concession to the Prime Minister# Girdle­
stone argued that the British, government*s eagerness for obtaining 
large numbers of Gurkhas was a recognition off their fighting qualities 
andy! ’ since this was a matter of pride for the Nepalese government, 
they should help the British in obtaining recruits# Girdlestone also
stressed the economic and other benefits of the Gurkhas entering Bri-
would
tish service# The men while in serviceAsenfc. money to their families
would
at home; in old age and retirement, pension^ sustaiu. them# Their tra­
ining in modern weapons, the Resident pointed out, would be valuable 
for the Nepalese army itself in which* after retiring from British ser­
vice, they could be employed as instructors# The regular troops of 
Nepal offered by Ranuddip had no such training and, therefore, could 
be of no use against the Russian troops# Girdlestone insisted that 
Ranuddip should not lose this opportunity to develop the martial quali­
ties of the Gurkhas who could not possibly be absorbed in any large 
numbers in their country's army, whose talents as soldiers could not
32^  Ibid#, Enclo#5»*>»7» DFP, Microfilm No>517, Vol«19» Dufferin to
Kimberley, 13 April 1885#
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be adequately utilised in Nepal where there was little scope for 
active service and where poor economic conditions made living hard 
and insecure* Since past experience held out no hope of getting good 
recruits through the durbar , the British wanted to obtain the men 
themselves by setting up a recruiting depot at Kathmandu and sending 
agents to the hill districts of Nepal* These agents* Girdlestone assu­
red Ranuddip* would be veteran Gurkha non-commissioned officers. The 
durbar should give the widest possible publicity to the arrival of 
these agents so "that prospective recruits could contact them; this 
much, cooperation on the part of the durbar* the Resident was certain* 
would make recruiting operation a success* The issue was vital and 
urgent, Ranuddip was warned; it was the test of his prefessed loyalty 
to the British* Ranuddip,for* his part* advanced the familiar excuses s 
he could not force the Gurkhas, "a stay-at-home people", to take ser­
vice in a foreign country without imperilling his regime; military 
service in Nepal was gradually losing its erstwhile popularity, so 
much so that it was difficult to keep even the Nepalese army in full
33
strength* For the enraged Resident it was* indeed* hard to remove the 
Nepalese governments conviction that by syphoning off the Gurkhas* the 
British "wanted to draw tie claw of a neighbour" whom they feared.
After prolonged wrangling Girdlestone felt that where 
arguments and warnings had failed* temptation might work; Ranuddip*s 
mood confirmed thid supposition* The Prime Minister was "fishing" for 
a G*C*B* and a 19-gun salute to show his detractors in the durbar
33* PSLI* Vol.44, No*101, 19 June 1885* Enclo*9-U.
that in the eyes of the Britidh he was not a shade less important than 
Jang* Bahadur had been# Like Jang. Bahadur*, again, he wanted some terri­
torial reward from the British so as to earn popularity in the country* 
Kedamarsing, Ranuddip1 s nephew, told Girdlestone thus 3
here is an opportunity for you to strengthen the Minister * s 
hands in carrying out for you the very difficult matter 
of enlisting recruits* With some assurance that the wish 
would be met, he would have something to show which would 
please the country at large and induce the people willingly 
to respond to the call for recruits • A Minister who can 
say that he has extended the national limits has unbounded 
influence•
In addition, Ranuddip wanted a gift of rifles and other arms as well 
as facility to freely import sulpher and lead to manufacture ammuni­
tion. This in his view would make up for the loss of Nepali military
34
strength following the loss of her fighting men*
Girdlestone had no difficulty in agreeing to Ranuddip1 s 
demand for arms, but as to the cession of territory, he was non-commi- 
tal* The arrangement was then finalised* Ranuddip agreed to make the 
British government#s need for recruits generally known throughout the 
country and to allow unrestricted enlistment; to facilitate the opera­
tions of the recruiting agents on the border- areas who, however, should 
never cross into the Nepalese territory; to personally help in the 
procurement and despatch of ±k recruits; to allow the Gurkha pensioners 
in Nepal to collect recruits under his supervision; to permit the 
Residency Surgeon to examine the physical fitmess of the recruits; and 
to provide for their training either by the officers of the Nepalese 
army who had served earlier in the British Gurkha regiments or by the
34* Ibid*, Enclo*12, Resident to Government, 9 May 1885*
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officers of the Residency escort*
In return Dufferin agreed to give the; Nepalese government 
one rifle for one recruit up to a total of 5,600; to allow Nepal to 
import materials for manufacturing ammunition, and to consider Ranuddip fs 
desire for a G.C.B* provided he fulfilled his commitments regarding 
the supply of recruits* QJhe latter*s request for territory was passed
36
over in deliberate silence*
Ranuddip*s violent death and the assumption of power by 
the Sham she r Ranas, supposedly anti-British., did not, however, dis­
rupt. the recruiting arrangement-and this for two reasons* The new 
Prime Minister, Bir Shamsher, was anxious to placate the British gover­
nment; and Dufferin, for his part, refrained from exploiting the ini­
tial difficulties of the new regime despite the contrary advice of 
Roberts, Durand and Girdlestone* Durand was against "accepting the
murderer as Minister", at any rate not until some material concession
37
had been wrung from him.* Roberts, the Commander-in-Chief , was of the 
same view* Possibilities of a war with Russia in very near future made 
him impatient; "very anxious" to raise the five additional Gurkha 
battalions as soon as possible, he kept impressing on the Government 
"the risk we run if we delay forming them"* :Che "only way" to get good 
recruits "in a reasonable time", Roberts maintained, was to establish 
a recruiting depot at Kathmandy. itself and to put "adequate pressure" 
on the durbar to make them agree to recruitjhg agents operating in the
3% Ibid*, Enclo.ll* The escort consisted ofsevcshffvgsepoys under a 
Subedar and a Jamadar* R.D*Jackson, India*s Army, pp.23-6*
36* PBhl*,V6i *144Ifio&Ol* 19 June 1885, Enclo.15-6.
37* DP, D*Q*Letters* Vol*I* July 1885-7* Durand to Col.I*C.Berkeley, 
Offg.Resident, 30 November 1885; Letter Book, 1884*90, Durand to 
Major E*Durand, Resident, 27 June 1888.
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Nepalese hills. Roberts wanted the Foreign Department "to hit upon
some plan for making the Nepalese authorities more amenable"; to deal
with Bir Shamsher "plainly and firmly", and even to threaten him that
unless he promptly supplied good recruits the British would help his
rivals to seize power? Roberts also suggested that economic sanctions
37A
be applied to reinforce political pressure# Dufferin, however, was 
not influenced# He reprimanded Bir for killing a"valuable ally of the 
British government for many years" ,but gave him recognition without 
much delay# However, he gave a warning to the new Brime Minister that 
he should rule "peacefully and humanely" so as to "merit the confiden­
ce and respect of the British government"# The Jang Ranas were given
asylum in India but warned against subverting the new regime by intri-
38
gue or armed action#
The recruitment position, Dufferin saw, was "on the whole
not unsatisfactory" and, therefore, pressure on Bir was unnecessary#
By the end of 1886, that is within a year of his coming to power, Bir
had supplied sufficient men to enable the British to raise three new
39
battalions; and all the old ones were in full strength# Next year ano­
ther new battalion was complete which led even Roberts to admit that
40
"on the whole... the Gurkha regiments are better than they used to be'1#
37A. RBP, X2Q923, R96/1, Notes.♦* to secure a sufficiency of Gurkha 
recruits, 27 September 1886.; Roberts to the Duke of Cambridge, 
20 February, 14# 20 April 1886# IMP, Yol.2758* April 1886, Nos. 
1301-8; Vol#2760, June 1886, Nos#1757-60#
38# DFP, VTol.19, Dufferin to Kimberley, 21 March 1886. PSLI, Yol.46, 
No.37* 23 February 1886, Dufferin to Raja of Nepal, 30 Jan. 1886# 
Gimlette, op.cit*, pp. 214-9* 225-30.
39* IMP, Vol.2766:, December 1886, No.985* 
40# RBP, X20923, R100/5, Roberts to General White, 8 October 1887.
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Besides, as the officiating Resident, Col.I.e.Berkeley, pointed out,
Bir had some genuine difficulties# The British wanted none but the 
Magars and Gurungs, the best tribes; the recruiting depots on the bor­
der were too soon closed down when they ought to have been kept open 
for a longer period, considering the fact that lack of roads and commr- 
unication facilities in Nepal made quick procurement and despatch of 
recruits by the Nepalese government difficult* Further, the recruiting 
officers showed little patience, imagination and initiative in dealing
with the Nepalese officers on the border. Nor could it be overlooked
41
that in view of a possible Tibetan campaign, the Nepalese government 
themselves needed men to expand their army* The British wanted Gurkhas 
to come with their families, and this the Nepalese government had just 
reasons to dislike s it would not only encourage large scale migration 
to India but, deny the Nepalese government the economic and other bene­
fits which, the Gurkhas as mercenaries brought to their country. Finally, 
as Gimlette observed, the bitter relation of Girdlestone with Bir was 
partly responsible for the difficulties in matters of recruitment.42
Dufferin himself was not “altogether satisfied” with Girdle­
stone whomc he removed from Kathmandu in early 1888 to prevent further 
deterioration in his relations with the durbar. Girdlestone, so Gimle­
tte informs, had strong prejudice against the shamshers whom, he “cord­
ially disliked”, and he made no secret of his sympathy for the Jang 
Ranas from whom he expected better dealings and perhaps some concessions. 
In September 1886 he sent Gimlette to the Viceroy to persuade the latt­
er to put pressure on Bir for Gurkha recruitment facilities. He even
41* On this point see Chapter IV,pp.ftJt-3.
42. IMP, Vol.2762, August 1886, No.1584# Gimlette, op.cit.,p.243*
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seemed to apprehend assassination by the Shamshers of which, however, 
as Gimlette testifies, "there was not the very smallest danger". Duff­
erin was very irritated by Girdlestonefs representation and accused
Gimlette of trying to persuade the Government to "annex Nepal" when
43
they were busy with, the Burmese affairs •
Bir strongly resented Girdlestone*s sympathy for the Jang
44
Ranas whose subversive activities on the border, he feared, had the
covert support of the British. Durand wanted to take advantage of this 
45
fear. Anxious, Bir went to Calcutta in February 1888 and promised
Dufferin that recruits would be regularly supplied. The Viceroy assured
the Prime Minister that the British government would not interfere in
the x internal affairs of Nepal and stricter surveillance would be
46
imposed on the Jang Ranas in India.
43* CP, Vol.24, Dufferin to Cross, Sepy. of State, 9 January 1888.
Gimlette, op.cit., pp.245-9, 254* Burma was annexed by the British 
in 1886, and for some years afterwards pacification of the provin­
ce and delimitation of its boundary with China kept the British 
engaged. Dorothy Woodman, The Making of Burma, pp.222-539*
44• In 1887 Raribir Jang, one of Jang Bahadur*s sons, led a march
into the Nepalese Terai, was arrested by the British and kept; in
custody. The Maharaja of Darbhanga was implicated in a plot to
murder Bit in October 1888. HC, Vol.99, Viceroy to Secy.of State, 
Telgs. 16 December 1887, 7 January 1888. ]J£, VII/II, p«155»
Ardagh’s Note on Nepal, 17 September 1889. Gimlette, op.cit.,pp.
251, 255*
45* DP, Major Durand to Mortimer Durand, 30 March 1888, Copies of D«0« 
Letters. 1888. Mortimer Durand to Major- Durand, 27 June 1888, Le­
tter Book. 1884-90. Mortimer Durand was in favour off supporting 
the Jang Ranas. Letter to Dufferin, 3 May 18£0, Letter Book, 1884- 
90*
46. CP, Vol.24, Dufferin to Cross, 26 January 1888. Marchioness of 
Dufferin and Ava, Our Viceregal Life in India , I, pp.289-90.
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III
Dufferin* s policy won the confidence of Bir Shamsher. This 
helped Lansdowne and Elgin to "bring him closer to the British govern­
ment with the result that Nepal *s military resources now definitely 
"became an essential accessory to India*s own military power# Politi­
cally, Nepal*s importance increased with, the developing British inter­
ests in Tibet and . British uneasiness over what appeared to be 
Chinese interference with the Indian government* s position in the
frontier states having traditional links with China based on past 
47
history#
Lansdowne *s object was to keep on well with the Nepalese govern­
ment and to avoid misunderstanding with Bir* That is why he rejected 
the Resident, Major Durand*s suggestion that as his ”quasi-friendl$” 
relations with the Prime Minister had not led the latter to remove the 
restrictions on the Resident's movement, the Government should put 
pressure on Bir# Lansdowne*s policy paid off# Bir proved consistently 
cooperative in regard to extradition of criminals and boundary adjust­
ments. The number of Gurkha recruits he supplied was, in Roberts* words,
"ample1* and "really astonishing11- all the recruits were of "excellent 
48
stamp". Apart from about llpOO Gurkhas in the thirteen battalions, th­
ere were Gurkhas in the Kashmir Imperial Service Infantry, Naga Hills
49
Force, Surma Valley Military Police and Burma Police# The recruiting
47- see Chapter IV.
48. RBP, X20923* R100/2, Roberts to Duke of Cambridge, 4 May 1891#
LNP, Vol.XIII, p#65, Lansdowne*s Minute on Nepal, 18 September 
1889# Altogether 7,662 recruits were supplied in 1886-92, mostly 
Magars and Gurungs# Vansittart, op.cit*,pp.174-5•
49* W.P#, Vol.24, Minute on Native Troops* 28 July, 1893* IMP, May 1893> 
Nos.B439* 1232-3. JLFP, Vol.39631 May 1891, No.2.
arrangement was ‘'so admirably organised** by Roberts and with such 
success that in other regiments also the same arrangement was followed. 
The recruitng operations were systematise!; a central depot was set up 
at Gorakhpur and other depots were at Darjiling, Pilbhit^Bahraitch 
- * the recruiting officers were men of long experience
with the Gurkhas; their initiative and resourcefulness enabled them 
to cultivate personal and friendly relations with the Nepalese offi­
cials# It was also decided to recruit men from Eastern Nepal, Limbus
and Raist and a small proportion of men from tribes other than Mag&rs
50
and Gurungs-Thakurs and Khas, for instance#
Roberts, who had earlier advocated a strong policy towards 
Nepal,would now "do all in our power to keep on friendly terms wi$h 
the state from which we get by far the best and most trustworthy of 
all our Asiatic soldiers"# He would adopt any measure which would 
result in "still more making the interest of Nepal identical with 
our own". For- instance, if the Nepalese government offered military 
assistance during emergencies, he would gratefully accept the offer; 
he would send British offcers to train the Nepalese troops at Kathman­
du, and attach a Nepalese battalion to the Indian regiments serving 
in the North-West frontier; he would also give the Nepalese officers 
honorary commissions in the British Gurkha regiments# These measures
50# RBP, X2Q925t RlQQ/7t Roberts to General Browne, 23 May lB9l'. 
Vansittart, op.cit., pp.144-57, 174-5* C.J.Morris, The Gurkhas, 
pp.129-31* F.i&.Cardew, M.J.King-Harman, E.G.Barrow, "Our Recrui­
ting grounds of the future for the Indian Army", J.U.S.I., Vol.
XX, 1891, No.86, pp.131-76.
Roberts had no doubt, would be popular with the Gurkha troops in
51
India and "stimulate recruiting"in Nepal.
In Marchi 1892 Roberts paid a visit to Kathmandu at the 
"pressing invitation of Bir" himself. This was the first visit to 
the Nepalese capital of a high British military officer. Roberts was 
impressed by Bir*s "greatest civility” and his brothers* "quiet and 
easy manners and... entire absence of anything like awkwardness".
Bir struck Roberts as "very intelligent"; his administration was both 
efficient and benevolent in character; the Prime Minister, Roberts 
found, had not only a passion for military affairs but had interest 
in hospitals, schools and sanitary arrangements for Kathmandu as well. 
Roberts had an audience with Bir*s wife-the first European to be so
52
complinented-which, in Lansdowne*s words, was a "significant event."
Roberts returned from Nepal with two convictions : first, 
the Nepalese government wanted nothing but peace and friendship with 
the British government,but they did have a lurking fear of the latter*s 
designs on Nepal’s independence; secondly, the Nepalese army was being 
strengthened. Roberts saw a parade of 18000 troops at Kathmandu "who 
are quite as good as the men we enlist"; in the magazines he visited 
there were many guns and "any amount of ammunition". Reports submitted 
by the Resident, Col.H.Wylie, put. the total strength of the Nepalese 
army at more than 44000 of all ranks; many of them were armed with 
Martinis and Sniders; cables; for "exploding mines" had been imported
51. RBP,X20925» R9^ /2, Roberts* Minutes, 8 February 1890, 4 September 
1891.
52. LNP, Vol.VII/YlI* Roberts to Lansdowne, 30 March 1892, Lansdowne 
to Roberts, 9 April 1892. Roberts, op.cit.,11, pp.449-52.
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from India, also machinery for the production of rifled cannon. Deb 
Shamsher, the Nepalese Commander-in-Chief, told Roberts that rifles 
and ammunition were being1*extensively manufactured” in Nepal. Both 
Roberts and Wylie urged what Girdlestone had already emphasised : if 
the Nepalese government’s fear and distrust of the British were dis­
pelled, their military resources could be used toeadSygreatly to the 
armed strength of the Indian government. The ideal policy, 9B Roberts 
explained to the Duke of Cambridge, was s
If we.' were to interfere unnecessarily with Nepal, no 
doubt the fine army I saw would give us considerable 
trouble, but I sincerely trust that we shall always 
keep on good terms with it, and that if ever the Nepal­
ese troops take the field in the direction of India, it 
will be as our allies not as our foes. We cannot afford 
to fall out with the state from which our best native 
soldiers are drawn. 54
sKbvJjl unrestricted
Both Roberts and Wylie wanted that Nepal Abe allowed A ' purchase of
arms from India so that it would "put an end to all attempts at local 
manufacture" and smuggling with the connivance of British firms. Alth­
ough* Arms for Gurkhas5 had been accepted as a principle by both Ripon 
and Dufferin, the Government had not yet acted on it which led Wylie 
to remark that
the present attitude of both our government and that 
of Nepal was wrong. We go on grumbling, but remain 
inactive while Nepal buys arms surreptitiously and 
imagines she is hoodwinking us because we dono£ inter­
fere and because she imports them under false names.
Thus, mutual suspicion and distrust are maintained and 
we are looked on as ogres who have to be cheated instead
55* Ibid., Roberts to Lansdowne, 50 March 1892. P3LI, Vol*73, No.4, 
3 January 1894» Enclo.2, Resident to Govt.. 9 June 1892.
54. RBP,X20923, R100/2, Letter dt. 8 April 1892.
of as powerful friends who can he relied upon 
for help. 55
Mortimer Durand, in fact, held that the British* should avoid giving 
rifles to Bir unless it was impossible to do so. The military auth­
orities required only 500 recruits in 1888 which,Durand observed, were
5&
"easily got without giving rifles." Wylie proposed that regarding arms
supply to Nepal, the Government should adopt "much the same course" as
57
they had done in regard to Afghanistan. In fact, the Nepalese govern­
ment had stronger claims to the trust of the British than -the Afghans;
Nepal had been consistently friendly while Afghanistan was "a trouble-
58
some and unsatisfactory ally” of the British. All that the Nepalese 
"require politically at our hands", Wylie-like Girdlestone earlier- 
pointed out, was a guarantee of their independence. Roberts fully 
supported Wylie’s proposals which would show "our confidence in the 
Nepalese alliance;" he found no military objection to arms supply to 
Nepal because
under any circumstances I cannot believe that we 
should again enter the Nepal country as enemies, and 
if the Nepalese ventured on the plains of India, we 
ought to be able to dispose of them without any 
great difficulty, no matter* how well they might be armed.
55* P3LI, Vol.73* No.4* 3 January 1894. Enclo.2, Resident to Govt.,
9 June 1892. RBP, X20923* R100/2, Roberts* Minute, 6 July 1892.
56. DP.Letter Book, 1884-90. Durand to Major Durand, 27 June 1888.
57« PSLI. Vol.73* No.4* 3 January 1894* Enclo.2, Resident to Govt.,
9 June 1892.
58. P.Sykes, Mortimer Durand,, pp. 198-223* Amir Abdur Rahman was very 
jealous of his independence and suspicious of the British#He..ii&ri- 
gued with vV'xJ. the frontier Pa than tribes. The railway construc­
tion on the frontier by the British added to his suspicion. The 
Durand Mission to Kabul,followed by an Agreement (November 1893)* 
sought tbimprove ' Anglo-Afghan relations. By this Agreement the Amir was
allowed unrestricted importation of arms and ammunition. Aitchison, 
(1909 edn.), yi , pp.361-2.
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By making this concession Roberts expected to get- from Bir 2^00
Gurkhas to replace an equal number of tfefe less martial Madras and 
59
Bombay troops.
In February 1893* Bir came to Calcutta as a state guest. 
Lansdowne found him “well-spoken and... very friendly”. Bir acquiesced 
when the Viceroy suggested to him. u that since Magars and Gurungs were 
the tribes most prized by the British, the Nepalese government,who were 
reportedly enlisting a large number of these men in their army, had 
better “avoid poaching on our preserves•“ Bir also promised to accord 
the Resident better treatment* Lansdowne agreed to help the Nepalese 
government in procuring arms and ammunition from India and England;
Nepal would bear all cost including that of delivery, but no duty 
would be levied. The Nepalese government would undertake to stop all 
clandestine means of obtaining arms and to inform the Resident of all 
their requirements which, should, of course, be “reasonable". The arms 
must not be passed on to Tibetr-ajprovision which, in view of Nepal's 
hostile relations with Tibet, was, indeed, unnecessary.
Hardly a year had passed when Bir made a requisition for 
8p00 Martini-Henry rifles with 300 cartridges per rifle, various kinds 
of field guns with adequate ammunition, and a complete set of machinery 
for manufacturing guns, cartridges and rifles. The Indian government
61
had not expected what Wylie described as "a preposterously large list.”
59.RBP, X20923* B9^/2, Roberts' Minute, 4 September 1891. LNP, Vol.lie7T, 
Lansdowne to Kimberley, 26 April 1893
60. Ibid., Lansdowne to Kimberley, 22 February 1893* PSLI, Vol.73* No.4*
3 January 1894* Enclo.3-5*
61. Ibid., Vol.77* No.189* 17 October 1894* Resident to Govt., 13 June 1894*
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In fact, lansdowne had not spelled out what a “reasonable indent"
would he for Nepal and, therefore, Bir had been able to stretch the
phrase as wide as he could#
Elgin,who in the meanwhile had taken over from Lansdowne,
could hardly allow Nepal an unlimited supply of arms without*. thereby
creating a problem for India's security# It. was more objectijaable to
supply machinery because sufficient arms if locally manufactured might
remove the Nepalese government's inducement, to supply Gurkha recruits,
to the British government# On the other hand, Elgin could not afford
to leave the Nepalese with
any doubts# •• as to our intention loyally to adhere 
to the policy of removing suspicion and distrust by 
liberal concessions#
In aJh extremely conciliatory language the Viceroy informed the King of
t
Nepal that for political and military reasons the British could not 
permit unrestricted supply of arms to Nepal, and that Lansdowne's 
assurance to Bir had an implied , though not explicit,reference to this 
effect# Since the Nepalese and British governments were allies, Elgin 
added, the former should consider this limitation from not only the 
Nepalese but British interest point of view# The Indian government 
avowed their "complete trust** in Nepal's friendliness, and the Vice­
roy's "principal aim" was
to employ every means in my power to guard against 
anything which might suggest or foster the idea that 
my government ever have entertained or will entertain 
the intention or design of interfering with Nepalese 
autonomy#
Accordingly, ££)00 Martini-Henry rifles and six 7-pounder field guns 
with adequate ammunition were given to Bir on payment but no machine
101
guns for fear that the hepalese would know their mechanism and
make the guns themselves. Bhe Nepalese government, then preparing
for 8, war with Ei.be t, accepted the arms, dropping at the same time
a feeler that a militarily strong Nepal would stand the British
themselves in good stead duiing emergencies. Bir also agreed that
in future the Indian government would fix "the quality and quantity
62
of whatever warlike materal Nepal might ask for'J
The Indian government claimed that the arms arrange­
ment was the most important "material proof" of their confidence 
in the Nepalese .government; this claim, as later events clearly 
proved,was much too tall. Giving arms to Nepal was no doubt, as 
Durand stated, "a bold game". But then, since distrust of Nepal 
was still very strong both in Calcutta and London, the British 
government did not play the game strictly according to rules. vVhile 
the Nepalese government contifaued to supnly(adequate number of 
recruits to the satisfaction of the British military authotities, 
the latter invariably showed extreme reluctance to meet Nepalese 
requests for arms and machinery. Hie Nepalese government expected 
one rifle for one Gurkha recruit and were very sore to find their 
expectation belied. Both Rlpon and Dufferin were willing to give 
rifles as gifts to the Nepalese durbar, but no such gift was made
63
until twenty years later. In fact, as wojild be shown later, the 
arms issue and Gurkha recruitment were by no means settled matters; 
a long time was to elapse before they became so.
62. Ibid., Fnclo.1-6. BP, Vol.65, Wylie to H.Babbington Smith, 
Private Secy, to the Viceroy, 6 August 1894. PEF, Vol.26, 1912, 
Pile No.2067/1906, S e c r e t to India, No.8, 2 February 
1894.
63. See Chapter VII.
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IV
Both Lansdowne and Elgin humoured Bir in mther ways. It also seemed 
to them, as Wylie put it, not only"just” hut "politic1* to "strengthen
64
the Ministerfs hands in every legitimate way." In May 1892, for exam- 
ple^Lansdowne secured a K.C.S.I. for Bir as a seal of appreciation of 
his policy towards the British. When the Home gohei^ ient raised objecti­
on on the ground that Bir had had a bloody ascent to power-, Lansdowne 
pleaded that
we must not be extreme to mark what is done amiss by 
such people. If we were, we should have to throw the 
Amir overboard at once, 65
Similarly, when in I896 Bir wanted to go to England, Elgin not only 
supported the project but pressed the Home government: for the necessary 
approval. Otherwise, he feared, Bir would take offence with the conse­
quent damaging effect upon the general relations between the two govern­
ments. The India Office, however, refused to meet Bir,s strong claim 
that while in England he be treated just I:: as Jang Bahadur had been s 
an ambassador of a foreign independent country with, a 19-gun salute.
To the Home government Nepal was "a most honoured but still a member of 
the semi-sovereign protected states of India”, and therefore her dele­
gation could not claim the rank or status given to the representatives 
of states like Prance, Germany, Russia, Japan and China. Besides, if 
Nepal were treated as an independent state, William Lee ?/armer, the 
£4. 1FP. Vol.4184. May 1892. Nos.179-80.
65. LHP. Vol.lX/lV, Lansdowne to Cross, 24 May 1892, Cross to Lansdowne,
18 March. 1892. Amir Abdur Rahman was notoriously cruel. W.K.Fraser- 
Tytler, Afghanistan : A Study of Political Developments in Central 
Asia, pp.172-3
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Political Secretary at the India Office, noted, "we must not object
66
if Russia deals with it as such*" In other wards, recognition of 
Nepal’s independent status migfct result in foreign contact with the 
state and thereafter foreign intrigue. But Bir Shamsher was adamant; 
he would rather abandon the project than accept a treatment which, 
besides exposing him, to an unfavourable comparison with- Jang: Bahadut, 
would, as he said to the Resident, lower the status of his country. 
Elgin reasoned with George Hamilton, the Secretary of State, that 
Nepalese friendship was too valuable an object to be sacrificed for 
the sake of strict observance of protocol and the rigid interpretation 
of the status of Nepal. Nepal, the Viceroy argued, was, in fact, not 
an Indian feudatory state. He was certain that politically Bir’s trip 
to England would be as useful as Jang Bahadur’s had been; there 
would be in the Nepalese dorbar a firmer c o n v i c t i o n p o w e r  
and a proportioaie increase in Nepal’s desire to be on good terms with 
Britain; the Rana government would be strengthened which would gurantee 
British influence in Nepal. On the other hand, if the trip did not 
come off, Bir’s prestige would suffer; the conservative elements in 
the durbar who opposed such sea voyages on religious grounds would 
be strengthened; in short, the ultimate result , so it appeared to 
Wylie,
would tell against the advancement and gradual opening 
up of' Nepal in the interest of England.
Lansdowne, the ex-Viceroy, persuaded Hamilton to meet Bir’s wishes who
"by moving his little finger... could spoil our Burkha recruiting",
66. HC, Vol.163, No.79* Dept.Notes, Hamilton to Elgin. 16 January 1896; 
Vol.l63, No.80, Notes of Hamilton and Lee Warner; V0I.I67, No.658, 
Note of Lee Warner y July I896.
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Besides, lie warned* when all was not well in the North-West frontier
6?
where the tribew were soon to rise against the British. , if the Nepal­
ese, too,"went wrong*1, it would he "Very awkward for India"♦ Ultimately, 
the India Office relented, hut the visit did not take place bacause, so
Bir explained to the Resident, the Nepalese government, were preoccupied
68
with Tibetan affairs. As though to salve BIrfs soreness, Elgin made him
69
a O.C.S.I. in 1897* Both the Viceroy and the Resident kept guessing if
70
the Tibetan crisis was not just an excuse for giving up the project
when Bir sensed that the British, no matter what they professed, did
not regard Nepal as an independent state. The status of. Nepal was a
vexed Issue which was not settled until many years later- and that only
71
under pressure of the Nepalese government.
67, C.C.Davies, The Problem of the North-West Frontier, 1890-1908, pp. 
89-98.
68, On this point see Chapter IV, p.143.
69, P.Landon, Nepal,II, p*78,
70, EP, Vol,22, BAbbington Smith to R.Ritohie, Private Secy, to Hamilt­
on, 14 April 1896, HMP, Vol,509/2, Elgin to Hamilton, 5 February 
I896, HC, Vol,l6g. No,1253* Wylie to Lansdowne, 15 December 1895* 
Lansdowne to Hamilton* 8 January 1896; Vol,l67» No.680, Lee Warner*s 
Minute, PSLI,Vol,87, Reg, No.127, 30 June I896.
71. see Chapter* VII
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C H A P T E R  F O U R
BRITISH ATTITUDE TOWARDS NEPAL*3 RELATIONS WITH CHINA AND TIBET
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I
One of the important factors which influenced t^e British
policy in Nepal was their recognition that Nepal's relations with Tibet
and China had a considerable bearing on Britain*s interests in the latter
two countries* The development of these interests led to cautious British
involvement in these relations and ultimate British control of them. This
control, however, was indirect, but, nevertheless, quite effective. It
was secured gradually, the Nepalese government resenting any interference
with their external independence.
Nepal had long standing relations with Tibet, the results
1
of geographical propinquity, shared history and cultural ties; trade
and commerce forged more tangible links. In Tibet's trade Nepal enjoyed
an important position which commercial agreements between the two coun-
2
tries further strengthened. These agreements provided for the closure
3
of the easier Indo-Tibetan trade route through the Chumbi valley and
Sikkim so as to prevent any diversion of this trade from the Nepalese
route and the resultant loss to the Nepalese government of income through
duties on imports and exports. Nepalese coins were also introduced into 
4
Tibet, and the exchange rates of gold, silver and salt settled. The early
1. It was largely from Nepal that Tibet received Buddhism. The Tibetan 
King, Song-tsen Gan-Po (8th century A*D*) married the Nepalese King, 
Amsuvarma's daughter, who took with her to Lhasa a large number of 
Buddhist scholars and Nepalese artisans. C.Bell, Tibet Past and Present, 
p.231. Tsepon W^ D-Shakabpa, Tibet A Political History, pp.13,26-7,58* 
D.R.Regmi, Ancient Nepal, pp.125-31»144, 150-511166-9*175“82,185,194•
2. The first authentic trade agreement was made during the rule of the 
Newar King of Kathmandu, PrataplHalla,in the seventeenth century, provi­
ding for the establishment of 32 Newar merchants at Lhasa uhder the 
headship of an officer, called Naikay, who was to look after their int­
erests. In 1757 Prithvinarayan Shah made a compact with JAyprakash Mal- 
la which settled the export of coins and goods to 'Tibet from Gorkha and 
Kathmandu. Nepal imported from Tibet mainly wool, borax, salt and gold 
dust, and exported rice, European and Indian manufactured goods, espe­
cially c&oth. P3LI, Vol.246, Reg.N0.326.
3 and 4 See the next page.
107
5
Nepalese-Tibetan disputes had always a commercial element in them*
Nepal had less frequent intercourse with China, the
early evidence of which lay mainly in the exchange of complimentary
6
missions from time to time between Kathmandu and Peking* Not until the
7
Chinese power had been firmly established in Tibet in the 18th century
did Nepal assume importance in China's political thinking*
The emergence of Nepal in the latter half of the 18th
century as a powerful expansionist force in the lower Himalayas affected
both British and Chinese interests. 'The East India Company's policy in
Nepal in its earliest phase was linked up with its commercial projects
in Tibet and western China. The conquest of the Nepal valley by the
Gurkhas and their jealousy and exclusive policy frustrated the Company's
hope of developing an alternative overland trade route to China through
8
Kathmandu and Lhasa.
The Chinese found the Gurkhas a menace to Tibet, Sikkim
and Bhutan, the last two countries, for their close relations with Tibet,
5C
being regarded as dependencies of the Lhasa government. The defence of
3* The tongue of Tibetan territory interposed between Sikkim and Bhutan.
4* 'The coins were called Mahendramalli mohar, after the name of the Newar 
King, Mahendra Malla of the l6th century who made a treaty with 'Tibet
for the supply of these coins. Tibet provided silver bullion, and Kath­
mandu charged 12^  commission on the transaction. E.H.Walsh, "The Coin­
age of Nepal*1, J.R.A.S., July 1908, pp.684-5* 691-2.
5. P3LI, Vol.246,Reg.No.326, Memorandum of the early history of the relaa 
tion3 between Nepal9 Tibet and China compiled by the Nepal Darbar, 1909*
6. On Nepal's relations with China in the 9th-12th centuries see L.Petech, 
Medieval History of Nepal, pp.99-101,152,201-11. Rishikesh Shaha,Hero­
es and Builders of Nepal, pp.33“42.
7* L.Petech, China and Tibet in the early 18th century. Tieh-Iseng Li, The
Historical Status of Tibet, pp.35“58. W.W.Rockhill,^"A’Geographical, 
Ethnological and Historical Sketch of Tibet derived from Chinese Sourc­
es'* , J.R.A.S., New Series, 1891, p*7f "The Dalai Lamas of Lhasa and 
their Relations with the Manchu Emperors of China, 1644-1908", T'oung 
Pao, Series 3, Vol.XL, 1910,pp.l-105.
8. See Chapter I, pp.22-3.
9. The SikkimSy royal family was 'Tibetan in origin; the £ajas of Sikkim
[Continued dn the next pagef
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Tibet and Sikkim impelled China to intervene in the Nepalese-Tibetan 
10
war (1733-92) which was an expression both of the military ambition of 
the Gurkhas as well as of their determination to further Nepal's econo­
mic interests in 'Tibet which the Tibetan government had guaranteed afresh 
by an agreement in 1775- 'Ike agreement had confirmed all the earlier
trade arrangements and had fixed the proportion of alloy and fine metal
11
in the Nepalese currency which was to be the only legal tender in Tibet* 
China's victory in her war with Nepal had far-reaching results 
on the latter*s foreign relations. Nepal came under the Chinese tribu­
tary system; quinquennial missions from Kathmandu to Peking, a result of
the war, were looked upon by China as a token of Nepal*s acknowledgement
12
of China's political and cultural primacy. Like Burma, Annam, Korea and
13
Siam Nepal was regarded as a client state lying outside the administra­
tive jurisdiction or direct political authority of the Chinese government 
but treated as having subordinate relations with, the Celestial Emperor.
held jagir in the Chumbi valley; they sent religious offerings to the 
Dalai Lamas and received stipend from the Lhasa government for assisting 
them in the maintenance of trade routes. History of Sikkim, compiled by 
the Maharaja and Maharani of Sikkim, pp.19,47»59*72-4* 76,96-8,106,121,124• 
J.C.Gawler, Sikkim With Hints on Mountain and Jungle Warfare, p.8. J,W* 
Edgar, Report on a Visit to Sikkim and the Tibetan Frontier (in October, 
November and December 1873)* 72.
Bhutan paid tribute to the Tibetan government and sent embassies 
annually to Lhasa; the Amban, the Chinese Imperial High Commissioner in 
Tibet, issued every year an imperial mandate to the Deb and Dharma raja3 
of Bhutan advising them in matters of administration. HC, Vol.91»No.69»
Note by A.Eden, on the relations of China and Tibet with Bhutan, 17 January 
1887* Political Missions to Bhotan s Report by Captain R.B»Pemberton, pp. 
87-9; Report by A«Eden, 18^ 4* p.131; Dr «ff.Griffith's Journal, p. l6f7 
J.C.White, Sikkim and Bhutan, pp.285-90.
10. Shakabpa, op.cit. % pp. 156-69. See also Chapter I,pp.23-j4,Chapter Vl,p,u,\t
11. Memorandum on > y Nepal's relations with Tibet and China, op.git.
12. In traditional Chinese theory relations with China mmplied a recogni­
tion of Chinese supremacy .A. Lamb, "The Indo-'TLbetan Border" ,A» J. P.H., 
May i960,pp.28 et seq; China-ItiddA Border, pp.27-31*
13* Burma sent tribute to China once in ten years, Korea and Annam every 
four years and Siam every three years. H.B•Morse, 'The International 
Relations of the Chinese Empire, II, p.341*
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China’s presige increased in the Himalayas as did her control on the
Tibetan administration by the augmented powers of the Ambans, the imperi-
14
al High Commissioners in Tibet* Preventing a future Nepalese attack on 
Tibet became the most important object of China’s policy towards Nepal* 
Peace between Nepal and Tibet was essential for, among other things, the 
safe passage of the Nepalese tributary missions to Peking thrombi the 
intervening Tibetan territory* The Nepalese-Tibetan frontier, so the 
Chinese annals claim, was demarcated at this time and boundary pillars
15
set y up* Chinese troops manned the military posts on the frontier. Nepal 
had to give up the Tibetan territories occupied during the war. The reco­
very of these tracts, lying south of the main Himalayan watershed and
commanding passes of great strategic and commercial importance, remained
t*
henceforth the cherished ambition of Nepalese statesmen and consequenly
16
an abiding source of dispute with the Tibetan government.
For the British the Gurkha government’s war with Tibet 
and China was at once an opportunity and a cause for anxiety. The pros­
pect of‘ military assistance against China prompted Nepal to agree to a
14. Tieh-Tseng Li, op.cit*, pp.55-Q. Rockhillu,K^ Geographical ... Sjfcbcfp, 
op.cit*, pp.10-19. Tsakabpa, p.169*
15* E.H P^arker, "China, Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim", Journal of the Manches­
ter Oriental Society, 1911* p.146.
The Nepalese were far from satisfied with the frontier demar­
cation, as indicated by frequent border disputes with Tibet in later 
years, ; •;> 7U
16. On Nepal’s northern frontier see Chapter Vi, p.X23.fn^  Also H.H.Oldfi- 
eld, Sketches from Nipal, I, p.41J*-5,
One of the passes , Kuti, called Nylam in Tibetan, lying 
about ninety miles north-east of Kathmandu had been occupied by Pra- 
tap Malla. Ipolito Desideri, a Jesuit missionary who returned from 
Lhasa to India vis Kuti and Kathmandu in 1721,refers to the former 
place as having recently come under the Tibetan government who, how­
ever, granted Ahe Newar merchants of Kathmandu, Pa tan and Bhatgaon 
special privileges regarding customs duljy at Kuti. Prithvinarayan 
occupied Kuti sometime in 1750. F.De Fil^ pi, AN Account of Tibet 
The Travels of Ipolito Desideri,1712-1727*pp.130,310-11. L.S.Baral, 
Life ... of Prithvinarayan Shah,
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commercial treaty with the Company. But the British had no desire for 
any military involvement with. China for Nepal's sake; yet at the same 
time they could not overlook that "no event was more to he deprecated 
than the conquest of Nepal by the Chinese", because in the resultant 
contiguity of the British and Chinese frontiers lay the dangers of rec-
17
urrent border disputes. In such circumstances, Cornwallis attempted a
diplomatic solution of the problem,which attempt far from realising his
18
objective damaged British relations with both Nepal and China. To 
Nepal's fear that the British were an aggrandising power was added her 
distrust that they were unreliable allies. The Chinese suspected the 
British of having been hand in glove with the Nepalese; the known Bri­
tish interests in the Tibetan trade, the recent Anglo-Nepalese treaty 
and the Nepalese invasion of Tibet-all suggesting some causal relation­
ship. Samuil ‘Turner, who was sent by Warren Hastings to Tibet in 1783 
for the promotion of Bengal's trade with Tibet, believed that the "simi­
larity of dress and discipline" between the Gurkha troops and the Comp- 
19any's sepoys might have reinforced the Chinese suspicion. The Nepalese- 
Tibetan war provided the Chinese with sufficient excuse to take a cold
20
attitude towards Lord Macartney's commercial mission to Peking in 1793* 
The increased Chinese prestige and influence in the Hima­
layan border states after the war was for the British an unwelcome poli-
17. W.Kirkpatrick, An Account ... of Nepaul, p.vu.
18. See Chapter I, pp. 23-4.
19. Prithvinarayan remodelled the Nepalese army on the lines of the Com­
pany's troops, Baral, op.cit.« p.311* 3•Turner, An Account of an 
Embassy to the Court of the Teshoo Lama in Tibet, p.440.
20. On this mission see J .Harrow, Some Account of the Public Life and
a Selection of the Unpublished Writings of the Earl of Macartney, II, 
203-4. H.B.Morse, The Chronicles of the East India Company ‘Trading 
to China 1635-I834, II, pp.213-54.
Ill
tical development; commercially it proved ruinous 3 Tibet was closed
to British, trade by the Chinese, and remained so for almost a century*
The Sino-Nepalese war and its results showed the British that Nepalese
action could injure British interests in Tibet and China even if the
British gave no support to this action*
The Company had no adequate knowledge of the "nature and
extent" of China*s relations with Nepal established by the peace of 1792,
but it was recognised that this knowledge was necessary to ascertain how
China would react if the British sought a closer connexion with Nepal
for commercial reasons* Enquiries through Abdul Kadir and Captain
21
Knox, the Company*s emissaries to Nepal, established that there was no 
love lost between the Nepalese and the Chinese, and that the Amban’s
attempt to influence Nepal’s internal politics had been foiled by a
22
strong anti-Chinese element in the Court of Kathmandu. Nevertheless,
in dealing with Nepal the Company was wary* With all his eagerness to
establish British influence in the Nepalese darbar through an alliance
23
with the ruling party,Wellesley, for instance, had to consider that this 
alliance did not give umbrage to China. Wellesley was glad that Nepal 
was "not in any degree dependent on the Chinese empire" and that "no 
connexion subsists" between the two countries of a nature "to limit the 
Raja of Nepal to contract engagements with Foreign Powers or to render 
the proposed alliance ... a reasonable subject of complaint or jealousy
21* See Chapter I, pp. 25-6.
22. P*C., 7 March 1796, No.9*
23. See Chapter I, pp.25-6.
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to the Chinese government". Yet he took care to avoid any provision in
24
his treaty with Nepal which would suggest "a defensive engagement again-
25
st China" or prejudice Chinese position in Nepal "in the remotest degree". 
The British view of Sino-Nepalese relations at this time seems to habe 
Been this : it was unlikely that the Chinese connexion with Nepal would 
develop into Chinese predominance, but Nepal did belong to the Chinese 
sphere of interests. Consequently, the fear of provoking China and the­
reby injuring Britain*s Canton trade had a sort of moderating influence 
on the Company’s Nepal policy.
This was apparent during the Anglo-Nepalese war, when the 
risk of Chinese military intervention in favour of Nepal made Moira
anxious. Lord Amherst’s commercial embassy was then due to go to Peking,
tb
and Moira did not want that it sheul-d meet the same fate as Macartney’s
26
earlier mission, Therefore, was at pains to convince the Chinese 
authorities at Lhasa that the war had been forced upon the Company by 
the Nepalese, and that nothing but punishing the aggressors was the Bri­
tish object, fhe Gk>vernor-General disavowed an# intention or interest in 
extending the British authority beyond the natural limits of India marked 
by the mountain ranges. Clearly, the British at this time had no desire
to compete with the Chinese position in the Himalayan area far less 
27
contest it.
24. fhe Treaty of 1801. See Chapter I,p*25*
25. Bengal Secret Letters to the Court, Vol.5* Letter to Secret Committee, 
1 January 1805.
26. On Amherst’s Mission see H.Ellis, Journal of the Proceedings of the 
late Embassy to China. 7^JU^
27. Papers Relating to the Nepaul War,KMoira to Secret Committee, 2 Aug­
ust 1915; also pp.272,996. Marchioness of Bute, ed,, The Private 
Journal, II, pp.144-5* H.T.Prinsep, Political and Military fransac- 
tions, I , pp.209-13* beo Rose, "China and the Anglo-Nepalese_¥/ar^
1^ 14 -6" , P.I.H.C«Delhi, 1961, pp.208-16. T.Smith, Narrative^,JLpp»92-8.
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The Nepalese, seeking to pit the Chinese against the British, 
had represented to the Amban that the British attack on Nepal was a pre­
lude to their invasion pf Tibet; the Chinese were entreated to attack 
Bengal in order to create a diversion in Nepal*s favour. The Chinese
Emperor sent a general with troops to Lhasa to ascertain if the British
28
had really any design on 'Tibet and to oppose them if they had.
Although by then the war had been over, Moira was troubled 
with the thought that China might resent the British establishing treaty 
relations with Nepal ignoring her suzerain. A British Residency at Kath­
mandu. established by the treaty of Sagauli could also stimulate China*s 
jealousy and suspicioh, particularly as she herself had no such establi­
shment in Nepal. 'The Nepalese sought to exploit this anxiety. They infor­
med the Resident* Edward Gardner, that
China was deeply offended, considering Nepal as tributary 
to the Emperor as this government having entered into war 
and concluded peace with the English without his sanction 
and knowledge. 29
To meet the supposed Chinese wrath the Nepalese government sought the
British protection, calculating that rather than risk a conflict with
China, the British would withdraw the Residency and restore the Nepal
30
Terai they had annexed. The stratagem had very nearly worked. Moira,who
was having trouble with the Marathas and the Pindaris, could have hardly
defended the British position in Nepal if openly challenged by China.
28. Papers Relating to the Nepaul War, p. 556, Moira to Secret Committee, 
11 May 1815*JJEUEraser, Journal of a tour through part of the Himala 
Mountains, pp.536-7* Rose, op.cit., pp.210-11. A*Lamb, Britain and 
Chinese Central Asia, p.41* Chittaranjan Nepali, Bhimsen Thapa, pp. 
136-8, 145-6, 157* the Nepalese King*s letters to the Chinese Emperor 
and the Amban, ws.
29* S.C., 14 September 1816, No.41* Gardner to Govt., 28 August 1816.
30. Ibid., Nos.39* 41-2.
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He was, therefore, prepared, should the Chinese insist, to withdraw the 
Residency and avert a misunderstanding with China for the sake of Brita-
31
in's China trade.
Fortunately, however, the Chinese authorities in Tibet 
were apparently satisfied with Moira*s explanation of the war and his 
assurance that the Company*s relations with Nepal would leave the Chi­
nese position there unaffected. What the British had done was "perfectly
correct and proper", the Chinese general at Lhasa assured the Governor*- 
32
General. The Chinese Emperor had confidentially asked the Amban to keep
33
the British away from Kathmandu, but the Amban made rather a mild requ­
est for the withdrawal of the Residency "out of kindness towards us phi-
34
nese] and in consideration of the ties of friendship" • Moira chose to 
ignore this, and the Chinese did not press it further. In May 1818 they 
declared that they were finally satisfied with the Company*s settlement
35
with Nepal. The Chinese also did not embarrass Amherst, as they did
36
Macartney earlier, by raising the Nepalese issue with him.
China's attitude during the war was clear evidence that
she had little sympathy for Nepal and no desire whatsoever to be drawn
into a conflict with the British for Nepal's sake. The Amban and the
31* S.C., 14 September 1816, No*43* Govt, to Gardner, 14 September 1816.
Lamb, op.cit.,p.45* Rose, op.cit., pp.212-3*
32. S.C., 9 November 1816, No.19*
33* E.H.Parker, "Nepaul and China", Imperial and Asiatic Quarterly Review, 
Vol.VII* 1B99* py*73* The sources used in this article are Chinese.
34* T.Smith, op.cit., p.88.
35* S.C., 11 January 1817* No.7* 15 May 1818, No.69*
36* Morse, Chronicles, op.cit., p. Ill, p*258. Lamb, op.cit., pp.45-8*
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Chinese general strongly distrusted the Nepalese. Not to speak of mili­
tary assistance, not even pecuniary help was given to Nepal because, as 
the Amban explained ii^ iis letter to the Nepalese King, "it is not custo­
mary to give treasures of China to other countries". The general had also 
no faith in the Nepalese? he wrote to Moira to explain the genesis of 
the war so that he could expose "the falsehood of the Goorkha raja". It 
seemed to the general "quite inconsistent with the usual wisdom of the 
English" that they should invade Tibet when they had such a heavy stake 
in the China trade. The Nepalese government were threatened with punish-
37
ment if their allegation against the English proved false.
China did not claim any monopoly of relations with Nepal;
the Emperor, as E.H.Parker citing Chinese sources informs us, clearly
disavowed any responsibility for the removal of the British Residency
from Kathmandu and told the Nepalese King that since he and the British
lived "in far distant countries" the "sovereign authority of the Emperor
38
of China does not extend" over Nepal. What China seems to have been 
concerned with was the continuance of Nepal's tributary relations with 
the Manchu Court. It is significant that while disclaimimg any obligation 
for the protection of Nepal from the British, the Amban reminded the 
Nepalese government of their commitment to regularly send tributary miss-
39
ions to Peking. Obviously, from the Chinese point of viww Nepal's treaty
37* Foreign Office, Kathmandu, Letter of Chinese Amban to King of Nepal, 
Chachin Varsa 12,Mahina 3 Ka Din 8.Nepali, op.cit., pp.301-2,312-4* 
Letters from Chinese authorities in Tibet to the King of Nepal, 1815-
6. 5.C., 13 July 1816, No.17; 27 July 1816, No.12. Rose, op.cit.,pp. 
210, 211-4.
38. Parker, "China, Nepaul, Bhutan and Sikkim", op.cit., pp. 149-50*
"China and Nepaul", op.cit., p*78. Nepali, op.cit., p.305*S.C., 22 
June 1816, No.31* Pemberton thought that the Chinese did not exte­
nd their direct authority beyond Tibet for fear of contact with the 
British. Report on his mission to Bhutan, op.cit., p.8.
39* Parker, "China, Nepaul, Bhutan and Sikkim", op.cit., 149-58* See aClso 
Chapter VI, p. 240.
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relations with the British had made little change to her status as a 
Chinese tributary.
The Anglo-Nepalese war had some other results as well* 
'The Residency henceforth served as an observation post in the Himalayan 
region whence the British could take a better view of the Chinese in 
Tibet. At Kumaun and Garhwal the British territory became directly 
coterminous with the Chinese territory in Tibet* The Raja of Sikkim 
who had helped the British in the war was assured of British protec­
tion against a future Nepalese invasion without any apparent Chinese 
40
opposition* The British appeared as a potential force in the Himalayan 
area where China had already established her influence.
II
The Nepalese policy after the war was to balance China 
against British India as a measure of security against domination by the 
latter* Politically relations with China were now found more useful to 
the Nepalese government than ever before* Missions were sent to Peking 
with scrupulous care and regularity, bearing tributes of indigeneous 
products and letters from the Nepalese kings paying homage to the Chi­
nese Emperors and invoking their blessings. The missions took normally
about two years to cover the journey both ways. The distance between
41
Kathmandu and Peking through Lhasa, Tachienlu and Chengtu was about
40. The Treaty of Sagauli obliged Nepal to accept British arbitration in 
her disputes with Sikkim. The Treaty of Titalya(1817) committed the 
Raja of Sikkim to assistance to the British in any hill campaign. 
Aitchison, Treaties, (1909 edn,),II, pp.112,322-3.
41• Tachienlu on the Szechuan border was an important trade centre. Cheng­
tu was the capital of Szechuan.
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2<?00 miles* Hie missions stayed , in Peking for forty five days and then 
returned to Kathmandu, bringing valuable presents from the Emperor along 
with a letter to the King of Nepal advising him to govern well and to 
receive the Emperor's blessings* The members of the missions were provi­
ded with food, transport and accommodation by the Tibetan and Chinese 
authorities as &oon as they crossed the Nepalese frontier. The goods
carried by the missions on their outward and return journeys passed duty 
42
free. On their return the missions were receiveda:/few) miles away from 
Kathmandu by the King of Nepal under whose personal supervision purifi­
cation ceremonies were held to restore the members of the missions to 
caste which they were supposed to have lost by going to foreign lands 
with strange customs and practices. Then, accompanied by the officers 
of the state and a large body of soldiers, the King escorted the miss­
ions into the capital where people stood in hundreds to welcome this 
impressive symbol of their country's relations with the most powerful 
oriental state. In the full darbar the Emperor's presents brought by 
the missions were displayed and his •'decree'* blessing his loyal and 
humble vassal read. And all this the British Resident noted together 
with the implied warning : keep off from Nepal on pain of Chinese repri­
sal. The Nepalese government strongly beliebed, as Hodgson reported to
the Government, that "we should hesitate at any time to push to extremi-
43
ties an acknowledged dependent of the celestial empite".
42. B.H.Hodgson,"Route of Nepalese Mission to Pekin with remarks on the 
watershed and plateau of Tibet" in Miscellaneous Essays Relating to 
Indian Subjects, II >^.167 et seq. Also in J.A.3.B.,Vol.XXV,183^,pp.473-^7
43* 3«C., 14 October 1829, No.23, Oldfield, I, 411-2. F.M,, V0I.36O, 
Report on Nepal, by 0. Cavenagh, I85I, pp.54-9*
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For Nepal connexion with China was not merely a useful deter­
rent to British hegemony "but a means of embarrassing them as well* No 
wonder,then,that the Anglo-Chinese war (1839-42) should be seized upon
by the Nepalese government, then dominated by the bitterly anti-British 
44
Pandes, as their opportunity. Emissaries were sent to Lhasa and Peking 
offering assistance to the Chinese and seeking their support against the 
British who were represented as a common enemy of China, Tibet, Nepal,
45
Bhutan and Sikkim. The King of Nepal, Rajendra Vikram, Hodgson reported,
professed "extreme eagerness to throw off his allegiance to the British
and to resume the old career of his ancestors'* by strengthening relations
with the Emperor. Throughout the China war, which coincided with the
46
first Afghan war and other troubles, Hodgson was concerned that the 
Nepalese situation would turn even worse if China gave military aid or
47
even moral encouragement to the Pandes.
The situation became further complicated when the Dogras in-
48
vaded western Tibet in May 1841. The Bogras under Raja Gulab Singh and
Dhian Singh had brought Ladakh, which paid tribute to Lhasa, under their 
49
sway in 1834-5* Both the ruler of Ladakh and the Dogras, the latter possi­
bly fearing Chinese intervention, asked for Nepalese assistance, Rajendra 
44* See Chapter I, p*33*
45* Missions were also sent to Bhutan and Sikkim asking them to rise te 
pise against the British and pledging Nepal*s assistance for the re­
covery of Darjiling and the Assam Duars from the British.
46. See Chapter I, pp.33-4*
47* S.C., 26 December 1839* No.139» 14 December 1842, No.83; 10 August 
1842, No.126. Parker, "Nepaul and China”, p.80.
48. M.W.Fisher, Leo Rose, and R.A.Huttenback, Himalayan Battleground, pp. 
49-59*K.M.Panikkar, The Founding of the Kashmir State ,pp.74-89* Tsa- 
kabpa, op.cit.,pp.176-80. Khuswant Singh, A History of' the Bikhs,II, 
pp.21-4.Pre-Mutiny Records of the Kumaun District, Political Letters 
Received, Series III, Vol.I, No(ll7; Political Letters Issued, Volfv,
No.50. 1 n
49* A.Cunningham, Ladak Physical, Statistical and Historical, p.333*
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Vikram was willing to help the ruler of Ladakh and asked the Amban for 
authority to do so, As-prtce he wanted the Tibetan territory adjoining 
the Kerung and Kuti passes. But the Chinese did not want any embroilment 
with the British on the Indian frontier when at home they were being 
defeated by the British. 'Therefore, to the Nepalese entreaties for assis­
tance against the British the Emperor gave a "stern refusal" together
with a strong warning to Rajendra Vikram against excessive restlessness;
50
the latter was rebuked for his "silly requests" for Tibetan territory,
Rajendra Vikram was told, so Hodgson reported to Government, that the
Chinese government "has little or no purpose to interfere with ladakh
politics1,' and so the Nepalese would do well to confine themselves to "the
established circle of connection cherishing peace and good faith within
51
that circle and to be less heedful of novelties beyond it", A Nepalese- 
Ladakhi alliance, so the Chinese will have thought, could lead to the
intervention of the Lahore government where the Dogra rajas had commah-
52
ding influence; and it might even bring in the British who had treaty 
relations with the Lahore government.
Rajendra Vikram then sounded Hodgson if the Nepalese
53
government could help the Dogras against the 'Tibetans; the King perhaps 
expected that the British would welcome suck a means of harming the Chi­
nese. Hodgson had no doubt that the real intention of the King and the
50. Parker, "Nepaul and China", p.80.
51. 3»C«, 31 May 1841, No.154, Resident to Govt., 20 May 1841.
52. Panikkar, op.cit., pp.19-41*
53* R&ja Dhian Singh asked for Nepalese assistance in the Dogra difficul­
ties with the ruler of Ladakh. This is mentioned in a secret report 
from Major Ra^iubir Singh and Jamadar Mannu Singh, Nepalese agents at 
the Lahore darbar, to the King of Nepal. 'The report, dated August 1838, 
is in the Foreign Office, Kathmandu. For its English translation with 
Notes see my article "A Note on Anglo-Nepalese Relations in 1838", 
Bengal past and Present, Vol.LKXKVI, January-June 19o7, PP*1“9«
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Pandes was somehow to involve the British with t&e Chinese, and there­
fore he discouraged the King*s intentions. "We had no desire", he told 
Rajendra Vikram, "to do injury to China in any quarter and should will­
ingly desist from our compulsory operations in China proper as soon as
54
justice had been rendered to us."
In the autumn of 1841 the Dogras conquered Gartok and the 
neighbouring Tibetan territories. Hodgson was now apprehending the 
appearance of a Chinese army on the scene?counting on whose support 
the Pandes would goad the Nepalese troops to invade ti^ British terri­
tory. Further, since the Dogra rajas were subjects of tjie state of 
Lahore which was in alliance with the British, the Chinese might sus- 
pect the British having incited the Dogras to attack 'Tibet, and if so 
they "are very likely to resent it by letting loose Nepal upon us", so 
Hodgson warned the Government. And then, he added,
with Chinese, Sikhs and Gurkhas we shall ere long 
find ourselves of necessity involved in a labyrinth 
of trans-Himalayan politics the clue to which may 
be difficult to find and unprofitable to use when 
found. 55
Besides, the Dogra military activities in Ladakh and western Tibet
had seriously affected trade in shawl wool, borax, salt and opium in
<u~ 56
which both the British and Chinese governments had^interest* This led
the British government to make a strong representation to Maharaja sher-
Singh, the ruler of the state of Lahore, that the Dogra activities must
54* S.C.,3 January 1842 ^ Resident to Govt., 20 December 1841*
55* 3.C., 11 October 1841, No.89, Resident to Govt., 11 October 1841*
56. Ibid., 13 December 1841, No.42. Cunningham, op.cit., pp.244*248. 
Lamb, op.cit.,pp.56-8, 64-71*
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stop. Towards the end of 1841 a Sino-Tibetan army arrived and routed 
the Dogra troops* killing their general, Zorawar Singh. With the end of
57
the war, Nepalese restlessness abated.
Neither the Anglo-Chinese war nor the Dogra-Tibetan war- could 
be exploited by Nepal because the Chinese refused to pla^ into the hands 
of the Nepalese; the Chinese would not encourage Nepalese militarism in 
any way nor give them any excuse for realising their territorial ambi­
tions in Tibet. Nepal*s offer of assistance against the British might 
have appeared to China rather a ruse to serve her own interests than a 
token of sincere allegiance to her suzerain. Hodgson*s reports suggest 
that the Nepalese King even tried to blackmail the Chinese. His letter 
to the Amban contained a threat that if the Chinese did not help Nepal 
against the British, the King "shall be necessitated" to seek British
58
assistance against China "which he has only to ask for in order to get".
The Amban cooly replied that the Emperor "never sends troops to protect
59
the lands of foreign barbarians". Once again the Nepalese had seen 
how difficult it was to embroil the Chinese withi the British and to reap 
political harvest therefrom.
57. On Nepal's role in the Dogra cappaign in western Tibet see my article, 
"Nepal and the Sikh-Tibetan War, 1841-2", Bengal Past and Present , 
Vol.LKXXII, January-June 1963, pp.12-25*
58. S»C., 14 September 1842, No.83, Translation of a Nepalese secret repp- 
rt enclosed in Residents letter to Govt., 2 September 1842.
59- Leo Rose, "Sino-Indian Rivalry and the Himalayan border states", Orbis, 
Summer 1961, p.202. Rose has drawn on Chinese sources. Hodgson also 
had earlier reported that "no importance is attached by the Chinese 
to their relations with Nepal, and they are maintained by Nepal chief­
ly or solely to be played off against us [British], if need be" .Letter 
to Govt.,9 November 1833* P«C., 21 November 1833* No.36.
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III
From the middle of the 19th century the pattern of Nepal's rela­
tions with China and Britain started changing as a result of two facts 5 
the establishment of the Rana regime with its settled policy of friend­
liness and cooperation with the British government; and the decline of 
the Chinese power. The Nepalese government were no longer eager to ex­
ploit the British troubles; rather they sought to make a profitable use 
of their alliance with the British, China's weakness was exposed in her 
successive discomfitures, both military and diplomatic, at the hands of 
Britain, France, Russia and Japan; revolts and insurrections in the out­
lying provinces and dependencies indicated the Chinese imperial govern­
ment's loosening grip over these regions.
The decline of China's power stimulated Nepal's military ambitions 
in Tibet and the hope of British support made Chinese retribution a less 
dangerous prospect in Nepalese eyes than it was before. Since the war in 
1788-92 Nepal's relations with Tibet had been uneasy as indicated by the
periodical disputes over border tracts and trade matters. The Amban medi-
60
ated in these disputes but not always ±0 the Nepalese satisfaction.
There were also other causes of soreness. The Nepalese merchants at Lhasa
66. The Nepalese in Tibet sometimes complained of the overbearing con- 
duct of the local Chinese officers, but the government at Kathmandu 
put up with it because, so Hodgson observed, "They were faced with 
the only alternative in the event of breach with china, that is 
closer alliance with the British which would have enabled them to 
set at defiance the resentment of the Chinese.... They must know 
that any closer alliance with us for the purpose of their protectioon 
against China implies their political dependence upon the British 
government, but to this they will never submit, but as the k last 
resort to save their government from extinction? P.C., 27 August 
1832, No.18.
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complained of maltreatment and the Nepalese missions to Peking of their
harassments by the & Tibetan authorities. In fact, however, these were hut
pretexts for Jang Bahadur, who found in the Chinese preoccupation in the
Taiping rehellion his opportunity to annex some Tihetan territory. This is
why, perhaps, Jang Bahadur offered military assistance to the Emperor to
crush the rehellion, and then invaded Tihet when the Emperor declined his 
61
offer•
The British governments attitude to Nepal's war with Tihet was one
of keen interest, sharp vigilance and noninterference in what they regard-
62
ded as an internal crisis in the Chinese Empire. Dalhousie, the Governor- 
General, saw that, he had "no right to interfere and no interest in interfer­
ing in an issue which is wholly between Nepal and China**, and *»when it 
does not appear calculated in any way to injure the interests of the Bri­
tish government or unduly increase the power of Nepal". Nepal, he believed, 
was a Chinese tributary. Yet, as Chinese intervention , as in 1791-2,was 
not impossible nor also the involvement of Sikkim and Bhutan, the Indian 
government could not just be indifferent to the event; and Jang Bahadur was
63
told accordingly.
Jang Bahadur asked for British assistance when the Nepalese army 
suffered reverses and when the Amban stepped up pressure on him for peace. 
The British reply to Jang Bahadur was ; "whatever emergency might occur and
61. Parker, "Nepaul and China", p.81.
62. On Nepal's war with Tibet see my article "Nepal-Tibet War,1855-6”, 
J,U.5,I«, April-June 1964* PP.175-94. A.C*Campbell, supdt. of Darjiling, 
to Govt., 17* 25 May 1855* N«R.» Vol.9* The military arrangements and 
the course of the war are given in great detail in a register in the 
Madan Puraskar Pustakalaya, Patan, Kathmandu. A si&ilar register exists 
in the Commandari Kitab Khana, Jangi Phant, Kathmandu,
63. 3.C,* 26 May 1854* N0.5O, Resident to Govt., 6 May 1854* No,51* Dalhou- 
sie's Minute, 12 May 1854* Ibid., 25 August 1854* Nos*52,54* Dalhousie's 
Minutes, 16, 22 August 1854.
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whatever disaster might happen to his troops", no help could he given
to Nepal because
besides involving a breach of treaty it would 
disturb mercantile transactions annually amo^ it- 
ing to from thirty to forty times more than the 
gross revenues of this kingdom (NepaJ. 64
The British policy of noninvolvement was based on their interpretation 
of China's attitude to the war. Colonel Ramsay, the Resident, was con­
fident that China would abstain from military intervention unless the 
Nepalese troops entered deeper into Tibet, and this appeared to him 
impossible for several reasons : the defeats lately sustained by the 
Nepalese army and the resultant damage to its morale; the enormous cost
65 66
of the war; and its general unpopularity in Nepal; the Amban*s insistence 
that Jang Bahadur end the war,and the latter*s growing fear of Chinese
67
military intervention in favour of TibeJ.
In March 1856 the war ended with a treaty very favourable 
to Nepal, It requited the Tibetan government to pay Nepal an annual tri­
bute L : of ten thosand rupees; allowed the Nepalese merchants the privi­
lege of duty-free trade in Tibet and the Nepalese subjects extra-terri­
torial rights; a Nepalese representative, called Vakil, would reside at
64, S«C«, 28 December 1855* No,88, Resident to Govt., 8 November 1855»
65, The war cost Jang Bahadur a sum^ of 2,685*568 rupees. Suba Buddhiman 
Vamsavali, p.251. The total^ revenue of the state in 1851 was suppo­
sed to be five million rupees. C^ Cavenagh, Rough Notes on the state 
of Nepal, its Government, Army and Resources, pt>.7o--n.
66. "The war has been unpopular since its very commencement and all classes
throughout the country have suffered by it in proportion to their me­
ans, or it would be more correct to say out of all proportion to the­
ir means • • • • All trade has been severely interfered with, and in 
many parts of the country even the cultivation of the soil has been 
partially interrupted. In short, the prosperity of the State has 
been most injuriously, though perhaps temporarily, affected.". SUg^ .,
■2$ August I856^Resident to Govt., 15 July I856,
67. 3«C., 50 November 1855* No,81; 28 December 1855* Nos.82-8.
125
68
Lhasa to safeguard his country*s interests. Nepal undertook to assist 
Tibet in the event of external aggression. But under the Amban’s pre­
ssure Jang Bahadur had to give up his demand for the bordering Tibetan 
terrmtor^ which the Nepalese army had occupied-Kuti, Kerung, Taglakot, 
Chowur Gumba and Dhakling. Jang Bahadur, no doubt because the Chinese 
power was an obstacle to Nepalese ambitions, seemed trying to remove that 
power when as one of the conditions for peace he asked the Chinese to 
withdraw from Tibet and recognise 'Tibet’s independence5 China, he 
urged, should only retain a Vakil at Lhasa just as Nepal would have hers. 
The Amban not only flatly rejected this proposal but obliged both the 
Nepalese and Tibetan governments to "agree that the Emperor of China
69
is to be obeyed by both states as before". But this apparent political 
gain of China carried with it what proved to be an onerous responsibi­
lity for her. Nepal looked to China as the guarantor or her |Ne pal’s] 
Tibetan interests; it followed, then, that China’s failure to protect 
these interests would compromise . her relations with Nepal.
The confirmation of China’s suzerainty over Nepal 
by the treaty of 1856 d-id result in any strengthening of her aatual 
position there, and therefore caused the British no concern at all. The 
British had no suspixrlon that Jang Bahadur would make political capital 
out of Nepal’s relations with China. On the contrary, he seemed to dis­
like them. As Orfeur Cavenagh, the Political officer attached to Jang
68. Previously a subordinate officer, called Naikay, was posted at Lhasa. 
See p.fo&;fn.2.
69. 5.C., 28 December 1855* No.81.Aitchison, Treaties,(1909 edn.),n, pp. 
97-100, fn.Article II of the treaty stated that Nepal and Tibet "have 
both borne allegiance to the Emperor of China up $0 the present time". 
See also Chapter Vi, p.243*f».
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Bahadur*s mission to England in 1950*51* observed,
Jang Bahadur would have severed the connection 
between Nepal and China which he evidently con- 
dered derogatory to his own country.
But then, he dared not estrange the Chinese without an assurance of
70
British support, in Jang Bahadur's loyalty the British government had 
confidence which his assistance during the Mutiny fully confirmed, phis 
assistance was all the more significant when contrasted with the fact 
that he had readily exploited China's preoccupation in the Taiping rebe­
llion. It was also noteworthy that Jang Bahadur did not take advantage 
of the synchronism of the Mutiny and the second Anglo-Chinese war (1856- 
60). The defeat of China im that war tarnished her image in Nepal and
proportionately enhanced the British prestige, in the words of. Ramsay,
The k late change in our political relations with 
China has caused great excitement here very favour­
able to our prestige, for although the Gurkhas 
admire our superiority as a nation to themselves, 
they had great doubts as to whether our power could
in any way be compared with that of China-now the
sardars are asking whether we have not lately con­
quered and taken possession of that country. 71
Jang Bahadur’s attachment to the British seems to have made the 
Chinese a trifle uneasy. In 1871 Jang Bahadur told Colonel Richard Law­
rence, the Resident, that in I860 the Emperpr had asked him to furnish 
details of his services to the British during the Mutiny and the honours
he had received from them; the Emperor had also wanted to bestow some
72
equally high honour on Jang Bahadur. The Chinese accounts say that
70. Q.Cavenagh, Reminiscences of an Indian Official, p.169*
71* ff.P-A, October 1861, No.44? Resident to Govt., 10 July 1861.
72. IFP, Vol.760, July 1871, No,100, Lawrence to Govt., 22 May 1871.
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earlier in 1857-8 the Emperor had given presents and buttons of rank
73
to Jang Bahadur and Surendra Vikram, the King of Nepal. The Chinese
accounts also say that the Epperor wanted the resumption of^ Nepalese
tributary mission which the Taiping disturbances had interrupted, in
May 1870 a Chinese mission visited Kathmandu; in the following year
Jang Bahadur received the title, Ihong^Ling-Ping-Ma-Kuo-Kan-Wang which,
as translated by his son, meant “Leader of the Army, the Most Brave in
Every Enterprise, Perfect in Everything, Master of the Brave people,
74
Mighty Maharaja".
The Indian government viewed the Nepalese missions to 
Peking as of mere symbolic importance to both Nepal and China, and so 
from, the British interests point of view they were unobjectionable.
When Jang Bahadur sent a mission in 1866 the British did not suspect 
any political motivation. The Resident saw "cupidity" as the impulse; 
Jang Bahadur seemed to Ramsay eager to receive from the Emperoi pre­
sents which were of "great intrinsic value", since they consisted of
bales of silk and satin, Chinese embroidered bukkos 
or cloaks, porcelain, ivory, jade, tortoise shell 
and other ornaments, pictures and sorts of artificial 
curiosities.
The Nepalese tribute to the Emperer, on the other hand, was of "trifling
75
value". The mission^ inability to go to Peking and return from chengtu
73* Parker, "Nepaul and China", p.81.
74. IFP, Vol.760, July 1871, No.100, to Govt., 22 May 1871.
P.J*B.Rana, Life of Jang Bahadur, pp.281, 285. The author, however, 
says that the title was given to his father in April 1872. in 
Hemraj Vamsavali, p.198, the date is given as 1928 Vikram samvat, 
corresponding to 1871 A*D. Lawrence translated the title as "The 
Highly honoured (the Most Noble) Commander and Controller of Mili­
tary and Political Affairs, the Augmentor and instructor (Discipli­
narian) of the Army, the Aggrandiser of the Country, the satisfier 
of the Law and High by increasing the Prosperity and Revenue of the 
Country, the Great Inheritor of Fidelity and Faithfulness to the salt". 
Landon, Nepal, I, pp.246-7 says that the title signified "Truly 
75* 3ee the next page. [continued on the next pageT)
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76in I869 led J.W.3.Wyllie, the Acting Foreign Secretary, to comment
that the "last links" between Nepal and China "are broken, and that
Nepal had been drawn into somewhat closer union with the British Empire
of India'1. This, he added, "matters little for England" but for China
it was of great significance , "for the final loss of all connexion with
77
China distinctly marks a further stage in the decadence of the Empire".
It proved, however, a false prophecy. In 1876 the British Minister in
Peking, Thomas Wade, reported that the Nepalese government had asked
for the Amban* s sanction to send a tribute mission to Peking. The Indian
Foreign Department's reaction was expressed thus :
tfe have no reason to question the loyalty of Bir 
Jang Bahadur, but rather the contrary, and it 
appears... in the highest degree improbable that 
this periodical interchange of presents will lead 
to a rapprochement with China in a sense hostile 
to us. The fact is that Bir Jang Bahadur's cupidity 
is the motive spring. He sends yaks tails and gets 
back gifts ... He gives a trout and catches a salmon.
Any attempt on our part to interfere would be unwise. JQ
Although it was recognised that "these missions kept up an artificial
importance for the Chinese throne which its military power could never
have gained for it", the Indian government disclaimed any "locus standi*1
in the matter. Wade was informed accordingly. "The Government of Nepal",
ran the Indian government's despatch,
"is not, in fact, in the position of the feudatories 
of the Indian Empire. It enjoys an independent national 
life, and possesses the power of making war, enter-
valiant prince, Commander-in-Chief of the army". See also Chapter
VI, pp.237-8, 246.
73. F.P-A. June 1866, No.163, Resident to Govt., 9 June 1866.
76. See pp.129-30*
77* W.W.Hunter, ed., Essays on the External Policy of India, by J.W.S.
Wyllie. p.197* J-T.Wheeler, Summary of Affairs, pp.217-8.
78. F.BwA. September 1876, Nos.129-33, Bept.Notes.
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ing into treaties and sending embassies without let or hindrance 
from the British government,. •. But apart from these considera­
tions, the relations at present subsisting between the British 
government anC the Government of Nepal, as represented by H.E.
Sir Jang Bahadur, are of so cordial a character that the Gover­
nor-General in Council has no reason to apprehend that this perio- 79 
dical interchange of presents with China will lead to complications.**
In fact, these missions were for the Rana government means of profitable
commercial transaction; a large variety of commodities, opium being the
main, was sent along with the missions for disposal in China, and all
80
the commodities passed duty free. For the British government also 
these missions served as useful means of obtaining informations about 
inner regions of Tibet and China; besides, when British explorers in chi­
na found themselves in difficulty with the loual people, they sought
81
the help of these missions.
In fact, the British government had no reason to be 
anxious about the Sino-Nepalese relations which seemed to indicate cool­
ness rather than cordiality. Chinese distrust of the Rana government 
increased commensurate with the latter*s intimacy with the British, The 
Nepalese missions to China were suspected of doing espionage work for 
the British and were closely examined while entering and leaving the 
Tibetan territory to prevent any Englishman travelling in disguise. The 
1866 mission was not allowed to go to Peking and was as&ed to deliver 
the tribute at Tachienlu where it was kept waiting for several months
79* ET«3-A, September 1876, No.131> r? I.H.Thornton, pffg.Foreign secy., to 
Wade, 25 July 1876.
80, See also Chapter VI, pp. 228, 243, 246, 250-51.
81. T.J.Cooper, one such explorer, sought the help of the Nepalese mission 
at Chengta and Bathang in eastern Tibet; the Nepalese, however, refu­
sed to take him along with them to Lhasa for fear of Chinese disapp­
roval. Cooper, Journal of an Overland Journey from China towards ind- 
ia; pp.53, 68, 74.
before,at the repeated requests of the head of the mission, £■§ was 
permitted to proceed to Chengtu. There the mission was accommodated in 
a ’‘dirty hovel” outside the town where the local Chinese officers trea­
ted it with, “extreme discourtesy”, hoping thereby to effect its return 
to Kathmandu. In May I869 the Resident reported that the death of seve­
ral members of the mission, allegedly caused by Chinese harassments, 
had angered Jang Bahadur so much that it was unlikely that anjr more miss­
ion would be sent to Peking in future. The situation seemed to the Resi­
dent tp resemble that in 1854 when maltreatment of a Nepalese mission 
had afforded Jang Bahadur a pretext to invade Tibet. At Chengtu the 
Nepalese mission received the Emperor's final order to return to Kath­
mandu because the road to Peking was unsafe owing to disturbances.
Jang Bahadur, however, suspected that this was a mere plea; possibly, 
he thought, the Emperor was annoyed that the mission had been sent four 
years later than its due date. Opium worth four and a half lakhs of 
rupees carried by the mission could not be disposed of in China and had
to be brought back and stored in the Nepalese warehouses at Lhasa, before
82
it could be sold at a much lower price to the Indian government. The
1877 mission was also subjected to much inconvenience before it could
reach Tachienlu, and this led Lytton to anticipate a Nepalese attack
on Tibet. The mission after great difficulty succeeded in reaching Peking
in late December 1879 and was lodged in “dirty buildings”. V7ade saw the
leader of the mission much to the dislike of the Chinese officer in charge.
82. F»P-A> October 1867, NQ.127; August. 1867, Nos.53-4; July 1868, No.
203; June 1873> Nos.462-75- F.3-1,(Foreign secret intelligence),
1870, Nos.400-04- N.R.» Vol.13* Lawrence to Col.Houghton, 13 April 
I869. Also F.P-A* May 1875* NO.104A. Foreign Revenue B Proceedings, 
April 1872, Nos.4-7- T.J.Cooper, Travels pf a pioneer of Commerce, 
pp.158-9, 398.
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The mission returned to Kathmandu in June 1882; instead of the normal
period of about two years it had taken almost five years to complete
the journey, E.C.Baber, the British Consular officer at Chungking,
believed that
the reasons why the Chinese government keeps the 
Nepalese at a distance is probably that it is by 
no means anxious to maintain close relations with 
a country so nearly connected with India*
Besides, he added, "as the tribute missions were little more than dis­
guised trade ventures, the Chinese fear that they will sooner or later
83
develop into a commercial establishment in Western China"* And this
establishment might serve the economic and political interests of the
British, Jang Bahadur*s allies* The steadily deteriorating relations
between Nepal and Tibet in the later decades of the century and the
84
former*s bellicose attitude was an additional worry for the Chinese, 
who seemed to Baber to be "apprehensive not for the integrity of their
,65
frontier but for the security of its bulwark or rather buffer, Tibet?
The Chinese, so it seemed to the British, came to treat
Nepal as Britain*s vassal. During the second Anglo-Chinese war, for
instance, the Russians were believed to have been trying to instigate
the Chinese to goad the Nepalese against the British in India. But the
Chinese Emperor in rejecting this suggestion was reported to have pointed
out to the Russians that
Nepal is subject to the English barbarians. Were we 
to propose that it should place its resources at our 
disposal for an attack upon India, it would be certain
83* P5LIt Vol.20, no.140 of 1878, Baber toR.Fraser, charg^ d*Affaires in 
Peking, 2 August 1878. Also Ibid., No.65, 14 July 1882.
84. See pp. 142-3*
85* Baber to Fraser, op.cit.
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to decline giving offence to the English, and the only 
result would he to open the door to their demands and 
reclamations.
From this the Indian Foreign department deduced that
•. • the Chinese not only look upon Nepal as a feudatory 
of England, hut that they regard the tie binding her to 
us as much stronger than that hy which she is hound to 
them, and which latter probably consists of nothing more 
than the so called embassy, 86
IV
From the mid-lSTC^s the British were seen to take an increasing 
interest in Nepal*s relations with China and Tibet, the result of which 
was the gradual establishment of indirect British influence over these 
relations. Britain*s general attitude and p&licy towards China and Tibet, 
in which Nepal came to figure larger and larger, brought about this deve­
lopment.
The period saw the intensification of the international scramble 
for concessions in China and for spheres of influence in her dependen­
cies some of which bordered on the Indian Empire. France, for instance, 
established her sway over Annam and Tongkin, threatening British inter­
ests in Burma and Si&m* Russia strengthened her position in Chinese 
'Turkestan, the Pamirs and the Upper Oxus, and was able to put pressure 
on the northern frontier of British India. The Indian government, as a
86. F,S-A» September 1876, Nos.129-33> Dept. Notes.
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measure of security, made counter moves, stepping up their activities
87
in Chinese Turkestan, the Pamirs, Hunza and Nagar, Burma and Siam* such 
activities created ill-feeling in the Chinese government which for the 
British government in England was a matter of serious consideration.
The Home governments policy on the Indian frontier was generally cau­
tious. They considered Indian frontier problems from the wider stand­
point of their bearing upon Britain*s relations with other European 
powers. The Indian government were, therefore, repeatedly asked to 
avoid any precipitate action on the frontier which would damage Britain*s 
imperial interests in the wider sense. Arty misunderstanding with China 
on the Indian frontier had the possibility of compromising Britain*s 
general relations with China, and this, the Home government feared,
Prance and Russia, Britain*s rivals in Asia, might exploit. Britain’s 
global conflict with these two powers thus found a reflection on the 
Indian frontier, and for the sake of this conflict the Home government
considered it worthwhile to be on good terms with China and, if possible,
88
to use her as an ally.
The second half of the 19th century was an “era of 
commercial optimism11, when the British were actively interested in deve-
87. These were two small chiefs&ips situated to the extreme north-west
of Kashmir and extending towards the north into the mountains adjoin­
ing the junction of the Hindukush and Mustagh ranges; on their south 
lies Cilgit. The two chiefs acknowledged the suzerainty of the ruler 
of Kashmii. in 1890*s the states assumed considerable strategic import 
tance in view of the Russian advance to the Pamirs and Kashgar, both 
the places having easy approached to Hunza. They were brought under 
British control in 1891-2. fhe’Mir* of Hunza paid a small amount of 
gold dust as tribute to the Chinese authorities at Kashgar|as a price 
for retaining his claim to Raksam and Tagdumbash districts situated 
to the north of the Hindukush watershed-and thms in Chinese territory. 
C.Alder, British India’s Northern Frontier, 1865-1895» PP-236-7*
Lamb, China-lndiajBorder, pp.94-8* Aitchison, Treaties(1909 edn.),
XI» PP.257-9.
88. c.N.Curzon, Problems of the Far East, pp.276-80. S.E.Roberts, History
[Continued on the next pageg
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loping trade with Tibet. Explorers, adventurersrs missionaries and 
officials stimulated this interest, their reports and accounts convin­
cing the British: trading community that Tibet was a veritable traders* 
paradise. Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim being the direct and easy approaches 
to Tibet, it was natural that the British should be active in these sta­
tes. In 1861 an expedition was sent into Sikkim followed by a treaty 
confirming a British protectorate over it. in 1889 its administration 
was taken over by tfee British, the administering authority being a poli­
tical Officer resident at Gangtok. Alongside, trade routes were develop­
ed in Sikkim. A campaign into Bhutan in 1865 resulted in the annexation
89
of the Duars in return for an annual subsidy to its authorities.
Incessant pressure by international powers increased the 
anxiety of the Chinese government who resented the British activities 
in the outlying Chinese dependencies, particularly Tibet, as detrimen­
tal to Chinese interests in these regions where the imperial governments 
hold had already weakened. The Chinese would not easily concede commer­
cial facilities to the British in Tibet in view of the known opposition 
of the Tibetan government as well as China*s own distrust of the British 
intentions. As Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim were looked upon by China as 
constituting the outer defence of Tibet, the increasing British influence
of French Colonial Policy, n, pp.419-98. D.H.Dallin, The Rise of Ru­
ssia in Asia, pp.15-41* Lamb, Britain and Chinese Central Asia, pp.54- 
238. Alder, op.cit., pp.72-299* Morse, International Relations,n,pp. 
239-415* Dorothy Woodman, The Making of Burma, pp.205-331* E.V.G.Kier- 
non, British Diplomacy in China, 1880-85, pp.205-331*
89. Lamb, op.cit., pp.87 et seq. A.P«, 1862, Vol.XL, East India (Sikkim 
Expedition). A.P», 1865, Vol.XXXIX, Papers Relating to Bhutan, politi 
cal Missions to Bhutan, Report of Ashley Eden. History of Sikkim. , by 
the Maharaja and Maharani, pp.134, 175-207* White, op.cit., pp.19-32, 
275 et seq.Gawler, op.cit. Edgar, op.cit. Colman Macaulay, Report of 
a Mission to Sikkim and the 'Tibetan frontier with a Memorandum on our 
Relations with. Tibet.pp. et seq. Aitchison. Treaties i 1909ecLh. \ .tt. 
PP*298-306, 325-30.
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in these states was from the Chinese point of view a threat not only
to the security of Tibet but to China*s traditional position in her
satellite states. Tributary relations with these states had for the
later Manchu rulers of china considerable prestige value, and so they
90
would not acquiesce in the loss of these relations.
The Indian government, on the other hand, viewed Chinese suzerain­
ty over the Himalayan border states as only a myth and having no prac­
tical validity. They had not interfered with the traditional relations of 
these states with China and Tibet because they had not affected British
interests inrfchese states, but should they do so the Indian government
/
would not hesitate to contest the Chinese suzerainty. This became in­
creasingly apparent from the last decades of the 19th century. In such 
circumstances Nepal1s relations with China and Tibet assumed considera­
ble significance in the eyes of the British, the more so because their 
relations with the Nepal darbar after Jang Bahadur’s death took a 
bad turn over the gurkha recruitment issue and the question of restric-
91.
tions on the Resident's movement.
One of the first acts of Ranuddip was to despatch a mission
to Peking, presumably to inform the Bmperor of his assumption of
power, In the following year he received the Chinese title given earlier
92
to Jang Bahadur by the Bmperor. in 1883 a Chinese delegation came to 
Kathmandu to present Ranuddip with a dress of honour appeftainingjto the 
title. Bir Shamsher was also reported to have sent a mission in August
90. J.K.Fairbank, and 3,Y.feng, "On the Ch»ing Tributary System", Harvard 
journal of Asiatic studies, June 1941* Bee also, Chapter VI*pp.242-5*
91. Bee Chapters II and III.
92. IFP, Vol.1216, February 1878, Nos.178-83; Vol.1217* India political 
Letter to Becy. of Btate, No.33* 1 February 1878 and No.52, 15 
February 1878.
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1886 to obtain the Emperor*3 recognition of his accession, in 1889 a 
Chinese delegation can^ e to Kathmandu to confer on Bir the usual Chi­
nese title.Bir*s reception of the delegation in customary pomp and cere­
mony was interpreted by the Resident as his "open subservience"to China;
—  tr
he wanted that the Viceroy, Lansdowne, should make a representation to
93
the prime Minister. Lansdowne, however, was discreet. He could not let
China undermine the British: position in Nepal any more than he could
damage Britain*s general relations with China by openly challenging her
traditional relations with Nepal, The Indian government had by now had
several diplomatic bouts with China regarding the Pamirs, Hunza and
Nagar, Burma, Siam and the Tibetan trade. China had made it clear to the
British that she would not abandon her claim to suzerainty over states
having historical relations with her. What made the Indian government
more uneasy were the reports of China being active in Sikkim and Bhutan.
In 1873> for example, the Amban had in a letter to the Sikkim £aja asked
him to prevent the Eritish from constructing trade routes in Sikkim; else,
94
the 1$aja would be punished, in I876 a Chinese and a Tibetan officer 
were reported to have arrived in Bhutan; the Deb raja promised to oppose 
any road building activity by the British and received the assurance of 
Chinese help. This appeared to J.W.Edgar, the Deputy Commissioner of 
Darjiling, as "a sort of offensive and defensive alliance" between China
95
and Bhutan. In 1888 the Amban was reported to have sent another mission
93. HC, Vol.92, No.282, J.Walsham, British Minister in Peking, to Foreign 
Office, London, 4 January 1887* LNP, Vol.XIII> Note on Nepal Affairs 
by Lansdowne, 18 September 1839.
9 4• Edgar, op.cit., pp.15-7*
95* IFP, Vol.1 2 1 6 , February 1 8 7 8 , n o s .1 6 6 - 7 6 ,  Edgar to Lord H.Ulick Browne, 
Commissioner of Rajshahi and Cooch-Behar, 27 November 1877*
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to Bhutan with the suspected intention of exploiting its political inst­
ability and strengthening Chinese influence there* Mortimer Durand, the 
Foreign Secretary, warned the Viceroy that the incident deserved **care- 
ful watching”. The next year, during negotiations with china on the
determination of Sikkim*s boundary with Tibet, China vigorously asserted
96.
her suzerainty over Sikkim. Lansdowne, while privately admitting to 
Cross, the Secretary of State, that China*s claim, was not altogether
97
baseless, could not publicly entertain it for fear of strengthening 
similar Chinese claim on Bhutan and Nepal. Durand, who was the British 
representative in the Sikkim negotiations, advised Lansdowne not to”look
with complacency”/'what, appeared like China*s attempt to establish her
A
authority on the Himalayan border states. He warned that grave difficul­
ties would arise if these states were not brought under exclusive British 
influence, it was in his view clearly anomalous that Nepal, Bhutan and 
Sikkim should continue to have dual relations with Britain and China.
96« in July 1886 'Tibetan troops intruded into Sikkimese territory at 
Lingtu on the Darjiling road. A small British expedition was sent 
to expel the Tibetans in March 1888. it was followed by negotiations 
between the British and the Chinese for the delimitation of Sikkim»s 
frontier with Tibet. During the negotiations the Chinese claimed 
that Sikkim was their vassal state; the Raja of Sikkim held a Chinese 
title and a coral button, paid homage to the Tibetan government, and 
the "$ibe;fcans being vassals of the Chinese, such homage would in 
effect have been rendered to China”• The Amban insisted that the Raja 
continue to wear the button and pay homage even if he was a British 
protected potentate. The British rejected the claim.? ultimately, the 
Chinese accepted that Sikkim was under the direct and exclusive influ­
ence of the British. This acceptance was embodied in the Anglo-Chinese 
Convention Of 1890, which was followed three years later by k flrade 
Regulations regulating indo-Tibetan trade. Aitchison, Treaties , n, 
PP*330-4* 333-9* F.Younghmsband, India and Tibet, pp.47-52* DP*
Sikkim Commission , contains many.letters, all private, written by 
Durand toP. Mackenzie Wallace, Private Secy, to the Viceroy, A.C.Lyall 
and others. See also India secret Desjajch to Secy.of state,^ 0 Janua­
ry; No.28, 12 February;No.86, 7 June;^ August? No. 156,21 October 
1889. LNP, IX* Vol.I, Lansdowne to Cross, 29 January, 22 April, 24 
May 18B77
97* Ibid., Letters dt.22, 29 January 1889.
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Earlier Durand had expressed his "belief in the"untold strength latent 
in China" , and had seen "nothing wildly impossible" in China*s "innu­
merable slowly moving armies quietly overflowing Nepal which has seen
98
them before and pays tribute" to their Emperor. All this, it appeared 
to Lansdowne, deserved "serious attention" of the British government. He 
had no doubt that "all along the slopes of the Himalayas the Chinese are 
endeavouring to set up the exercise of some kind of authority beyond their 
own frontier". Upon Nepal, the Viceroy saw, China was "clearly endeavouri­
ng to increase her hold", it was a "source of great danger to us", he in- 
formed Cross, especially when he consideredABir 3hamsher*s relations with 
the Indian government were "still very ill-defined and likely to lead to 
complications". The Chinese mission to Nepal, seem in the context of 
China*s activities in Sikkim and Bhutan, suggested to Lansdowne that she 
had "deliberately adopted as a part of a general policy" the subversion 
of the relations of these states with the British government. Nor could 
the latter overlook a report published in a Chinese official document and 
sent to A.Y/.Paul, an officer with considerable experience of North-East
99
frontier affairs, by Father Desgodins, a French missionary in China. The
report stated that the Amban had informed the Emperor that Nepal contained
rich gold mines, coveted by the British and Russians; that"an Englisnman
98. DP, Letter Book, 1882-3, Durand to George Chesney, 26 June 1882.
P.O. Letters, Book No*2, Durand to Dufferin, 28 November 1888, to Lans­
downe, 23 December 1888. Sikkim commission, 1999, Durand to Mackenzie 
Wallace, 3 January 1889, to W.Cunningham, Qffg.Foreign secy., 14 Janu­
ary 1889, to A.C-Lyall, 29 January, 12 May 1889* India secret Letter to 
Secy, of State, No.3, 8 January 1889, Durand*s Memorandum, 1 jany. 1889. 
Ibid., No.28,12 February 1889, Durand*s Memorandum, Sykes, Mortimer 
Durand, pp.163-6*
99* Paul was the Deputy Commissioner of Darjiling, political officer in 
Sikkim and ....brie b of the British delegates in the Anglo-Chinese 
Convention regarding sikkim.
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could, in fact, already have opened up a mine in Nepal"; in order mot to 
be outdone, the Emperor should dend some great mandarin to "protect this 
friendly country*? and other mandarins versed in European learning to''live 
there permanently". Desgodins commented that "to anyone knowing the Chin­
ese, who have not opened up the rich gold mines in Tacftienlu, Batang,
Yunnan etc., it is clear that opening up mines in Nepal is only an excuse
to establish themselves firmy before the English, just as the Tibetans
100 101 
wanted to do in Sikkim". The exiled Badi Maharani had also written to
the Viceroy, pointing out that Bir Shamsher had some political object in
entertaining the Chinese mission when it was not unknown to him that over
the Sikkim issue the British were having troubles with china, in such
circumstances, Lansdowne could not "help being afraid that we may have
102
trouble with the Nepalese and through them with China before long". But 
then, however disquieting the incident might be was the ground strong 
enough for immediate intervention? The Viceroy on sober reflection thought 
not. "The Chinese and the Nepalese", he admitted, "were both strictly with­
in their rights in sending and receiving the mission now at Kathmandu", 
and the occurrence was "more or less an usual one". Besides, Nepal was not 
an Indian feudatory state, and on her foreign relations, Lansdowne noted, 
the British government could claim no control. Above all, when the Indian 
governments general policy then was to keep on good terms with Bir for . 
the sake of Gurkha recruits, Lansdowne thought it politic to wink at this 
incident until some other and stronger evidence was found regarding a sino-
100. India secret Letter to Secy, of state, No.1417 ^ 8 August 1888, A* Des-
godins to A.W.paul, 19 July 1888.
101. wife of the late prime Minister, Ranuddip Singh, and a refugee in
India since 1885 when she fled from Kathmandu, see Chapter :ii, p.7A-
102. LNP, IK, Vol.I, Lansdowne to Cross, 6 August 1889*
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Nepalese intrigue against the British.
Lansdowne *s decision was influenced by the Home govern­
ments unwillingness to rub China hard mn the Indian frontier and there­
by give a handle to Rmssia and France. Cross reminded Lansdowne that the 
Foreign Office wished for "many and I dare say good reasons to keep on 
the best of terms" with the Chinese who, he added, should, therefore, be 
given "no reasonable ground for offence." Salisbury, the Foreign Secre­
tary, while generally agreeing with Lansdowne that in Sikkim British infl­
uence should be exclusive, advised the Viceroy to show the "utmost 
forbearance towards the Chinese", because John Walsham, the British Mini­
ster in Peking, had warned the Foreign offioe that China would be very 
annoyed if the Indian government repudiated her symbolic suzerainty over
Sikkim. Lansdowne himself held that although in Sikkim his government
103
would establish "exclusive and undivided" supremacy, his general policy 
was to deal with the Chinese "as tenderly as we can in order to remain 
on good terms with them in other parts of the continent". Lansdowne want­
ed to persuade the Chinese government that Britain and China*s interests
in Central Asia were "identical", and so they should join hands to oppose 
Rmssia; the Viceroy also hoped to use China as a bulwark against the
1 0 2 /T l n p , Vol.XIIIt Lansdowne*s  Note on Nepal Affairs 18 'September-
1 8 8 9 . Ardagh Papers, Vol. 1 0 , Lansdowne*s Administration in the Fore- 
gn Dept.,pp.1 3 ,  8 3 -4 .
103* LNP,IX, Vo^I, Lansdowne to Cross, 29 April 1 9 8 9 . Durand wrote thus : 
"If we give way in respect to Sikkim, we must be prepared to
do so, at some future time, not only in regard to Bhutan and
Nepal, but with regard to Kashmit and her feudatories, such 
as Hunza and Nagar, and with regard to any of the smaller 
Himalayan states which may have ommmiited themselbes. we 
might even have China claiming suzerain rights over Dar jee- 
ling and the Bhutan Dooars, which we acquired from her so- 
called feudatories."Memorandum by Durand in India secret 
Letter to Secy.of state, No.2 8 , 12 February 1 8 8 9 .
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French: in Siam and the Russians in the Pamirs, in regard to Kashgar ,
104 105
Hunza and Nagar, the Burmese tributary mission to China, and the British
foG
frontier with China in Burma,and Siam, the Home government urged the
Indian government to give due consideration to China *s susceptibilities
107
and as far as possible to accommodate &er interests, in such circumstan­
ces, the Indian government had to be circumspect in regard to the suspect­
ed Chinese moves towards Nepal. They recognised how embarrassing Nepal'd 
relations with China could be for India, but the time was not yet ripe 
for interference with these relations, especially when it was certain to 
anger the Nepalese. Lansdowne disposed ofj the issue with the remark
that if an opportunity for placing our relations with 
China and Nepal on a less precarious footing were to 
offer itself, such an opportunity should not be allow­
ed to go by. 108
In regard to Nepal*s relations with Tibet the British attitude
was more than of wao moro than e€ watchful interest; it was one of
anxiety and disapproval. The main object of Nepalfs policy in Tibet was
to defend the ri i^ts and privileges secured by the treaty of I856 and,
when this proved difficult due to the growing opposition of the Tibetan
government, to seek territorial compensation in the bordering Tibetan
104. Although Hunza was brought under British influence during Lansdowne*s 
period, the British recognised China*s symbolic suzerainty over the 
state by allowing the tribute from the "Mir” of Hunza to the Kashgar 
authorities to continue. PSM, A*170 (1911)« H»C, Vol.l38> Nos.493t 
529* Foreign office to India office, 14 April 1893? !!":.! India office 
to Foreign Office, 2 May 1893* Lamb, China-jndia Border, pp.94-8. 
Alder, op.cit., pp.236-7* Aitchison, Treaties,(1909 edn.),xl» pp. 25 7-7.
105. After the annexation of Burma in 1886 the British after much reluc­
tance agreed that the customary decennial mission from Burma to China 
would not be interfered with. However, no mission actually went; in 
I896 the British formally declared its discontinuance. HC, yol.84, 
N0.3O8, Memo on Burmese Mission to China, 1886. Woodman, op.cit.,
pp. 247-67*
106. Ibid., pp.284-95*
107 and 108 see the next page.
tracts by threats of military action. For several years the Nepalese 
traders at Tingri Maidan had been, complaining of ill-treatment at the 
hands of the local Tibetans, in the 1870*s the Nepalese merchants at 
Lhasa made similar complaints. The Nepalese Vakil at Lhasa observed a 
military spirit increasing among the Tibetans and their mounting hosti­
lity to Nepalese interests in Tibet, in 1871 the Chinese delegation 
which came to Kathmandu to confer the Chinese title on gang Bahadur 
failed to bring about any improvement in the strained relations between 
Nepal and Tibet. In 1872-3, following the Nepalese Vakil*3 withdrawal 
from Lhasa, both the governments made military preparations. At Kath­
mandu rumours spread that the Amban had toured along the southern Tibet­
an frontier presumably to ascertain the strength of the Nepalese forces 
on the border, The Resident privately informed the Foreign Secretary 
that Jang Bahadur was ready to attack Tibet if assured of British aid.
In 1883 the Nepalese shops at Lhasa were looted by Tibetan monks who 
refused to put up with the swaggecing behaviour of the local Nepalese 
traders. Kathmandu demanded compensation of three k lakh taels. Upon 
orders from Peking an enquiry was made by the Amban who found the Tibetan 
monks guilty and fixed the indemnity at one lakh taels. Rejecting the 
sum as inadequate the Nepalese government made warlike preparations and 
despatched four regiments to the frontier. Soon after a high ranking 
lama was reported to have been sent from Peking who managed to coax the
107* LNP, IX, Vol.I, Lansdowne to Cross, 13 January, 22 January, 27 Feb- 
ruary, 22, 29 April, 24 May, 28 June, 26 July, 9, 16 August, 26 Nov­
ember, 10 December 1889; Cross to Lansdowne, 18, 30 January, 24 Apr>- 
ril, 6 June, 3 October, 12 December 1889* Ibid., ix, Vo^H, Lansdow­
ne to cross, 14 July 1890. Ibid., ix, Vol.Ill, cross to Lansdowne,
2 December 1891*
108. Ibid., Vol.XIII, Lansdowne*s Note on Nepal Affairs, 18 September 
18££.
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disputants into a settlement. Towards the end of 1885 Kathmandu recei­
ved one lakh taels as compensation, the Chinese government having paid 
on behalf of the Tibetans as much as 80,000 taels, some years afterwards 
troubles recrudesced, this time over the barter rate of exchange between 
Nepalese rice and Tibetan salt. The Nepalese traders refused to take 
salt at the rate demanded by the 'Tibetans whereupon the latter tried to 
smuggle it at times by even killing the Nepalese customs officers on the 
border. The Commissioner of Kumaun reported the Nepalese troops having 
been sighted on the border near Taglakot. The Lhasa government had to 
tender apologies before the Nepalese troops pulled out. in November 
1895 on the Amban* s persuasion the two governments held a joint commi­
ssion for the settlement of the barter question as well as certain boun-
sary disputes. In the following year an agreed settlement was made which
109
the Nepalese government hailed as their diplomatic victory.
The Indian government in the 1870*s disliked this "almost 
yearly appearance of hostilities" between Nepal and Tibet because of 
their injurious effect on Bengalis frontier trade. Jang Bahadur's request 
for military and financial assistance was turned down which damped the 
Prime Minister's zeal for war; but his brother, Dhir shamsher, was un­
deterred. The darbar was divided into two parties, one in favour and the
109* F.P-A, July 1871, No *100 ? June 1875, Nos.462-75; August 1874, Nos.
1-9; October 1874, No.97, Keep With, Dept. Notes. IFP, External,May 
1883, No.302; June 1883, No.427; September 1883, No.&9; April 1884, 
Nos.239-42; January 1886, No.90. HC, Vol.58, no.581, Foreign office 
to India office, 3 September 1883; Vol.64, no.487, Viceroy to secy, 
of state, Telg.31 May 1884; Vol.65, No.702, political Letter to Secy, 
of State, No.41, 27 June 1884; Vol.81, No.1812, Foreign Office to 
India Office, 29 December 1885• P3I, Vol.20, 2 February 1894, No.8, 
Note of S.C*Das, 31 December 1883 enclosed. IFP, External, Vol.3740, 
September 1890, No.14; November 1890, Nos.74-5* P5LI, Vol.85, D.O. 
letter from the Resident to Govt., 14 April I896, Govt*s reply, 22 
April 1896; Vol.86, No.101, 19 May 1896; Vol.87, :.No.118, 16 June
1896; Vol.89, r.so.184, 21 October I896, EP, vol.19, Elgin to Lord
Hamilton, seoy. of state, Telgs.25 Febtf^ry , 17 April 1896,tesS\«^]
144
other against a Tibetan campaign. Girdlestone urged the Government to
advise Jang Bahadur to peacefully settle the dispute, and to strengthen
his hands in dealing with the "war party". He requested Jang Bahadur to
replace his Vakil by another more agreable to the Tibetans. The Indian
government were willing to mediate in the dispute but Jang Bahadur show-
110
ed no inclination to abail himself of the opportunity. This, however,
was hardly surprising in view of the extreme jealousy with which the the
Nepalese government viewed the commercial aspirations of the British in
Tibet which conflicted with Nepal's own commercial interests in Tibet.
As early as 1862, for instance, when the Bengal government were trying
to develop their trade with Tibet through Sikkim the Resident noted
Jang Bahadur's concern because
our opening trade with Lhasa would be a serious 
blow to its {Nepal's] own commerce there of which 
it has now a complete and lucrative monopoly.
Jang Bahadur was suspected of exerting "secret influence" on some part­
ies at Lhasa to foil the British objective, his argument being that the 
British were engaged in road building activities in Sikkim with some 
ulterior political motive, and that if they were not totally excluded 
from Tibet, Tibetan religion and society would be endangered. Jang 
Bahadur was also reported to have tried to increase his influence at 
Lhasa by backing a party contending for power; he was believed to have 
promised the party his support, if it kept the British away from Tibet
Hamilton to Elgin, Telg.4 March 1896. P,J»B<.Rana, op.cit., p.305* 
Edgar, op.cit., p.20. shakabpa, op.cit., pp.193-4* Lamb, op.cit., 
PP*153-5*
110. F.P-A, June 1873, Nos.462-75; October 1874,No.97, Dept. Notes.
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and promoted Nepalese interests there* Ramsay, on "being instructed by 
the Government, lodged a strong protest with Jang Bahadur, warning him 
that
as the British government is always desiroud to see the 
peaceful and civilising influence of commerce and mutual 
intercourse between nations as widely as possible extend­
ed, it did not fail to view with disfavour any attempt on 
His Excellency*s part to perpetuate the policy of the 
exclusion of Europeans from Tibet. Ill
This conflict between the British and Nepalese interests in Tibet 
became in later years an important issue between the two governments.
There was another reason why the British discouraged Nepalese 
hostility towards Tibet : possibility of international complications 
and rift with China following the impression that the British were using 
Nepal as a tool to further their own objectives in Tibet. The risk of 
misunderstanding with China increased further when the Indian govern­
ment decided to supply arms to Nepal in return for Gurkha recruits.
Even before such supply had actually been made Mortimer Durand thought 
of asking Bir Shamsher to forcibly eject the Tibetan intruders from 
Lingtu. He privately asked the Resident, Major. Durand, about "the prac­
ticability and expediency of getting the Nepalese to try their new wea- 
112
pons as our allies or substitutes". The idea, he confessed, had "some 
objection", and was "doubtless immoral", but still "seems worth consider­
ing". Durand wanted to know from the Resident what the Nepalese wanted
111. F.P-A, April 1862, No*302, Resident to Govt., 17 April 1862; 
august 1862, Same to same, 24 July 1862; September 1862, Same to 
same, 9 August, 5 September 1862. Sarat Chandra Das, the Indian 
government* s secret agent to Lhasa, re ported in 1883 that the local 
Nepalese traders bitterly resented the opening of the Darjiling- 
Siliguri railjline and the development of the Sikkim trade route, ft* 
had led to the introduction of Indian products into Tibet to the
detriment of Nepalfis trade with Tibet* Journey to Lhasa and central 
Tibet (ed. by W.W.Rockhill), p.91. The Nepalese pressed the Tibe­
tans to close the Sikkim route. Macaulay, op.cit., pp.74* 82.
112. TSfce- thjsf).tfeatfferpagsy'1-: ■>.r\ D— t* 2*1 j, 9 'Jo v, 13 33.
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113
in Tibet and whether they were afraid of China.
114
Lansdownefs arms arrangement coincided with a fresh round 
of disputes between Nepal and Tibet, and Elgin*s decision hot to meet Bir 
3hamsher*s "preposterously large" requisition for arms was influenced by 
the Home government’s consideration of adverse Chinese reaction. For 
"imperial reasons", the Home government wanted "specially to be on good 
terms with china" at this time, when Britain’s difficulties with Russia 
and France regarding the Pamirs and Siam respectively and the negotiations 
with China for the delimitation of the Burmo-Chinese frontier had entered 
upon their final and most delicate stage, in such circumstances, it app­
eared to the political and Secret Committee of the India office that
the Government of India in providing for the import­
ation of arms to a country over whose foreign relations 
they had no control were taking a new departure and 
undergoing a new responsibility. 115
Consequently, before agreeing to give arms, Elgin had to make it clear to 
the Nepalese government that in view mf their' many international obliga­
tions the British government could not permit
the importation of warlike material into Nepal in 
quantities which Your Highness’s other neighbours 
might consider excessive or as constituting a menace 
to them and would expose the Government of India to
the risk of imputation which might possibly involve
very undesirable complications. 116
The Nepalese government had, therefore, to gcndertake not to use the Bri­
tish arms against Tibet. This undertaking, as it applied to all subsequent 
delivery of arms to Nepal, could be said to have given the British a measure
112. The weapons were those which the Nepalese had smuggled from India.
See Chapter m ,  p82.
113* P.P., P.O.Letter Book, No.2, p.l69. Private Telg. 9 November 1888.
114. See Chapter m ,  p. 99*
115* PSI, Vol.20, No.8, 2 February 1894, Minutes of S.C.Bayley and A.Lyall.
116. PSLI, Vol.77, No.189, 17 October 1894, Enclo.2, viceroy to the King 
or Nepal, 15 May 1894.
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of indirect control on Nepal’s relations with Tibet to the extent, at 
least, of lessening the risk of a Nepalese attack on 'Tibet.
Nepal’s disputes with Tibet reached an acute stage in 1895*6. 
Elgin hoped he could persuade Bir Shamsher to rely upon the British 
government’s influence with the Chinese who would be requested to make 
the 'Tibetans agree to an immediate settlement of the dispute. Elgin’s 
real object, as he disclosed to George Hamilton, the secretary of state, 
was just to "use the name"of China more with the object of humouring her 
than of actually bringing her up as an active mediator and thereby 
strengthening her influence on Nepal and Tibet. It was necessary to 
humour China because Elgin saw her "oscillating towards Russia and
117
Prance whose influence is on the wax in China while ours is on the wane".
The India Office, however, objected to this policy, it
appeared to William Lee Warner, the Political secretary, as "a marked
departure in the history of our relations with Nepal", because, he said,
on all eailier occasions when Nepal had quarrelled with Tibet the Indian
118
government had refrained from involvement. Chinese mediation on British 
sponsorship, S*C.Bayley, a member of the Political and secret Committee, 
noted, might anger the Nepalese who were not yet known to have approached 
China for mediation. Nepal and Tibet had both relations with China and 
could, if they so liked, make such appeal themselves. Therefore, in 
Bayley’s opinion, "if China does, not interfere spontaneously or at the
117. EP, Hamilton, 18 March, 30 July 189&. HC, Vol.164, No. 185, 
Viceroy to secy .of state, Telg.25 February I896.
118. Lee Warner had obviously overlooked that in 1791*2>when there was 
war between Nepal and Tibet,Cornwallis had tried mediation, see p.110. 
Also Chapter I, p.24.
instance of either party1*, the Indian government had better not "take 
the initiative, at all events at the present stage" nor urge Nepal to 
do do. Besides, if China intervened at the British instance and Nepal 
rejected the Chinese advice, China would naturally expect British support 
to enforce her decision. lf‘ then, the British supported China, Nepal would 
be annoyed, while if they did not, misunderstanding with China could not 
be averted. Besides, Hamilton observed that China was so weak and "so 
discredited that we can hardly believe her capable of any assertive 
authority over her quasi-vassal states". Elgin was, therefore, advised 
against any "undue use of China’s name and authority", for if the British 
asked china to intervene in Nepal’s disputes with Tibet on the present 
occasion, it would be interpreted by China as British acknowledgement of 
China’s suzerainty over Nepal, and this was against the political inter­
ests of the Indian government themselves, it was also significant that 
although arms had been supplied to Nepal, China had as yet made no pro­
tests, either because she was ignorant of the matter or had regarded it 
as the natural manifestation of Britain’s special interests in Nepal.if, 
however* the Chinese did protest now on the ground that it exacerbated 
Nepalese militarism, Lee Warner would tell them that Nepal had purchased 
all arms "fairly1*, and so the British government saw no reason to inter­
fere with such purchases. This, however, was not Hamilton’s view. The 
Secretary of state did not want any riflt with China on account of Nepal 
and so while approving of Elgin* s policy of giving arms to Bit shamsher, 
he impressed upon the Viceroy the risk of such rift, it also seemed to 
the India Office from the Resident’s report that the dispute with Tibet 
was but an excuse for Bir shamsher to increase the armed strength of
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Nepal with British assistance. Therefore, the "best policy seemed to the
Secretary of State was to wait and t watch the course of the dispute
without making any attempt to influence it. China, it was seen, was too
occupied in her war with Japan to desire a military intervention in the
dispute. But if she did intervene or if Tibet defeated Nepal-an equally
unlikely event-the British could not avoid, intervention “because Mindia
could never allow a foreign power to occupy Nepal”. However, soon the
119
dispute was settled thanks to China*s mediation. The reaction of the 
India Office was one of relief, for it was apprehended that a war bet­
ween Nepal and Tibet "must have produced" for the British "embarrassments
120
and complications with China".
The recurring disputes between Nepal and Tibet were
obvious pointers to China*s difficulty in managing her satellite states.
Since British interests required prevention of these disputes, they had
to seek to assume control of Nepal*s relations with Tibet. Circumstances
in the first decade of the 20th century were such that it seemed the
British might attain their object, prom the^SipiiJISeapoint of view the
decline of Chinese power proved of dubious advantage. Nepal continued to
look to China as a power "too distant to constitute a real threat" to her,
but China was no longer "too close enough to serve as a potential source
121
of support against aggression from the south". The inevitable trend in 
Nepal*s foreign relations, therefore, was towards an increasing accommo­
dation with the British..
119* See 1>. 143.
120. EP, Vol. 14, Hamilton tcpslgin, 28 February, 17 April 1896; Vol. 19* Same 
to same Telg.4 March 1896. HC, V0I.I64, No.183, Minutes of Lee Warner 
and Bayley, March 1896} V0I.I65, No.332, Viceroy to Secy,ofjktate, Telg.
17 April I896. P3LI, Vol.86, No.101, 19 May I896, Enclo.Resident to 
Govt., 2 May 189b. :
121. Rose, op.cit, p.215*
C H A P T E R  F I V E
HEPAL AND THE Y0UNGHU3BAND MISSION 'TO 'TIBET, 1903-04.
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Sir ohamsher died on 5 March 1901. His brother, Deb
Shamsher, succeeded him, but before three months had elapsed was
1
deposed and exiled by his younger brother, Chandra Shamsher. Qiie 
coup was significant because, first, it was bloodless-a rare event
m
in Nepalese politics-and secondly, an ex-Resident, Col.H.Wylie, knew 
from Chandra Shamsher's letters to him that he was not happy over 
Deb's succession and Mid not mean to sit down qMetly if opportu­
nity should occur to better his position*" Chandra ohamsher had 
assured Wylie that the coup would involve "no loss of life and that 
everything should be done in such a way that nobody could be shocked 
or annoyed". From the British interest point of view, Wylie privately 
wrote to Lee Warner, the change was a "good one". Chandra Shamsher 
was "clever, sharp and quite ready to be loyal" whereas Deb Shamsher
was "much addicted to drink, conceited and overbearing"; worse still,
2
he was "the Nepal nationalist, averse to the English", In fact, 
however, this was a prejudiced view, As Colonel (E.C.Pears, the Resi­
dent. at the time of the coup,tells us, Deb was deposed because he 
was considered by his rivals as not anti- but pro-British and too 
progreessive in his views. Deb had allowed Curzon to make a hunting
1. P3LI, Vol.130, Reg No. 447; Vol*155, Reg.Nos.949. 957* CRP, Vol. 
160, Curzon to Hamilton, 3 July 1901. Deb was removed to Bhankuta 
in Eastern Nepal whence he escaped to Darjiling. He failed to 
get British support to regain power. He died at Mussoorie in 1914• 
P3LI, Vol.139, Reg.No. 144&A; Vol.140, Reg.Nos. 1479A, 1558A, 
1557A.
2* PSLI, Vol.l34> Reg.No. 772, Wylie to Lee Warner, 2 July 1961.
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Ato the Terai-the first Viceroy to be given such permission* Deb had 
taken bold steps towards the abolition of slavery and had also en­
couraged the spread of education in Nepal which alarmed the powerful.
4
obscurantist elements in the dorbar. However, Wylie's estimate of 
Chandra Shamsher proved correct; no Prime Minister of Nepal served the 
British, government better than he* t
Chandra Shamsher1 s accession coincided with a crisis
in Tibet which stemmed from two developments s the Tibetan government1 s 
assertion
^against the steadily weakening Chinese control; and the Indian govern­
ment1 s determination to bring Tibet under their sphere of influence 
so that it did not pas3 under the Russian fold. Chinese power and 
prestige in Tibet1 which was already in decline reached a very low ebb 
in the closing years of the 19th century. ‘The disastrous defeat by 
Japan, the rebellion in Kansu and North-West China, the growing 
Russian pressure on Manchuria and Mongolia, the tribal uprisings in 
Eastern Tibet-all strengthened the Tibetan government1 s impression 
that China was too weak to protect them from foreigners, particularly 
the British,whom the Tibetans feared as an aggressive and annexation­
ist power. What the Tibetans particularly resented was Chinas acquie­
scence in the loss of Sikkim to the British. They repudiated the
5« Earl of Ronaldshay, The Life of Lord Curzon ,11, pp.l££-9*
Curzon1s earlier proposal, to Bir Shamsher to visit Kathmandu 
had "taken the breath away" from the Prime Minister. CRP, Vol. 
158, Curzon to Hamilton, 2 February 1899* Vol.l60, Curzon to 
Hamilton, 17 April 1901.
4. PSLI, Vol.l35» Reg* No.957, Secret Letter to Secy.Of State,
No.125* 1 August|l901; Vol. 139* Reg.No.l446A, Pears to Govt.
7 November 1901.
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Anglo-Chinese Conventions regarding ^British protectorate over 
Sikkim (1890) and their commercial rights in Tibet (1893)* They 
uprooted the boundary pillars demarcating the frontier between Sikkim 
and Tibet, intruded into the Sikkimese territory at Giagong and re­
fused to vacate it; their contention was : the Anglo-Chinese agree­
ments concerning Tibet were not binding on her because she had not
5
sighed them* The spirit of independence from Chinese control intent 
sified with the coming of age of the 13th Dalai Lama, an extremely 
energetic and ambitious personality* The Dalai Lama, determined 
to reign as well as rule, had frequent conflicts with, the Amban 
regarding administration. Considering the fact that Britain and 
China feared Russia and the Czar had many Buddhist subjects living 
in Siberia and Mongolia who venerated the Dalai Lama, it was not 
unnatural for the latter to calculate that close relations with the 
Russians was the best insurance against Chinese and British press­
ure. The many Mongolian Buriats-Russian dubjects-who studied in the 
Lhasa monasteries could serve as the medium of communication between 
the Dalai Lama and the Czar* The Czar, Nicholas II, himself was
keenly interested in Tibet possibly viewing it as another place on
6
the Indian frontier whence he could put pressure on the British.
The Chinese, for their part, were anxious to hold on to their posi­
tion in Tibet*
5 * Francis Younghusband, India and Tibet, pp.50-65««
6. D.J.Dallin, The Rise of Russia in Asia , pp.42-3.
For the life of the 13th Dalai Lama see C.Bell, The 
Portrait of the Dalai Lama* Tokai Toda, The Thirteenth Dalai 
Lama. Toda was at Lhasa in 1913-23 as a student of Lamaism 
and later as the Dalai Lama^ unofficial adviser in Foreign 
affairs.
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As for the British, they had no intention to give up their 
treaty rights in Tibet which assumed considerable political signi­
ficance under Curzon*s Viceroyalty. Curzon was convinced that the 
Tibetan problem could not be settled through Chinese mediation;
China was not only unable to make the Tibetans honour her agreements 
with Britain, but- unwilling to do so because the exclusion of foreign 
influence from Tibet which served as a buffer between British India 
and the Chinese province of Szechuan was China's settled policy. 
Curzon in several despatches to Hamilton pointed out that the exis­
ting policy of dealing with Tibet through the Chinese government
7
was at once ’'unproductive and inglorious" , and therefore the
Viceroy wanted to establish direct relations with the Dalai Lama.
He would use Britain* s commercial, rights in Tibet as a convenient
instrument of pressure on the Dalai Lama with' the ultimate object
of bringing Tibet under exclusive British influence, which influence
in his opinion was the only safe guarantee against Russia^  filling up
the political vacuum in Tibet caused by the breakdown of Chinese 
8
power there.
Of the Russian government's interests in Tibet Curzon was 
for long aware. On their intrigues with the Dalai Lama he had recei­
ved between 1899 and 1901 many reports from a variety of sources, 
official and non-official. These reports spoke of the exchange of 
delegations by the Dalai Lama and the Czar. One Mongolian Buriat,
7T PSLI, Vol.112, Reg.No.415» Secret Letter to Secy.Qf State, No.
60, 30 March 1899 • CRP, Vol.158, Curzon to Hamilton, 23 March 
1999.
8. For Curzon's Tibetan policy see A.Lamb, Britain and Chinese 
Central Asia, pp.237-317* Peter Fleming, Bayonets to Lhasa.
Shakabpa, Tibet, pp.205-23*
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Dorjieff - "by name, was strongly suspected to be the key figure in
the Russo-Tibetan secret intercourse. Between 1899 and 1901 Curzon
had made three attempts to open epistolary communication with the
-  9
Dalai Lama,and their failure considerably enraged him. By the autu­
mn of 1901 Curzon was convinced of the Russian intrigues at Lhasa, but 
as to the extent of these intrigues and whether or not the Dalai Lama 
had actually been won over by the Czar he needed some more and authen­
tic information in order to adopt a strong Tibetan policy. Curzon 
was determined to nip the Russian menace in the bud, and the only
way to forestall Russian predominance in Lhasa, he maintained, was
10
by"being in advance ourselves". His plan which he sketched out in 
a private letter to Hamilton dated 11 June 1901 was to step up 
pressure on the Tibetan frontier adjoining Sikkim, to drive the Tibet­
ans from. Giagong and, if opposed, to occupy the Chumbi Valley and 
then, finally, to compel the Tibetan government to negotiate for 
a settlement at Lhasa. The object of the settlement, he added, was 
to convert Tibet into a buffer between the Russian and Indian Empires 
and thereby prevent Russian influence seeping through Tibet into
Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim and disturbing their relations with the
11
Indian government.
But it proved hard to convince the Home government who
were against any forward movement in Tibet which would be resentdd
by China and create international complications for Britain. The
9• Lamb., op.cit.,pp• 242-52• A.P., 190 4 V63J., LXVIl* East India 
(Tibet) : Papers Relating to Tibet, pp.102-20, India Secret 
Letter to Secy,Of State, 26 October 1899*
10. CRP, Vol. 160, Curzon to Hamilton, ll|June, 11 July, 31 July 1901.
11. Ibid., V0I.I6O5 Curzon to Hamilton, 11 June 1901.
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Home Government were quite aware of Curzon* s Russophobia and his
views as to how to tackle the Russian threat to India* When Curzon*s
appointment as Viceroy was first announced, Hamilton was a trifle
uneasy because Curzon, through his writings, had “somewhat committed
himself” to “a more advanced policy1* than the Secretary of State
approved of* Hamilton, in his own words, "never believed” that Russia
had any serious intention of invading India althou^i he did recog^ -
nise that she used her position in Central Asia as a lever to worry 
12
the British* As for safeguarding the Indian government* s commer­
cial interests in Tibet, the game, in the India Off ice* s opinion,
was not wotth the candle s the Tibetan trade was not only small in
15 14
value but showed not imjch :•. promise of future expansion either* 
Curzon*s "somewhat aggressive” Tibetan policy, Hamilton feared, 
would enrage China- and this for several reasons the Home govern­
ment wanted to avoid. Negotiations which were in progress for a
15
commercial treaty with China would be affected; Russia might take
advantage of the Anglo-rChinese rift and also use Britain* s pressure
on Tibet as an excuse for her own pressure on Chinese Turkestan,
Manchuria and Mongolia. Besides, the Home government's hands were
otherwise full s the Boer War, the Boxer indemnity issue, the Anglo-
French rivalry in .Egypt and North Africa, checking Russian advances
12. HMP, C125/5, Hamilton to Elgin. 4 October 1898.
15• The total value of' this trade in 1898-99 was Rupees 5450810*
7/ith Nepal the trade was valued at Rupees 57475510. A.P., 1910* 
Voll"CtV? Statistical Tables, Bast India, pp.248-9*
14* P3LI, Vol.112, Reg.No.4151 Note by C.Bernard, 17 April 1899*
The annual value of this trade in 1895-4 was 188996 rupees; in 
1894-5> 218907 rupees; in 1895*-$>>208011 rupees; in I896-7,
209862 rupees; in 1897-8, 225246 rupees. A.P., I9IQ*;---  A9?
15. The Treaty of Shan^ iai was signed on 5 September 1902.
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towards Persia and the Gulf, the uneasy relations with Habibullah, 
the Amir of Afghanistan, and the Pathan tribes on the North-Western 
frontier. Any addition to this load of problems was considered most 
undesirable. Besides, pending more authentic and definite information 
regarding the precise nature and object of the Dalai Lama's intri­
gues with the Czar, Hamilton thought it unwise to put pressure on the
Dalai Lama lest, instead of detaching him from the Russians, it
16:
goaded him into a firmer alliance with them.
There was yet another consideration s misunderstanding 
with Nepal whose jealousy and suspicion of British activities in 
Tibet was well known to the Home government. The Nepalese government 
who were extremely sensitive about their independence and very anxious 
to keep the British influence as far away as possible might be alarmed 
if this influence were established so close to their territory. It.
17
seemed to Lee Warner and Lyall not unlikely that the Nepalese might
even join the Tibetans and Chinese to oppose Curzon*s moves. The
Viceroy, it appeared to Lee Warner, had overlooked this, and so the
latter regretted that "the importance of Nepal in the political
system of India is too often minimised1 • It was most impolitic, he
18
warned, to get behind Nepal; Curzon, it seemed, was doing just
that-and because he distrusted the Nepalese. The Viceroy, for instance,
while trying to contact the Dalai Lama, had thou^it of sending an
16. CRP, Vol.l^O, Hamilton to Curzon, 4. 11 July 1901*
17* A.C.Lyall was Member, India Council.
18. HC, Vol.196, No.2166, Lee Warner's Note, July 1901, Captain 
Peach's Note on Tibet; No.2151, Lyall*s Note, 17 July 1901;
Vol.197* No.2175* Secret Despatch to India, No.26, 16 August
1901. CRP, Vol.160, Hamilton to Curzon, 25 July 1901.
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emissary to Lhasa via Nepal hut later dropped the idea because the
^ln^ormed him that it was impossible to carry out the project without
the Nepalese government’s knowledge, and Curzon for himself did not
want^he dorfo&r djjtg^i^know about a "matter of such delicacy1; No
wonder, then, that nothing was said to Chandra Shamsher about the
Tibetan situation until the Prime Minister himself raised the issue
with the Resident.
Chandra Shamsher, so he told Pears, learnt about the
Czar’s receiving a Tibetan mission from the Pioneer, an Indian
newspaper, but his initial reaction was rather one of curiosity than
anxiety. The Nepalese agent at Lhasa, Captain Jit Bahadur, was
asked to enquire and was assured by the Tibetan authorities that
the reports were baseless and they had been designedly got up byjthe
British to sow dissension between Nepal and Tibet, Chandra Sham-
sher was not quite convinced; the reports could be mere "myth", but
3till it was worth ascertaining whether the British knew about them.
20
Accordingly, the Prime Minister asked Pears.
Chandra Shamsher’s query opened out for Curzon an 
important possibility : using the Nepalese agency at Lhasa as an 
observation post and intelligence transmitting centre, a means to 
keep close watch on the Dalai Lama and Dorjieff. Information^ from 
this source wase.likely to have more effect on the Home government 
than those supplied by others-British officers at Darjiling, Kalim-
19. PSLI, Vol.l35> Reg.No.930, India Secret Letter to Secy.Of State, 
No.123, 25 July 1901.
20. HC, Vol.198, No.2429* Chandra Shamsher to Pears, 13 July 1901. 
PSLI, Vol.143, Reg.No.571; Vol.142, Reg.No.448.Chandra to 
Pears’ January 1902.
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pong, Sikkim and Peking* Informations about Dor jieff1 being still 
"somewhat scanty", Curzon wanted more details about him and his act­
ivities* Besides, it appeared to the Viceroy, rather a "curious 
fact" that a mission, possibly headed by Dorjieff, had reportedly
passed through Kathmandu to India on its way to Russia by sea, but
21
the Nepalese government seemed to have had no knowledge about it*
On request., Chandra Shamsher agreed to keep the
Resident informed of the developments in Tibet as reported by Jit
Bahadur from . Lhasa* For the Prime Minister,who had recently come
to power, this was an opportunity to ingratiate himself with the
British government- a spirit perhaps fostered by the additional
consideration that if he did not cooperate with the British, he
might be misunderstood by the Viceroy who could even make political
use of Deb Shamsher who in the meanwhile had fled to Darjiling. Jit
Bahadur set up a secret service at Lhasa and roped in some Tibetan
and junior Chinese officers as paid informers; members of the Dalai
Lama's household-his gardener, cook and personal physician-also
served him in like capacity. At Kathmandu Nepalese police shadowdd
22
Tibetan pilgrims and interrogated them about affairs at Lhasa.
Reports from Lhasa and Kathmandu sent regularly by 
the Resident to Government corroborated some facts and confirmed
tfc* i®fo*±S O:
many more. Curzon relied uponAJit Bahadur^s-whom he described as 
"a sagacious and accurate informant-repeat* as "our main authority"
21. HC, Vol. 198* No.2429* K*Daly, Deputy Secy. Foreign Dept, to
Pears, 1 August 1901. PSLI, Vol. 145* Reg* No.480, C.S.Buckland,
Chief Secy .Bengal, to Secy. Foreign Dept., 17 October 1901.
22. Ibid., Reg.No. 571* Chandra to Pears, 25 December 1901, Chandra
to Dr .Armstrong, Actg.Resident, 26 February 1902.
for the events at Lhasa. The weakness of the Amban, so Jit Bahadur 
reported to Chandta Shamsher, had, indeed, made the Dalai Lama swo­
llen-headed. In the Lhasa monasteries, he added, there were many 
Mongolian monks, the most important of them being one Khendechagga 
whom the British promptly identified as Dorjieff; he was the Dalai 
Lama's tutor in metaphysics and his confidant; he had gone to Russia 
only recently and had returned with some Russians disguised as 
Mongolian monks* He was believed to have made the Dalai Lama a gift 
of Russian rifles and the Tibetan monasteries large sums of money 
obtained presumably from the Russian government. His proceedings 
were suspicious, Jit Bahadurrs informers reported; he rarely came 
out of the Dalai Lama’s private apartments where he lived. All these 
were not unimpeachably true facts, but they were not just baseless 
rumours either; Jit Bahadur warned Chandra Shamsher s "there is no 
smoke without a fi±e". More news followed : Colonel Indra Vikram, 
the leader of the Nepalese tributary mission to Peking, while 
returning by way of Lhasa saw caravans bringing to Tibet what he 
believed Russian arms from Mongolia. Russian mechanics were reported 
to be turning out rifles in the Tibetan arms factories. Speculations 
were rife in Lhasa bazars about how soon Russian troops would arrive 
to face the British army believed to be preparing for a macch into
23
Tibet.
Jit Bahadur had several meetings with the Amban and the
23* RNA and Chandra's letters to the Resident, 1901-2, P3LI, Vol. 
140, Reg.No.l535A; Vol.142, Reg.No.412; Vol.143* Reg.No.571; 
Vol.144* Reg.No.644; Vol.145* Reg.Nos.807*899; Vol.146, Reg. 
Ho.977; Vol.149* Reg,Nos.ll69,1396; Vol.150, Reg.No.l658A.
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23*
'Kajis' from whom he tried to find out the authenticity of a 
strongly-rumoured agreement between Russia and Tibet guaranteeing 
Russian protection to Tibet. The Amban as well as the Kajis repea­
tedly denied the existence of such an agreement but failed to allay 
Jit Bahadur’s suspicion. Jit Bahadur kept arguing that if the Bri­
tish had smelt a rat in the Dalai Lama's activities, they had reasons
24
to do so; after all, "a dog never barks unless something is up".
In January 1902 Chandra ohamsher held a conversation 
with a high ranking Tibetan lama who had come to Kathmandu on re- 
ligious business. The lama stated that sometime ^ go a Tibetan 
delegation had passed through Nepal for India, but he could not 
confirm if that was the one which visited Russia. He also disclo­
sed that strong anjsi-British feelings in China, Tibet and Ladakh 
had led them to form an alliance which had the backing of Russia, 
and that an attack on the British would be launched in 1904* The 
lama added that if Chandra ohamsher joined the alliance he could
25
expect the extension of Nepal as far as Calcutta. Chandra
ohamsher did not take the lama's statement very seriously but his
suspicion was confirmed : the Dalai Lama did have some bee in
his bonnet and the Russians were encouraging him. This suspicion
26
was further strengthened by the remarks of Kawaguchi who told
23A. The Kajis, called in Tibetan ohap-pe-three laymen and one 
monk-constituted the Tibetan Council or the Ka-3hag, the 
principal executive body of the Tibetan government with 
general controlling power over the internal administration 
of the country. Bell, Portrait, op.oit.,p.!42. H.B.Richard- 
son, Tibet and its history, p.21.
24. PoLI, Vol.146, Reg.No.977* Chandra to Col.Rabenshaw, Offg.
Resident, 5 June 1902.
25* Ibid., Vol.142, Reg.No.309* Chandra to Pears, 13 January 1902.
26. Kawaguchi was a Japanese Buddhist scholar who went to Tibet
via Nepal in 1899-1904* His book-.Three Years in Tibet, pp.526-9,
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Chandra Shamsher that Russia had influence with the Dalai Lama and 
his closest associates. Chandra Shamsher had good reasons to he 
disturbed over the Tibetan situation.|Russian alliance would make 
the Dalai Lama powerful which the Nepalese government coufcd not but 
view with disfavour because it mi^it undermine the main plank of 
Nepal’s prestige and influence in Tibet-her military superiority. 
The Dalai Lama might also repudiate the I856. treaty and invoke 
Russian assistance to meet Nepalese reprisal .Further , Russian prot­
ection of Tibet would mean the end of Nepal’s long^ -cherished terri­
torial aspirations in Tibet.
Jit Bahadur’s reports and Chandra Shamsher’s uneasiness 
were used by Curzon to justify his strong Tibetan policy which the 
Home government were in no mood to sanction.. Hamilton in emphasis­
ing the political, military and financial objections to this policy 
had warned the Viceroy that the
Tibetans are but the smallest pawns on the 
political chessboard, but castles, knights and 
bishops may all be involved in trying to take 
that pawn.
27
This was in August 1901.
By the end of 1902, however, the Home government seemed 
to have had a far better appreciation of the Russian intrigue', at 
Lhasa and the damage it might do to Britain’s relations with Nepal. 
What, influenced the Home government’s thinking most was t£ie year-­
round report: from the Indian government and the British diplomats 
in China and Russia that a secret agreement / had been concluded 
between Russia and China which had given the former a special posi-
HKP," Vol. 160. Hamilton to Curzon. 22 August 1901.
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28
tion in Tibet. The Home government who were already exercised over 
the predominant position of Russia in North China became doubly so 
for what appeared to them a fresh instance of Russia’s outrunning 
Britain in the race for obtaining concessions and spheres of infl­
uence in China. "We cannot tolerate this", Lee Warner declared.
Nor could Curzon who considered it his”duty to frustrate this litt-
29
le game while there is yet time",
Russian influence in Tibet was rather a political
than a military problem and, therefore, the Home government were
for a political solution in which Nepal figured prominently. A
Russian invasion of' India from the side of Tibet, according to the
highest military authorities, was impracticable in view of1 the
formidable geographical obstacles. "A full dress Russian invasion
of India throu^i 'Tibet, no responsible person ever dreamed possi-
30
ble", wrote Younghusband • Tibet could hardly afford the same faci­
lities for a Russian military operation against India as 'Turkestan 
did in regard to Russia’s advance towards Afghanistan. Hundreds of 
miles of difficult terrain separated Central Tibet where lay Lhasa 
and the Russian boundary beyond Mongolia. The intervening country
28. HC, Vol.207, Nos.2710,2820; Vol.208, Ho.2963. P3LI, Vol.145, 
Reg.No.80J; Vol.150, Reg.No.1590A, Notes by S.C.Bayley, Lyall,
D.Fitzpatrick, J.Edge and Lee Warner, December 1902, January 
1903. F.0 . 800/119* Lansdowne Private Papers, E.3atow to Lans- 
downe, 11 September, 19 November, 11 December 1902.CRP, Vol.
172, Hamilton to Curzon, Telgs. 11 August, 16, 26 November 1902. 
Lamb, op.cit., pp.267-76*
29* PSLI, Vol.150, Reg.No.1590A, Curzon to Hamilton, 13 November 




was too poor to support a large army* Besides, the high passes 
between Nepal and Tibet remained closed by snow for most of the 
year, making troop movements through them, extremely difficult. Russia 
could not place across the northern Nepalese frontier as large num­
ber of troops as she could across the Afghan border, connected by 
railway with the Russian military bases in Central Asia. But then, 
there were strong political objections to Russia’s presence in 
Tibet. Russian secret agents and a small Russian army in Tibet 
could oblige the Indian government to lock up troops in the north­
east frontier , thms enabling the Russians to foment further trou­
ble in Persia and Afghanistan. Russia in Tibet could threaten the 
security of’ Nepal, Sikkim and Bhutan which formed an important link 
in India’s defence structure. Russia could subject Nepal, in parti­
cular, to pressure and undermine her loyalty to Britain* Nepal betw­
een British India and Russia could play one off against the other 
and follow a more independent policy than the British could safely 
allow her. Further, a scramble between Russia and Britain for exclu­
sive political influence in Nepal could lead to political confusion 
at Kathmandu. In short, Russian ascendancy over Tibet would create 
those very problems in the north-east frontier of India which still 
baffled the British in the north-west. Besides, Russia could enlist 
Gurkhas in her army, delivering a blow to Britain’s military inter­
ests in Nepal and snapping the most important link between the Indian
165
and Nepalese governments* Lord Roberts, now the Commander-in-Chief
of the British, army, noted thus :
Russians predominance in Tibet would not be a direct 
military danger to India, but it would be a serious 
military disadvantage* It would certainly unsettle 
Nepal and would in all probability interfere with 
our Gurkha recruiting which could of itself be a 
real misfortune* I consider it out of the question 
Russia being permitted to obtain a footing in Tibet*
We have fead and shall still have quite enough trou­
ble owing to Russia being near us on the north west 
frontier of India-that we cannot avoid; but we can 
and ought to prevent her getting a position which 
would inevitably cause unrest all along the north 
east frontier* 51
As to the Russian menace, then, there was no doubt, but as 
to how it should be dealt with there was no agreement between the 
Indian and Home governments. Curzon1s ready solution was to des­
patch a mission to Lhasa, pacific in declaration, military in com­
position and political in intention. He declared s
I am a firm believer in the existence of a secret 
understanding if not a secret treaty between Russia 
and China... I would not on any ground withdraw the 
mission. I would inform China and Tibet that it was 
going and go it should. It would be a pacific mission 
intended to conclude a treaty of friendship and trade 
with the Tibetan government. But it would be accompanied 
by a sufficient force to ensure its safety. 52
It would fight if opposed and then “Lhasa would be in our hands
35
within 2-5 months".
To the Home government Curzon* s scheme seemed rather to 
aggravate than resolve the problem; Russia might send a counter 
mission to Lhasa, thereby creating a situation like that on the eve
51. HC, Vol.206, No,2651, Roberts* Minute, 50 September 1902, j»emo“ 
on Tabet. by Col.Robertson, War Office, 25 September 1902
52. CRP, Vol.l6l, Curzon to Hamilton, 15 November 1902.
53* Ibid., Curzon to Hamilton, 20 August 1902.
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of the second Afghan war. Tibetan resistance to the British mission,
so Jit Bahadur’s report said, was certain and a full-scale war -that
would inevitably follow would create the impression abroad that
Britain had invaded Tibet, a part of the Chinese empire* Besides,
the Cabinet was unwilling to incur public criticism for undertaking
a Tibetan campaign when elsewhere the British government had already
34
had what Hamilton described later as a "surfeit of fighting".
Curzon*s plan was rejected and the India Office hit upon a novel
scheme., instead s using Nepal as a cat’s paw.
It was The Times which had first suggested that since
Nepalese interests would be endangered by Russian predominance in
Tibet, Nepal should be allowed to take any action she liked for the
defence of her trade and other interests guaranteed by the treaty of
I856. Nepal’s eagerness to fight the Tibetans was well known to the 
34A
Government, and so,The Times pointed out s
we need utter only one word of encouragement at
Kathmandu and there will be an end to Tibetan seclu­
sion within a very few hours, possibly without a 35 
single Indian regiment being sent beyond the frontier.
The idea caught on and Lee Warner shaped it into a plan. He and the
Members of the India Council strongly held that not only should the
Nepalese government know the British concern over. Russian designs
on Tibet but they should be taken inkcomplete confidence before
Curzon took any action to frustrate those designs. Curzon had no
doubt utilised the Nepalese agency at Lhasa as a look-out post but
34. Ibid., Vol. 162, Hamilton to Curzon, 14 January 1903.
34A. see Chapter IV, pp. 122-5, 141-4.
35* The Times, 24 October 1900.
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it did not appear to Earl Percy, the Parliamentary Under Secretary,
that the "idea of using Nepalese rights over Tibet as a weapon"
36
against the Dalai Lama had crossed the Viceroy's mind* In other 
words, Curzon had overlooked that "to punish Tibet we might let
37
Nepal do our work". Curzon, in fact» had not yet informed the 
Secretary of State what he thought would be Chandra Shamsher's reac­
tion if a British mission went to Lhasa. Lee Warner feared that if 
the British were involved in a military action in Tibet, the Nepal­
ese government might be embarrassed because their treaty (1856)
with Tibet obliged them to come to her assistance in the event of
36
foreign aggression. Lee ’Warner wanted Curzon to have "an immediate 
exchange of ideas with Nepal on the whole question of Tibet" so that 
Any step that the Viceroy took against the Dalai Lama did not 
create misunderstanding with the Nepalese government; "we cannot 
afford to be indifferent or to run the slightest risk of a quarrel 
with Nepal", Lee Warner added. He suggested that the Viceroy urge 
Chandra Shamsher to exert diplomatic pressure on the Dalai Lama 
and ascertain if the latter had concluded a written agreement with 
Russia and if so to what effect. If it were established that such 
an agreement existed, Chandra Shamsher should demand its revocation 
pointing out its injurious effect mn Nepalese interests in Tibet.
If political pressure failed, Lee Warner suggested, "might not
36. CRP, Vol.l6l, Percy to Curzon, 3 September 1902.
37. HC, Vol.196, No.2166, Lee Warner's Note, July 1901.
38. Aitchison, Treaties and Engagements (edn.1909), II» P*97> f.n., 
Article II of the treaty.
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Nepal be urged to send a force to Lhasa" and demand from the Dalai 
Lama an undertaking that Russian troops would not be let into Tibet? 
The British representatives in Peking and St.Petersburgh, Lee War­
ner continued, would ask the Chinese and Russian governments not 
to meddle in the dispute between Nepal and Tibet and to let them 
settle it themselves. It was very likely that the Dalai Lama who 
feared Nepal's military power would quail under Chandra Shamsher's 
admonition, but if.' he did hot and if a war followed, the latter 
would certainly come out the winner. At any rate "putting Nepal 
forward instead of our marching to Lhasa" was a far less risky 
expedient than Curzon's so called "pacific mission". If, however, 
such a mission ultimately proved unavoidable, the India Office 
would first ensure Nepalese cooperation because, so Hamilton 
pointed out to Curzon,
In addition to the material assistance we should 
thus gain, if we come to overt acts, the political 
effect outside India could be great, for it wojjsld 
be a demonstration to the world at large that not 
only the British government but the peoples of India 
were equally determined to withstand and combat any 
Russian advance into territories which command an. 
outlet to India. 39
The plan had the additional advantage that whereas China would
certainly protest if a British mission entered Lhasa, she would
probably see no objection to Nepal-a Chinese tributary-doing what
the Amban had so far failed to achieve s restraining the ambitious
Dalai Lama from a rash policy. Lee Warner's plan was accepted
39* CRP, Vol., l6l, Letter dated 11 September 1902.
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by the Eome government as the "final solution to the Tibetan prob­
lem"; Lansdowne, the Foreign Secretary, was impressed; "the Nipal- 
ese", he noted, "aae friendly and would fi^ rt". Hamilton asked Cur­
zon to sound the Nepalese government "how far their cooperation
40
could be relied upon assuming we had to move".
Curzon was annoyed with what seemed to him the India 
Office's obsession with Nepalese susceptibilities. It appeared to 
him strange that Lee Warner should suspect that the Indian govern­
ment- had not taken Chandra Shamsher into confidence when Jiii Baha­
dur's reports together with the Prime Minister's comments thereon 
had been regularly sent to the India Office. Curzon also rejected 
Lee Warner's plan; he had two major considerations against setting 
Nepal on Tibet. First, if Nepal were involved in a war with Tibet 
the supply of Gurkha recruits for- the Indian army might be restric­
ted by the dqrbar because the Nepalese army itself would require 
more men. Secondly, Chandra Shamsher would demand large supply of 
arms to which, for security reasons, the Indian government could 
not agree. In fact, Chandra Shamsher had been urging a review of 
the arms question on the ground that as Russia was supplying arms 
to tjie Dalai. Lama, Britain should make Nepal militarily stronger 
so that she could not only defend her own interests but serve aa 
an effective buffer state, The Prime Minister grumbled that "a
40. PSM, B 138, Note on Tibet, by Lee Warner, 5 September 1902. 
PSLI, Vol.150, Reg.No.l590A, Notes by Hamilton and Members of 
the.India Council, December 1902. HC, Vol.205, No.2559, Lee 
Warner's Note. CRP, Vol.161, Hamilton to Curzon, 17 September 
1902, Lamb, op.cit., pp.278-9.
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well-armed and powerful Tibet and an ill-armed Nepal would be a 
very depressing sight and an unequal match”; he expected that the 
Indian government would not like Nepal "to remain in a completely 
unprepared state” when a sudden Russian thrust towards India was 
not impossible# The contrast between what Chandra Shamsher " termed 
"free and generous supply of arms" to the Amir of Afghanistan and 
the restrictions on this supply to Nepal annoyed the Nepalese gov­
ernment most. The Durand Agreement (1893) committed the British
to both allowing the Amir unrestricted importation of arms and
41
munition^ as well as assisting him in their procurement. But the 
arms arrangement made with Bir Shamsher at the same time had restric­
tions, and some conditions had to be fulfilled by the Nepalese
42
government before the British permitted them to import arms. This 
to Chandra Shamsher was gross discrimination. Curzon, however, re­
fused to entertain this grievance. He strongly believed that Bri­
tish influence on the border states decreased injproportion as they 
became militarily strong; and this belief had been confirmed by 
his cool relations with the Amir whose extensive acquisition
43
of arms Curzon viewed with great suspicion and utter disapproval.
Curzon strongly suspected that the Nepalese were going the Afghan
way. Lansdowne*s arms arrangement with Bir Shamsher, in Curzon*s
opinion, was "somewhat similar” to the Durand Agreement with Abdur
Rahman and equally regrettable. The Viceroy wanted to put more
41* Aitchison, op,cit., XI, P*3^ 2, Article VII.
42. see Chapter III, pp. 99-101*
43* Ronaldshay, op, cit., pp.265-71* Lovat Eraser, India under
Curzon and After, p.66.
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stringent restrictions on arms supply to Nepal. He took strong 
exception to the fact that the Nepalese government had set up an 
arms manufacturing factory in 1894 which had been kept from the 
Resident*s knowledge until 1900. This he took as a clear breach 
of Bir Shamsher*s assurance to Lansdowne and Elgin that the Nepal­
ese government would keep the Resident informed of their military 
establishments and their outturn in order to Justify their perio­
dical procurement of arms through the British government. Curzon 
also knew about Deb Shamsher*s claim of having established a new 
gun powder factory which had increased the production of gun pow­
der ten fold. Deb had also taken measures to manufacture 8000 rifles 
in imitation of Martini Henry rifles and six batteries of 7-pounder 
guns. Lansdowne and Elgin in permitting Nepal to import arms had 
expected that she would not manufacture them locally but get them 
through the Indian government alone-this expectation had been be­
lied. As a further instance of Nepalese "deception", it was reported 
that large quantities of brass sheets recently imported by the 
Nepalese government ostensibly for roofing temples had actually 
been used for manufacturing cartridges. All this indicated that the 
Nepalese government were "clearly engaged in a surreptitious attempt 
to convert Nepal into a second Afghanistan", their idea presumably 
being "to hold the scales between the Russians and the English 
and to prevent the entry to their country by eithe3P", Curzon was 
aware of the Nepalese sensitivity about their independence but 
himself looked upon Nepal^nothing but an Indian protectorate the 
defence of which was the British governments responsibility. He
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would not, in short, let Chandra Shamsher exploit the Russian
intrigues with the Dalai Lama as an excuse to make Nepal militarily
strong and proportionately independent of British influence. The
Prime Minister had accordingly been warned s "we are not going to
44
wink at another Afghanistan" • Hamilton saw the force in Curzon* s
arguments but did not quite like that the Viceroy should make arms
an issue with: the Nepalese and Afghans and antagonise both at the
same time. He advised Curzon thus :
The keenness of qriental rulers to obtain arms 
necessitates gentte handling where restrictions 
upon the imports of arms have to be imposed. It 
is quite true that Nepal cannot advance any plea 
that she is in danger from external aggression, 
and although that may be a conclusive reason from 
our point of view for stopping the accumulation 
of arms in Nepal, the Nepalese will not look at 
the matter in the same light. 45
In December 1902 Chandra Shamsher, while in Calcutta on 
his way to Delhi to attend the Durbar, assured Curzon that he 
regarded the interests of Nepal as "entirely bound up with the 
British government in India", and so he would heartily cooperate 
with the British in any measure they took against the Dalai Lama. 
Nepal, Chandra Shamsher added, could not allow Russian ascendancy
46
in Tibet, for that would mean "good-bye to her [Nepal's! independence".
Chandra Shamsher's frankness was "almost a surprise" for Curzon, who,
however, did not disclose his own Tibetan policy to the Prime
44* CRP, Vol.l6l, Curzon to Hamilton, 9 July* 1 October 1902,
Curzon to A.Godley, Permanent Undersecretary, 30 October
1902. F.Q, 766/5* Beb Shamsher to Chandra, 2 December 1901.
PSLI, Vol.150, Reg.No.l551A, Chandra to Ravenshaw, 6 October 
1902.
45. CRP, Vol.l^ l, Hamilton to Curzon, 31 July 1902.




Minister except in "a general and non-committal manner*.1 The main 
object of the meeting, so far as Curzon was concerned, was to test 
the genuineness of the Nepalese government's repotted concern over 
the Tibetan situatioh.
Chandra Shamsher's assurance of cooperation strength­
ened Curzon*s hands vis-gt-vis the India Office whose fear of mis­
understanding with the durbar regarding the Tibetan issue proved 
baseless. Curzon now maintained that the Nepalese were not only 
anxious about Russian threat to their interests but looked to the 
British government to remove that threat; therefore, if the latter 
did not take necessary measures to allay the Nepalese anxiety, 
British prestige in Nepal would be seriosly compromised. This 
constituted an important argument in Curzon*s secret despatch to 
Hamilton, dated 8 January 1903* where after giving a masterly 
account of how British policy in Tibet had failed, the Viceroy 
established that the only solution to the Tibetan problem lay in 
an Anglo-Tibetan treaty negotiated at Lhasa and the posting of
a permanent British representative there to ensure the observance
48
of the treaty by the Tibetan government.
Hamilton was impressed by these arguments but not
Lee Warner who contended that if military use of Nepal was consi-
. make
dered risky, Curzon could at|Leastpolitical use of "the card which 
we have in our hands"-that is, he should 11 take advantage of our
49
relations with Nepal and Nepal's treaty relations with Tibet".
47* Ibid.
48. PSLI, Vol.151, Reg.No.182.
49* Ibid.,Vol.150, Reg.No.1590A, Lee Warner's Note.
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Instead of sending a mission to Lhasa, Curzon, Lee Warner sugges­
ted, should warn the Dalai Lama through Jit Bahadur. It was like­
ly that Anglo-Nepalese diplomatic pressure might oblige the Dalai
Lama to agree soon to negotiate with the British government-sooner,
50
if the number of Jit Bahadur*s escorts were increased, su^esting 
possible military action by' Nepal. However, if all this proved 
unavailing and if a mission were at all sent, Lee Warner would 
prefer a Nepalese mission. He was in no doubt that Nepal had strong 
grounds to intervene in the matter while the British had "no ri i^t 
to force down the throats of the Tibetans a mission to which they 
object. A British mission to Lhasa would appear as an invasion of 
Chinese territory^ while Nepalese Intervention^Jasna5Savoidable 
step taken by Chandra Shamsher' for no other feason than the pro­
tection of Nepal*s interests based on treaty and recognised by 
both Tibet and China for about fifty years. John Edge, a Member 
of the India Council,agreed with Lee Warner and noted s
In fact, our object might be better, more surely 
and more easily effected by turning Nepal on to 
the Government of Tibet than by the hazardous 
expedient of. a so called pacific mission which, 
if necessary, should be converted into a mission 
by force. 53-
In other words, British hands had better not be openly shown 
when they could work, quite effectively inside Nepalese gloves. 
However, if China and Russia opposed the Nepalese mission the 
British would have to come to Nepal's assistance. And then,
50. Jit Bahadur had thirty one escorts.
51. PSLI, Vol.150, Reg.No.l590A, Note on Tibet by J.Edge, 7 January
1903.
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If the worst comes to the worst, we or the Nepalese 
are In possession of Lhasa without having been the 
first to break our own declarations of the integrity 
of China, 52
Hamilton, on the other hand, was Inclined to support Curzon 
and to persuade the Cabinet to approve of the Viceroy*s plan, The 
Secretary of State was "really pleased" that the Nepalese durbar 
had taken "so sensible and wholehearted a view of a Russian erup­
tion into Tibet" which had served to "simplify the situation". One 
of Hamilton*s arguments with his Cabinet colleagues was that Russ­
ian influence in Tibet would make greater British control over 
Nepal's foreign relations a compellingr necessity, but then, any 
attempt to seuure that control would irritate the Nepalese govern­
ment, The (far Office, too, had already drawn attention to this
53
point.
But the Cabinet "almost spontaneously and unanimously" 
rejected Hamilton's contention and stuck to its opposition to any 
local solution of the ‘Tibetan problem as desired by Curzon; it would 
not allow a mission to Lhasa, It preferred Instead to exert diplow 
matic pressure on the Russian government and ask them to keep off 
from ‘Tibet, The Chinese government arlso w$re warned against giving 
Russia any special position in Tibet, In reply, the Russian govern­
ment disclaimed any intention to meddle in Tibet and warned the
53A.
British not to disturb the political statusjquo. of Tibet, This dis-
52, Ibid,, Private Notes addressed by Lee Warner to Godley, Lee 
Warner's Notes; Vol,151* Reg,No,182, Lee Warner's Note, 16 
February 1903*
53* CRP, Vol,l62, Hamilton to Curzon, 25 January, 28 January 1903. 
PSLI, Vol.154, Reg.No,86l. HO_, Vol.206, N0.265I, Col.Robert- 
son's Memo on Tibet, 25 September 1902.
53A., The British government also disclaimed any intention of annex­
ing Tibetan territory. Younghusband, op.cit., pp.79-83»
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claimer and warning, the Cabinet $eld, made despatching a British
mission to Lhasa at once unnecessary and inexpedient# And Hamilton
informed Curzon accordingly# The Cabinet, feowever, approved of
Curzon*s proposal of conducting negotiations on trade matters with
Chinese and Tibetan representatives at Khambajong, about twelve
miles inside the Tibetan territory# The declared object of the
negotiations was to obtain commercial facilities of a nature which
54
Nepalese traders in Tibet enjoyed# Lamb points out that
the chief significance of the mission to Khambajong 
must have been that the Home government had accepted 
the necessity for some form of British mission on to 
Tibetan soil; if Khambajong failed, the only direction 
that mission could possibly move was forward# 55
The mission headed by Colonel Francis Younghubband reached Khamba­
jong in July 1905* There it impatiently waited for four months for 
duly accredited 'Tibetan negotiators to arrive and then marched
56
to the Chumbi valley when they did not#
The entry of the British mission into Tibet raised 
Chandra 3hamsher*s hope that in the likely event of an Anglo-TLbet- 
an war, he would assist the British government and obtain in return 
some Tibetan territory# Earlier Deb. Shamsher had told the Viceroy 
that the Indian government were just to "wink an eye in his direc­
tion" and in no time the Nepalese army would march into Tibet, 
Chandra Shamsher, so Colonel C.W*Ravenshaw, the Resident, informed
54. HC. Vol.210. Ho.2405; Vol.212, ffos.2580, 26^ 3. PSLI, Vol.151, 
Reg#No#182, Secret Despatch to India, No#5* 27 February 1905» 
Vol#158, Reg#No#1504* Minutes of the Members of the India 
Council# CRP, Vol#l62, Hamilton to Curzon, 19 February, 28 May 
1905.
55« Lamb, op#cit#, p#290#
56• Younghusband, op#cit#,pp# 116-61 • 0.Seaver, Francis Younghusband 
201-15# ' ’
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Younghusband,was "thirsting for a fight with 'Tibet" and was "quite 
prepared"# Chandra Shamsher hinted that he wanted "rectification" 
of Nepalfs boundary with Tibet and kept his troops ready at four 
days5inarch from Khambajong# Younghusband, although against engaging 
Chandra Shamsher*s troops in Tibetan campaign, would let the Prime 
Minister occupy the strategic area around the Kerung pass and so 
enable him to realise the cherished desire of successive Nepalese 
statesmen; Youn^iusband would also post a Nepalese contingent at 
Khambajong to protect north Sikkim when the mission would move 
forward to Phari# Curzon, however, was opposed to any military 
involvement by Chandra Shamsher, but he accepted the latter*s offer 
of yaks and transport to show the Tibetans that Nepal was on the
57
British side#
Curzon*s attitude must have disappointed Chandra Sham­
sher. From the Nepalese point of view some form of active involve­
ment in the Tibetan crisis was very necessary if for no other rea­
son than to impress on the British that Nepal was vitally interes­
ted in the matter and,therefore, the British while making a settle­
ment with the Tibetans must not overlook or harm Nepal*s interests. 
'The only wajr for Chandra Shamsher to put himself forward was by 
assuming the role of a mediator in the Anglo-Tibetan dispute and 
to resolve it throu^i pressure on the Dalai Lama# Curzon, for his
57• F,Q., 7^ 6/7, Ylounghnsband .to Ravenshaw# 28 July# 19 August. 12
September 1905j Ravenshaw to Younghusband, 8 August, 50 August
1905, Chandra Shamsher to Ravenshaw, 29 August 1905# CRP, Vol.
160, Curzon to Hamilton, 14 August 1901# PSLI, Vol.159, Reg.No. 
: 1592A, Younghusband to Govt., Telg.5 October 1905* Reg.No. 
1605, Govt, to Resident, Telg. 28 October 1905#
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part, had no ground for objection, considering especially the
Home government*s feelings about Nepal.
Jit Bahadur kept reasoning with the Kajis that the
Tibetan government should forthwith start; negotiations with the
British for a settlement ; the Kajis replied that the fault lay
squarely with the British who were "by nature always aggressive,
just like a drop of. oil on a sheet of paper which gradually spreads
itself"; that any concession to them whetted their ambition for
more and induced other powers to press similar claims; the fate of
China was, indeed, a warning for ‘Tibet, and the Kajis repeatedly
53
stressed this point. Chandra Shamsher accused the Dalai Lama of 
having made a "serious mistake" in not sending delegates to confer 
with Younghusband who was still at Khambajong. This intransigent 
attitude, the Prime Minister warned the Kajis, would compel the 
British to adopt tougher measures which might lead to even destruc­
tion of Tibet. The British, he assured, had no territorial ambi­
tions in Tibet; they only wanted to safeguard their treaty rights 
in Tibet which China, 'Tibet’s suzerain , had recognised. They would 
never interfere with Tibetan religion; in fact, Chandra Shamsher 
pointed out, the British had genuine interest in Buddhism as evi­
denced by their careful preservation of Buddhist monuments in India. 
The Prime Minister cited the friendly relations between Nepal and
So
British India to prove that contact with the British was not /.that
58. PSLI, Vol.159* Heg.No.l639* KNA, August 1903*
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dangerous. 'The British, Chandra Shamsher added, had not only scru­
pulously abstained from interfering with Nepal’s "religious and 
social prejudices" but had "actually helped us to maintain the 
autonomy, of our country" instead of tampering with it. Nepal had
59
also obtained from them territorial reward.
Chandra Shamsher kept Curzon posted wmth his diplo­
matic efforts at Lhasa which., however, so it appeared from Jit 
Bahadur’s reports, were not proving successful. 'These reports spoke 
of the Dalai Lama’s many meetings with Dorjieff, the fresh arrival 
of Russian arms at Lhasa, the sight of Russian-1 ooking troops on 
the Ilbetan-Mongolian border, mobilisation orders to the Lhasa 
troops and the Amban’s futile efforts to persyade the Dalai Lama 
to send delegates to . Younghusband•s camp at Khambajong. It was 
obvious to Jit Bahadur that
these Tibetans do not listen to what the Amban 
says and considering circumstances it does not 
seem that they pay much heed to us also. 60
Such, too, was the impression of Curzon and Younghusband both of
whom, after reading Jit Bahadur*s"accmunts" were "certain" that
Dorjieff is now at Lhasa, that he has promised 
'Tibetans Russian support; that Tibetans believe 
Russian support will be given to them and that 
Russian arms have already been given. 6l
In such circumstances Curzon saw no reason to regard the Russian
government’s disclaimers as having any "canonical sanctity".
59* Ibid., Reg.No. 1592A., Resident to Govt., 4 September 1905* 
enclosing Chandra Shamsher*s letter to Kajis.
60. Ibid., Reg,Nos.1605, 1639* 1659*1660; Vol.161, Reg.N0s.329*
344, 373, 407, 1214; Vol.162, Reg.No.528, REA, 21 November 
1903; Vol.165, Reg.No.1180; Vol.166, Reg.No.1282, RNA, 18 
October 1903*
61. HC, Vol.216, No.3357* Viceroy to Secy.Of State, Telg.13 December 
1903*
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The only explanation of the Dalai Lama’s continued obduracy in
face of Anglo-Nepalese diplomatic pressure lay, Curzon argued,
in his expectation of Russian support* So felt Chandra Shamsher
also who, as he told Ravenshaw, seu^ io prospect of the Dalai Lama’s
agreeing to open negotiations at Khambajong; therefore, if the
mission advanced further, Tibetan resistance and a full-scale war
could not be averted. Curzo^who had been insisting on such advance^
claimed that &e had been completely vindicated. Younghusband, he
asserted,must press on to Gyantse to avomd “needless sacrifice” of
British prestige in Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim where Britain’s
62
forbearance might appear as her fear of China and Russia.
Curzon’s insistence worked. The Home government’s 
patience had now run out. Apart from Younghusband’s prolonged but 
fruitless stay, a few other incidents led the Cabinet to reluctant­
ly sanction the advance of the mission to Gyantse. In July 1903 
two Sikkimese who were British intelligence agents were arrested 
by the Tibetans while going to Shigatse. In August the Tibetans 
were alleged to have caused the death of several Nepalese yaks
carrying provision for the mission. The closure of the British
62A
trade mart at Yatung by the Tibetans was another incident. Then;
there were reports from Jit Bahadur about military preparations
at Lhasa. Curzon made much of these incidents, citing them as
proof that the Tibetans preferred hostility to any peaceful settle-
Z2 I P3LI, VQ1.161, Reg.No.547t Viceroy to Secy.Qf State, 4 Febru- 
ary 1904* HC, Vol.219, No.2547, Viceroy to Secy.Of State, Telg.
4 November 1903*
6§A. This mart was obtained b$ the British according to the Anglo-
Chinese Convention regarding Tibetan trade (1893)* Aitchison,3£» 
op.cit., p.332, Article I.
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ment of the dispute*
IL
Younghusband moved on to/Chumbi valley in December 
1903; a few days later, in January 1904, he reached Phari and then 
Tuna* By the end of March the mission was at Guru where the first 
engagement with the rabhle of a Tibetan army ended in its complete 
massacre* Next month Younghusband arrived at Gyantse. In May the
64
Tibetan troops attacked the mission and were again routed*
Meanwhile Chandra Shamsher increased his pressure 
on the Dalai Lama. His object was to create and strengthen an 
opposition to the Dalai Lama in the Tibetan administration and to 
force him to come to terms with the British. 'The Amban being the 
principal opponent of the Dalai Lama, the Nepalese aim was to 
bolster his waning power and influence. Chandra Shamsher repriman­
ded the Kajis for having repudiated the Anglo-Chinese agreements 
regarding Tibet. Indeed, he said, it had been
a serious mistake on the part of your government 
born and brought up under the fostering carec of 
China to say that the arrangement made by her, your 
constant projector and benefactor, on your behalf 
is not at all binding on you. 65
In his frequent meetings with the Amban Jit Bahadur urged him Jo
assert his authority and advised the Kajis to listen to the "nectar1-
63* Balfour Papers, PRO 30A>0-49» Viceroy to Secy.df State, felg.4 
November 1903* P3LI, Vol.159* Reg.No.l592A, Secret Letter to 
Secy.Of State, No.183, 5 November 1903* Vol.161, Reg.No.373* 
Chandra to Resident, 31 December 1903* Lamb, op.cit., pp.290-6.
64• Youn|chusband, op.cit.,pp*l62-222. P^ Landon, Lhasa, I, pp.46-346. 
B.Candler, ‘The Unveiling of Lhasa, pp.22-243• L.A.if/addell, Lhasa 
and its Mysteries, pp.78-329• W .P.0*Connor, On the Frontier and 
Beyond, pp.35-66. A«P., I9Q4WUV-II-r. pp.5-6.
65. P3LI, Vol. 163* Reg.No.687* Ravenshaw to Govt., 6 March 1904*
enclosing Chandra*s letter to Kajis. ‘The reference in this letter 
is to Tibetan refusal to accept Anglo^Chinese Conventions con­
cerning Tibet* 1890 and 1893*
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like words of the parental Amban1*; he also upbraided the Kajis 
for having insulted the Amban; the Tibetan government, he said, 
had provoked the British by attacking the mission, Russia*s war 
with Japan and her reverses were strong points in Jit Bahadur*s 
argument that it was foolish on the Dalai Lama*s part to expect 
assistance from the Czar. Jit Bahadur j^ad also several meetings 
with the Ti Rimpoche of the Gnaden monastery who was an influen­
tial lama and who disapproved of' the Dalai. Lama*s adventurous 
policjc. Jit Bahadur's pressure, it appeared, &ad some effect.
By the summer of 1904* so he reported to Chandra Shamsher, every 
one save the Dalai Lama and his closest followers had been "com­
pletely tired and exhausted", and the general desire at Lhasa was 
for a settlement with, the British for which Jit Bahadur's assis­
tance was repeatedly sought. The Kajis declared their absolute 
want of faith in the Amban and expected Chandra Shamsher*s help 
to obtain from the British an honourable peace. The Amban also 
wanted Jit Bahadur to negotiate with the British on behalf of the 
Tibetan government. But Jit Bahadur was careful; he would not 
agree to the Amban's proposal until the mission had advanced 
within two-three days' match from Lhasa or unless "the pride of 
the Dalai Lama has a fall" and he persohally begged Nepalese 
intercession. In a letter to the Dalai Laipa Chandra Shamsher
66. P5LI, Vol.166, Reg.No.1282, RNA, 15 October 1903
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strongly urged him to immedi&iely make a settlement with the British.
On 5 July 1904 the Tibetan army met with another 
disaster when the fort of Gyantse fell to the Mission. Thorou^ily 
alarmed, the Kajis, this time, reportedly at the Dalai Lama's instance, 
made urgent request to Chandta Shamsher to send a diplomat from Kath­
mandu to help the Tibetan government in their negotiations with the 
mission. Jit Bahadur reported that the Dalai Lama was repentent for 
not heeding to Chandra Shamsher»s advice earlier. Chandra Shamsher 
was willing to accede to the Dalai Lama's request but the Resident 
would not let him dto so. The Indian government did not want any 
Nepalese finger in the Tibetan pie; if the Nepalese were now allowed 
to be a party in Anglo-Tibetan negotiations, they would claim such 
participation in future, which, considering Nepalese distrust of 
British policy in Tibet, might prove at once inconvenient and emba­
rrassing for the Indian government. Therefore,the Resident allowed 
Chandra Shamsher to do no more than offer general advice to the 
Dalai Lama on how he should conduct negotiations with the British 
mission. The Prime Minister drafted a letter to the Dalai Lama asking 
him to realise “the necessity of promptness of action, caution and 
forbearance" in dealing with the British.. The latter, Chandra Sham­
sher assured, would not be unreasonable in their terms provided the
Dalai Lama did not "insist upon untenable points" and showed a "just
68
desire to give and take, foresight and true patriotism".
Ibid., Reg,No.1302, Chandra to Dalai Lama, 9 June 1904, R M  j 
2 Hay 1904; Vol.168, Reg.M0s.i356, 1627; Vol.169, Reg.No7IS75,
RNA, 30 June 1904; Wo.1716, RM, 21 July 1904; Vol.163, Reg.No. 
725; Vol.165, Reg.Mo.1180, RNA, 13 April 1904.
68. Ibid., VoJ. 169, Reg.No.1675, Resident to Govt., 8 August 1904, 
enclosing Chandra's draft letter to Dalai Lama.
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The Gyantse incident seemed the incontrovertible proof of Tibetan 
intransigence; an advance to Lhasa was now not only imperative, hut 
the only course left, 30 at any rate Younghusband thought; he had hy 
now been thoroughly put out by "this playing about at Khambajong, at 
Tuna and at Gyantse", by the hesitancy of the Acting Viceroy, Lord Ampt-
68a
hill, and above all by the timidity of the Home government who sought 
»
to cover up their failure to settle this "trumpery affair of trade
and boundary with a semi-barbarous people" on the Indian frontier
6^ B
by specious excuses of wider international implications.
.Anthill*s really was an unenviable position of a man whose 
lack of enthusiasm for a personally disagreable job did not absolve him 
from the ultimate responsibility for its successful execution. He was 
naturally cautious, picking his steps and temporising, younghusband*s 
impatience worried him, and his attempt to calm it by repeated reminders 
of the Home government*s policy of restraint served only to aggravate 
the impatience. 68c
The Home governments position was no less difficult, the more 
so because of Curzon*s constant prodding for vigorous action under the 
thinly-veiled accusation that the Cabinet had been a prisoner of its
68a. Curzon was in England on furlough between May and December 1904*
68B. Younghusband, op.cit., pp.184, 191-2, 198, 200-01. Fleming, op.cit.,
. ^   ^Ampthill.Papers, Vol.37,
68c. Ibid., 187-931 196-9•^fmptnixl to .brodrick, phe secretary of State, 
5,12,19,27 May, 16,27 June, 7,20 July 1904; Curzon to Ampthill, 26 
May, 1,8 July 1904, Ampthill to Curzon, 16 June, 5 July 1904*
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own^ecisio# and pussilanimity. The Home government intensely disliked 
being virtually forced to adopt a course with full knowledge of its 
risks. Incidents at Tuna and Guru had dimmed the prospect of a negotia­
ted settlement with the Tibetans, and in May, St.John Brodrick, who had
6$d
taken over from Hamilton, had most reluctantly sanctioned the Mission*s 
advance to Lhasa with a still lingering hope that ultimately reason 
would prevail with the Dalai Lama. The Gyantse incident dashed this 
hope; there was now nothing to restrain Younghusband from pressing on
68e
to the Tibetan capital.
But while sanctioning the Mission’s advance to
Lhasa, the Home government had also confirmed their earlier pledge to
the Russian government that Britain had no intention to annex Tibet or
to interfere in its internal administration, such confirmation being
necessary to allay Russian misgivings and to obtain their adherence
to the Khedivial Decree whereby Britain sought to strengthen her posi- 
68F
tion in Egypt.
68D. Hamilton resigned from the Cabinet in October 1903* Earl of Middle­
ton (St.John Brodrick), Records and Reactions, 1856-1939, p.186.
68e. Fleming, op.cit., pp.173-4* Younghusband, op.cit., pp.191-2, 197- 
201. A.Pp 1905, Vol.LVIII* pp.6-7, Secy.of State to Viceroy, Telg. 
12 May 1904, Viceroy to Secy.of state, Telg.12 May 1904.
68F. Younghusband, op.cit., pp.201-3* Fleming, op.cit., pp.154-5*L ^
P5LI, Vol.166, Reg.No.1282a, private Letter from Salisbury, prime 
to Brodrick, 26 July 1904* Agpthill papers, Vol.37, 
Brodrick to Ampthill, 6,10,13*27 May, 10 June, 1 July 1904* HC.
Vol.220, No.2661, Lansdowne to C.Spring Rice, British charge d* 
Affaires, St.Petersburgh, 4,10 May 1904* A.P., 1905, Vol.LVIII, 
p.15, Lansdowne to C.Hardinge, British Ambassador at St.Peters­
burgh, Telg.2 June 1904*
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The Dalai Lama fled from Lhasa on 2 August. 1904; next 
day Younghusband reached the Tibetan capital,and then started nego­
tiations for a treaty• It was now that Jit Bahadur was at his best.
He played the role of an honest broker admirably well; he had the 
confidence of all the parties involved in the issue-the Tibetans, 
the British and the Chinese. His long stay in Tibet, intimate know­
ledge of its politics and personal and friendly relations with the 
Amban and principal Tibetan officers made him ideal for a delicate 
diplomatie job. To the ‘Tibetan government he appeared as the only 
friend to turn to-a friend who understood them well and who promi­
sed to help them get a moderate treaty. To Younghusband his services 
proved invaluable. He was the most effective channel of communication 
with the 'Tibetan government, the best person to allay their fear 
and soften their obstinacy. Younghusband foynd Jit Bahadur 11 a man 
of ability... a person of dignity and good breeding" who had recei­
ved "the most emphatic orders from his government to assist me in 
every possible way". Jit Bahadur visited Younghusband "daily", gave 
him "most valuable information" and was "instrumental" in getting 
him in touch with important 'Tibetan officers. Jit Bahadur explai­
ned Younghusband's terms to the Tibetans, arguing that between the 
prolonged stay of the mission and the prompt acceptance of its terms, 
the latter was the lesser of the two evils.; he added, that if the 
terms were rejected the British would raze Lhasa to the ground. Jit 
Bahadur also impressed upon Younghusband the need for caytion in 
dealing wij&h the Tibetans, who, he assured, did want to come to 
terms with the British provided the latter showed consideration
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to their defeated foes, and did not indist upon a harsh settlement*
It is, however, noteworthy that on Jit Bahadur’s advice only an
indemnity of seventy five lakhs of' rupees was imposed upon the
Tibetan government, although Younghusband for himself had considered
6 9
the amount rather tpo heavy*
The Anglo-Tibetan dispute and the British expedi­
tion to Lhasa was an event which had considerable bearing on Nepal’s 
future relations with TibeJ, British India and China* Nepalese 
prestige already high at Lhasa increased still further and so did 
their influence* True, the Nepalese government had not helped the 
Tibetans by arms-as required by the 1856 treaty-but the latter had 
reasons to be grateful to Chandra Shamsher for not having taken 
advantage of the crisis to occupy the bordering Tibetan territory* 
Throughout the crisis Chandra Shamsher had acted in such a manner 
as to leave the Tibetans with the impression that his concern ofrer 
the Dalai Lama’s flirtations with the Russians was genuine, that his 
efforts to resolve the Anglo-Tibetan conflict sincere, and that 
personally he had no axe to grind. 'The Lhasa Convention (September
1904) did not have anything to suggest that Nepal had benefited at 
70
Tibet’s cost* 7/hen the mission left Tibet after concluding the
£9* Ibid*, Younghusband to Govt*, 4>6»9 August 1904; Reg.No *17l£>,
Younghusband to Govt*, 31^ ugust, 3 September 1904. GRP, Vol.3451 
Note by L*Dane, Foreign Secy., 10 September 1904 on Secret Exter­
nal Proceedings, February 1905? No*817* Younghusband, op.cit*, pp* 
267-98. Waddell, op.cit*, pp*35^”8*
70. The Convention recognised the Sikkim-Tibet frontier as laid down 
b$r the 1890 Convention; opened two new trade marts at Gartok 
an& Gyantse where two British agents would reside; imposed an 
indemnity of seventy five lakhs of rupees to be paid in annual 
instalment of one lakh, and until the whole amount had been paid 
the British would occupy the Chumbi valley; the Tibetans would
{continued in the next page^
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Convention, the Tibetans were left with the belief that bu± for 
Chandra Shamsher*s pleading on their behalf, the British would have 
imposed a more rigorous tr&ty on Tibet. Needless to say, this Eeeling 
was sedulously fostered by Jit Bahadur. In future the Tibetan gover­
nment would turn to Chandra Shamsher for advice and guidance, and
71
Jit Bahadur became a lively force in Tibetan politics.
To say that the Nepalese an& Indian governments
were drawn closer hereafter is to emphasise the obviojcs. It was the
first important political event in Chandra Shamsher*s career showing
him as an ally of the British government. It enhanced his stock with
them; Curzon was converted from, a cynic to an admirer of the Prime 
72
Minister. The Viceroy was impressed by Chandra Shamsher*s attitude
which "was characterised by a friendliness and freedom from suspi-
.,'75cion uncommon in the previous relation of India and Nepal. Lord 
Ampthill, who ^ al:ail.albngikept'’a^watohful eye ^ onCh&ndra sh&msh- 
Attitude;, believed that without the "invaluable assistance" 
of ..the 1 Nepal©sb* government- -..the. "‘iflaoleiaffaitf Vrould haveA-- vs
70• {continued from the previous page^
have no dealings withn any foreign power without British consent. A 
^parate Article ;: appended to the Convention provided that the Bri­
tish. agent at Gyantse could, if necessary, visit Lhasa. Aitchison, op. 
cit., pp.344-7* Younghusband, op.cit., pp.289-306.
71* see Chapter VI.
72. Curzon at first had doubts if Chandra Shamsher could remain in 
power for long. CRP, Vol.l60, Curzon to Hamilton, 3 July 1901.
In 1902 Curzon agreed to see Chandra (who v;as going to Delhi to 
attend the Durbar)for only ten minutes-and that in deference to 
the repeated requests of L.Dane, the Foreign Secy. But, as Dane 
recalled the incident 37 years later, Chandra "came, saw and 
conquered, the ten minutes expanded into an interview of an hour 
and a half" when "our relations with Nepal were put upon a very 
satisfactory basis". Dane's address to the East India Associa­
tion, 7 February 1939* Asiatic Review, April 1939* p.258.




been a lamentable fiasco". Therefore, as a "tangible recognition 
of his services and with the express object of attaching him firm­
ly to the British government, Chandra .Shamsher was made a G.C.3.I.
75
"straight off". This honour met with the prime Minister’s "high­
est ambitions": he desired, as Ravenshaw informed Ampthill, "to
strengthen his position by showing that he can go one better than
76
his predecessor". He was also given 56,000 rounds of ammunition,
27000 time fuses, 90 Martini Henry and 25 Lee Metford rifles together
77
with 5,000 rounds of ammunition.
The Tibetan crisis had some effect on Nepal’s commer­
cial interests, in the existing panic and uncertainty at Lhasa the 
Nepalese shops had to close down for a time^and Jit Bahadur had to 
warn the Tibetan authorities that Nepal would retaliate if her 
interests were injured in any way. The Dalai Lama put an embargo on 
Tibet's trade with Nepal partly to prevent the Nepalese merchants 
exporting the Tibetan goods to British India but mainly in retalia­
tion to Chandra 3ham3her's having helped the British with yaks and 
transport. People of eastern Nepal suffered from a scarcity of sal.t
74. Ampthill Papers, Vol.37* Ampthill jso Brodrick, Becy.Of 3tate,
14 -September 1904*
75* Ibid., Vol.34/2* Ampthill to Ravenshaw, 3 October 1904* Ravenshaw 
to Ampthill, 9 October 1904* None of Chandta’s predecessors was 
made a G.C.3.I. straight away. Jang Bahadur received the title 
in 1875 after he had become a K.C.o.I. (1852) and a G.C.B. (I860). 
Ranuddip was made a K.C.o.I. in 1875* Bir received this honour 
in 1892 and G.C.3.I. in 1897*
76. Ampthill Papers, Vol.34/2, Ravenshaw to Ampthill, 9 October
1904. P3LI, Vol.173* Reg.No. 1022, Resident to Govt., 27 April 1905. 
77* PEF» Vol.26, 1912, Pile No.2067/1906, statement showing Arms 
and Ammunition >?iven or sold to Nepal Durbar. Curzon, however, 
rejected Chandta 3hamsher's request for a still larger supply 
of ammunition. P3LI, Vol.183, Reg.No.1807, Frontier Memoranda, 
October 1905*
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a Tibetan import, and the Chinese in Tibet experienced hardship for 
want of Nepalese rice. The price of rice at Wallong in .. eastern 
Nepal fell from six seers a rupee to thirteen, hitting the Nepal­
ese rice dealers hard. Nepal’s trade with Tibet decreased for a 
time when the most important channel of this trade-the Kerung and 
Kuti passes-were closed to commercial traffic under the Dalai Lama's 
orders. (Che Dalai Lama also warned all the foreign traders in Tibet 
against taking their goods for dale to any place outside Lhasa. 
However, on Jit Bahadur’s strong representation the ban was lifted 
from the Nepalese traders, and since it continued to operate so far 
as otherf-partcularly, the Kashmiris, the main competitors of the 
Nepalese merchants-^ traders were concerned, the Nepalese merchants, 
so Jit Bahadur- reported to Chandra Shamsher, enjoyed a favourable 
position.. The opening of British trade marts at Gyantse and Yatung- 
they being on easier route to Lhasa and,hence, more convenient for 
trade than the Nepalese route-was resented by the Nepalese merchants
who feared injury to their interests resulting from the diversion of
77A
Indo-Tibetan trade from the customary Nepalese route. 'The Nepalese 
government were at first reluctant to open trade establishments at 
Yatung and Gyantse considering the fact that the Tibetans might look 
upon them-as they did the British marts-as centres of espionage. Boon, 
however, with the permission of the Tibetan government, Nepalese trade 
agencies were opened at the two places. Communication between Kath­
mandu. and Lhasa became hereafter much easier when the Nepalese govern-
77A. 'The closure of the Sikkim route had been the traditional policy 
of Nepal so that the trade between India and Tibet would pass 
through the Nepalese route alone and the Nepalese government 
would impose import and export duties on this trade, see Chapter 
IV, p. 106.
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ment were allowed to use the British telegraph and postal establish-
78
ments at Gyantse and Yatung.
The Chinese government were pleased with Chandra
79
Shamsher who received the usual Imperial title in ilpril 1904*
The Amban was obliged to the Nepalese government for their support 
with which he tried to strengthen his own position. He had made 
repeated requests to Jit Bahadur for two-three thousand Gurkha troops 
ostensibly to force the Dalai Lama to accept his (Amban* s| and Chandra 
Shamsher*s advice. The Prime Minister^being equally interested to 
curb the Dalai Lama’s power and increasfc '■ Nepalese influence at 
Lhasa was inclined to oblige the Amban,but the Resident restrained 
him, advising caution and asking him to avoid unnecessary complica­
tions with the Tibetans^such complications being certain to arise
if a large number of Gurkhas were used by the Amban against the 
80
Dalai Lama.
78. P3LI, Vol.159, Reg.No.l688, C.Bell, Offg.Depy.Commissioner, 
Darjiling, to Govt.of Bengal, 17 November 1903; Vol.162, Reg.
No.528, RNA, 21 November 1903; Vol.163* Reg.Nos.725* 991* RNA,
12 February 1904; Vol.l66, Reg.No.1282; Vol.l&t , Reg.No.1709* 
Diary of O’Connor, British trg.de agent, Gyantse, 24 September 
1905; Reg.No.1746* RNA , 25 July 1905; Vol.183, Reg.No.1901, 
RNA, 10 September 1905; Vol.190, Reg.No.1274, Gyantse Weekly 
Diary, 9 June 1906.
79. PNF, Vol.27, 1912, File No.947/1910, Resident to Govt., 20 April 
1904. Landon, however, says that this title was conferred on 
Chandra shortly after he assumed power. Nepal, II, pp.113-4*
80. P5LI, Vol.165, Reg.No.1180; Vol.166, Reg.No.1302; V0I.I67,
Reg.No.1445* RNA, 24 May 1904* Resident to Govt., 7 July 1904*
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Chandra Jhamsher wanted to retain and, if possible, aug­
ment the prestige which the Tibetan crisis had earned him. He was
happy that the Dalai Lama had fled whereafter the Chinese govern—
1
ment had ’’denounced" him. Jit Bahadur's friendship with the Ti-
Rimpoche, whom the Amban recognised as the Regent, and his high
Re­
stock with the Tibetan officials made^Nepalese position at Lhasa
secure. Hardly a week had passed after Younghusband had left Tibet 
when the Kajis ■ appealed to Chandra Shamsher to request the British 
for a revision of the Convention. The indemnity, they said, was too 
heavy; the provision for the visit of British officers to Lhasa 
would encourage other powers to demand similar concessions; the 
opening of new trade marts in Tibet, would also create complications. 
The Kajis contemplated sending a deputation to the Viceroy with. Jit 
Bahadur as one of its members, and should the representation fail 
the deputation would go to London to lay the Tibetan grievances be­
fore the Home government* Holding a brief for the Tibetans was for 
Chandra ohamsher both a temptation and a risk ; success would incre­
ase his prestige and influence with the Tibetan government while 
failure would tarnish both. He himself had doubts regarding his abi­
lity to influence the British in the matter. ‘The British might won­
der why Chandra Bhamsher was now interceding for the Tibetans when
lT PJLIg Vol. 169» Reg.No. 1762, Younghusband to Govt., 15 August 
1904; Vol.173, Reg.Ho.359* HC» Vol.222, Ho.3047, B.Batow, , • ‘ a . 
Briti&qftinister la Peking,to Lansdowne, Foreign Becy., Telg.28 
August 1904.
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he had for so long himself pressed the Tibetan government to submit 
to the British terms. It was particularly odd to request the British 
to reduce the indemnity which had been fixed on the express advice 
of Jit Bahadur. In such circumstances Chandra Shamsher, with the 
Resident's advice, merely forwarded the Kajis* appeal to the Vice­
roy. He did not want the Tibetans to "evade" or "nullify" the Con­
vention and so give the British an excuse for a fresh expedition
which might result in greater British influence in Tibet-a develop-
2
ment not suited to Nepalese interests.
The Convention was amended at the instance of
2A
the Home government who found some of its provisions incompatible
with the assurance earlier given to the Russian government that
Britain had no intention to annex or even to occupy for long any
Tibetan territory. The indemnity was reduced to twenty five lakhs
of rupees payable in three annual instalments whereafter-that is
in 1908-the Chumbi valley would be vacated by the British. It was
also decided that no British agent would go to Lhasa for any reason 
3
whatsoever. Jit Bahadur sought to impress on the Kajis that the re­
vision of the Convention was the result of Chandra Shamsher's succ-
4
essful pleading with the British on behalf of the Tibetans.
2. PSLI ., Vol.172, Re . :o.2223A, Kajis to Chandra Shamsher, 30 Sept­
ember 1904; No.2304A, Chandra to Kajis, 20 November 1904*
2A. Article VI and the Separate Article, for instance. Fleming, Bayo­
nets, op.cit., op. 268-75*
3. A.P., 1905* Vol.LVIII, Bast India : Further Papers Relating to 
Tibet, po.77, 34, Secy.ofState to Viceroy, Telg.7 November 1904, 
Secret Despatch to India, 2 December 1904* Lamb, Britain and
hinese Central Asia, pp*303-5* Younghusband, India and Tibet, 
PP*337-41* Fleming, op.cit.,pp.263-93*
4* PSLI, Vol. 177, Reg.i;o.332, I a , 27 December 1904, Chandra to
Kajis, 27 January 1905*
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The Tibetan crisis had clearly demonstrated the Nepalese
government's sensitivity regarding their position in Tibet and
their determination to maintain it. Chinese activity in Tibet after
the British mission had left it and the Tibetan opposition to it
led to a fresh crisis which profoundly affected the pattern of
Nepal's relations with India and China.
!jChinese policy in Tibet after 1904 was to reorganise
the Tibetan administration by a series of reforms; to remove from
the administration the elements supporting the . Dalai Lama and
opposing them; to increase the Amban*s power; and to improve the
military defences of Tibet. The ultimate object was to convert
Tibet from its existing status of an autonomous, self-governing
5
protectorate into a directly administered Chinese province. Alar­
med by the British advance to Lhasa, the Chinese were now determin­
ed not to let that happen again. The Jimban declared that it was the 
Dalai Lama's impolicy and the resultant complications with the 
foreign powers which had obliged the Chinese Bmperor to take grea­
ter control of Tibetan affairs.
In the autumn of 1906 Chang Yin-Tang, one of the most 
efficient Chinese officers, came to Lhasa with elaborate plans for 
reorganising the Tibetan administration. Administrative boards 
would be set up to deal with matters like the development of Tibet's 
economic resources, foreign relations and defence. Polyandry would 
be made illegal; new schools would be opened where students would 
learn Chinese as a compulsory language, Factories would be set up
5"! Alastair namhVrAchahon Line. I. pp. 117-22. C.Bell, Ylbet Bast 
and Present, pp.BB-94*
196
with Chinese mechanics to train the Tibetan workers* Elaborate 
instructions were issued to the Tibetan people dealing with their 
day to day life* In short, Chang declared that he wanted to make 
the Tibetans a new people, enlightened, forward-looking, free 
from the fetters of time-worn traditions and socio-religious prac­
tices, In 1907 & Amban, Lien Yu, arrived at Lhasa; also came 
some new Chinese officers and soldiers with rifles of the latest 
design*
The Chinese reforms, so Jit Bahadur reported to Chandra
Bhamsher, were too grandiose and too expensive to be willingly
accepted by the Tibetan government, and Lien's insistence in imple-
6
menting them embittered his relations with the Tibetan officials.
Far in eastern Tibet and the semi-independent tribal marches
between the upper reaches of the river Balween and the Chinese
provinces of Bzechuan and Yunnan serious disturbances flared up
following local, particularly monastic, opposition to the Chinese
efforts to. bring these territories under the direct Imperial admi- 
7
nistration. In 1906 Chao Erh Feng, one of the ablest Chinese gene­
rals and a brilliant frontier administrator, was appointed the 
.Varden of the marches. Both by tactful diplomacy and ruthless mili­
tary operations Chao subjugated a number of marches and established
8
Chinese rule over some adjacent Tibetan territories,
6. P3LI, Vol.175, Reg,ho,559; Vol.177, Reg.No,852; Vol*199, Reg.
Bo.578; Vol.202, Reg.No.1050; Vol.g05, Reg.No.1613; Vol.207, 
Reg.No.1916, RUT, (1904-07?* Bell, op.cit. 88-94.
7* Eric Teichman, Travels of a Consular Qfficertl in Eastern Tibet + 
together with a history of the relations between Tibet and India,
pp.2-8.
8. Bell Papers, F*30.5*i*22, Military Report on Tibet, by India 
General otaff, pp.112-3* Lamb, McMahon Line, I, pp.181-95*
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Simulteneously the Chinese pursued what appeared to he the 
policy of restoring their influence in Nepal, Bhutan and oikkim.
From the Chinese point of view an essential element of Tibetan 
defence had been destroyed when their influence in these border 
states had weakened. Nepal and Bhutan had helped the Younghusband
9
mission, and through, oikkim the British, troops had moved into 
Tibet. In May 1908 the Amban sent messages to the Bhutanese govern­
ment to the effect that since Bhutan was traditionally a Chinese
territory China would henceforth take far more interest in its
10
politics than had been possible for many years. Chang made over­
tures to the Raja of SikJqhi as well, who had a "deep respect" for 
11
China.
Nepal occupied an important place in Chinese policy. A hostile 
Nepal was a threat to Tibet and so a matter of anxiety for China, 
while a friendly Nepal, Chang considered, would strengthen Tibetan 
security. It was felt by the Chinese that peaceful relations between 
Nepal and Tibet could not be guranteed unless both were kept under- 
effective influence of China. Chang and Lien tried to humour the 
Nepalese and convince them that they had better establish closer 
relations with China than with Britain. In 1906-7 Chang in several
9. The Tongsa Penlop, the most powerful feudal chief of Bhutan,
allowed the Mission to make a road through Bhutan to the Chumbi
valley and assisted Younghusband during negotiations for the 
Lhasa Convention. The British government rewarded him with a 
R.C.o.I. and recognised him as the hereditary Maharaja of Bhutan, 
Younghusband, op.cit., pp.203-4, 209-22, 279-00, 285-9, 556. 
J.C.White, oikkim and Bhutan, pp.105-236, 281-4.
10. PSF, Vol.25, 1912, File No.1921, Bell to Govt., 1 Hay, 12 Hay
1908. Bell, Tibet, op.cit., pp.100-1.
11. PEF, Vol.25, 1912, File No.1321 , Notes on India's North East 
Frontier Relations, by E.G.'Nilton, 9 March 1908.
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meetings with Jit Bahadur praised Chandra Shamsher*s able rule 
which, he added, could serve as a model for the Tibetans, He also 
repeatedly stressed Nepal's historical relations with China. He 
pointed out to Jit Bahadur and Shankardas, the Nepalese government's 
trade agent at Gyantse, that friendship with the British had proved 
detrimental to Nepal's interest. The opening of the Kalimpong-Phari 
route and the establishment of British trade marts at Gyantse and 
yafcung, for instance, had diverted Tibetan trade 'ifromh its tradi­
tional Nepalese route with consequent detrimental effect on the 
Nepalese merchant's commercial interests. 'The number of these mer­
chants had also fallen from, two thousand to about seven hundred in
12
the past few years. Chang would, as he said, frustrate the British
ambitions in Tibet and therefore sought Nepal's cooperation. He
intended opening a Chinese trade centre at Gyantse to compete with
the British mart there. Nepalese merchants were persuaded to boycott
the British and make use of the Chinese trade centre. Chang promised
that the revenue realised through customs would be divided between
the Tibetan and Nepalese governments. As Lien, owing to the Tibetan
government's opposition, was finding it difficult to get enough
money to make payments to the Chinese troops at- Lhasa, he requested
13
Jit Bahadur for a loan.
Chang enquired about Nepal's military and economic
resources, giving several hints of his desire to employ Gurkhas in
12. Jit Bahadur told the Daily Mail correspondent in 1904 that in 
Tibet there were eight hundred Nepalese, mostly merchants.
B.Candler, The Unveiling of Lhasa, p.346.
13* F3LI, Vol.198, Keg.No.358, RNA, 30 November 1906, 13 December 
1906j Vol.204, fieg.Iio.1346, fim, 28 March 1907.
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the reorganised Tibetan army. His immediate idea, so he told Jit. 
Bahadur, was to bring the Nepalese and Tibetans closer to their mutual
benefit. Chang would also send Tibetan military officers to Kathmandu
for military training and forge a defensive alliance between Nepal and 
Tibet. This alliance would serve a3 the corner stone of' his project s 
the formation of a Himalayan confederacy-with Nepal, Bhutan, oikkim 
and Tibet-under China's tutelage. The geographical position of the sta­
tes-” side by side like the molar teeth in a man's mouth”-promised the 
feasibility of the project; the more so because they had a common 
cultural link and were all"subjects of China”• Indeed, Chang pointed 
out to Jit Bahadur :
China, Nepal, Tibet, Bhutan and Sikkim might be
compared to the five principal colours, viz.
yellow, red, blue, black and .green. A skilful 
painter may so arrange the colours as to produce 
a number of beautiful designs or effects. In the
same way if we could cooperate with one another,
we may presumably promote the interests of all. 14
The Himalayan states, Chang urged, should unite and drive away their 
common enemy, the British, and China would support them. Chang won­
dered why the Nepalese had an exaggerated fear of- the military strength
pf the British and why they had helped the Younghusband mission with 
pack animals and transport. He warned Jit Bahadur that Nepal should
be careful of the British who were "quarrelsome, selfish, faithless
15
and are first class in deceiving or betraying others.” The leader
16
of the Nepalese embassy to Peking, Kaji Bhairab Bahadur, was told in 
like terms; he confirmed that the '’Chinese appeared to be very suspi­
cious of us for being on intimate terms with the British". Chang
14* Ibid., Vol.196, Reg.No.446, RHa7 13 December 1906; Vol.201, Reg.
-No.820, RNA, 14 December 1906."[Continued on the next pageTj 
15. See next page. 16. See next page.
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proposed to go to Kathmandu himself to talk these masters over 
with Chandra Shamsher and, in appreciation of his able administra-
17
tion, to invest him with a new Chinese title*
The Nepalese government for a time found in the Chinese 
activities in Tibet nothing to which they could take any exception* 
Restoration of Chinese authority and the Amban’sfpower was but the 
reestablishment of the old, normal order in Tibet; the ambitious 
Dalai Lama’s policy had not only upset this order but posed a 
threat to Nepal’s interests* Besides, there were at Lhasa still 
some lingering hopes that the Dalai Lama would return-and with a 
Russian army. Jit Bahadur reported that the Dalai Lama had left 
but his influence still worked among certain sections of the Tibe­
tan administration; delegations had, in fact,been sent to bring
him. back,and his followers at Lhasa corresponded with him and sou- 
18
ght his advice. 'The removal of the Dalai Lama’s influence from 
the Tibetan administration was what Chandra Shamsher wanted, and 
since this seemed to be the Amban’s object as well the Nepalese 
government had good reasons to support him.
This support, however, was given not at the cost of
14. [Continued from the previous pag£] PSLI, Vol.20l>, Reg.No.1^94, 
RNA, June-July 1907* Bell Papers, 5»i*l6s Nepal Note Book* p.9.
15. PBLI, Vol.195, Reg*No.2112, RHA, 10 October 1906.
16 * The embassy lef# Kathmandu in August 1906 and returned in 
March 1910*
17. PSLI, Vol. 198, Reg.No.446, M , 13 December 1906; Vol.204» 
Reg.No.1346, RNA, 5 April 1907. ££» Vol*27, 1912, File No.
947, Bhairab to Chandra, 11 February 1908. Lamb, McMahon Line, 
I, pp.158-9.
18. PSLI, Vol.172, Reg.No.22231^ ; Vol.173, Reg.No.359; Vol.177,
Reg.No.832; Vol.180, Reg.No.1440, RNA, May-AugU3t 1905*
PKF, Vol.24, 1908, File Uos.996-8, RNA, 13 March 1906.
Bell, Tibet, op.cit., p.56.
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good relations with the Tibetan government; Chandra Shamsher*s poli­
cy v/as to assure the Tibetans that Nepal wanted nothing but peace 
in Tibet and so was anxious to resolve her dispute with the repre­
sentative of the Chinese government. Jit Bahadur during his frequ­
ent meetings with the Kajis dissuaded them from opposing the Amban 
and incurring the Emperor’s Y/rath; China, he pointed out, ?;as the 
traditional protector of Tibet, and the Amban’s reforms Y/ould bene­
fit the Tibetans themselves. The Nepalese government made it quite 
clear to the Kajis that they disfafrou^ed the continuing uncertain­
ty in the Tibetan administration. The Amban, for his part, was re­
quested not to hustle his projects through because the Tibetans,
as Jit Bahadur pleaded, were a conservative people who feared irmo-
19
vations and hasty measures.
From about the middle of 1908 the Nepalese government 
began to show uneasiness over the Chinese activity in Tibet. Jit 
Bahadur’s several meetings with the Amban, the Regent and other 
high officers strengthened his impression that China’s objective 
was not merely the restoration of her traditional authority in 
Tibet but taking over the Tibetan administration-and that by force, 
if necessary. More than a thousand well-armed Chinese troops were 
reported to be coming from Szechuan to Lhasa under the command of 
the formidable Chao Erh Feng who in March 1908 was appointed the 
new Amban of Tibet. The news excited the Tibetans; the Kajis repre­
sented to Jit Bahadur that Chao had massacred the Tibetan people
19. PSLI, Vol.190, Reg.No.1242; Vol.198, Reg.No.358f RNA, 31 Octo­
ber 1906; Vol.201, Reg.No.820, RNA, 18 January 1907*
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in the marches, destroyed the monasteries and committed great cruel­
ty, and that there was no need for Chinese troops to come to Tibet 
forjostensible reason of strengthening the police forces of Lhasa* 
The Tibetans raised an a,rmy of five thousand, indicating their 
resolve to resist further pressure by the Amban* The Chinese troops 
who were eTLready at Lhasa clashed with the Tibetan troops. The Kajis 
fervently requested Jit Bahadur for Nepalese government’s interven­
tion because
one thousand words from us cannot have the same 
weigjit with the Amban as a dingle word of the 
Gurkha government. 20
They also urged Jit Bahadur to get Gurkha military officers from 
Kathmandu to train the Tibetan troops at Lhasa.
Jit Bahadur himself was now feeling that much of the 
brewing discontent at Lhasa was due to Lien’s arrogance and tact­
lessness. Jit Bahadur was anxious for the safety of the Nepalese 
merchants who were afraid of widespread disturbabce in Tibet if the 
Szechuan troops entered Lhasa-the more so if Chao led them. The 
reported intention of the Amban to monopolise trade in wool, yak 
tail and musk and then farm it out to the highest bidders was ano­
ther disturbing news for the Nepalese merchants who had a large 
share in this trade. The Chinese officers at Gyantse even tried 
to browbeat the local Nepalese trade agent but without success. 
Nepalese traders were asked to use the Chinese currency, newly
20. P3LI, Vol.223, Reg.Ho.2105; Vol.224, Eeg.Ko.2210; Vol.226, Reg. 
Ho. 492; Vol.229, Reg.Ho.lO56. /ulso, P5LI, Vol.215. Reg.Ho.785'.
Vol.217. Reg.Ho.1202; Vol.218, Reg.iJo.1410; Vol.220, Reg.Ho. 
1709, RHA, 1908-09.
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introduced in Tibet s as this currency was unacceptable to the Indian
traders with whom the Nepalese had business transactions, the latter 
21
suffered. Bhairab Bahadur' while at Peking sent similar reports to 
Chandra Chamsher about the Chinese intention to make Tibet a province
of their Empire whece ten thosand well-armed Chinese troops would be
22
stationed. Chang’s military projects, nhairab Bahadur had already 
pointed out, weee"not a healthy sign"-Chang was planning to raise for­
ty thousand troops tr^ .ned by Chinese military experts. On his way 
from and to Peking through eastern Tibet and the tribal marches, 
Bhairab Bahadur saw Chinese colonies and Chinese troops at Batang,
Litang and other places between Lhasa and Chengtu. Bhairab Bahadur
heard, like Jit Bahadur, about Chao Erh Feng’s going to Lhasa at the
23
head of a crack Chinese regiment from Bzechuan. The Amban, so Jit 
Bahadur informed his government, contemplated bringing immediately 
five thousand Chinese troops to Tibet, three thousand of whom to be 
posted at and near Bhigatse and the rest at Lhasa. Jit Bahadur saw 
the Chinese troops already at Lhasa being regularly drilled. The 
situation at the Tibetan capital appeared to him "very critical" 
necessitating Chandra Bhamsher’s intervention. It also seemed to Jit 
Bahadur that the Kajis’ griyances against the Amban were genuine and
21. P3LI, Vol.226, Reg.No.492, REA, 17 November 190Q; Vol.229. Reg.
No.1082, Rig., 30 April 1909? Vol.230, Reg.No.1284. Also, P3LI,Vol. 
215, Reg.No.785; Vol.225, Reg.No.210.
22. PEF, Vol.27, 1912, File No.1979» Bhairab to Chandra, 7 June 1908. 
P3LI, Vol.201, Reg.No.820.
23. PEF* Vol.27, 1912, File Nos.746, 905* Bhairab to Chandra, 8 Decem­
ber 1907, 11 February 1908. P3LI, Vol.201, Reg.No.820, Bhairab to 
Chandra, 9 December 1906; Vol.206, Reg.. N0.I69I, Bhairab to 
Chandra, 12 June 1907*
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therefore, they deserved full moral support of the Nepalese government*
This support would sustain the Tibetan government and earn Nepal not
only "great religious merit1,'
but the undying gratitude and entire devotion of the 
whole people both high and low of Tibet, and great 
advantage would acrue to us (Nepalesil besides.
Chandra Shamsher was requested to oppose the "novel demand" of the 
Amban "for extra or s&le authority" in Tibet:; else, Jit Bahadur war­
ned, if the Chinese took over the Tibetan administration, they being
men of' no belief' in god, who never do any act of 
charity or virtue, who are void of all sense of’ 
shame or decency, pity or kindness, faith or hones­
ty, who disregard or are unmindful of all rules 
or relations and who are extremely selfish when 
opportunity occurs-1 describe them just as I find 
them now a days-they might not hesitate to do us 
injury in the end* 24
The Amban, Jit Bahadur advised, should be asked "to act with greater 
caution and foresight" and not to bring in more Chinese troops; if 
the Nepalese government did not help the Tibetans no?/, the Nepal­
ese merchants at Lhasa might suffer "rough handling"* In Jit Baha­
dur’s view Tibet was changing fast, and so Chandfca Shamsher should
25
act "with an eye to the future".
These reports set Chandra Shamsher thinking. The Tibet­
an government’s discontent was coming to a head, and Nepal, because 
of her heavy stake$ in Tibet, could not be indifferent* If Tibet 
became a Chinese province what ' - would happen to Nepal’s treaty 
relations with it, which relations formed the basis of the Nepalese
24v PSLI, Vol*223, Reg*No*2105, RNA, 21 August 1908*
25* Ibid.; Vol.198, Reg.No*358, RNA, 31 October 1906; Vol.225, Reg. 
N0.333* 24 November 1908.
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rights and privileges in Tibet? Besides, would not Nepal*s security 
be endangered if Dibet had a large well-eqipped army with a sizeable 
proportion of Chinese in it? Would not, then, China show an undesi­
rable interest in the Nepalese affairs and back up that interest, 
if necessary, by a shpw of force? Further, where was the guarantee, 
when Lien had strained relations with the Tibetan government, that 
the large Tibetan army would not break away from his control, and 
what, if that army, then, turned upon Nepal, Tibet's traditional 
enemy? Moreover, if Tibet became a Chinese province, would not Nepal 
lose all hope of realising her territorial aspirations there? In 
short, politically the presence of China on her immediate border 
was for Nepal an extremely unwelcome development, and a large Sino- 
Tibetan army a potential threat to her security,
Chandra Shamsher was little flattered by Chang’s atten­
tion and eulogies, and he had learnt^much about Chinese intentions 
in Tibet to feel any desire for closer relations with them. In fact, 
he was considering how to defend the Nepalese frontier against a
L
future Chinese violation. So long as the approaches to^ Kuti, Kerung
and Taglakot passes lay on the Tibetan side of the border, Nepal’s
frontier was vulnerable to a Chinese attack from Tibet, and therefore
26
Chandra Shamsher-like "Jang: Bahadur^r-was keen on occupying them.
As the Chinese were certain to oppose this, Chandra Shamsher tried 
to obtain assurances of British assistance or at least their protec­
tion. 'With his keen political sense Chandra Shamsher must ‘ have 
seen that in view of Chinese activities in Tibet and their overtures
Z&l See Chapter ±V, p. 125.
to Nepal , the British would want to remain on good terms with him 
and perhaps wink at his occupation of^strategic Tibetan territories 
Both as a measure of strengthening Nepal's border defence and as a 
compensation for the likely loss of Nepalese interests in Tibet if 
it became a Chinese province. The Prime Minister had, therefore, been 
dropping hints to conclude a definite agreement with the Indian 
government regarding Nepal's "political subordination in dealing 
with China”; he stated that the Nepalese preferred more intimate 
relation with the British to that with the Chinese because "China 
is nothing to us”. To Perceval Landon, The Times correspondent, 
who visited Nepal in 1908, Chandra Shamsher confided that if the 
Indian government raised no objection, he could annex some border­
ing Tibetan territory* He spoke in similar terms to the Acting
Resident, Colonel F.'.7. P. Macdonald, as well* In August 1909 he
27
sent a survey party to map the frontier.
27, PEF, Vol,24, 1908, File No.3377» Manners Smith, Kesident, to 
Govt., 6 April 1910; Vol.26, 1912, File No.632, H.Butler, For­
eign Secy, to Manners Smith, 8 April 1909*
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The Indian government, too, were uneasy over the Chinese acti­
vity in Tibet. Communications from the Nepalese officers at Lhasa, 
Bhigatse and Gyantse which were regularly forwarded by Chandra Sham­
sher to the Resident confirmed the Indian government's impression 
that the Chinese were digging themselves firmly in Tibet and that 
Sino- Tibetan relations had developed strains. Jit Bahadur*s reports 
corroborated those of the British officers at Gyantse, Yatung and
Kathmandu that china had no intention to observe her jjreaties with
23 29
Britain regarding Tibetan trade. Captain W.P.O'Connor, J.C.V/hite, 
and Charles Bell made many allegations that the Chinese in prevent­
ing direct communications between the British trade agents and the 
Tibetan authorities at Gyantse, Yatung and Chumbi were robbing the 
British of one of the main gains out of the Lhasa Convention. The 
Chinese were alleged to have interfered with British trade in Tibet 
and their administration of the Chumbi valley. The Chinese reinfor­
ced their troops at Gyantse, Yatung and chumbi whiwh led the local 
British officers to ask for more escorts for personal security. The 
Indian government, then under Lord Minto, from time to time urged 
the Home government that China be strongly asked to desist from in-
28. O'Connor was British trade agent at Gyantse. He went to Lhasa 
with the Younghusband mission. Be was the most active supported 
of the policy of bringing Tibet under Britain's political infl­
uence. he had strong distrust of China. O'Connor became ’ 
Resident in Nepal in 191&. a
29. White was the Political Officer in Jikkim and simultaneously 
held charge of British relations with Bhutan as well. He, too, 
was in favour of an active policy in regard to the Himalayan 
border states and Tibet to prevent their domination by China, 
lie retired in 1908 when Bell took over.
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terfering with Britain’s treaty rights gigivfcg- in Tibet.
The Home government, however, were unwilling to take 
a tou^h line with the Chinese* They were opposed to an active policy 
in Tibet because it would create international complications and 
add to the already heavy political and military responsibilities of 
the Indian government, xhere was in London no ambition to establish 
political influence in Tibet nor any desire to interfere in its in­
ternal administration. The best safeguard against a future political 
vacuum in Tibet and a fresh Anglm-Russian competition to fill it up, 
it seemed to the Liberal government, was to restore the status quo 
in Tibet which the Dalai Lama’s adventurous policy had disturbed; the 
restoration of this status quo meant the restoration of^Chinese posi­
tion in Tibet. The Liberal government secured China’s adherence to 
the Lhasa Convention by another Convention signed in Peking (April 
1906) which recognised China’s special position in Tibet and her 
responsibility for the maintenance of British treaty rights and pri-
31
viliges there. 'The main object of the Liberal foreign policy was 
to compose Britain’s long-standing differences with Russia. In Au­
gust 1907 Britain and Russia signed a self-abnegatory Convention 
by which they engaged to respect the territorial integrity of Tibet,
30. PALI. Vol.178, Reg.Ho.U26; Vol.200, Reg.Hos.625-7; Vol.205, 
Reg.Ho.l258; Vol.204l Reg.No. 13H? India Secret Letter to Secy, 
of State, Ho. 123, 18 July 1907; Vol.210, Reg.No.302, Viceroy to 
Secy, of State, felg.15 January 1908; Vol.216, Reg.No*1024» Note 
on Tibet, by O’Connor, 13 March 1908; Reg.No. 1288; Vol.219, Reg. 
No.1490; Vol.220, Reg.No.l624; Vol.224, Reg.No.2236. PEF, Vol. 
23,1908, File Nos.654,901, Viceroy to Secy, of State, 3 February 
1907* Lamb, MdMahon Line, I, pp.16-67*
31. Ibid.,pp.32-55* Aitchison, Treaties and Engagements,(edn.1929), 
XIV, pp.27-8. CRP, Vol.345» Secret E Proceedings, October 1905, 
Nos.575-613.
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to desist from interference in its internal administration, to
enter into no negotiations with its government for any industrial and
commercial concessions except through the good offices of China, and
32
not to send any agent to Lhasa*
"Jith the conclusion of this Convention, the prac­
tical sterilisation of Tibet was rendered complete 
••* and for a moment it seemed possible that the
country must be left to its own devices, ineffective
and dormant; an effective barrier between the con­
flicting interests of three great empires in Asia1,’ 
Britain, Russia and China* 33
The effect of Britain1 s new Conventions with China and Russia was 
to give tiie Chinese a virtually free hand in Tibet, precluding any 
jtossibility of foreign interference with their policy. The Home 
government would now take no "more than a passive interest in Tibet­
an affairs"; their policy in Tibet, from now on was "to have as little
34
as possible to do with it".
1m such circumstances, when the .Indian government 
wanted to strongly assert their position in Tibet, no wonder the 
Home government-particularly, Lord Morley, the Secretary of States 
saw in it the scire of Curzonfs forward policy which they had both 
discredited and repudiated* Morley was totally against any more Tibe­
tan adventures on the plea of a supposed threat to British interests 
in Tibet-and this he repeatedly pointed out to Minto*
32* Lamb, op*cit*,pp*71-114.T.Morley, Recollections, II, pp*177-9• 
33* FF, Vol. 11, 1914» File No*2964, Tibet Conference, Final Memo­
randum, by. A.H.McMahon, 8 July 1914*
34. PSM, B.191, Tibet, by A.Hirtzel, 27 January 1913; B.201, Tibet, 
The Simla Conference, by J.E.Shuckburgh, 17 October 1913* PSLI, 
Vol.171, Reg*No*2002, SecreijDespatchJbo India, No*58, 2 December 
1904. PEF, Vol.21, 1908, File No.901, Secy, of State to Vice­
roy, 19 February 1909* Diaries of A.Hirtzel (Private Secy, to 
Morley), p.3. MP, Vol.l, Morley to Minto, 16 January, 23 March, 
7 June 1906; Vol.2, Same to same, 2 May, 26 September 1907;
Vol.3* Same to same, 3 January 1908.
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The Indian government took a serious view of what seemed to 
them China’s attempt to "tamper1* with the "allegiance" of Nepal,
Bhutan and Sikkim to the British government. Minto saw a "clear sign 
of a forward policy hy China" on the north-east frontier of India, 
and China’s "open attempt" to establish influence in Bhutan, in part­
icular, led him to suggest to Morley that a treaty be made with Bhu-
35
tan securing British control of its foreign relations. Minto had 
no fear of Chandra Sbjamsher’s being weaned away by the Chinese, but 
he could not ignore the political effect of Chinese overtures to 
Nepal for closer alliance. The Amban’s desire to enlist Gurkhas and
Chang’s eagerness to go to Kathmandu were, so Minto had already
!
warned Morlejf, "an innovation in policy which from/Indian point of
36
view is open to serious objection". It was true that Chandra Sham­
sher had assured Colonel j.Manners Smith, the Resident, that he had 
no wish to exploit the Sino-Tibetan dispute, far less to act as a 
Chinese dat#s paw; he would not act upon Chang’s proposal either to 
lend money or troops to help strengthen Chinese position in i'ibet; 
he promised to keep Manners Smith informed of any further communica­
tion from the Amban. The Prime Minister said he knew that the British 
did not want any Nepalese intervention in Tibet, and "the Nepal durbar 
would never dare to incur the serious displeasure of the Indian gover-
37
nment". Nevertheless, Minto could not overlook that some of Chandra
35* PEF, Vol.25, 1912, Pile No.1921, India Secret Letter to Secy.
of State, No.174* 1 October 1908.
36. Ibid.,File No.1048, Viceroy to Secy.of State, felg.23 March
1907; Pile No. 1921, aril ton and Bell's Notes on the Indian North 
Bast Frontier. 9 March, 24 July 1908.
37* PSLI, Vol.201, Reg,'. N0.9OI, Kesident to Govt., 23 April 1907*
\
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Shamsher*s advisers were inclined to take advantage of the 'Tibetan
situation. Jit Bahadur, for instance, wanted Nepalese troops to be
brought into Lhasa ostensibly to safeguard Nepalese interests but
really to increase their influence in Tibet. Nepal, being an ally
of British India, the British , Jit Bahadur argued, would rather
welcome this influence than oppose it. Jit Bahadur would even meet
the Amban*s request for a loan provided Nepal was allowed to hold
38some bordering Tibetah territory until the loan wa,s paid off. 
Chandra Shamsher rejected all this as "curious suggestions", but 
he did not fail to tell Manners Smith that Chinese overtures had 
bothi embarrassed and worried him. The Prime Minister"professed
39
personally to set little value" on Nepal's connexion with China, 
but he would not antagonise the Amban lest the latter banned the 
Nepalese trade in 'Tibet and expelled the Nepalese agent from Lhasa. 
For the same re?.son he dared not openly oppose the Amban* s intended 
visit to Kathmandu although, as he confided to Manners Smith, such
a visit was "an innmvation"-no Amban having ever come to the Nepal-
40
ese capital to confer inperial titles on the Nepalese ministers.
On the other hand, it was certain that any assistance to the Amban,
either pecuniary or military, to strengthen his position at Lhasa
would damage Nepal’s relations with the Tibetan government. In such
circumstances Chandra Shamsher, as he disclosed to Manners Smith,
could think of only one way to wriggle out of the dilemma. He would
38. PSLI, Vol.201, Keg.No.820, RNA, 18 January 1907*
39* Ibid., Keg.No.901, Redident to Govt., 23 April 1907*
40. Ibid.
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continue to advise the Kajis to settle their disputes with the Amban 
and to remain loyal to the Nmperor of China, Then he would offer the 
Amban four/five thousand Gurkha troops instead of a smaller number of 
them as asked by the Amban, The latter was very unlikely to accept 
such a large number of Gurkhas at Lhasa who might fall out with the 
local Tibetan troops and aggravate the Chinese problem, but he could 
not blame Chandra Shamsher for not assisting him in his difficulties. 
Manners Smith discouraged the plan, suspecting it to be a ruse; he 
knew that a section in the durbar urged Chandra Shamsher to intervene 
in Tibetan politics at what appeared to them a very favourable time. 
Manners Smith pointed out to Chandra Shamsher that the British govern­
ment disapproved of China’s policy towards Nepal and the neighbouring
states and 1 persistence in such a policy would presumably entail diplo-
41
matic action to prevent its success,” Manners Smith's warning that
the Chinese in Tibet might create future troubles for the British as
well as the Nepalese governments suggested possible action by both
against China, and this raised Chandra Shamsher#s ho£e that if he
made a treaty with the British giving them control of Nepal's relations
with China-a highly-prized object for the Indian government-they migh$
not object to his annexation of some Tibetan territory.
In September 1908 Chandra Shamsher stated that if the
42
Chinese were to attack Nepal, he would expect British help. In January
1909 Minto found Chandra Shamsher “evidently nervous about the advance
of Chinese influence in Tibet” and considered that "some rearrangement
4E PSLI, Vol.253* Keg.No. 1597> Manners Smith to Chandra, 3^  September 
42. Lamb, op.cit., p.l6l. 1909*
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of our relations with Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim” was necessary, meaning,
presumably, guaranteeing these states British protection against Chinese
44
pressure. Kitclfner, who had first hand knowledge of Nepal, however, 
suspected that Chandra Shamsher was "spoiling for a fight" with the 
Chinese with the intention of annexing Tibetan territory and was perha­
ps trying to commit the British to his support. But Minto was not sure 
what the Prime Minister was up to : was he trying to exploit the Tibe­
tan situation,or was he really anxious about Nepal's territorial secu­
rity and,therefore,"drawing us into some treaty arrangement with him in 
response to Chinese aggression”? Whatever be his real intention, Chan­
dra Shamsher was "certainly restless" which made Minto anxious that 
if the Prime minister took any "hasty action in Tibet", the Indian 
government would be "in a terrible difficulty",
for we should at once become compromised in respect 
to the Anglo-Russian Convention, whilst the last 
thing we wish to do is to bring foree to bear upon
Nepal with the risk of a serious fight and the loss
of Nepalese friendship. 45
Minto also considered whether to accept Chandra Shamsher's hints of
a treaty which would make the British responsible for Nepal's security
and allay Chandra Shamsher*s anxiety; the treaty would be an insurance
against Chinese intrigues, and in return for the treaty the Indian
government would ask Chandra Shamsher to abandon Nepal's exclusive
policy. But there were risks; before agreeing to the treaty, the Prime
Minister might demand some qmid pro quo-possibly a free hand in Tibet
or a large supply of arms to strengthen the Nepalese army. But to the
43* MP» Vol.20, Minto to Morley, 21 January 1909*
44* He visited Kathmandu in 1906.
45* MP> Vol.20, Minto to Morley, 7 April 1909*
Indian government both the concessions were objectionable; a free hand 
to Nepal in Tibet was very likely to lead to a Sino-Nepalese war* while 
increasing Nepal's military strength was against India1s security int­
erests. Minto* therefore, saw "nothing at present to gain by a treaty**
which might raise "difficult and troublesome issues"• Manners Smith was
accordingly instructed to discourage Chandra Shamsher^ hints and to
remind him of British commitments to Russia and China regarding the
4 6
territorial integrity of Tibet.
The India Office supported Minto*s opposition to a
Nepalese treaty, agreeing that "our policy in Ifepal is to maintain the 
47 /status quo". rJ3ae Nepalese restlessness, it appeared to the Home gover­
nment, was due not so much to any fear of China as to their own unrea­
lised ambition in Tibet. The problem, therefore, was not how to pro­
tect Nepal from China but how to restrain her from falling out with 
China in Tibet. Bedides, as the Resident had not even the "slightest
doubt"as to Chandra Shamsher*s loyalty to the British and his readi-
48
ness to accept British advice in dealing with the Chinese overtures, 
the Home government saw no reason to be alarmed over the Chinese intri­
gues. However, this attitude changed a few months later when Nepalese 
reaction to the Chinese proceedings in Tibet created a far greater 
impact at Whitehall.
4^ * PEF, Vol.26, 1912, Nile No.632, Butler to Manners Smith, 8 April
1909.
41* Ibid.,F.M.Gerard to Butler, 28 May 1909, F.Campbell to R.Ritchie. 
24 May 1909.
48. PSLI, Vol.231, Reg.No.1412, Resident to Govt., 22 August 1909*
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I I I
Towards the end of 1909 the Tibetan situation took a graver 
turn. The Dalai Lama returned to Lhasa having been in exile for
49
more than five years; opposition to the Amban increased in the 
Tibetan government. The Dalai Lama and his followers were totally 
against the Amban’s bringing Chinese troops from Szechuan, but 
Lien was adamant. 'The Kajis kept making vain requests to Jit Baha­
dur to get Gurkha officers to train the Tibetan afcmy; they wanted
Chandra Shamsher to persuade the Amban not to bring any more Chi-
50
nese troops to Lhasa. On 12 February 1910 an advance body of 
Szechan troops entered the Tibetan capital and were immediately 
involved in trouble with the 'Tibetans, Within sight of these tr-
51
oops the Dalai Lama escaped-this time to India.
Chandra Shamsher, as Manners Smith saw him, 
was now in "great anxiety”-and not unreasonably. With the return 
of the Dalai Lama had returned the Nepalese fear of renewed Russian 
intrigue, violation of the Lhasa Convention and another British 
expedition to enforce it. Jit Bahadur reported that the Tibetan 
troops escorting the Dalai Lama home wore Russian caps and uni­
forms, and that influential Tibetan officials still believed in
52
Russia’s backing the Dalai Lama. Disturbances at Lhasa had alarmed
49- C.Bell, ‘The Portrait of the Dalai Lama, p.97* Lamb, op.cit.,
pp.172-80.
50. PEF, Vol.21, 1908, File No.286/1910. PSLI, Vol.237, Reg.ko.
547, RNA, 14 February 1910, Resident to Govt., 10 March 1910.
51. PEF, Vol.21, 1908, File No.3011, Viceroy to Secy, of State,
Telg.22 February 1910. Teichman, op.cit.,p.28. Bell, Portrait, 
op.cit.,pp.82-9* Shakabpa, Tibet, pp.227-9
52. PEF, Vol.21, 1908, File No.256, KM, b December 1909, Manners
Smith to Butler, 3 January 1910.
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the Nepalese merchants who sought Jit Bahadur's protection; the impre­
ssion had already been created among the Bharadars (Members of the 
State Advisory Council composed of the Ranas and other leading fami­
lies of Nepal whom the Prime Minister consulted in his administrative 
duties) that the Prime Minister had done nothing to protect Nepalese 
interests in Tibet. The ill-treatment of the Nepalese embassy to Pe-
55
king was another disturbing news for the Bharadars. Chandra Shamsher*s 
main object now was to obtain from the British an undertaking that if 
they did not let him take adequate measures to defend the Nepalese 
interests in Tibet, they should themselvesAsuch measures. In December 
1909 Chandra Shamsher told Manners Smith how worried the Nepalese 
government were #orAthe reduction of Tibet by China in her “old ortho­
dox fashion". "An angry, turbulent, distracted Tibet and a coterminous 
Chinese frontier", the Prime Minister added, would"aggravate Nepal's 
responsibilities" and “emphasise anxious watchfulness on her part". 
Continuance of a peaceful and orderly 'Tibetan government was vital 
for Nepal. Chandra Shamsher would give moral support to the Tibetans, 
although their requests for military assistance he dismissed as "quite 
quixotic". The Tibetans, Chandra Shamsher continued, were “in a way 
justified" in their fight "for the preservation of their legitimate 
rights". lie warned Manners Smith that the "novel policy initiated by 
China in Tibet" and the Tibetan government's resistance to it would 
create "probable complications" for both Nepal and India. In several 
interviews with Manners Smith early next year, Chandra Shamsher repea­
ted his concern.He wanted the British to exert political pressure on
53. See pp. 229-30.
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the Chinese government for the maintenance of an effective Tibetan 
government at Lhasa "without prejudice to the principle of the exis­
ting suzerain rights of China" in Tibet# Otherwise, he told the Resi­
dent, he would not be able to withstand the BharadarS1; pressure on him 
to despatch troops to Lhasa in order to safeguard the Nepalese interests 
there. Eight thousand troops, he added, were ready to march, and but
for his consideration of British reaction, they would have been already 
54
at Lhasa. In March 1910 Chandra Shamsher submitted a memorandum to 
Manners Smith demanding either a definite commitment by the British 
to protect Nepal’s interests in Tibet or else freedom to take his own 
measures. He grumbled that when the British, by the Anglo-Russian Con­
vention, pledged themselves to defend Tibet’s territorial integrity, 
they had overlooked Nepal’s treaty rights in Tibet for the defence of 
which the Nepalese government had the right to take any measure they 
deemed necessary. Even if no military action was actually taken, by thre­
atening such action, Nepal could put pressure on 'Tibet and redress her 
grievances and ensure the maintenance of her treaty tights. 'This pre­
ssure, mmch to Chandra Shamsher’s regret, was unlikely to work any more 
because the Tibetans knew that the British, in view of their internati-
55
onal undertakings, would check Nepalese jingoism. Manners Smith appre­
ciated Chandra Shamsher*s arguments and sounded him if he would agree 
to a treaty giving the British control over Nepal’s relations with
54. BBT. yol.2Hrfril9 No.28^ , RM, 15 November 1909. Chandra to 
Manners Smith, 29 December 1909* Manners Smith to Butler, 3 Jan­
uary 1910. PSLI, Vol.237* Reg.H0.5il* Resident to Govt., Telgs.
4, 7 March 1910.
55. Ibid., Reg.No.547* Chandra Shamsher’s Memorandum, 11 March 1910, 
Resident to Govt., 8, 10, 12 March 1910. PEF, Vol.26,'^ile No.
334, Chandra to Manners Smith, 11 March 1910.
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China and Tibet and obtaining in return British guarantee of Nepal’s 
territorial security. Chandra Shamsher was "not indisposed to consi­
der the question", and to the evident surprise of Manners Smith, he 
did not hint at any expectation of arms as a price for the treaty. 
However, Manners Smith saw as yet rub. "urgency" for such a treaty 
because the Chinese intrigues were certain to fail in winning over
the Nepalese Prime Minister who "looks entirely to British government
56
and will do nothing to risk his present good relations" with them.
But Manners Smith was in no doubt that Chandra Sham­
sher ’s anxiety over the Tibetan situation was genuine, whivh anxiety 
provided Minto with a powerful argument to convince the India Office 
that a strong Tibetan policy could no longer be avoided. The Chinese, 
so Minto represented to Morley, were violently overthrowing the 
Tibetan government whose existence was essential to the operation of 
the Lhasa Convention which China had herself recognised by her own 
Convention (1906) with Britain. The disappearance ofl a "real 'Tibetan 
government" at Lhasa, Minto pointed out, would alarm Nepal, Bhutan 
and Sikkim-all having intimate relations with and considerable stake 
in that government. Mintofs main contention was much the same as 
Curzon’s earlier-China in 'Tibet, as Russia there, would subvert Bri­
tish relations with the Himalayan border states whose allegiance to 
the Indian government was essential for the latter’s political, eco­
nomic and military interests. Minto in the meanwhile had received 
fresh reports of Chinese intrigues with Nepal. Bhairab Bahadur while
56. PSLI, Vol.2^ 7, Reg»No*511* Resident to Govt., ~'Telg.4 March 1910; 
Reg.Ik>.547* Same to same, Telg.10 March 1910.
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at Lhasa, on his return journey from Peking was told by the Amban 
that
.Ye, China, Tibet and Gorkha, are like members of the 
same family. If any one of them is injured in any way, 
the other two become afflicted, 57
The Amban also stressed the importance of Nepal as a "wall or barrier
on the British side of the frontier"; he sent presents for Chandra 
Shamsher as well,which in Bhairab Bahadur’s opinion was an unprece­
dented gesture. It was a relief to Minto that Chandra Shamsher*3 
attitude was "still friendly and correct" irjlpite of his "reasonable 
apprehension" regarding the Chinese activities in Tibet, "Shumshere
is very sensible, and so far there is no indication of his increasing
58
our difficulties", Morley was informed. But then, in view of the 
growing feeling among the Bharadars that he should take some posi­
tive action, the Prime Minister’s position was becoming increasingly 
difficult. "The best solution" of the Tibetan problem, according to 
the Indian government, was to restore "the former Tibetan government 
under the Dalai Lama". This was what Chandra Jhamsher, too, wanted. 
British prestige in Nepal and the two other neighbouring states,
Minto argued, would be seriously compromised if the course suggested 
by him were not adopted, for British inaction would appear to the
59
Himalayan states as their fear of China.
From all this the Home government drew one 
conclusion : China in Tibet could create tension and uncertainty
57. P3LI, Vol.256, Reg.N0.3fe, Bhairab to Chandra, 5 January 1910.
58. MP, Vol.25, Minto to Morley, 24 February, 10 March 1910.
59. PBLl, Vol.2351 Reg.No.190, Viceroy to Secy.of State, Telg.31 Jan­
uary 1910; Vol.237» Reg.No.511» Viceroy to Secy.of State, felg.
5 March 1910; Reg.No.547» Same to same, felg.12 March 1910.
in the north-east frontier o£ India in the same manner as Russia did 
for a century in the north-west, putting the Indian government to 
an enormous expence for maintaining their territorial security. Of the 
three border states, Sikkim had been recognised by China in 1890 as a 
British protectorate. In regard to Bhutan, however, the British posi­
tion was less secure. No doubt the treaty of I865 and the subsidy
provided for therein had given the Indian government a measure of in-
59A
fluence in that state, and the Mahaiaja, Ugyen Wangchuk, was a depen­
dable ally. But then, Bhutan which had practically no army worth the 
name was vulnerable to Chinese pressure; and therefore Minto had for 
some time been urging the Home government that Bhutan be as'Sred British 
protection. Morley agreed to this in June 1909? and in the following 
January a treaty was signed which increased the Maharaja’s subsidy
from fifty thousand to one hundred thousand rupees per annum, and gave
60
the British control over Bhutan’s external relations.
7/hat troubled the Home government most was their fear 
that the Tibetan situation might spark off a Bino-Nepalese armed con­
flict which would compromise Britain’s relations with China and Russia. 
Morley, with all his opposition to an active Tibetan policy, could 
scarcely ignore Minto*s warning that if Chandra Jhamsher’s anxiety 
over the Nepalese interests in Tibet were not allayed, Anglo-Nepalese 
relations would be strained with damaging effect on , particularly, 
Guikha recruitment-and as for the Gurkhas, Morley well knew that
59A, Bee Chapter IV, p, 134.
60. PEF, Vol.25, 1912, File No.1423? oecret Despatch to India, 25
June 1909; File No.530? Bell to Govt., 25 January 1910. Aitchi-
son, op.cit.,(1929 edn.), Vol.XIV, pp.100-01. Bell, gibet, op.cit. 
pp.99-106.
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their "quality as soldiers is not more essential to the native army
6 l
than their detachment from Indian politics and religious disputes".
He had now no doubt that some move on the part of the British govern­
ment was unavoidable, and Edward Grey, the Foreign Secretary, agreed 
with this. Accordingly on 26 February 1910 the British Minister at 
Peking, John Jordan, made a representation to the Chinese government 
about the situation in Tibet, The British government demanded that 
China refrain from abolishing "an effective 'Tibetan government" whose 
existence was essential to the maintenance of British treaty rights 
in Tibet which China herself had recognised. The British disclaimed 
any intention to meddle in the internal affairs of Tibet and any res­
ponsibility if Nepal, which was an independent state and, so, beyond
62
British control, took ar^ ied measures to protect her Tibetan interests. 
It was pointed out to the Russian government that if Chinese policy 
in 'Tibet led to a Jino-Nepalese war, the British government could not 
remain indifferent to it because of the resultant disturbance and ten­
sion in the entire north-east frontier of India, The British, as Mann­
ers Smith later described,were, thus, clearly
making use of Nepal*s ostensibly independent position 
as a lever to press for the enforcement of Tibetan auto­
nomy, 63
Jordan’s representation elicited from the Chinese Foreign Ministry a 
categorical denial of any intention of China either to repudiate the 
Mnglo-Chinese treaties concerning Tibet or to abolish the government
61. P5LI, Vol.235* Reg.No.190, India Office to Foreign Office, 9 
February 1910.
62. PEF, Vol.21, 1908, File No.31981 Jordan to Prince Ch’ing, 26 Feb­
ruary 1910.
63. PEF, Vol.26, 1912, File Mo.334* Manners Smith to Govt., 12 March 
1910; Vol.21, 1908, File Mo.374, Foreign Office Memo to the 
Russian Ambassador, 24 February 1910.
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of Tibet, The Chinese troops from Szechuan, Jordan 7/as told, had
gone to Lhasa purely for police duties and to protect British trade
6 4
interests in Tibet.
Morley would have been content with this but not 
Minto. Morley strongly believed that the Indian government were,in fact, 
prejudiced against China; that they showed "speculative apprehensi­
ons" regarding Chinese designs,tpvere inclined to support the Dalai 
Lama; and, therefore, unless the Home government held a tighter rein 
on them, they might drive the matter to an issue with China despite 
the Cabinet*s declared disapproval. It 7/ould be a "disastrous error", 
Morley warned Minto, if China were ma,de-as Russia, had been for a cen­
tury-"?, standing bogey" to justify a forward policy on the north-east- 
frontier. The exigencies of European politics would not allow the 
British government any longer to play the "Great Game" in Asia. "So 
there must be no sort nor shadow of committal" by the Indian government 
for the Dalai Lama-a "pestilent animal", as Morley described him, who 
should be "left to stew in his own juice". Morley even wondered whe­
ther Minto had correctly interpreted the Nepalese anxiety. "Nepal is 
important no doubt", Morley pointed out, "but the Prime Minister is 
not without craft, and it won't be the first time that he tries to
65
use the fears of the Indian foreign office for a game of his own".
Morley*s impression was that Chandra Shamsher*s supposed anxiety was
a means of wringing some concessions from the British; he had tried
65A
this trpk during the Tibetan crisis^ 1903-4. It could not have esca­
ped Morley's notice that it was Manners Smith who, contrary to the
64. Ibid.,File No.3190* Prince Ch'ing to Jordan, 27 February 1910.
65. MP, Vol.5* Morley to Minto, 24 February, 3* 9* 17* 23 March, 30 
June, 13 July 1910« 5. Jolpert, Morley and India, 190o-1910* P«93*
65A. See Chapter V, pp.170-72, 176-7T
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Governments instruction, had discussed the question of a treaty with 
Chandra Shamsher-and this, presumably, had encouraged the latterb hope 
that if he allowed the British to control Nepal’s relations with 
Tibet and China, he could commit them to the protection of Nepalese
interests in Tibet as well as secure their acquiescence in his terri-
66
torial aspirations in 'libet. Besides, Morley could see no reason 
why Minto should v/orry about Nepal when Manners Smith,who knew Chan­
dra Shamsher well, was "confident"
that there is no present fear of the Nepal Durbar 
carrying on secret negotitions with China or of 
desiring a closer connection with that power, 67
Nevertheless, lest Chandra Shamsher should intervene in Tibetan poli­
tics, Morley considered it wise to ask Minto to advise the Prime Minis­
ter that he should not take any action without prior consultation v/ith
68
the British government.
Minto, on the other hand, had no faith in China’s dis­
claimers; "notwithstanding official declarations in Peking", he pri-
69
vately informed Morley, "it looks like a Chinese occupation of Tibet";
the Chinese news papers at Lhasa justifying this occupation as a
necessary precaution against foreign aggression on Tibet strengthened
the Vicero^y's argument. Minto, in fact, had little doubt about China’s
70
"aggessive intentions". After his interview with the Dalai Lama and 
the latter*s warnings that after Tibet, China would absorb Nepal,
Bhutan and Sikkim, Minto became more keen on taking firmer steps. Hot
66. See p.Xlfe.P3LI, Vol. 237* Heg.N0s.9il, 947 > Minutes by Hir tzel, March wo.
67. Ibid.,Reg. No.547* Manners Smith to Govt., 12 March 1910.
68. PNF, Vo.25, 1903* File No.415* Secy.offState to Viceroy*Telg,23 Mar­
ch 1910.
69. MP, Vol.23, Minto to Morley, 10 March 1910.
70. PHF, Vol.21, 1908, File NoS.382-4, Viceroy to Secy, of State, Telg.
5 March 1910,
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that he had any immediate apprehension of China’s detaching Nepal,
Bhutan and Sikkim from the British government, but
still it is disagreable having this great increase in 
Chinese strength in close proximity to our frontier 
native states* 71
The boundary of Nepal and Bhutan with Tibet being neither well-defined
72
nor demarcated was a potential source of complications with China and
certain to involve the Indian government; the latter,who had not for-
72k
gotten their troubles with Russia regarding the Afghan boundary, did 
not naturally want that experience to be repeated in the north-east 
frontier* 'The Chinese, so it appeared to Minto, were out to Challenge 
^British position in Nepal and Bhutan in all possible ways. In March 
and April 1910 came the news of Chinese troops having been dighted on 
the Bhutan border. Jit Bahadur reported that the Amban wanted to write 
to the King of Nepal, asking him not to lend any assistance to the 
Dalai Lama. Jit Bahadur was again requested for Gurkha troops-"even 
10, 20 or 40 will do", the Amban told him-primarily to show the "Tibe­
tan government that "the interests of China and Gorkha are indissolub-
73
ly tied together", All this . Minto held up as a vindication of his 
stand which was that if China had not yet become a grave menace to the
71. MP,Vol.23, Minto to Morley, 17 March, 14 April, 30 June, 9*21 July 
i910. PALI, Vol.237* Reg.No.451* 1910 , BJ,mi I : East India
(Tibet, Further Papers), p.207* Mary, Countess of Minto, India , 
Minto and Morley, pp.387-8.
72. Nepal's boundary with Tibet, Manners Smith wrote to Dunlop Smith, 
Uinto's Private Secretary, was "curiously irregular".Letter dt.
10 July 1907* MNP, No.931. 'This boundary had been generally agreed 
upon by the settlement made by China in 1792. For the most part 
it was supposed to run along the main Himalayan ranges except for 
certain places-as near the Kuti and Kerung passes-where there were 
indentations of Tibetan tracts into the southern and,therefore, 
Nepalese side of the watershed. The occupation of these tracts 
wa3 the abiding object of Nepalese policy. Landon, Nepal, I,pp. 
xv-xvii. 3ee also Chapter IV, p*109.
72A and 73* the next page.
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political interests of the Indian government, she might well become so 
soon.
Minto’s persistence had some effect on the Home government. The Foreign
Office,which had by April 1910 received several reports from the British.
diplomats in China, had "no longer any doubt that. China is actively making
74
her suzerainty over Tibet effective." The Maharaja of’ Bhutan and the Raja 
of Sikkim: had, in the meanwhile, repeatedly requested the Indian govern-
75
ment to ask the Chinese to desist from taking over the Tibetan government.
another representation was, therefore, made with the Chinese government
demanding that they maintain an "effective Tibetan government" and keep
off from the border states. In April 1910 v/.Maisdjiiiller, who was holding
charge of the British embassy at Peking, warned the Chinese Foreign Office
"that we cannot allow any administrative changes in Tibet to 
affect or prejudice the integrity of either of Nepal or of 
the two smaller states" and "we are prepared, if necessary, 
to protect the intersts and rights of these three states" JG
The Chinese were also asked not to keep many troops in Tibet which set 
off uneasiness in Nepal, Bhutan and Jikkim. The India Offive declared 
that the British government had only an "indirect interest" in the Tibet­
an affairs; all that they wanted the Chinese to realise was, as Arthur
72A. On the two issues-the determination of the Upper Oxus frontier of
Afghanistan and the settlement of British India’s northern frontier 
at the Pamirs see O.Alder, British India’s Northern Frontier, 1365- 
1395, pp.165-287.
73. PEP, Vol.24, 1903, File No.3377/1910; Vol.21, 1910, File No.339/1910. 
PBLI, Vol.243, Reg.No.1436.
74. Ibid,, Vol.238, Reg.No.609, Crey to Ka^ VIuller, Telg.8 April 1910.
75. Ibid., Vol.237, Reg.No.582. PNF, Vol.24, 1908, File Nos.794, 3377/1910.
76. Ibid., Vol.25, 1908, File No.3429»Na:&Iuller to Prince Ch’ing, 11 April
1910.
Ilirtzel, the Political Secretary at the India Office, put it,
that the form of Tibetan government must continue"if only because it
was "recognised by treaties and because its disappearance would still
77
further alarm the border states".
The Chinese government denied that their administrative - 
reforms in Tibet would in any way affect the interests either of the 
British government or of the three border states. Prince Ch’ing of 
the Chinese Foreign Office told Ma^Iuller that the British had no 
reason to question the "sovereign rights" of China in Tibet, the feu­
datory status of Nepal vis-a-vis China and the latter*s "friendly 
relations" with Bhutan and Sikkim. China, thms, made it clear that
she would not surrender her traditional suzerainty over the three 
78
border states.
77. Pag, Vol.23, 1908, File Nos.415, 3098/1910.




with Chinese claims of suzerainty over Nepal, Bhutan and 
iikkim, the British government were, in fact, quite familiar. But they 
had as yet taken no step to challenge these claims mainly for two rea­
sons : the Home government’s unwillingness to make an issue with China
78a
on the Indian frontier; and the Indian government’s knowledge that 
Nepal valued her relations with China and resented any British inter­
ference with tkem, Towards the end of the 19th century the Home govern­
ment’s attitude showed some change. In 1895» for instance, the British 
: inister at Peking, N.O’Conor, drew to the attention of the Foreign 
Office that in the Chinese Nmperer^s reply to the Nepalese King’s 
address for permission to send a mission to Peking, Nepal had been 
referred to as a vassal of China. 0'Conor warned that the juxtaposition 
of effective British influence and shadowy Chinese suzerainty in Nepal 
was a political anomaly which should be removed. It would be wise, he 
said, to have the Bino-Nepalese relations clearly defined, removing 
any suggestion of Nepal's allegiance to China and all doubt about 
Britain's exclusive position in Nepal. China’s suzerainty, 0'Conor 
added, had only a symbolic significance; it should never be admitted 
by the British as constituting a real state of subordination on the 
part of Nepal hecause
the transference of such suzerainty into other 
hands might possibly someday prove embarrassing 
to the interests of our Indian empire. 79
By "dtner hands", 0'Conor meant, partcularly, Russia and France 
78h. Jee Chapter IV.
79- 2BF. Vol.27, 1912, File No.947? O'Conor to Kimberley, Foreign 
Cecy., 30 April 1895*
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who had alreddy secured spheresjbf influence in parts of China as well
as in some Chinese “tributary states”. O'Conor well knew that Chinese
claims to suzerainty over Korea and Tongkin had created complications
for Janan and Prance respectively. Britain herself had the experience
80
of these claims over Burma, Hunza and Sikkim. The Chinese Foreign Office 
was accordingly informed by O'Conor that the British government regar­
ded the submissive expressions in the Nepalese King's "petition" to 
the Kmperor as "purely formal and complimentary style of address" 
rather than^ an explicit acknowledgement of Chinese overlordship. The
Chinese government replied that they would maintain their traditional
81
relations with Nepal. The matter was not pursued thereafter. Curzon,
who regarded Nepal as a British protectorate, dismissed the Chinese
claim as a fiction, and was prepared to resist any attempt by China
82
to assert the claim. But when in April 1904 a Chinese delegation 
visited Kathmandu and bestowed on Chandra Shamsher the usual Imperial 
title ( Thong-— ling-ping-ma-kuo-kan-wang), it was not thought necessary 
to make any representation $o the Prime Minister presumably because 
there was no doubt about his loyalty to the British nor any novelty in 
the incident. Howeber, a-fter the Tibetan crisis leading to the Young- 
husband mission,when the Indian government became increasingly sus­
picious of China, they viewed the SinowNepalese relations with some
30. Bee Chapter IV, pp.133 (fn.87)* 137* 141 (fn.105).
81. HO, Vol.159, No.727; Vol.162, No.1802, India Becret Letter to Becy. 
of State, No.179* 10 September 1395; V0I.I63, No.114. FBI, Vol.21, 
No.20, 12 July 1895•
82. PBF, Vol.27, 1912, File No.1755/1910, India Secret Letter to Secy, 
of State, No.79* H  June 1903*
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uneasiness. In 1906, for example, when Chandra Shamsher despatched the 
customary embassy to China, Manners Smith drew the Prime Minister’s 
attention to the Amiran* s memorial to the ICmperor in which tie pal was des­
cribed as "a dependency beyond the borders of China’1 and whose "tribes
83
have always displayed loyal devotion to the throne”• The Indian govern- 
ment, then challenging Chinese claim of sovereignty over Tibet, natu­
rally disliked that China should claim overlordship over Nepal as well. 
However, Chandra Shamsher explained that the language of the Amban’s 
memorial represented not the actual but "rather vague and undefined 
relations between Nepal and China”, and that the Nepalese King’s "peti­
tions',’ which always preceded the despatch of Nepalese embassies to 
Peking, were written "in the truly oriental style of exuberant but 
meaningless formality”. 3o far as the Nepalese government were con­
cerned, the Prime Minister added, the quinquennial embassies had no 
political motivation; they had a purely commercial value; Nepal had 
maintained "this harmless and friendly practice" for ages as nothing
but a sort of urice raid to China for the privileges the Nepalese
84
had been enjoying in Tibet since 1656# This put the matter to rest
for the present. However, the Foreign Office had the feeling that
33; K3F, Vol.27, 1912, Pile Ho.1037/1910, Manners Smith to Chandra,
1^  April 1906.
33A. The Indian government maintained that Tibet was an autonomous,
self-governing state where China had suzerainty-China was respon­
sible for Tibet's foreign relations and defence; in the internal 
administration she had no right to interfere. The Chinese govern­
ment’s contention was that over Tibet China had 3avereignty-Tibet
was as much a part of the Smpire as the regular Chinese provinces;
and although China had normally abstained from interfering with 
the internal administration of Tibet, she had the authority to 
do so, if necessary. CRP, Vol.345* Foreign 3ecret Proceedings, 
February 1905» Nos.892-955* Dept.Notes; October 1905* Nos.575“
613, Dept.Notes. Lamb, op.cit.,1, pp.42-9. Tieh-Tseng Li, The 
Historical Status of Tibet* pp.101-14.
84. See Chapter lV, pp. 124-5 •
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although the Nepalese government regarded their missions as "purely 
formal and complimentary", the Chinese attached more political sig­
nificance to them; this was subsequently borne out by both the Chi­
nese declarations and a thorough study of Sino-Nepalese relations
85
by the India Office.
The 1906 mission was treated with such "studied conte­
mpt and rudeness" by the Szeehuan authoiities that the leader of the 
mission, Bhairab Bahadur, doubted if any such mission should be sent 
in future at all. Bhairab Bahadur complained to the British Acting 
Consul-General at Chengtu about the misbehaviour of the local Chinese 
officers and inadequate supply of provisions by them.He seemed extre­
mely reluctant to continue the long and hazardous journey. Nhile at 
Peking the mission was given, so Jordan reported, "somewhat inadequate 
accommodation" in a corner of the city. Bhairab Bahadur saw Jordan 
and confided to him that the Chinese suspected that the Nepalese miss­
ion was doing espionage work ; for the British. Commercially, he said, 
the mission had proved of doubtful utility for Nepal; Nepalese goods 
brought by the mission for sale in China did not earn much profit; 
besides, the Chinese government's restriction on the sale of opium 
had affected the principal source of earning for the mission. The 
only utility of the mission, so far as the Nepalese government were 
concerned, was that it was a means of obtaini^ first hand informationAT
about events in Tibet and China which was not easily available. Bhai­
rab Bahadur grumbled that the Chinese government insisted on the obser 
vance of the rigid formalities concerning the mission without recog­
nising the fact that the times had changed as had the actual relations
SWee PMaT-rtPiff*. Vol.25, 1908, File Ho.5429, IJa4imier to iirey, 'dz 
April *1910.
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between Nepal and China. He wondered why the Chinese government turned 
down Nepal*s proposal of sending the mission by the easier sea route.
The Chinese especially disliked, Bhairab Bahadur told Jordan, Nepal*d
extra-territorial rights in Tibet, and this Jit Bahadur later confir-
86
med. In Bhairab Bahadur*s opinion "the mission was a relic of the past
which might be discontinued although the process should be a ;gradual
one". Jordan noted "scant ceremony" in the Chinese governments recep-
87
tion and farewell to the mission. All this, together with Chandra 
3hamsher*s uneasiness over the Chinese policy in Tibet,indicated a 
change in Bino-Nepalese relations-a development which correspondingly 
strengthened British hands to contest the Chinese claim on Nepal.
The best answer to this claim, it was now being 
increasingly felt at the Indian Foreign Department, was to take over 
Nepal’s external relations by a treaty. The secretary of the Department, 
j.H.Butler, Jordan and B.alston, the Foreign Office (London) expert 
on China, all shared this view. Minto was not unwilling although he 
would wait until Chandra ohamsher himself pressed for such a treaty- 
in which case the Indian government would not have to give him any quid 
oro quo, most likely arms. King Edward VII wr^ s also "much interested 
in Tibet" and the British position there; he thought that the British 
government "ought to clinch" their relations with Nepal; he"entirely 
agrees", Butler informed Minto from London, with the Indian government’s 
concern over China*s policy in Tibet and the frontier states,and was 
367"  Bee up. 233>248.
37. PLF, Vol.27, 1912, File Nos. 510, 3468, 3561, 35^8, 3772, 4100,
Jordan to Grey, 29 April, 25 May, 5 June, 7 July* 14 September 1908. 
PoLI, Vol.205, Reg.No.1571, Manners Bmith to R.Holland, 7 August 
1907, enclosing Chandta Bhamsher’s Memorandum to the Resident.
231
33
particularly "anxious about Nepal". But Morley would not favour such 
a treaty until China asserted her suzerainty by some positive action. 
For the present he considered it sufficient to assure Chandra ohamsher 
that he should have no fear from China. The Prime Minister was accor­
dingly told that the British government would defend Nepal against 
external aggression and that
so long as he preserved his present correct and 
friendly attitude, consulted the British govern­
ment before committing himself and followed the 
advice when given, the British government would 
not allow Nepalese interests to be prejudiced by 
any administrative change in ‘Tibet. 39
He was also assured that the British government fully recognised the 
Nepalese rights in Tibet and appreciated the Prime Minister’s concern 
for them and that the Anglo-Russian Convention would not affect 
these rights in any way. But at the same time it was also made clear 
to him that British obligation regarding Tibet’s territorial integri­
ty would not let them acquiesce in Nepal’s taking armed measures to 
defend her interests in Tibet. At any rate Chandia ohamsher should 
consult the British before taking such measures. Manners Smith expla­
ined the point thus s
the British government desired from Nepal a conti­
nuance of the present confidential relations in 
regard to external affairs, and a readiness to seek 
advice in matters which mi&ht lead to a conflict 
with China and Tibet, and that the Nepal govern­
ment may expect the maintenance of their existing 
rights and interests by the British government. 90
91
Chandra Shamsher agreed to this arrangement-and he had his own reasons.
The arrangement, in fact, did not place him on the losing side of the
bargain. On the contrary, he prided himself of having realised what he
83. MNP. No.996. Butler to Minto. 20. 28 July 1910.
89. PBF, Vol.26, 1912, File No.334» Manners Smith to Chandra, 5-'Ju*ie 
90 and 91» Cee next page. 1910.
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considered an important political object : committing the British 
to defend Nepal’s position in Tibet without giving them any general 
control on Nepal’s foreign relations. Nepal was still perfectly free 
to deal with Tibet and China in all manner short of force. In fact, 
his undertaking not to seek armed solution of Nepal’s disputes with 
Tibet and China did not amount to anything beyond what the Nepalese 
government were already Committed to in practice, although there was 
no written obligation to that effect.
Manners Bmith himself regarded the arrangement as inadequ­
ate. True, now Nepal could not fall out with China and Tibet on the
pretext of safeguarding her interests, and this, he conceded, was, in-
92
deed, "a distinct change in the political situation" But then, in view 
of the consolidation of Chinese rule in Tibet backed by a strong Chin­
ese army at Lhasa and China's continuing intrigues with Nepal, a treaty­
like the one made with Bhutan-would have been the most desirable Bri­
tish object. Nepal was friendly now, but with a strong China in her
immediate neighbourhood, it was not impossible for her to play in 
future the .game which Afghanistan played between Russia and British 
India. Manners Smith wanted to detach Nepal from her Chinese connexion, 
and was encouraged to see certain favourable indications in Chandra 
Shamsher*s policy that suggested that it would not be difficult to 
persuade the Prime Minister. The latter, for instance, had replied to 
the Imperiar'decree" brought by the Nepalese mission in March 1910 in 
a deliberately "less humble and submissive tone" to suit, as he explain-
90. PbF. Vol.26, 1912, File No.334> Manners Bmith to Chandra, 15 June 
1910.
91. Ibid., Chandra to Manners Bmith, 19 June 1910.
92. Ibid.,Vol.21, 1908, File No.974, Manners Bmith to J.B.Bood, deputy
Becy., Foreign dept., 10 June 1910.
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ed to the Resident, "Nepal's independent status", 'the idea was to see 
how the Amban reacted to this departure from the traditional form of 
such replies. Should the i^mban object, Chandra Shamsher had one ready 
explanation : official correspondence in Nepal was being purged of un-
93
necessary verbosity. Manners Smith welcomed this step as a cautious 
beginning of a change in Nepal’s attitude towards China undertaken at 
the Prime Minister's own initiative. The Nepalese reply, he told Ch­
andra Shamsher, would of course "be useful as a test of the temper of 
the Chinese uO.vaj.cLs Nepal"; but then, it was doubtful if a "mere ver­
bal change in the Kharita, even if the alteration evoked no comment
Ion the part of the Amb an}, would in itself be held to affect the rela-
94
tions between Nepal and China". The hint was : Chandra Shamsher 
should do something which would clearly prove that Nepal was not in 
subordinate relations with China. Nepal's extre-territorial rights
95
in Tibet were then being challenged by the Chinese police at Lhasa 
and in October-November 1910 the matter came to a head when Chandra 
Shamsher asked Manners Smith how to defend these rights, for the 
Resident this, too, was an opportunity. In such circumstances, "with 
a view to future eventualities", Manners Smith wanted t^&iTSino-Nepal-
hr o
ese relations/be clearly defined, leaving no suggestion of Nepal’s
93. PNF, Vol.27, 1912, File No.4123, Manners Smith to Govt., 11
august 1910.
94. Ibid.
95. PShI, Vol.242, Reg.No.1247, H E , 22 June, 8 July 1910.
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vassalage to China-and that during the rule of Chandra shamsher, whose
successors might not have "the same personal influence in Nepal to ca-
96
rry a debated policy through".
The Government, however, were not impressed. Minto, who
wanted Chandra shamsher bdmself to take the initiative for a treaty,had
favourable
so far found no^indication in the Prime Minister’s attitude. On the
contrary, by Manners Smith’s own account,Chandra shamsher’3
inclination at present is to do nothing and to wait 
and see what attitude the Chinese may adopt... in 
future... he would prefer to let the question of 
quinquennial mission and the relations of Nepal 
towards China remain as at present. 97
Chandra Shamsher seemed to have been content with what he had got •
a confidential assurance from the British to protect Nepal’s interests
in Tibet. A treaty, he believed, would give only unnecessary publicity
to Nepal’3 subservience to Britain in regard to foreign relations and
provide a handle to his detractors in the darbar where, as Manners
Smith saw, there was
3till a feeling... that the vague connection with 
China is valuable... as being a bar to the British 
government obtaining too close a political hold 
over Nepal.
Chandra Shamsher had to consider this feeling before he could sever
relations with China in favour of closer political relations with
98
Britain. At the India Office Hirtzel opposed the idea of a treaty on
two grounds-if Nepal violated the treaty, the British could not enforce
it without a serious conflict with her; and an "unqualified assurance
of protection" against China might encourage Nepal to attack Tibet in





future. Moreover, there was much diplomatic advantage in keeping up
the impression that 1 was an independent state, and as such could
action
take any action she liked for her interests in Tibet, for which ^the 
British could not be held responsible. Hirtzel had alPady explained 
the point thus s
3® long as Nepal is willing to act with us it is
very much better that she should in the last resort
be free; we have then power without responsibility.
If we take over the control of her foreign relations, 
we have no more power, but we have a responsibility 
which we should be as impotent to discharge as we 
are in the case of Afghanistan* 99
Hirtzel admitted that "the traditional form of reply from Nepal to
China certainly goes far in admitting Chinese claims-at all events in
100
theory" , but until China tried to "translate theory into practice", 
the Indian government had better wait and see the course of events.
fhere was, in fact, no reason to press ohandra shamsher for a treaty
when Manners Smith himself had testified that the prime Minister
fully realises that in practice his policy must be 
guided by the wishes and advice of the British go­
vernment but he would be glad if the nepal durbar 
could avoid making a formal stipulation on that 
point, so that he may not be thought by his country 
to have lowered the independent status of Nepal. 101
•The idea of a Nepalese treaty was then dropped only to be revived some
102
years later when it was Hirtzel who, of all, was most eager for it.
British representation to Peking in April 1910 had
little effect on Chinese activity in the border states. Bell and Jit
Bahadur reported on the movement of Chinese troops on the Bhutan border
99* PKF, Vol.25, 1903, Pile No. £&), Hirtzel1 s Minute, India Office to 
Foreign Office, 11 May 1910. MNP, n o .210, Butler to Minto, 12
August 1910.
100. Ibid., Vol.27, 1912, Pile n o .4123/1910, Hirtzel1s Minute, Oct.1910.
101. P3l i, Vol.242, Reg. No.1203, Annual Report on Nepal, Resident to
102. Bee Chapter VII, pp. 308 etseq. Govt., 3 uuly 1910.
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a n d  t h e  A m b a n ^ s  c o m m u n i c a t i o n  w i t h ,  t h e  B h u t a n e s e  a u t h o r i t i e s *  W . H . W i l -
k i n s o n ,  t h e  B r i t i s h  C o n s u l - G e n e r a l  a t  C h e n g t u ,  h a d  a n  i n t e r v i e w  w i t h
C h a o  E r h  F e n g ,  n o w  t h e  G o v e r n o r  o f  S z e c h u a n ,  w h i c h  l e d  h i m  t o  b e l i e v e
t h a t  C h i n a  m i g h t  m o r e  v i g o r o u s l y  a s s e r t  h e r  s u z e r a i n t y  o v e r  N e p a l  a n d
B h u t a n *  C h a o  r e g r e t t e d  t h a t  t h e  B r i t i s h  s h o u l d  h a v e  i n t i m a t e  r e l a t i o n s
w i t h  N e p a l ,  a  C h i n e s e  n t r i b u t a r y  s t a t e " ,  w h i l e  C h i n a ' s  o w n  i n f l u e n c e
104
i n  N e p a l  w a s  " r e t r o g r a d e " « o t h e r  a n d  m o r e  a l a r m i n g  n e w s  f o l l o w e d  s 
t h e  C h i n e s e  w e r e  e s t a b l i s h i n g  c o l o n i e s  o n  t h e  r i v e r  v a l l e y s  n o r t h  o f  
A s s a m  a n d  B u r m a  a n d  i n t r i g u i n g  w i t h  t h e  t r i b a l  p e o p l e  o f  t h e  A s s a m  h i l l s *  
T h e  I n d i a n  g o v e r n m e n t  w e r e  w o r r i e d  o v e r  C h i n a ' s  p r e s e n c e  s o  n e a r  a  r e g ­
i o n  w h e r e  m u c h  B r i t i s h  c a p i t a l  h a d  b e e n  i n v e s t e d  i n  t h e  t e a  g a r d e n s *
T h e  N o r t h - e a s t  f r o n t i e r  f r o m  B h u t a n  t o  B u r m a  w a s ,  b e s i d e s ,  s t i l l  v i r ­
t u a l l y  a  t e r r a  i n c o g n i t a ,  a n d  o f  t h e  m a n y  l o c a l  t r i b e s  v e r y  l i t t l e  w a s
k n o w n *  T h e r e  w a s  a s  y e t  n o  p r o v i s i o n  f o r  t h e  d e f e n c e  o f  t h i s  s t i l l
105
u n d e m a r o a t e d  f r o n t i e r  a g a i n s t  a  p o s s i b l e  C h i n e s e  b r e a k t h r o u g h *  M i n t o
w a s  c o n v i n c e d  t h a t
L o o k i n g  a t  t h e  w h o l e  p o s i t i o n  f r o m  a  b r o a d  p o i n t  o f  
v i e w  C h i n a  i s  b e c o m i n g  s o  a g g r e s s i v e  o n  o u r  f r o n t i e r s  
« •  •  t h a t  • « •  w e  a r e  m u c h  m o r e  l i k e l y  t o  a v o i d  a c t u a l  
w a r  i n  t h e  f u t u r e  b y  p u t t i n g  o u r  f o o t  d o w n  n o w ,  t h a n  
b y  s h i l l y - s h a l J ^ n g  w h i l e  s h e  s t e a l s  f r o n t i e r  p o s i t i o n  
f r o m ,  u s  •  1 0 6
I n  t h e  c o n t e x t  o f  s u c h  d e v e l o p m e n t s ,  t h e  H o m e  g o v e r n m e n t  w h o m ,  i n
B u t l e r ' s  w o r d s ,  i t  w a s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  " m o v e " ,  h a d  t o  t a k e  t h e  C h i n e s e
i05* PSFr Vol*25» 1912* F i l e  No,1019/19lb; Vol*27» 191^. File No»1440/ 
1910* PSLI, Vol.245* Reg.No*1706, Report on North-East Frontier, 
October 1910*
104* Ibid*, Reg*No*1823* Wilkinson to Max^auller, 9 August 1910*
105* PSM, B*177r Chinese Forward Policy in the North-East Frontier of 
India, 2 November 1910; B*180, North-East Frontier of India* 5  ^
December 1910* Political and Secret Dept*Library, D.174* Report 
on the Chinese Frontiers of India, by A«Rose, 30 September 1911* 
PEP, Vol.13* 1910* File Nos*1648, 1918/1911; Vol*24, 1908, File 
Nos* 4049* 4076/1910* Lamb, op*cit,, I ,  pp*196-2255 1 1 *  P P *271-91* 
106* MNP, No.996, Letter Dt*29 June I9J-0*
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activities more seriously than ever before* Accordingly in October
1910 Jordan was asked to remind the Chinese government of Britain* •
relations with. Nepal and Bhutan which, the Chinese proceedings in Tibet
tended to disturb* This drew from the Chinese Foreign office what
seemed to the British a "direct claim?1 over Nepal and Bhutan-and that
107
made in an"unoonciliatory and aggressive" tone* It was also reported
that the Amban had made similar claim and had expressed his desire
to send a special delegation to Kathmandu to confer a new Chinese title
108
on Chandra Shamsher* The British, then* had to take a still harder 
line with the Chinese government* But before doing so* the India 
Office considered, it wise to make a thorough study of sepal * s rela­
tions with China, their origin, basts and the motives underlying
the relations* No such detailed enquiry had been made before to assess
109
the validity of China*s claim on Sepal* The result of the enquiry con- 
firmed that the Chinese claim did have am historical basis* From time 
to time Nepalese Kings received from the Chinese Emperors letters pat­
ent denoting subordinate status* The Nepalese Kings could not address 
the Emperors diieotj their addresses had to pass through the Ambans 
who could refuse their transmission if they were not in conformity 
with the set form and style* The addresses were always worded like 
"prayerful petitions", while the Emperors* ; replies conveyed through
ilQ7«,r'PEF » Vol*27t 1910. File No* 4294/1910* F*^unghuaband, "ftur 
position in Tibet", Proceedings of the Central Asian Society, now 
ember 2 , 1 9 1 0 *
108. PSL1, V o l.243* Reg n o.1485* R M , 28 August, 2 September 1910;
PEF, 701*27. 1912, File N0 .I9 O8 , KNA, 5 October 1910.
109* Ibid*, File No.4546/1911* Historical Note on Relations between 
Nepal and China* bar A*Hirtzelj4 November 1910*
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t h e  A m b a n s  w e r e  i n  t h e  n a t u r e  o f  ' ' d e c r e e s "  a n d  p r e s c r i p t i o n  f o r  a  c o u r s e  
o f  c o n d u c t ;  t h e y  w e r e  p a t r o n i s i n g  i n  t o n e  a s  t h o u g h  w r i t t e n  b y  a n  o v e r ­
l o r d  t o  a  f e u d a t o r y *  T h e  N e p a l e s e  g o v e r n m e n t  i n  t h e i r  t r o u b l e s  w i t h  t h e  
B r i t i s h  h a d  s u p p l i c a t e d  C h i n a f s  a s s i s t a n c e  j u s t  a s  a  v a s s a l  w o u l d  d o *  
C h i n a  m e d i a t e d  i n  N e p a l * s  d i s p u t e s  w i t h  T i b e t ,  a n d  N e p a l  a c c e p t e d ,  w i l l y -  
n i l l y ,  s e t t l e m e n t s  m a d e  b y  t h e  A m b a n *  C h i n a ,  i n  s h o r t ,  h a d  a l w a y s  l o o k e d  
u p o n  N e p a l  a s  a  t r i b u t a r y ,  a n d  N e p a l  h a d  n e v e r  d i s p u t e d  i t *  B o t h  J o r d a n  
a n d  M a i p i l l e r  c o n f i r m e d  t h a t  t h e  C h i n e s e  t i t l e  t o  t h e  N e p a l e s e  K i n g s
( E r t i n i  W a n g )  a n d  M i n i s t e r s  l  T h o n g - l i n g - p i n g - m a - k u o - k a n - w a n g )  d i d  d e n o t e
110
feudatory status of their receipients* The tributary mission of 1906
w a s  t h e  l a t e s t  c o n f i r m a t i o n  o f  t h e  C h i n e s e  c l a i m *
J o r d a n ,  w h e n  c o n s u l t e d ,  a l s o  h e l d  t h a t  h i s t o r i c a l l y
C h i n a  d i d  h a v e  a  s t r o n g  c l a i m ,  o n  N e p a l *  T h e  f i r s t  l e t t e r  p a t e n t  o f
Emperor Ch9ien Lung to Ran Bahadur, the Nepalese King, in 1789 stated.
t h a t  t h e  E m p e r o r  r e g a r d e d  t h e  N e p a l e s e  m i s s i o n  " a s  a  t o k e n  o f  a  d e s i r e
o n  t h e  p a r t  o f  N e p a l  t o  b e  i n c l u d e d  a m o n g  t h e  t r i b u t a r i e s  o f  h i s  e m p i r e " .
T h e  t h e n  A m b a n * s  t r a n s l a t i o n  o f  t h e  N e p a l e s e  K i n g * s " p e t i t i o n "  i n  1792
r a n  a s  f o l l o w s  3 " N o w  t h a t  w e  h a v e  b e c o m e  a  s u b j e c t  d e p e n d e n c y  o f  t h e
C e l e s t i a l  d y n a s t y . . * "  C fc & e n  L u n g * s  " d e c r e e "  of 15 S e p t e m b e r  1793 d e c l a -
111
r e d  N e p a l  a s  " h a v i n g  n o w  b e e n  i n c l u d e d  i n  t h e  n u m b e r  o f  o u r  f e u d a t o r i e s ?  
T h e  u n c h a n g e d  l a n g u a g e  a n d  f o r m i  o f  C h i n e s e  "  d e c r e e  f s "  a n d  N e p a l e s e  " p e t i ­
t i o n s "  s i n c e  1792 s u g g e s t e d ,  f r o m  t h e  C h i n e s e  p o i n t  o f  v i e w ,  t h e  c o n ­
t i n u i t y  o f  t h e  s u z e r a i n - t r i b u t a r y  r e l a t i o n s  o f  t h e  t w o  s t a t e s *  I t  w a s
110* P E P ,  Vol*27. 1912, File N o s *  1752, 3704* Maafetiller to Grey, Telg.
24 N o v e m b e r  1910, J o r d a n  t o  V i c e r o y ,  7 M a r c h  1911*
111. I b i d * ,  L a n d o n ,  op.oit*, I I ,  p*114*
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a l s o  s i g n i f i c a n t  t h a t  t h e  R a n a  P r i m e  M i n i s t e r s  h a d  m a i n t a i n e d  t h i s  r e l a ­
t i o n ,  a l t h o u g h  t h e y  w e r e  e x t r e m e l y  s e n s i t i v e  a b o u t  N e p a l  9 s  i n d e p e n d e n t  
s t a t u s  V i s  f t  v i s  t h e  I n d i a n  g o v e r n m e n t *  B e s i d e s ,  t h e i r  e a g e r n e s s  f o r  
C h i n e s e  t i t l e s  w a s  n o  l e s s  t h a n  t h a t  f o r  B r i t i s h  h o n o u r s *
E . H * P a r k e r ,  a  ; h i g h  a u t h o r i t y  o n  C h i n a ,  q u o t e d  C h i n e s e  
s o u r c e s  t o  s h o w  t h a t  C h f i e n  L u n g  r e c e i v e d  N e p a l e s e  e m b a s s i e s  t o  h i s  
c o u r t ;  o n  t h e  s a m e  f o o t i n g  a s  t h o s e  f r o m  o t h e r  t r i b u t a r y  s t a t e s ,  A n n a m ,
S i a m ,  A v a  a n d  K o r e a *  I n  1 7 9 9 *  P a r k e r  p o i n t e d  o u t ,  J  R a n  B a h a d u r  a s k e d  
f o r  a n d  r e c e i v e d ' r o y a l  r a n k *  f o r  h i s  s o n ,  G i r v a n  Y u d d h a  v i k r a m *  i n  1 8 4 2  
R a j e n d r a  V i k r a m ,  G i r v a n 9 s  s o n ,  d r e w  t h e  a t t e n t i o n  o f  t h e  t h e n  E m p e r o r  
t o  C h 9 i e n  L u n g f s  d e c r e e  ( o f  1 7 9 3 )  *  p r o m i s i n g  C h i n e s e  g o v e r n m e n t * s  a s s ­
i s t a n c e  t o  N e p a l  e i t h e r  " i n  m e n ,  m o n e y  o r  h o r s e s "  t o  m e e t  f o r e i g n  a g g r e ­
s s i o n .  R a j e n d r a  V i k r a m ,  t h e n  h a v i n g  s t r a i n e d  r e l a t i o n s  w i t h  t h e  B r i t i s h
government, wanted the Emperor to redeem the pledge of his forbear* All
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t h i s  went i n  f a v o u r  o f  China*s c l a i m *
B u t  t h e n ,  t h e r e  w a s  a n o t h e r  a s p e c t  o f  t h e  m a t t e r *  C h i n e s e
s u z e r a i n t y  i n v o l v e d  n o  c o n t r o l  o f  o r  i n t e r f e r e n c e  w i t h  t h e  N e p a l e s e
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  i n  a n y  w a y *  I t  i s  n o t e w o r t h y  t h a t  i n  1 7 9 6  C h ’ i e n  L u n g
h i m s e l f  a d v i s e d  h i s  s o n  a n d  s u c c e s s o r  a g a i n s t  s u c h ,  i n t e r f e r e n c e  u n l e s s
1 1 3
it was absolutely unavoidable* In fact, as Parker maintained, China9s
a t t i t u d e  t o  N e p a l  h a d  a l w a y s  b e e n  r a t h e r  o n e  o f  " i n d i f f e r e n c e "  t h a n
a c t i v e  a n d  s u s t a i n e d  i n t e r e s t .  N o  a s s i s t a n c e ,  d i p l o m a t i c ,  m i l i t a r y  o r
f i n a n c i a l ,  h a d  e v e r  b e e n  g i v e n  t o  t h e  N e p a l e s e  i n  t h e i r  t r o u b l e s  w i t h
1 1 2 *  H i s t o r i c a l  N o t e ,  b y  H i r t z e l ,  o p . o i t *  P a r k e r ,  " N e p a u l  a n d  C h i n a " , " "
The i m p e r i a l  a n d  A s i a t i c  Q u a r t e r l y  R e v i e w  a n d  O r i e n t a l  a n d  C o l o * * 
n i a l  R e c o r d ,  1 8 9 9 1 V o l . V I I ,  N o s .  1 3  a n d  1 4 *  See a l s o  C h a p t e r  I V y . h \ w , | i i  
1 1 3 *  P a r k e r ,  o p . c i t * ,  p * 7 7 *
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t h e  B r i t i s h *  T h e  C h i n e s e  g o v e r n m e n t  w h i l e  c l a i m i n g  s u z e r a i n t y  o v e r
I T e p a l  h a d  c l e a r l y  d i s o w n e d  a n y  r e s p o n s i b l i t y  w h a c h  a  s u z e r a i n  o w e d  t o
113^
a  v a s s a l *  T h i s ,  a s  s e e n  a l r e a d y ,  b o t h  d u r i n g  t h e  N e p a l  w a r  ( 1 8 1 4 - 6 )
a n d  i n  t h e  1 8 ^ 0 f s  t h e  C h i n e s e  h a d  d e c l a r e d  t h a t  N e p a l  w a s  o u t s i d e  t h e i r
s p h e r e  o f  a c t i v e  i n t e r e s t  a n d  s o  t h e  E m p e r o r  h a d  n o  o b l i g a t i o n  t o  d e f e n d
N e p a l  f r o m  f o r e i g n  a g g r e s s i o n *  F a r  f r o m  p r e v e n t i n g  N e p a l  f r o m  e n t e r i n g
i n t o  r e l a t i o n s  w i t h  B r i t a i n ,  t h e  E m p e r o r ,  d u r i n g  t h e  N e p a l  w a r ,  w a s
r e p o r t e d  t o  h a v e  a s k e d  t h e  A m b a n  t o  t e l l  t h e  N e p a l e s e  t h a t  " a s  a  m a t t e r
o f  f a c t  t h e y  c a n  j o i n  t h e  F e r i n g h i  r u l e  i f  t h e y  l i k e  s o  l o n g  a s  t h e y
1 1 4
s e n d  u s  t r i b u t e * "
F u r t h e r ,  t h e  c l a i m s  o f  C h i n a  d i d  n o t  a l w a y s  c o r r e s p o n d  t o  
a c t u a l  f a c t s ;  i n d e e d ,  a s  H i r t z e l  p o i n t e d  o u t ,  " t h e r e  w a s  n o  l i m i t  t o  
C h i n e s e  c l a i m s " *  F o r  e x a m p l e , J o r d a n  c i t e d  t h e  I m p e r i a l  d e c r e e  o f  c h ' i e n  
L u n g  o f  4  F e b r u a r y  1 7 9 6 *  I n  t h i s  d e c r e e  t h e  E m p e r o r  a c k n o w l e d g e d  t h e  
g i f t  o f  t h e  E n g l i s h  K i n g ,  G e o r g e  I I I ,  b r o u g h t  b y  h i s  e m i s s a r y ,  L o r d  
M a o a r t n e y *  C h * i e n  L u n g  d i s c l a i m e d  a n y  r e g a r d  f o r  t h e  E n g l i s h  " t r i b u t e "  
t h o u g h  v a l u i n g  " t h e  h u m b l e  s p i t i t  w h i c h  o f f e r s  i t " .  T h e  d e c r e e  t h e n  
s t a t e d  t h a t  t h e  E n g l i s h  h a d  s e n t  a n  a g e n t  t o  T i b e $  w i t h  a  " p e t i t i o n "  
t h a t  t h e y  h a d  a d v i s e d  t h e  N e p a l e s e  t o  s u b m i t  t o  t h e  C h i n e s e  E m p e r o r *  
S i n c e  t h e  S i n o - N e p a l e s e  w a r  h a d  t h e n  b e e n  a l r a d d y  w o n  b y  t h e  C h i n e s e ,  
t h e  d e c r e e  w e n t  o n ,  t h e r e  w a s  n o  n e e d  f o r  t h e  E n g l i s h  m e d i a t i o n *  Y e t ,  
" c o m m e n d i n g  y o u r  h u m b l e  l o y a l t y  t o  o u r  C e l e s t i a l  D y n a s t y * * ,  C h ’ i e n  L u n g  
s a i d  i n  h i s  l e t t e r  t o  G e o r g e  I I I ,  " w e  n o w  p r e s e n t  y o u  w i t h  f u r t h e r
1 1 3 A *  See C h a p t e r  I V ,  114-6, 119, 121.
1 1 4 *  P a r k e r ,  o p * c j t * »  p * 7 8 «  H i s t o r i c a l  N o t e ,  b y  H i r t z e l ,  o p * c i t ,  P a r ­
k e r  t o  H i r t z e l ,  P r i v a t e  l e t t e r ,  6 N o v e m b e r  1 9 1 0 *
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g i f t s  a n d  c o m m a n d  y o u  t o  d i s p l a y  e n e r g y  a n d  d u t i f u l  l o y a l t y  s o  a s  t o  
d e s e r v e  o u r  p e r p e t u a l  f a v o u r • "  A s  a  m a t t e r  o f  f a c t ,  h o w e v e r ,  t h e  B r i ­
t i s h  h a d  s e n t  n o  a g e n t  t o  T i b e t  n o r  a d v i s e d  N e p a l  t o  s u b m i t  t o  C h i n a ;  
C o r n w a l l i s  h a d  s e n t  C a p t a i n  K i r k p a t r i c k  t o  K a t h m a n d u  a s  a  m e d i a t o r ,
b u t  h e  o n l y  r e a c h e d  h i s  d e s t i n a t i o n  a f t e r  t h e  w a r  h a d  e n d e d - a n d  i n
1 1 5
C h i n e s e  v i c t o r y *
T h e  S i n o - N e p a l e s e  w a r  i t s e l f  h a d  b e e n  d e s c r i b e d  d i f f e r e n t ­
l y  i n  t h e  N e p a l e s e  a n d  C h i n e s e  a c c o u n t s *  T h e  f o r m e r  m a i n t a i n e d  t h a t  
t h e  G u r k h a s  p u t  u p  a  s t i f f  f i g h t  a n d  t h e  C h i n e s e ,  t h e n  u t t e r l y  e x ­
h a u s t e d  a n d  a n x i o u s  t o  r e t u r n  h o m e  b e f o r e  s n o w  b l o c k e d  t h e  p a s s e s ,  
w e r e  e a g e r  f o r  a  p e a c e *  o n  t h e  o t h e r  h a n d ,  t h e  C h i n e s e  a c c o u n t , a s  
e n g r a v e d  o n  a  s t o n e  s l a b  b e l o w  t h e  P o t a l a  p a l a c e  a t  L h a s a > c l a i m s  t h a t
t h e  G u r k h a s  w e r e  t h o r o u g h l y  d e f e a t e d  a n d  h a d  b e g g e d  f o r  p e a c e  w h i c h
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t h e  C h i n e s e  g e n e r a l  d e i g n e d  t o  g r a n t  o u t  o f  s h f i e r  m e r c y *  i t  w a s  a l s o  
s i g n i f i c a n t  f o r  H i r t z e l  t h a t  t h e  f i r s t  N e p a l e s e  m i s s i o n  w e n t  t o  P e k ­
i n g  i n  1 7 8 9  a f t e r  t h e  G u r k h a s  h a d  a c h i e v e d  v i c t o r y  i n  t h e i r  w a r  w i t h
t h e  T i b e t a n s - a n d  n o t  a f t e r  t h e y  h a d  s u f f e r e d  d e f e a t  b y  t h e  C h i n e s e  i n  
1 1 7
1 7 9 2 .  T h e  G u r k h a s  a g r e e d  t o ^  t r i b u t a r y "  r e l a t i o n s  w i t h  C h i n a  i n  1 7 8 9
1 1 5 •  Historical Note, b y  Hirtzel. PEF, V o l * 2 7 ,  1 9 1 2 ,  File No* 3 7 0 4 ,
J o r d a n  t o  V i c e r o y ,  7  M a r c h  1 9 1 1 *  S e e  C h a p t e r  I ,  p * l ^ .
1 1 6 •  F o r  t h e  a c c o u n t  o f  ' t h e  w a r  s e e  D * H e g m i ,  M o d e m  N e p a l ,  p p * 1 6 7 - 2 3 0 .  
B e l l ,  T i b e t ,  o p . O i t * ,  p p * 4 1 - 5 *  2 7 5 - 8 ,  b a n d o n ,  o p * c i t * , I I ,  p p * 2 7 2 -  
8 2 *  M a y u r  J a n g  K u j j w a r ,  " C h i n a  a n d  t h e  W a r  i n  t h e  H i m a l a y a s 5' ,  1 7 9 2 -  
9 3 »  T h e  E n g l i s h  H i s t o r i c a l  R e v i e w ,  V o l . L X X V I I ,  A p r i l  1 9 6 2 ,  p p . 2 8 3 - 9 7 *  
1 1 7 *  I n  1 7 8 8 - 9  t h e  G u r k h a s  i n v a d e d  T i b e t  a n d  i m p o s e d  a  t r e a t y  b y  w h i c h  
T i b e t  w a s  r e q u i r e d  t o  s e n d  a n  a n n u a l  s u m ; o f  f i f t y  t h o u s a n d  r u p e e s  
t o  K a t h m a n d u  a n d  t o  g i v e  t h e  N e w a r  m e r c h a n t s  o f  N e p a l  t r a d e  f a c i ­
l i t i e s *  T h i s  t r e a t y  w a s  c o n c l u d e d  w i t h  t h e  m e d i a t i o n  o f  t h e  A m b a n  
w h o  a l s o  p e r s u a d e d  t h e  G u r k h a s  t o  s e n d  a  m i s s i o n  t o  P e k i n g *  w h e n  
t h e  T i b e t a n s  d i s c o n t i n u e d  p a y m e n t  o f  t h e  s t i p u l a t e d  s u m  a f t e r  o n e  
y e a r ,  t h e  G u r k h a s  a g a i n  a t t a c k e d  T i b e t  i n  1 7 9 1 *  T h e  G u r k h a s ,  a f t e r  
t h e i r  d e f e a t  b y  t h e  C h i n e s e ^ s e n t  a  m i s s i o n  i n  1 7 9 2 ,  w h i c h ,  w a s ,  t h u s ,  
t h e  s e c o n d  N e p a l e s e  m i s s i o n  t o  P e k i n g *
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n o t .  s o  m u c h  f o r  p o l i t i c a l  r e a s o n s  a s  t o ; c  s a f e g u a r d  In; N e p a l ' s  c o m m e r ­
c i a l  i n t e r e s t s  i n  T i b e t  b y ^ S a n e s i  r e c o g n i t i o n  o f  t h e m ,  i n  v i e w  o f
t h e s e  f a c t s  ,  J o r d a n  w a r n e d  t h a t  t h e  c l a i m  m a d e  o u t  i n  C h i n e s e  i m p e r ­
i a l  d e c r e e s
m u s t  h e  r e a d  s t r i c t l y  i n  i d l e  l i g h t  o f  a s c e r t a i n e d
f a c t s  b e f o r e  i t  c a n  b e  a c c e p t e d  a s  p r o o f  o f  t h e
e x i s t e n c e  & f  a n y  s t a t e  o f  a f f a i r s  w h i c h ,  i t  m a y  
p u r p o r t  t o  d e s c r i b e ,  1 1 8
I n  t h e  i m p e r i a l  D y n a s t i c  C h r o n i c l e s  a  l a r g e  n u m b e r  o f  E u r o p e a n ,  A s i a n  
a n d  A f r i c a n  c o u n t r i e s  w e r e  l i s t e d  a s  " t r i b u t a r i e s ”  o f  C h i n a ,  b u t  m o s t  
o f  t h e m  w e r e  b e y o n d  t h e  a d e q u a t e  k n o w l e d g e  o f  t h e  C h i n e s e  g o v e r n m e n t ;  
t h e  l a t t e r  c o u l d  n a t u r a l l y  h a v e  n o  r e g u l a r  i n t e r c o u r s e  w i t h  t h e s e  
s t a t e s ,  w h i c h ,  w e r e  11 t r i b u t a r i e s "  i n  t h e  s e n s e  t h a t  f r o m  t h e  C h i n e s e  
p o i n t  o f  v i e w  a n y  f o r e i g n  s t a t e  h a v i n g  a n y  r e l a t i o n  o r  i n t e r c o u r s e  
w i t h  C h i n a  w a s  a  t r i b u t a r y .  T h e  C h i n e s e  r e g a r d e d  t h e m s e l v e s  a s  a  s u p ­
e r i o r  p e o p l e  a n d  a l l  o t h e r s  a s  b a r b a r i a n s .  T r a d e  w i t h  C h i n a  w a s  a  h i g h ­
l y  p r i z e d  o b j e c t  f o r  t h e  f o r e i g n  s t a t e s  w h o m  t h e  C h i n e s e  g o v e r n m e n t  
g r a n t e d  c o m m e r c i a l  f a c i l i t i e s  o n  t h e i r  a c c e p t a n c e  o f  C h i n a ' s  c u l t u r a l  
s u p e r i o r i t y .  T h e  t r i b u t a r y  r e l a t i o n s  w e r e  f r o m ,  t h e  t r a d i t i o n a l  C h i n e s e
p o i n t  o f  v i e w  b u t  m e a n s  o f  f o r e i g n  r e l a t i o n s  a n d  c o m m e r c i a l  t r a n s a c -  
1 1 9
t i o n s .  I t  i s  i n d e e d  d i f f i c u l t  t o  i n t e r p r e t  t h e  C h i n e s e  t r i b u t a r y
s y s t e m  f r o m  t h e  w e s t e r n  p o i n t  o f  v i e w  a n d  i n  t e r m s  t a k e n  f r o m  t h e
w e s t e r n  p o l i t i c a l  v o c a b u l a r y .  T h e r e  w a s ,  f o r  e x a m p l e ,  n o  a n a l o g y
b e t w e e n ,  s a y ,  B r i t a i n ' s  f e u d a t o r y  r e l a t i o n s  w i t h  I n d i a n  p r i n c e l y
s t a t e s  a n d  C h i n a ' s  t r i b u t a r y  r e l a t i o n s  w i t h  B u r m a ,  K o r e a  a n d  N e p a l ,
S u z e r a i n t y  f r o m  t h e  w e s t e r n  p o i n t  o f  v i e w  h a s  p r i m a r i l y  a  p o l i t i c a l
1 1 8 ,  P E F ,  Y o l , 2 7 t  1 9 1 2 ,  File N o ,  5 7 0 4 ,  J o r d a n  t o  V i c e r o y ,  7  M a r c h  
1 9 1 1 .
1 1 9 *  J.K*Fairbank, Trade and Diplomacy on the China Coast, I ,  p p , 2 4 - 3 3 *
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c o n n o t a t i o n ;  a  s u z e r a i n  n o t  o n l y  c l a i m *  b u t  e x e r o i s e s  e z c l u s i v e  p o l i ­
t i c a l  i n f l u e n c e  o n  t h e  f e u d a t o r y ,  a n d  h a s .  t h e  c o r r e s p o n d i n g :  p  o b l i g a ­
t i o n  f o r  t h e  l a t t e r * s  d e f e n c e  a g a i n s t  e x t e r n a l  t h r e a t *  C h i n a ' s  t r i b u ­
t a r y  s y s t e m ,  a s  i t  e x i s t e d  i n  t h e  1 9 t h  c e n t u r y ,  o n  t h e  o t h e r  h a n d ,  
i n v o l v e d  n e i t h e r  e x c l u s i v e  p o l i t i c a l  I n f l u e n c e  n o r  a n y  s p e c i f i c  r e s p o n ­
s i b i l i t y  t o  d e f e n d  t h e  t r i b u t a r i e s  f r o m  f o r e i g n  a t t a c k *
H i r t z e l  a l s o  e x a m i n e d  t h e  1 8 5 6  t r e a t y  b e t w e e n  N e p a l  a n d  
T i b e t ,  t h e  m o s t  i m p o r t a n t  d o c u m e n t a r y  b a s i s  o f  C h i n e s e  c l a i m * o n  N e p a l *  
T h e  t r e a t y ,  a s  t r a n s l a t e d  b y  C o l o n e l  R a m s a y  ( t h e  t h e n  R e s i d e n t )  a n d  
a s  p r i n t e d  i n  t h e  1 9 0 9  e d i t i o n  o f  A i t c h i s o n ? s  C o l l e c t i o n  o f  T r e a t i e s  
w a s  f o u n d  t o  d i f f e r  i n  i m p o r t a n t  r e s p e c t s  f r o m  t h e  t r a n s l a t i o n  o f  t h e  
T i b e t a n  t e x t  o f  t h e  t r e a t y  m a d e  b y  C a p t a i n  O ' C o n o r  i n  1 9 0 4 }  0 *  C o n n o r  
h a d  o b t a i n e d  t h e  t e x t ,  ’ f r o m  C h a n d r a  S h a m s h e r *  R a m s a y v s  v e r s i o n  r e p r e ­
s e n t e d  N e p a l  a n d  T i b e t  a s  h a v i n g  " o b e y e d "  t h e  E m p e r o r  o f  C h i n a  " a s  
b e f o r e "  a n d  " b o r n e  a l l e g i a n c e "  t o  h i m  " u p  t o  t h e  p r e s e n t  t i m e " *  B u t  
i n  0  * C o n n o r *  s  r e n d e r i n g  t h e  t w o  s t a t e s  h a d  p a i d  o n l y  " r e s p e c t "  t o  t h e  
E m p e r o r *  T h e  f o r m e r  v e r s i o n  l a i d  s t r e s s  o n  t h e  s u b o r d i n a t i o n  o f  N e p a l
a n d  T i b e t  t o  C h i n a  w h i l e  t h e  l a t t e r  c o n t a i n e d  n o  s u c h  e x p l i c i t  d e c l a -  
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r a t i o n *
AboVe a l l ,  w h a t e v e r  i n f l u e n c e  C h i n a  m i g h t  h a v e  h a d  i n  N e p a l  i n  
t h e  j p r e - R a n a  p e r i o d ,  t h i s  i n f l u e n c e  h a d  d e c r e a s e d  w h e n  t h e  R a n a s  
v e e r e d  c l o s e  t o  t h e  B r i t i s h *  T h a t  r e l a t i o n  w i t h  C h i n a  o n  t r a d i t i o n a l  
l i n e s  w a s  s t i l l  m a i n t a i n e d  by t h e  R a n a s  w a s  d u e  l e s s  t o  i t s  p o l i t i c a l  
v a l u e  t h a n  t o  c o m m e r c i a l  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s ,  a n d  e v e n  t h e s e  w e r e  o f  d i m i -
1 2 0 *  A i t o h i s o n  ( 1 9 0 9  e d n * j ,  II, p * 9 7 t  f « n *  PSLI, V o l * 2 3 8 »  R e g * N o * 6 3 7 *  
B u t l e r  t o  H i r t z e l ,  1 4  A p r i l  1 9 1 0 *  0 * C o n n o r * s  v e r s i o n  i s  g i v e n  
i n  t h e  1 9 2 9  e d n *  o f  A i t c h i s o n ' s  C o l l e c t i o n ,  X I V ,  p p # 4 9 * 5 0 ,  f * n .  
See a l s o  B e l l ,  T i b e t ,  o p * c i t * »  p p * 2 ? 8 - & ) ,  L a n d o n ,  o p * c i t * , II, 
p p . 2 8 2 - 5 •  L a m b ,  o p * c i t * , T J > « i 9 7 t  f « n *
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121 12U
n i s h i n g  i m p o r t a n c e .  T h e  C h i n e s e ,  a s  a l r e a d y  s e e n ,  w e r e  a w a r e  t h a t
N e p a l  h a d  g r a v i t a t e d  t o  B r i t a i n ,  h u t  t h e y  h a d  t a k e n  n o  s t e p  t o  p r e v e n t
t h e  d e v e l o p m e n t ;  o n  t h e  c o n t r a r y ,  t h e y  h a d ,  i n  f a c t ,  l o o k e d  u p o n  N e p a l
a s  a  B r i t i s h  p r o t e c t o r a t e .  I n  I 8 9 6 ,  f o r  e x a m p l e ,  t h e  C h i n e s e  E m b a s s y  i n
L o n d o n  e n c j i i i Y e d  f r o m  t h e  F o r e i g n  O f f i c e  i f  t h e  N e p a l e s e  w e r e  r e a l l y  p r e -
121B
p a r i n g  f o r  w a r  a g a i n s t  T i b e t ,  w h i c h  f a c t  C u r z o n  i n t e r p r e t e d  l a t e r  a s  a n
i n d i c a t i o n  t h a t  t h e  t h e o r y  o f  o u r  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  t h e  
d o i n g s  o f  t h e  N e p a l e s e  i s ,  t o  s o m e  e x t e n t  a t  a n y  r a t e ,  
s h a r e d  b y  t h e  C h i n e s e  g o v e r n m e n t .  1 2 2
H o w e v e r ,  i t  w a s  n o t  s u r p r i s i n g  t h a t  C h i n a  s h o u l d  s t i l l  h o l d  o n  t o  h e r  
c l a i m  o n  N e p a l  b e c a m s e ,  a s  t h e  B r i t i s h  f u l l y  k n e w ,  s h e  h a d  b e e n  a s  
t e n a c i o u s  i n  r e g a r d  t o  K o r e a ,  A n n a m ,  S i a m  a n d  B u r m a  e v e n  a f t e r  t h e s e  
t r i b u t a r i e s  h a d  b e e n  l o s t  t o  o t h e r  p o w e r s .  R e s e n t m e n t  t o w a r d s  f o r e i g n  
p o w e r s  w a s  v e r y  m u c h  i n  e v i d e n c e  i n  C h i n a  i n  t h e  l a s t  d e c a d e  o f  t h e  
19t h  a n d  t h e  f i r s t  d e c a d e  o f  t h e  p r e s e n t  c e n t u r y ,  a n d  w i t h  i t  w a s  
s e e n  a  f e t r o n g  t e n d e n c y  t o  a s s e r t  C h i n e s e  c l a i m s  o n  t h e  o u t l y i n g  d e p e n ­
d e n c i e s  a n d  t r i b u t a r i e s *  W h e n  M a x j & l i i l l e r  m a d e  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s  w i t h  t h e  
C h i n e s e  F o r e i g n  O f f i c e  r e g a r d i n g  t h e i r  c l a i m s  o n  T i b e t ,  N e p a l  a n d  B h u ­
t a n ,  t h e  C h i n e s e  a s s e r t e d  t h e i r  " s o v e r e i g n  a u t h o r i t y "  o n  t h e s e  t e r r i ­
t o r i e s  w h i c h ,  s o  M a j s j M i i l l e r  i n f o r m e d  G r e y ,  w a s  " n o w  t h e  s t o c j d  p h r a s e  o f
e v e r y  C h i n e s e  o f f i c e r  n o  m a t t e r  w h a t  t h e  s u b j e c t  o f  d i s c u s s i o n  w i t h  t h e
1 2 3
f o r e i g n e r  m a y  b e * "  C h i n a  r e f u s e d  t o  a c c e p t  t h a t  b e c a u s e  s h e  h a d  b e e n  
r o b b e d  o f  h e r  t r i b u t a r i e s ,  h e r  t r a d i t i o n a l  r e l a t i o n s  w i t h  t h e m  h a d  a l s o
1 2 1 .  S e e  C h a p t e r  I V ,  p ? .  1 2 7 - 3 1 *
1 2 1 A .  I b i d . ,  g ) . 1 3 1 - 2 .
1 2 1 B * Sfegl b i d * ,  p ^ .  143“9 for Nepal's relations with Tibet in the 1890's. 
1 2 2 *  * P E F ,  V o l . 2 7 ,  1 9 1 2 ,  F i l e  N o * 1 7 5 5 / 1 9 1 0 ,  I n d i a  s e c r e t  L e t t e r  t o  
S e c y . o f  S t a t e ,  N o . 7 9 ,  1 1  J u n e  1 9 0 3 *
1 2 3 *  I b i d . ,  V o l . 2 5 ,  1 9 0 8 ,  F i l e  N o * 3 4 2 9 ,  L e t t e r  D t .  2 2  A p r i l  1 9 1 0 *
F . Q .  4 0 5 / 1 7 1 t  A n n u a l  R e p o r t s  o n  C h i n a ,  1 9 0 6 ,  P a r a  1 *
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ended. In regard to Sikkim, Hunza and Burma, for instance, the Chinese
had insisted on the retention of the traditional symbols of their
124
suzerainty while acquiescing in British absorption of these states.
J?he conclusion which Hirtzel arrived at from his study of Nepal*s rela­
tions with China was "satisfactory to our position".
"It is clear", he saw, "that at no time since 1792 
have they [Chinese] attempted to make their theoretical 
suzerainty an effective reality, while the facts- 
(1) that the mission to Peking began before the 
Gurkha defeat of 1792, (2) that the defeat was not
so overwhelming as has been supposed-go to weaken 125
the inference of an even theoretical suzerainty." /
( t
However strong the Chinese claim might theoretically be and whatever
its historical basis, its lack of any practical validity provided the
British with sufficient ammunition to challenge it. fhe British
argument, as succinctly put by Hirtzel, was : Chinese claim on Nepal
possesses no better foundation than similar 
claims over other neighbouring states which 
have been advanced by the Chinese but have 126
succumbed to the logic of facts and lapse of time.
But before joining the issue the British wanted to be
certain about Chandra ohamsher*s own feeings regarding Nepal*s rela-
127
tions with China, "as much will depend upon his attitude". Manners 
Bmith had already obtained from the Prime Minister an historical acco­
unt of these relations prepared on the basis of Nepalese official 
128
documents. Chandra Shamsher, on being asked, told Manners Smith that
124. See Chapter IV, Pf. 133, 137, 141.
125. PBF, Vol.27* 1912, Pile No.1584, Hirtzel*s Minute, November 1910.
126. Historical Note, by Hirtzel, op.cit.
127. PHF, Vol.27, 1912, File No.1584* Viceroy to Secy, of State, felg.
2 November 1910.
128. PSLI, Vol.246, Reg.No.326, Memorandum of the ... history ... Nepal, 
libet and China, 19®9» 3ee Chapter IV, p. 107,fn.5.
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N e p a l * s  r e l a t i o n s  w i t h  C h i n a  s h o u l d  h e  " r e c t i f i e d 14 s o  a s  t o  c o n f o r m  t o  
w h a t  h e  t e r m e d  t h e  " r e a l  s t a t e  o f  a f f a i r s " .  H e  f a v o u r e d  0 *  C o n n o r ^  
v e r s i o n  o f  t h e  I 8 5 6  t r e a t y  a n d  d e n i e d  t h a t  t h e  C h i n e s e  t i t l e s  t o  t h e  
N e p a l e s e  K i n g s  a n d  M i n i s t e r s  i n  a n y  w a y  i n d i c a t e d  N e p a l *3  f e i d a t o r y  
s t a t u s  v i s - 4 t - v i s  C h i n a .  C h a n d r a  S h a m s h e r " e m p h a t i c a l l y  r e p u d i a t e d "  
t h e  C h i n e s e  o v e r l o r d s h i p ,  e x p r e s s i n g  " g r a v e  e o n c e r n  a n d  a s t o n i s h m e n t ”  
t h a t  C h i n a  s h o u l d  m i s r e p r e s e n t  t h e  " s i m p l e ,  f r i e n d l y  a n d  i n n o c e n t  n a t ­
u r e "  o f  h e r  c o n n e x i o n  w i t h  N e p a l . H e  d e n i e d  t h a t  t h e  q u i n q u e n n i a l  
" p r e s e n t " - b e a r i n g  m i s s i o n s  t o  P e k i n g  h a d  a n y  p o l i t i c a l  i m p u l s e  b e h i n d  
t h e i r  d e s p a t c h  b y  t h e  N e p a l e s e  g o v e r n m e n t .  T h e y  w e r e ,  h e  e x p l a i n e d ,
m e r e l y  t h e  c h a n n e l s  b y  t t h i c h  w e  k e e p  u p  o u r  f r i e n d l y  
c o n n e c t i o n  w i t h  d i s t a n t  C h i n a ,  e x p r e s s  o u r  h i g h  r e g a r d  
a n d  r e s p e o t  f o r  t h e  E m p e r o r  a n d  c u l t i v a t e  g o o d w i l l  f o r  
t h e  C h i n e s e  g o v e r n m e n t  e s p e c i a l l y  o n  a c c o u n t  o f  o u r  
h e a v y  s t a k e  i n  T i b e t ,  1 2 9
N e p a l ,  C h a n d r a  S h a m s h e r  a s s u r e d  t h e  R e s i d e n t ,  h a d  l o n g  r e a l i s e d  t h a t
h e r  s e c u r i t y  l a y  i n  f r i e n d l i n e s s  w i t h  t h e  B r i t i s h  g o v e r n m e n t  r a t h e r
t h a n  i n  c o n t i n u i n g  t h e  p a s t  p o l i c y  o f  " b a l a n c i n g  C h i n e s e  s u z e r a i n t y
a g a i n s t  p o l i t i c a l  c o n n e c t i o n  w i t h  t h e  B r i t i s h * *  •  1 J Q
C h a n d r a  S h a m s h e r  a g r e e d  t o  b e  g u i d e d  b y  B r i t i s h  a d v i c e
in dealing with China. Knowing the Bharadarj*- feeling about Nepal*s
l i n k  w i t h  C h i n a  a n d  h o w  t h e y  r e s e n t e d  a  b r e a k  i n .  i t ,  t h e  B r i t i s h
r e g a r d e d  t h e  P r i m e  M i n i s t e r *3  a s s u r a n c e  a n d  e x p l a n a t i o n  a s  e n o u g h .
C h a n d r a  S h a m s h e r  w a s  a d v i s e d  t o  l e t  a n y ^ a s s f o n  f r o m  T i b e t  c o m e  t o
K a t h m a n d u ,  i f  h e  l i k e d ,  b u t  h e  s h o u l d  c o n s u l t  M a n n e r s  S m i t h  b e f o r e
1 2 9 .  P E F ,  V o l . 2 7 .  1 9 1 2 ,  F i l e  N o . 1 8 0 9 ,  C h a n d r a  t o  M a n n e r s  S m i t h ,  1 9  
N o v e m b e r  1 9 1 0 ;  F i l e  N o . 1 7 8 1 ,  M a n n e r s  S m i t h  t o  G o v t . ,  1  N o v e m ­
b e r  1 9 1 0 5 F i l e  N o . 1 8 6 7 *  C h a n d r a  t o  M a n n e r s  S m i t h , 2 9  N o v e m b e r  
I 9 I O 5 F i l e  N o . 1 7 6 3 »  M a n n e r s  S m i t h  t o  W o o d ,  I T  N o v e m b e r  1 9 1 0 .
1 3 0 .  I b i d . ,  F i l e  N o . 1 7 8 1 ,  M a n n e r s  S m i t h  t o  G o v t . ,  1  N o v e m b e r  1 9 1 0 .
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accepting any new Chinese title or repaying to any Chinesd letter con­
ferring such title, and if either thejjtitle or the letter implied Chin-
1 3 1
e s e  s u z e r a i n t y ,  h e  s h o u l d  n o t  e n t e r t a i n  r i t  : •
T h e  B r i t i s h  w e r e  n o w  i n  a  v e r y  s t r o n g  p o s i t i o n .  I n  J a n ­
u a r y  1 9 1 1  t h e y  w a r n e d  P e k i n g  t h a t  a n y  a t t e m p t  b y  C h i n a  t o  e x e r c i s e  
i n f l u e n c e  o v e r  N e p a l  a n d  B h u t a n , w h i c h *  w e r e  " s o  r e m o t e  f r o m  t h e  s p h e r e  
o f  d i r e c t  C h i n e s e  i n t e r e s t s " ,  w o u l d  n o t  b e  t o l e r a t e d  b y  B r i t a i n .  T h e  
B r i t i s h  d i s c l a i m e d  a n y  i n t e n t i o n  o f  i n t e r r u p t i n g  t h e  f r i e n d l y  a n d  
s  c o m p l i m e n t a r y  r e l a t i o n s  o f  C h i n a  w i t h ,  N e p a l ,  b u t
t h e y  m u s t  a c t  a n d  a d v i s e  t h e  N e p a l e s e  g o v e r n m e n t  £ 0  
a c t  u p o n  t h e  a s s u m p t i o n  t h a t  N e p a l  i s  n o t  a  v a s s a l  
b u t  w h & l l j r  i n d e p e n d e n t  o f  C h i n a  a n d  i n  i n t i m a t e  r e l a ­
t i o n s  w i t h  t h e  B r i t i s h  g o v e r n m e n t  i n  a c c o r d a n c e  w i t h  
t h e  t r e a t i e s  a n d  t h e  m u t u a l  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  a g r e e d  u p o n  
b e t w e e n  t h e m .  1 3 2
The Chinese government answered this clear declaration of Britain's
exclusive relations with Nepal by another spirited affirmation of 
1 3 3
their own claim. A sterner warning was, then, given to the Chinese
government that if they tried to impose their authority on Nepal and
Bhutan >or in any way interfered with them, Britain would strongly
1 3 4
resist such action.
The Revolution in 1911 provided the coup de grace to
the Chinese position in Nepal. In that year a tributary mission fell
due, and the Amban duly reminded the Nepalese government about it.
1 3 5
Chandra Shamsher was willing to send the mission-rather a strange
1 3 1 . PSF, V o l . 2 7 >  1 9 1 2 ,  F i l e  No.1 7 8 1 .  Manners Smith to Govt., 1  Nov- 
ember 1910.
1 3 2 .  I b i d . , F i l e  N o . 4 5 4 6 ,  J o r d a n  t o  P r i n c e  C h ' i n g ,  1 7  J a n u a r y  1 9 1 1 .  
1 3 3 *  I b i d . , F i l e  N o . 3 4 0 4 *  C h ' i n g  t o  J o r d a n ,  3 1  M a r c h  1 9 1 1 .
1 3 4 .  I b i d . , File N o . 3 7 0 4 *  J o r d a n  t o  Ch'iag, 1 0  M a y  1 9 1 1 .
1 3 5 *  I b i d . , F i l e  N o . 1 7 7 1 *  M a n n e r s  S m i t h  t o  G o v t . ,  2 5  S e p t e m b e r  1 9 1 1 .
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decision, in view of his recent "emphatic repudiation" of Chinese suz­
erainty and his knowledge how the earlier mission had been ill treated
by the Chinese* The possible explanation could be that he thought it
wise not to suddenly terminate this ling established practice of the 
Nepalese government and thereby give the Chinese an open provocation* 
The dispute over Nepal•sAterritorial rights in Tibet had not yet been 
settled which was another reason why the Prime Minister was cautious* 
Above all, the feelings of the Bharadars could not be ignored; altho­
ugh personally Chandra Shamsher had no great apprehension of British 
intentions in Nepal, he o had to show deference to the impression 
among his advisers that
if the prop which their outside connection with 
China has given them in the past is to be with­
drawn, it is all the more necessary for ]the
Nepalese government^  to obtain a guarantee from
the British government that the independent 136
status of Nepal will be scrupulously respected*
Chandra Shamsher had, in fact, asked for and obtained this guarantee
from the British who had assured him that Britain had
no desire whatever to interfere with the indepen­
dent position which the state of Nepal has hither­
to enjoyed* 137
Whether the "position" which Nepal had "hitherto enjoyed" was really
"independent" in the full sense of the term was itself a point not
free from doubts* The status of Nepal was a complicated issue which
138
the British had deliberately kept unsettled. However, Chandra sham­
sher, for himself, seemed to be satisfied with the British assurance 
which he later put forward as the definite undertaking by Britain to
1 5 6 *  I b i d * , F i l e  N o * 1 8 0 9 ,  M a n n e r s  S m i t h  t o  G o v $ . ,  2 g  N b ^ ^ m b e r  1 9 1 f f l  
1 3 7 *  I b i d * , V o l . 2 6 ,  1 9 1 2 ,  F i l e  N o . 9 3 5 *  M a n n e r s  S m i t h  t o  C h a n d r a ,  1  M a y  
1 3 8 .  S e e  C h a p t e r  V I I ,  f t a .  1 9 1 1  •
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r e s p e c t  N e p a l ' s  I n d e p e n d e n c e *
I n  N o v e m b e r  1 9 1 1  w i t h  t h e  n e w s  o f  t h e  C h i n e s e  R e v o l u t i o n  
h a v i n g *  r e a c h e d  L o n d o n  ,  t h e  F o r e i g n  O f f i c e  e n q u i r e d  a t  t h e  I n d i a  O f f i c e  
w h e t h e r  t h e  I n d i a n  g o v e r n m e n t  c o u l d  p e r s u a d e  C h a n d r a  S h a m s h e r  t o  d i s ­
c o n t i n u e  t h e  m i s s i o n  i n  v i e w  o f  t h e  s u d d e n  c h a n g e  i n  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  
s i t u a t i o n  i n  ( C h i n a *  B o t h  t h e  F o r e i g n  O f f i c e  a n d  t h e  I n d i a  O f f i c e  
w a n t e d  t h e  p e r m a n e n t  a b a n d o n m e n t  o f  t h e  p r a c t i c e  a n d  t o  s u p p o r t
1 3 9
C h a n d r a  S h a m s h e r  i f  t h e  C h i n e s e  r e t a l i a t e d *  T h e  I n d i a n  g o v e r n m e n t  
w e r e  a l s o  n o  l e s s  e a g e r *  B u t  t h e n ,  s i n c e  i t  w a s  a  d e l i c a t e  i s s u e ,
L o r d  H a r d i n g e ,  w h o  i $  t h e  m e a n w h i l e  h a d  t a k e n  o v e r  f r o m  M i n t o ,  c h o s e  
t o  p i c k  h i s  w a y *  I n s t e a d  o f  a s k i n g  C h a n d r a  S h a m s h e r  t o  a b a n d o n  t h e  
m i s s i o n  f o r  g o o d ,  H a r d i n g e  p r e f e r r e d  s u g g e s t i n g  i t s  p o s t p o n e m e n t  
u n t i l  t h e  f i n a l  r e s u l t  o f  t h e  R e v o l u t i o n  b e c a m e  c l e a r *  A c c o r d i n g l y ,  
i n  D e c e m b e r  1 9 1 1 ,  M a n n e r j S m i t h  d r e w  C h a n d r a  S h a m s h e r  * s  a t t e n t i o n  t o  t h e  
" p e c u l i a r  p o l i t i c a l  s i g n i f i c a n c e "  w h i c h  t h e  C h i n e s e  a t t a c h e d  t o  t h e  
N e p a l e s e  m i s s i o n , a n d  a l s o  t o  t h e  " c h a n g e d  s i t u a t i o n  a n d  g e n e r a l  p o s i ­
t i o n  o f  a f f a i t s  i n  C h i n a " *  M a n n e r s  S m i t h  t h e n  a d d e d  t h a t  t h e  B r i t i s h  
g o v e r n m e n t  h a d  a l r e a d y  m a d e  i t  c l e a r  t o  t h e  C h i n e s e  g o v e r n m e n t  i n  1 9 1 0 -  
1 1  t h a t  t h e y  w o u l d  p r o t e c t  N e p a l ' s  i n d e p e n d e n c e  i f  C h i n a  c h a l l e n g e d  i t *  
T h e  o b v i o u s  h i n t  w a s  s t h e  P r i m e  M i n i s t e r  c o u l d ,  i f  $ e  w a n t e d ,  t a k e
a d v a n t a g e  o f  t h e  u n s e t t l e d  p o l i t i c a l  s t a t e  i n  C h i n a  w i t h o u t  a n y  f e a r
140
o f  C h i n e s e  r e p r i s a l s *  T h e  f a l l  o f  t h e  M a n c h u s ,  i t  c o u l d  b e  a r g u e d ,
1 3 9 •  H P *  V o l .  9 5 *  P a r t  I ,  C r e w e ,  S e c y * o f  S t a t e ,  t o  H a r d i n g e ,  T e l g * ,
1 4  N o v e m b e r  1 9 1 1 *  P E F ,  V o l . 2 7 *  1 9 1 2 ,  F i l e  N o . 4 5 4 6 ,  F o r e i g n  O f f i ­
c e  t o  I n d i a  O f f i c e ,  P o l i t i c a l  a n d  S e c r e t  D e p t .  M i n u t e s ,  N o v e m b e r  
1 9 1 1 |  F i l e  N o * 4 7 3 3 *  S e c y ,  o f  S t a t e  t o  V i c e r o y ,  T e l g .  5  D e c e m b e r
1 9 1 1 .
1 4 0 *  I b i d . : ^  F i l e  N o s . 2 0 5 7 *  1 6 7 4 *  M a n n e r s  S m i t h  t o  C h a n d r a ,  1 0  D e c e m ­
b e r  1 9 1 1 ,  3 1  M a r c h  1 9 1 2 ;  V o l . 1 6 ,  1 9 1 0 ,  F i l e  N o s . 1 9 1 8 / 1 9 1 0 ,  1 8 2 2 /  
1 9 1 1  •  H P *  V o l . 9 5 ,  P a r t  I ,  H a r d i n g e  t o  C r e w e ,  T e l g . 2 5  N o v e m b e r  1 9 1 1 .
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had freed the Nepalese government from their obligation to send these 
missions; indeed, the main p$ank of vassal-suzerain relationship 
between Nepal and China as existing during the Manchu rule could be 
said to have been removed by the fall of that dynasty*
But Chandra Shamsher was discreet* He, too, wanted 
to await the final result of the Bevolution before permanently aban­
doning the mission at the British instance* He thought it prAdent to 
only delay the mission and see the Amban's reaction; the disturbances 
in Tibet and China were for him quite a convenient excuse* But to 
avoid any misunderstanding with the British, Chandra Shamsher hasten­
ed to as^ fre the Resident that the Nepalese government repudiated the 
Chinese suzerainty "with all the emphasis" at their command, because 
it was based on "mistaken grounds and misconstrued view" of the real 
basis of Nepal*s relations with China; the T o r i i > durbar, he added, I 
regarded the Chinese claim as a slur on the Nepalese,who were a "free 
people" t^ who. "startled to hear of the surptise so unexpectedly 
sprung" upon their country. The Prime Minister declared that his govern­
ment strongly objected to the "false interpretation" given bjr China to 
the Nepalese missions, and that he would not accept any title or other 
obligation from China nor send any mission to Peking without giving 
prior intimation to the British government; for Nepal*s territorial
1 4 1
security, in case China threatened it, Nepal would look to the British*
Chandra Shamsher*s astonishment at the Chinese view of
the Nepalese mission was, in fact, "a little over acted" and "slightly
1 4 1 *  P E F ,  V o l * 2 7 »  1 9 1 2 ,  F i l e  N o * 1 4 7 5 ,  C h a n d r a  t o  Manners s m i t h ,  1 7  
D e c e m b e r  1 9 1 1 ;  P i l e  N o . 1 6 7 4 *  Same t o  s a m e ,  4  A p r i l  1 9 1 2 .
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disingenuous** because, as MannersSmith clearly saw,
it is impossible that he should not be aware that 
in the eyes of the Chinese government the mission 
is a sign of vassalage and that the presents which 
accompany the mission are a tribute* 142
However, the Prime Minister kept his word s no Nepalese tributary
mission went to Peking hereafter*
V
The Chinese Revolution gave a sudden turn to the Tibetan 
situation* The Chinese troops at Lhasa and Shigatse mutinied, deposed 
the Amban, Lien, and set up their own Commander, General Chung, as 
the new Amban* Bitter fighting broke out between the Chinese and 
Tibetan troops; Lhasa was plunged in utter anarchy and confusion*
The Tibetan government deolared themselves independent and threaten­
ed to exterminate the Amban, the Chinese officers and troops if they 
did not forthwith leave Tibet* The Chinese rejected this demand and
de e^rately fought on* By the end of 1 9 1 2  Chinese authority in Tibet 
1 4 3
had collapsed*
The situation caused much, anxiety to the Nepalese govern­
ment for whom an independent Tibet with all her tradition of hostility 
to Nepal was as a disagreable as the conversion of Tibet into a Chinese
1 4 2 .  Y o l * 2 7 t  1 9 1 2 ,  F i l e  N o * 1 4 7 5 ,  M a n n e r s  S m i t h  t o  A . M c M a h o n ,
F o r e i g n  S e c y . ,  7  M a r c h  1 9 1 2 .
1 4 3 *  Lamb, op*oit*,II, pp.3 7 1 - 9 5 • Teichman, op.oit*, pp.3 6 - 9 *  PF, Vol. 
2 ,  1 9 1 2 ,  File No.2 1 8 ,  R E ,  1 8  November 1 9 1 1 ;  Vol.1 9 ,  1 9 1 3 ,  File 
No.3 5 2 0 ,  Annual Report on China ( 1 9 1 2 ) ,
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province. What suited the Nepalese interests most was Tibet as a self-
governing , militarily weak dependency of China. But their immediate
w o r r y  w a s  t h e  c h a o t i c  s i t u a t i o n  a t  L h a s a  a n d  t h e  d a m a g e  i t  h a d  a l r e a d y
done to the Nepalese trade. In the disturbances many Nepalese shops had
been looted and several Nepalese lives lost despite Jit Bahadur's earnest
efforts to restore peace and order. The Chinese troops suspected him to
be prorfcLbatan, while the Tibetans would not listen to his advice either;
Nepalese influence in Tibet had suffered a blow. The durbar at Kathmandg
was excited. Chandra Shamsher told Manners Smith that Nepal's intervention
had how become "imperatively necessary". The Prime Minister wanted to
send an "urgent, definite and strong1* representation to the Chinese and
Tibetans at Lhasa and to the Dalai Lama in India, demanding suitable
indemnity for the loss of Nepalese life and property; and if it were not
paid, he added, "we may even be driven by sheer necessity to push our
544.
northern frontier in lieu of compensation". Chandra Shamsher became more
restless after receiving Jit Bahadur's report that the President of the
new Chinese republic had declared Tibet a province of the republic, and
that a strong Chinese force from Szechuan was moving towards Lhasa with
the object of crushing the Tibetan revolt and restoring Chinese authority.
This restoration Chandra Shamsher would oppose by arms for the ostensible
object of preserving Tibet's "proper status of practical independence",
but more probably to occupy the long-coveted Tibetan territory on the
1 4 5
border before the Chinese regained their power in Tibet.
1 4 4 ,  F . Q . 7 ^ ^ / 8 ,  C h a n d r a  S h a m s h e r ' s  M e m o r a n d u m  t o  t h e  R e s i d e n t ,  5 0  A p r i l
1 9 1 2 .  P F ,  V o l . 1 7 ,  1 9 1 2 ,  F i l e  N o s . 2 1 0 2 - 3 ;  V o l . 2 1 ,  1 9 1 2 ,  F i l e  N o s . 2 1 6 3 ,  
2 2 1 6 ,  C h a n d r a  t o  O f f g . R e s i d e n t  (H.L.S h o w e r s ), 6 May 1 9 1 2 ;  V o l . 2 4 ,  
1 9 1 2 ,  F i l e  N o . 2 8 6 5 ,  C h a n d r a  t o  D a l a i  Lama, 8  M a y  1 9 1 2 .
1 4 5 .  I b i d . , V o l . 2 1 ,  1 9 1 2 ,  F i l e  N o . 1 9 1 0 ,  Showers to McMahon, 1  May 1 9 1 2 .
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i.
T h e  s i t u a t i o n  w a s  s i m i l a r  t o  t h a t  i n  t h e  e a r y  m o n t h s  o f  1 9 1 0 ,  
a n d  N e p a l e s e  a n x i e t y ,  a s  t h e n *  h a d  n o w  a  c o n s i d e r a b l e  e f f e c t  o n  B r i t i s h :  
p o l i c y *  T h e  B r i t i s h  p o l i c y  t o w a r d s  t h e  n e w  s i t u a t i o n  i n  T i b e t ,  i n  i t s  
m o r e  u r g e n t  a s p e c t ,  w a s  t o  p r e v e n t  t h e  r e e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  C h i n e s e  a u t h o ­
r i t y  i n  T i b e t  b y  a r m s  a n d  t h e  c o n v e r s i o n  o f  t h e  c o u n t r y  i r i j j b o  a  p r o v i n c e  
o f  t h e  C h i n e s e  r e p u b l i c *  T h e  u l t i m a t e  a i m  w a s  t o  s e c u r e  b y  a n  a g r e e m e n t  
w i t h  C h i n a  a n  a u t o n o m o u s  T i b e t  u n d e r  n o m i n a l  C h i n e s e  s u z e r a i n t y  b u t  e f f e c ­
t i v e  B r i t i s h  i n f l u e n c e *  T h e  c o l l a p s e  o f  t h e  C h i n e s e  a u t h o r i t y  h a d  m a d e  
t h e  T i b e t a n s  i n d e p e n d e n t ,  i n  f a c t *  T h i s  d e  f a c t o  i n d e p e n d e n c e  t h e  B r i ­
t i s h  w o u l d  s u p p o r t *  T h e i r  a r g u m e n t  w a s  t h a t  i t  w a s  t h e  a m b i t i o u s  p o l i c y  
o f  C h i n a ,  h e r  a t t e m p t  t o  t a k e  o b e r  t h e  T i b e t a n  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  b y  f o r c e ,  
a n d  h e r  i n t r i g u e s  w i t h  N e p a l ,  B h u t a n  a n d  S i k k i m  w h i c h  h a d  k e p t  T i b e t  
a n d  t h e  b o r d e r  s t a t e s  i n  s u s p e n s e ,  u n c e r t a i n t y ,  a n x i e t y  a n d  t e n s i o n ;  i t  
w a s  t h i s  p o l i c y  w h i c h ,  i n  s h o r t ,  h a d  a c t i v a t e d  t h e  n o r m a l l y  d o r m a n t  n o r ­
t h - e a s t  f r o n t i e r  o f  I n d i a ;  i t  h a d
" t h r e a t e n e d  t o  c a n c e l  a l l  t h e  a d v a n t a g e s  o f  o u r  
p r e v i o u s  a r r a n g e m e n t s  i n  r e g a r d  t o  T i b e t  a n d  t o  
i n v o l v e  g r e a t  p o l i t i c a l  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  a n d  a  
h e a v y  m i l i t a r y  e x p e n d i t u r e ”  o n  t h a t  f r o n t i e r *  1 4 6
Therefore, the British would not let rfhcrb be be repeated* They decided
that Tibet must be^free from any influence which might be hostile ;
either to the British themselbes or to Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim, and
t h a t  i t  m & s t  r e m a i n  a n  i d e a l  b u f f e r  s t a t e *  S i n c e  C; C h i n e s e  i n t e r v e n t i o n
in Tibet had proved "disastrous” to British interests, Hirtzel noted,
"the only alternative was to exclude it* If we can do that we hav* got 
1 4 7
all we want*” However* the British would allow China to retain the
1 4 6 *  F F ,  V o l . 1 1 , 1 9 1 4 *  F i l e  N o . 2 9 6 4 ,  F i n a l  M e m o r a n d u m  o n  T i b e t  C o n f e r ­
e n c e ,  b y  M c M a h o n ,  8  J u l y  1 9 1 4 *  T e i c h m a n ,  o p . c i t * ,  p p . 4 3 - 6 .
1 4 7 *  PSM, B * 1 9 1 ,  Tibet* by Hirtzel, 2 7  Janyary 1 9 1 3 *
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s y m b o l s  o f  h e r  t r a d i t i o n a l  l i n k s  w i t h  T i b e t  :  t h a  A m b a n  a n d  h i s  e s c o r t s ;  
b u t  n o  a c t i v e  i n t e r f e r e n c e  w i t h  t h e  i n t e r n a l  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  o f  T i b e t  b y  
C h i n a  w o u l d  b e  p e r m i t t e d  n o r  t h e  p o s t i n g '  o f  a  l a r g e  n u m b e r  o f  C h i n e s e  
s o l d i e r s  i n  T i b e t .  T h i s  p o l i c y ,  s o  H i r t z e l  e x p l a i n e d ,  w a s  i n  e f f e c t  n o  
m o r e  t h a n  a  " r e v e r s i o n  t o  t h e  s t a t u s  q u o  b e f o r e  t h e  C h i n e s e  e x p e d i t i o n  
t o  L h a s a "  i n  e a r l y  1 9 1 0 ,  w h i c h ;  h a d  l e d  t o  t h e  D a l a i  L a m a 9 s  e s c a p e  t o  
I n d i a  a n d  t h e  c o l l a p s e  o f  h i s  g o v e r n m e n t .  F o r  t h e  B r i t i s h  i t  w a s  e s s e n ­
t i a l  t o  " s t e r e o t y p e "  t h a t  s t a t u s  q u p  " b y  a n  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  i n s t r u m e n t "  
t o  w h i c h  b o t h  T i b e t  a n d  C h i n a  w o u l d  b e  s i g n a t o r i e s .  W i t h o u t  s u c h  a  
b i n d i n g  a g r e e m e n t  C h i n a  c o u l d  n o t  b e  t r u s t e d  t o  r e t a i n  t h e  7 t r a d i t i o n a l  
a u t o n o m o u s  p o l i t i c a l  s t a t u s  o f  T L b e £ .  T h e  r e c o g n i t i o n  o f  t h e  n e w  C h i n e s e
r e p u b l i c  w a s  m a d e  c o n t i n g e n t  u p o n  i t s  s i g n i n g  t h e  a g r e e m e n t  f o r  w h i c h  a
148
conference would be called. In both the development and application of 
this policy the British made use of their Nepalese ally.
The first natural step in this policy was to secure 
the departure of the Chinese who were in Tibet. But since the British 
themselves could not drive the Chinese ou*t without violating their pled­
ge of non-interbention in Tibet, they thought Nepal might be asked to do 
the job; the Nepalese government,already restive,could be encouraged to 
intervene and ease the Chinese out. Lord Crewe, the Secretary of State,
b e l i e v e d  t h a t  t h i s  p o l i c y  w o u l d " p a v e  t h e  w a y  t o  a  s a t i s f a c t o r y  s e t t l e m e n t
1 4 9
locally of the Tibetan question." Crewe9s advisers in the Political and
1 4 8 .  P S M ,  B . 2 0 1 ,  T i b e t ,  t h e  S i m l a  C o n f e r e n c e ,  b y  J . E . S h u c k b u r g h ,  1 7  O c t o ­
b e r  1 9 1 3 5  B . 2 0 3 ,  T i b e t ,  b y  W . F . 0 9C o n n o r ,  1 7  A p r i l  1 9 1 2 .  P P ,  V o l . 5 6 ,  
1 9 1 2 ,  F i l e  N o . 4 3 4 7 *  4 4 4 0 .  A l s o ,  P . F ,  V o l . 3 0 ,  1 9 1 2 ,  F i l e  N o . 3 6 6 9 ,  
M e m o r a n d u m :  o n  t h e  N o r t h - E a s t  F r o n t i e r  o f  I n d i a ,  b y  H . T . N u g e n t ,  2 6  
A u g u s t  1 9 1 2 ,  M i n u t e  b y  J . D . G r e g o r y ,  1  S e p t e m b e r  1 9 1 2 .  L a m b ,  o p . e i t . ,  
I I ,  p p . 4 1 2 - 5 6 .  B e l l ,  T i b e t ,  o p . e i t . ,  p p . 1 4 8 - 5 9 *  R i c h a r d s o n ,  o p . e i t . ,
p p . 9 6 - 1 0 6 .
1 4 9 *  H P ,  V o l . 9 6 ,  C r e w e  t o  H a r d i n g e ,  T e l g .  1 6  M a y  1 9 1 2 .
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Secret Department, however, were against any Nepalese involvement* Lee
Warner, for example, who had earlier shown keenness to use Nepal for
150
securing British objectives in Tibet, was now much opposed to such use,
w h i c h  h e  c o n s i d e r e d  b o t h  i m p o l i t i c  a n d  u n j u s t i f i e d *  C h i n e s e  p r o c e e d i n g s
i n  T i b e t  a n d  t h e  c o n s e q u e n t  N e p a l e s e  c o n c e r n ,  h e  a r g u e d ,  h a d  s e r v e d  t o
g i v e  t h e  B r i t i s h  s o m e  c o n t r o l  o v e r  N e p a l ' s  r e l a t i o n s  w i t h  C h i n a  a n d  T i b e t
t o  t h e  e x t e n t ,  a t  l e a s t ,  o f  r e s t r a i n i n g  N e p a l ' s  m i l i t a r y  a m b i t i o n s  i n
Tibet* If now the British encouraged Nepal to take independent action
in Tibet, it would weaken that control*
" * • *  i f  w e  u s e  t e r m s " ,  L e e  W a r n e r  p o i n t e d  o u t ,  " w h i c h
c o n v e y  t h e  i m p r e s s i o n  t h a t  N e p a l  h a s  a n y  i n h e r e n t
r i g h t s  o f  w a r  o r  n e g o t i a t i o n  w i t h  C h i n a ,  w e  s h a l l  
p r e j u d i c e  w h a t  m i g h t  i n  d u e  c o u r s e  b e c o m e  a  p o l i c y  
t h a t  p l a c e s  N e p a l  i n  t h e  s a m e  p o s i t i o n  a s  A f g h a n i s t a n  
i n  r e g a r d  t o  f o r e i g n  r e l a t i o n s * "  1 5 1
B e s i d e s ,  i t  w a s  r a t h e r  o d d  f o r  t h e  B r i t i s h  n o w  t o  s a y  t h a t  N e p a l  w a s  a n
i n d e p e n d e n t  s t a t e  o v e r  w h d s e  a c t i o n  t h e y  h a d  n o  c o n t r o l , a n d  a t  t h e
s a m e  t i m e  m a i n t a i n  t h a t  a  C h i n e s e  a t t a c k  o n  N e p a l  o r  i n j u r y  t o  h e r  i n ­
t e r e s t s  i n  T i b e t  w o u l d  n o t  b e  t o l e r a t e d  b y  B r i t a i n - w h i c h  c l e a r l y  i m p l i e d  
t h a t  N e p a l  w a s ,  i n  f a c t ,  a  B r i t i s h  p r o t e c t o r a t e *  H i r t z e l ,  w h o  a l s o  k n e w  
t h e  N e p a l e s e  w e l l ,  h e l d  t h a t  t h e y  w e r e  a  d o u b l e - e d g e d  w e a p o n  a n d ,  t h e r e ­
f o r e ,  s h o u l d  b e  v e r y  c a r e f u l l y  h a n d l e d *  T o  g i v e  N e p a l  a  " m a n d a t e "  i n  
T i b e t ,  H i r t z e l  p o i n t e d  o u t ,  w a s  l i k e  g i v i n g  h e r  " c a r t e  b l a n c h e " ;  o n c e  
u n l e a s h e d ,  s h e  c o u l d  n o t  b e  c o n t r o l l e d  e a s i l y *  M o r e o v e r ,  i t  m i g h t  " l e a d  
t o  a  c o l l i s i o n  w i t h  R u s s i a  w i t h o u t  d i m i n i s h i n g  t h e  r i s k  o f  e v e n t u a l  
c o l l i s i o n  w i t h  C h i n a " *  I t  w o u l d  a d d  t o  C h a n d r a  S h a m s h e r ' s  s e n s e  o f  s e l f -  
1 5 0 1  See C h a p t e r  V ,
1 5 1 .  E F ,  V o l * 2 1 ,  1 9 1 2 ,  P i l e  N o . 2 0 5 5 ,  L e e  W a r n e r ' s  N o t e ,  5  J u n e  1 9 1 2 .
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i m p o r t a n c e ; t h e  s w o l l e n - h e a d e d  N e p a l e s e  P r i m e  M i n i s t e r  w o u l d  t h e n  b e  a s
£  d i f f i c u l t  t o  m a n a g e  a s  t h e  p r e s u m p t u o u s  A f g h a n  A m i r *  B e s i d e s ,  H i r t z e l
a d d e d ,  t h e  G A r k h a s  w e r e  H s a v a g e s ' * ;  " t o  l e t  t h e m  l o o s e  u n c o n t r o l l e d  ■  i n
$ i b e t ,  w o u l d  n o t  b e  j u s t i f i a b l e  f o r  a  p o w e r  m a k i n g  a n y  p r e t e n s i o n  t o  o i -  
1 5 2
v i l i s a t i o n * "
T h e  I n d i a n  g o v e r n m e n t  w e r e  a l s o  u n w i l l i n g  t o  u s e  N e p a l  i n  t h e
m a n n e r  C r e w e  s u g g e s t e d .  T h e  O f f i c i a t i n g  R e s i d e n t ,  H.L.S h o w e r s ,  w a r n e d
t h a t  s u c h  a  m e a s u r e  w o u l d  " h a r d l y  f u r t h e r  t h e  o b j e c t  o f  s e c u r i n g  a n
a u t o n o m o u s  T i b e t " ; o n  t h e  c o n t r a r y ,  i t  w o u l d  b e  s e i z e d  u p o n  b y  t h e
C h i n e s e  g o v e r n m e n t  a s  a n  e x c u s e  t o  d e s p a t c h  t r o o p s  t o  L h a s a .  H a r d i n g e
h o p e d  t h a t  v e r y  s o o n  t h e  b e l e a g u r e d  C h i n e s e  w o u l d  e i t h e r  s u r r e n d e r  a n d
d e p a r t  f r o m  T i b e t  o r  b e  a n n i h i l a t e d  b y  t h e  T i b e t a n s - t h u s  o b v i a t i n g  t h e
n e e d  f o r  N e p a l e s e  i n t e r v e n t i o n .  H o w e v e r ,  b o t h  H a r d i n g e  a n d  S h o w e r s
r e g a r d e d  N e p a l e s e  i n t e r v e n t i o n  a s  p o l i t i c a l l y  a  " u s e f u l  c a r d " ;  t h e y
w o u l d  e x e r t  " e x t r e m e  p r e s s u r e "  o n  C h i n a ,  w a r n i n g  h e r  t h a t  r, a^v '
1 5 3
a t t e m p t  a t  r e c o n q u e r i n g  T i b e t  w o u l d  l e a d  t o  a  S i n o - N e p a l e s e  w a r .  T h e s e
w e r e  w e i g h t y  a r g u m e n t s ,  a n d  C r e w e  t o o k  n o t e  o f  t h e m .  O n  1 4  J u n e  1 9 1 2  h e
w r o t e  t o  H a r d i n g e  t h a t  i t  w a s ,  i n d e e d ,  a  " c y n i c a l  a l t e r n a t i v e "  t o  " s e t
N e p a l  o n  t h e  C h i n e s e  i n  o r d e r  t o  e v a d e  o u r  o w n  i n t e r v e n t i o n " .  B u t  t h e n ,
C r e w e  a d d e d ,  t h e  p l a n  " d o e s  n o t  a p p e a l  t o  m e  n o t  b e c a u s e  I  a m  m o r e  p a r t i -
1 5 4
c u l a r  t h a n  o t h e r  p e o p l e  b u t  b e c a u s e  t h e  c o u r s e  a p p e a r s  t o  m e  V e r y  r i s k y " .  
H o w e v e r ,  l a t e r  t h a t  m o n t h  N e p a l e s e  i n t e r v e n t i o n  w a s  a g a i n  s e r i o u s l y  c o n ­
s i d e r e d  b y  H a r d i n g e  a n d  C r e w e  a f t e r  i t  w a s  r e p o r t e d  t h a t  C h i n e s e  t r o o p s
1 5 2 .  P S M ,  B . 1 9 1 ,  Tibet, by Hirtzel, 2 7  January 1 9 1 3 •
1 5 3 *  V o l . 2 1 ,  1 9 1 2 ,  F i l e  N0 . I 9 6 8 ,  O f f g . R e s i d e n t  t o  G o v t , ,  1  M a y  1 9 1 2 ,  
V i c e r o y  t o  S e c y ,  o f  S t a t e ,  T e l g . 2 4  M a y  1 9 1 2 .
1 5 4 .  H P ,  V o l . 1 1 8 .
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had actually started from Szechuan for Lhasa, and this news had increa­
sed Chandra Shamsher^ anxiety* The Prime Minister saw that Nepalese 
interests at Lhasa had suffered in spite of the British assurance of 
their protection; and so he repeated to the Resident his "earnest desire1* 
to see Tibet "restored to it3 proper status of ptactical independence” 
and his determination to assist the Tibetans with Nepalese troops* it 
seemed to him that the British would not prevent China from testoring 
her authority; but bcftore China could do so, he wanted the border bet-
1 5 5
ween Nepal and Tibet "rectified”, giving the former control of strate­
gic passes* Hardinge pointed out to Crewe that unless the Home govern­
ment, by diplomatic pressure at Peking, barred the entry of Chinese 
troops into Tibet, Nepalese intervention could not be avoided, urewe, 
for himself, would not mind this intervention, for though it would be
"awkward", "I cannot see why it should have the tremendous consequences
156
a t t r i b u t e d  t o  i t  i n  s o m e  q u a r t e r s ” .  B u t  i t  w a s  t h e  F o r e i g n  O f f i c e  w h e r e  
o p p o s i t i o n  t o  t h i s  p o l i c y  w a s  t h e  s t r o n g e s t *  G r e y  d i d  n o t  w a n t  t o  g i v e  
R u s s i a  a n y  c a u s e  f o r  a n n o y a n c e  n o r  a g r e e  t o  a n y t h i n g  o t h e r  t h a n  a  d i p l o ­
m a t i c  s o l u t i o n  o f  t h e  T i b e t a n  p r o b l e m - a m d  t h a t  o n l y  a t  P e k i n g *  H o w e v e r ,  
h e  q u i t e  s a w ,  a s  i n  1 9 1 0 ,  t h e  u r g e n t  n e e d  f o r  a l l a y i n g  t h e  N e p a l e s e  
a n x i e t y  a n d  u s i n g  t h i s  a n x i e t y  t o  c o n v i n c e  R h s s i a  t h a t  t h e  B r i t i s h  g o v e r ­
n m e n t  c o u l d  n o  l o n g e r  a v o i d  s t r o n g  p r e s s u r e  o n  t h e  C h i n e s e  r e p u b l i c .
Grey was persuaded by the India Office*s argument that
He are*., not on firm ground for advising Nepal to 
abstain from taking action on her own account while
1 5 5 •  P B F ,  Y o l * 2 4 ,  1 9 0 8 *  F i l e  N o * 2 9 5 ^ »  R e s i d e n t  t o  G o v t * ,  ^ 2  j ^ p r i l  1 9 1 2 *
1 5 6 .  H P ,  V o l . 1 1 8 ,  C r e w e  t o  H a r d i n g e ,  2 8  J u n e  1 9 1 2 .  P E F ,  V o l . 6 9 ,  1 9 1 2 ,  
F i l e  N o . 2 4 0 6 ,  V i o e r o y  t o  S e c y . o f  S t a t e ,  T e l g . 2 1  J u n e  1 9 1 2 .
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t h e  e f f e c t  o f  s u c h  a c t i o n  m i g h t ;  a t  a n y  m o m e n t  
c o n f r o n t  H i s  M a j e s t y Ys  G o v e r n m e n t  w i t h  t h e  
a l t e r n a t i v e s - e i t h e r  o f  w h i c h  w o u l d  h e  e q u a l l y  
d i s a g r e a h l e - o f  h a v i n g  t o  j u s t i f y  i t  t o  t h e  
R u s s i a n  g o v e r n m e n t  o r  t o  d i s a v o w  i t .  1 5 7
N e p a l e s e  d i s c o n t e n t ,  a s  H i r t z e l  p o i n t e d  o u t ,  w o u l d  n o t  m e r e l y  a f f e c t
G u r k h a  r e c r u i t m e n t  h u t  h a v e  a  p o w e r f u l  e f f e c t  o n  " t h e  H i n d u  d i s a f f e c t e d
e l e m e n t s  i n  I n d i a " .  I n d e e d ,  t h e  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  h a d  c o m e  t o  s u c h  a  p a s s
t h a t  " f r o m  t h e  I n d i a n  p o i n t  o f  v i e w  N e p a l  h a s  b e c o m e  r e a l l y  t h e  o r u x  o f
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t h e  T i b e t a n  q u e s t i o n . "
T h e  T i b e t a n  p o l i c y  u l t i m a t e l y  d e c i d e d  i n  L o n d o n  w a s  
t o  p u t  s t r o n g  p r e s s u r e  o n  t h e  C h i n e s e  g o v e r n m e n t  a t  P e k i n g  a n d  t o  e n ­
c o u r a g e  N e p a l  t o  g e t  t h e  C h i n e s e  o u t  o f  T i b e t  b y  m e d i a t i o n  w i t h  t h e  
T i b e t a n  a h d  C h i n e s e  a u t h o r i t i e s  a t  L h a s a .  T h e  C h i n e s e  g o v e r n m e n t  w e r e  
w a r n e d  t h a t  i f  t h e  S z e c h u a n  t r o o p s  e n t e r e d  T i b e t ,  t h e  B r i t i s h  w o u l d  t a k e  
d e c i s i v e  a c t i o n .  T h e y  w o u l d  a c t i v e l y  a s s i s t  t h e  T i b e t a n s  t o  m a i n t a i n  
t h e i r  i n d e p e n d e n c e  a n d  p r e v e n t  C h i n e s e  a g g r e s s i o n .  I n  J u l y  1 9 1 2  t h e  
D a l a i  L a m a  r e t u r n e d  t o  T i b e t  w h i c h  i n t e n s i f i e d  t h e  a n t i - C h i n e s e  m o v e m e n t  
t h e r e .  O n  1 7  A u g u s t  1 9 1 2  t h e  B r i t i s h  g o v e r n m e n t  d e l i v e r e d  a  m e m o r a n d u m :  
t o  t h e  C h i n e s e  g o v e r n m e n t  a s k i n g  t h e m  t o  a c o e p t  b y  a  w r i t t e n  e n g a g e m e n t
t h a t  T i b e t  w o u l d  r e m a i n  a n  a u t o n o m u ik s  r e g i o n  u n d e r ,  a s  b e f o r e ,  n o m i n a l
1 5 9
C h i n e s e  s u z e r a i n t y .  I n  S e p t e m b e r  G r e y  a n d  C r e w e  h a d  i n t e r v i e w s  w i t h  t h e
R u s s i a n  F o t e i g n  M i n i s t e r ,  S a z a n o v ,  i n  L o n d o n  w h e n  t h e  B r i t i s h  p o l i c y
160
r e g a r d i n g  T i b e t  w a s  e x p l a i n e d  t o  h i m .  I n  M a y  1 9 1 3  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t s  o f
1 5 7 .  P F ,  V o l . 3 0 ,  1 9 1 2 ,  P i l e  N o . 3 6 6 9 ,  I n d i a  O f f i c e  t o  F o r e i g n  O f f i c e ,  1 5  
A u g u s t  1 9 1 2 .
1 5 8 .  P S M ,  B . 1 9 1 *  o p . e i t .
1 5 9 .  P E F ,  V o l . 1 6 ,  1 9 1 3 ,  F i l e  N o . 1 4 7 2 / 1 9 1 2 }  V o l . 6 9 ,  1 9 1 2 ,  F i l e  N o s . l l l 6 ,  
1 1 2 0 ,  1 5 2 8 ,  2 4 1 6 - 7 ,  2 6 0 7 ,  2 7 6 5 / 1 9 1 2 .  F F ,  V o l . 3 5 ,  1 9 1 2 ,  F i l e  N o . 4 0 9 2 * .  
A .  B e l l ,  T i b e t ,  o p . e i t . , p . 1 4 9 *  L a m b ,  o p . e i t . , I I ,  p p . 4 1 2 - 5 6 .
1 6 0 .  P E F ,  V o l . 6 9 ,  1 9 1 2 ,  F i l e  N o . 1 3 4 9 / 1 9 1 2 5  V o l . 1 6 ,  1 9 1 3 ,  F i l e  N o s . 5 / 1 9 1 3 ,  
3 0 5 8 b / 1 9 1 3 .
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China and Tibet were invited to a Tripartite Conference in India to
161
settle the Tibetan question.
The latter half of 1912 saw intense diplomatic activity 
at Lhasa by the Nepalese agent there. Jit Bahadur, who had lost confi-
W c i o L  b c G  v \ ,
dence of the Chinese, wete-^ re placed by Captain Lai Bahadur, formerly the 
Nepalese trade agent at Shigatse. Lai Bahadur fared better than his pre­
decessor. In August he made the Chinese and Tibetans agree to a settle­
ment whereby the former undertook to leave their arms with Lai Bahadur 
and depart to India whence by the sea route they would go home. General 
Chung, however, procrastinated which led to renewed fighting at Lhasa.
At the end of 1912 his position became "perilous in the extreme"; he 
had no hope of being relieved by Szechuan troops whose entry into Tibet 
had been successfully prevented by the British pressure on the Chinese 
government. Chung left Lhasa on 18 December. He made one last effort jbo
hold on at Chumbi until in February 1913 he was obliged to leave Tibet 
162
for good.
There still remained one problem which the Indian government wanted 
to have solved-China*s claim on Nepal and Bhutan. Hardinge wanted th&^ f
L'o
the Chinese republic formally abandon this claim before the British
163 \
government recognised it. Jordan supported the idea,but the India Office 
regarded it as rather unnecessary. In its view Britain*s exclusive rela­
tion with the two states had been made already amply clear to China in
161. PF , Vol.11, 1914, File No.29^ 4> Tibet Conference, Final Memorandum, 
by A.McMahon, 8 July 1914* Lamb, op.eit.,11, pp.459-7&. Bell, Tibet, 
op.eit.,pp.148-59*
162. PF, Vol.14, 1912, File No.4317; Vol.21, 1912, File Nos. 2235. 2548, 
29^ 7? Vol.22, 1912, File No.4052? Vol.24, 1912, File No.2906; Vol.30,
1912, File No.3778; Vol.32, 1912, File Ho.3180; Vol.39, 1912, File 
Nos.4801-2; Vol.3, 1913, File Nos.312-3, 411-2; Vol.13, 1913, File 
Nos.1913, 1875* Lamb, op.eit.,11, pp.378-85.
163. EEF, Vol.69,1912, File No.1590, Viceroy to Secy, of State, 29 April
1912, ^ Continued on the next page]
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1910-11 and the issue finally closed when the then Chinese government
164
did not reply to Jordan's note of 10 May 1911* this silence, Crewe 
interpreted as China's acquiescence in the fact that Britain had ex­
clusive influence in Nepal and Bhutan* Besides, the issue involved no 
"question of our treaty rights in China", whicJa ri i^ts alone-in so far 
as they concerened Tibet-would he considered in the (Tibet conference* 
Further, Nepal could not be left out of the conference if any question 
that concerned her were to be discussed , but then, Nepalese participa­
tion was disliked because, as McMahon, the British delegate to the 
Tibet Conference, explained to Manners Smith, it would only add to the
165
complexity of / the Tibetan problem, making its solution doubly difficult*
However, it was not long before Hardinge and Jordan
turned out to be true propftets* Republican China's attitude towards
Nepal was the same as that of the previous regime, and it made similar
efforts to forge closer links with Nepal* In February 1913 General
Chung, them at Chumbi, wrote to Chandra Shamsher proposing Nepal's
alliance with the new republic* Chandra Shamsher was asked to send a
special delegation to Peking congratulating the new regime in China and
seeking its "orders and advice". Chung was obviously trying to revive
the suggestion that Nepal was a Chinese satellite state* In a secret
telegram to President Yuan Shi Kai,which, was intercepted by the British.
intelligence in Calcutta, Chung described Nepal as "practically the
16$. [Continued from p.2-5^  3 Jordan to Grey, Telg.24 May 1912, India 
Office to Foreign Office, 13 June 1912* .
164* See p.247*
1$5* PEF, Vol.69* 1912, File No.1590/1912, Political and S^ eoret Dept. 
Minute. F.(). 766/8, McMahon to Manners Smith, 8 November 1913*
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last of out tributary states" which the republican government of China 
could not afford to lose to the British* If the Nepalese could be persu­
aded to send a delegation for "orders and advice" to Peking, Chung 
explained in his telegram, "there would be proof positive that Nepal is 
subject to the Republic"* The Nepalese alliance would strengthen the 
republic, militarily* Chung suspected that Chandra Shamsher had already
made an offensive and defensive alliance with the British, but he was
166
not certain if it had made him a "mere puppet of the British"* Yuan 
Shi Kai welcomed Chung's proposal, but he was not unaware of its risks* 
True, if Nepal "could be drawn into alliance with China", it would be 
the "most fitting consequence of her loyalty" to the new republic; Chan­
dra Shamsher as an ally of China might be an effective set off to the 
pro-British Dalai Lama. But it was certain that the British would strong­
ly oppose this new Chinese intrigues, and British annoyance, so Yuan 
cautioned Chun&, would make the more important Tibetan issue harder to 
settle* Therefore, Yuan asked Chung to be very oaieful in trying to
167
win over Chandra Shamsher*
However, Chung failed as Chang and Lien had done earlier*
Chandra Shamsher turned down Chung's suggestion, explaining his desire to
168
preserve Nepal's "independence and her separate existense"* But then, it
did not escape Shower's notice that the Prime Minister made this commu-
169
nication in a language "as courteous and conciliatory as possible".
Chandra Shamsher was not yet certain what shape the Tibetan situation
166. PEE1, Vol.27, 1912, File No.1406/1915.
167. Ibid.
168. Ibid..File No.3120, Chandra to Chung, 16 March 1913*
169. Ibid., Offg.Resident to Govt., 11 March 1913*
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would ultimately take and whether Tibet; would be able to sustain her
"practical independence" for any length of time in the face of Chinese
169A
determination to restore their authority* As has already been seen, the 
Nepalese government did not want China’s connexion with Tibet to end; 
in fact, Lai Bahadur had tried to persuade the Tibetan authorities 
that they should agree to the retention of the Amban with his escorts 
at Lhasa. This, too, was the line Chandra Shamsher took whenever he dis­
cussed the Tibetan situation with Manners Smith and Showers* in such 
circumstances, it was hardly susprising that the Prime Minister should
be courteous in his reply to Chung and would not "wish his relation with
170
the Chinese Representative to be othersise than amicable*" Showers, then,
explained to Chandra Shamsher the British government’s new Tibetan poli- 
171
cy in order to convince him that independent Tibet under n only nomi­
nal Chinese suzerainty was in the interest of both Britain and Nepal* 
However, as events were to prove, Tibet was not independent in the full 
sense of the term; it became a British protectotate-a development which 
made the Nepalese government none tpo happy. Tension between Nepal and
Tibet recrudesced, posing for the British the problem : how to maintain
172
their own interests in Tibet without thereby antagonising the Nepalese*
l69A. See pp.200, 2l6, 251-2.
170. PEP, Vol.27, 1912, Pile No.3120, Offg.Resident to Govt., 11 March 
1913*
171* Ibid., Govt* to Offg.Resident, 11 June 1913* 
172. See Chapter VII, pp*
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C H A P T E R  S E V E N
ANGL0-NEPALE3E"TREATX OP FRIENDSHIP;' 1923-
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Politically, there were two most important developments 
during Chandra Shamsher*s rule : the de facto, though not de jure, 
subordination of Nepal’s external relations to the British government; 
and Nepal’s involvement in Britain’s imperial problems, both in India 
and elsewhere* During this rule the Nepalese and the British governments* 
interests tended to be closely identified, resulting in an increasing 
degree of interdependence.
The British- were happy over this development but not the
Nepalese to whom it seemed to accelerate the danger of eventual British
domination. Independence being a cherished object in Nepal, feelings
against too close relations with the British were still strong in the
darbar, and this Chandra Shamsher could not ignore. Lord Kitcl^ ier’s
visit to Kathmandu in 1906, for example, had been misinterpreted and
1
the result was an abortive conspiracy against the prime Minister.
Nothing, indeed, could damage the Prime Minister’s reputation more than 
the impression that Nepal’s independence and integrity were being com­
promised for his personal ends, and that concessions were being made to 
the British without adequate returns for the country.
To many in the darbar Jang Bahadur was the model prime Minis­
ter of Nepal who got on well with the British but kept them at a safe
1. P3LI, Vol.205, 1907. aeg.No.1572. PEP, Vol.26, 1912, Pile No.183/ 
1907.
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distance; who rendered services to Britain hut never without a price; 
who exacted from the British the treatment of a de facto ruler of an 
independent state; who was a friend of Britain, not a feudatory# Chandra 
Shamsher was expected to live up to this standard which, in the changed 
circumstances of his time, was rather exacting# The British impact on 
Nepal in the 20th century was an irresistible phenomenon; it was hard 
to counter the force of events which tended to draw Nepal definitely 
within Britain*s sphere of influence#
Chandra Shamsher with his understanding of the world situa­
tion clearly saw this. But there was another phenomenon which he could 
not overlook either-Britain also needed Nepal's friendship and assis­
tance. There was, then, some scope for the Prime Minister to see Nepal­
ese interests promoted by his British allies as a price for Nepal's un­
dertaking more and more obligation for Britain. Chandra shamsher would 
be proud to play the role of Britain's partner in her imperial tasks but 
then,he expected Britain to treat Nepal as an ally having common interests 
with her and not as one who stood in a subordinate relation to her and, 
therefore, whose assistance could just be taken for granted#
It was repugnant to the Nepalese government that they should 
sink to the position of an appanage of British India. Nepal under Chandra 
Shamsher strove to maintain and even assert her distincrt political indi­
viduality; this was in tune with her tradition and past history, it was 
in tune, too, with Chandra Shamsher*s times when self-government and 
self-determination were the watchwords in A.sia. in India, particularly, 
the struggle for self-rule was gaining momentum and articulation, and 
this had some indirect influence on Nepal's relation with Britain as well.
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For some time Chandta Shamsher was uneasy to find the British
government showing far less deference to Nepal*s sensitiveness regarding
her independence than they did formerly; the British,to his annoyance,
very often equated Nepal with the Indian feudatory states* The British
gave the Nepalese Prime Ministers while in India only a 15-gun salute?
while earlier they used to give them 19 guns* Bir shamsher, in fact, had
to drop the idea of going to England,for the British appeared to him
reluctant to give him idle honour of an ambassador from a foreign indepen-
2
dent country-an honour they had accorded to Jang Bahadur in 1850* Chandra 
Shamsher himself had taken strong exception to the fact that in the 
Delhi Darbar Curzon had expected him to sit at the head of the Indian
3
princes* In the 1908 edition of the imperial Gazetteer of India Nepal
was described as "a native state on the northern frontier of India”, with.
its political status "intermediate between Afghanistan and native states
of India”; like Afghanistan its foreign relations were controlled by $he
4
Indian government although internally it was independent* in the 1881
edition of the same work, however, Nepal had been listed as an"independent 
5 6 
state"* In a book, England*s work in India ( by N.N.Ghosh) which was
prescribed by the Calcutta university for teaching in Nepal*s schools,
Nepal was described in the same way as in the 1908 edition of the imperial
2"! See Chaptei^ I, p.36 and Chapter III, pp. ■“132=07:--------------------
3* PEF, Vol.35* 1908, File No.2210, Chandra to Ravenshaw, 7 June 1902, 
Chandra to Manners Smith, 15 December 1907*
4* Afghanistan and Nepal, pp.91* 105*6*
5* Vol.I, p.xiv; Vol.VII, p.103*
6. p.166.
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Gazetteer, in November 1910 Chandra Shamsher had represented to Manners 
Smith that Nepal*s friendly relations with Britain had led to a **tight­
ening of political control and various restrictions on her old rights 
and privileges”, He pressed then and again in 1916 for a defitite assur­
ance that the British government would not interfere with Nepal *s inde-
7
pendent status in any way.
Chandra Shamsher had another grievance 2 the Nepalese
government had over the years liberally supplied Gurkha recruits to the
8
Indian government, but the latter did not fully meet Nepal's requisition 
for arips, and her requests for machinery to manufacture arms and ammuni­
tion had been invariably turned down. This he resented as a violation of 
the principle which the British had earlier accepted-giving Nepal arms
9
to make up for the loss of her martial population.
The Nepalese government were bitter over the existing
arrangement which made the Resident's approval essential before arms
10
could be procured through the Indian government. The Nepalese government, 
so the Resident testified, maintained a large army not for use against 
the British-the latter's power was too well known in Nepal-but for main­
taining internal order and the authority of the government, defending the
northern border, and providing occupation to a large number of hereditary
11
soldiers and keeping them contented. Nepal was, besides, a military state,
7* PEP* Vol.26, 1912, Pt.5» File No»524» Chandra to Manners Smith, 19, 23 
November 1910, Manners smith to Govt., 29 November 1910. F.Q., 766/2, 
Chandra to Manners Smith, 1 April 1916. See also Chapter VI* P*
8. Between 1901 and 1913* 24,469 recruits were supplied. Vansittart, Gurkhas, 
9* See Chapter m ,  . 9 PP*175“7*
10. Ibid.
11. PEP, Vol.26, 1912, Pile No.2067, Manners smith to Govt., 1 July 1906.
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and a strong army was prestigious for the rulers. Chandra Shamsher had 
made several representations to the British against their arms policy, 
hut in vain.
There was much substance in Chandra Shamsher*s allegations, in 
fact, the British government both in India and England did not regard 
Nepal as an independent state in the fullest sense of the term. Nepal, 
in their view, had, of course, many attributes of independence, but trea­
ties and, what was more important, actual practices did put some limita­
tion on this independence, indeed, in some important respects like exter­
nal affairs, Nepal was free to the extent that the British allowed her to 
exeroise freedom. True, Nepal was not looked upom as just one of the 
many Indian feudatory states, but she did suffer from some disabilities 
suffered by these states. The position of Nepal, in consequence, was 
anomalous and, as the British themselves admitted, it was very difficult 
to frame an exact definition of Nepal*s political status.
British treaties with Nepal did not contain any conclusive
proof of her status. The 'Treaty of Sagauli, for instance, provided for
12
exchange ofMaccredited Ministers" between the two governments-a unique
provision in view of its absence in British treaties with the Indian
states. But then, the same treaty put a ban on Nepal*s employing Euro- 
13
peans just as treaties with Indian states did on them. Further, there
were some legal provisions in India which applied to Nepal as well, which
fact suggested that from^legal point of view Nepal was not regarded as
a foreign state. For example, by a notification, dated 23 September 1874*
12. ArtideVIII.Aitchison, Treaties, Engagements (1909 edn.), II, p.112. 
13* Article VII, Ibid., p.112.
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Nepal was included among the "States of India in alliance with Her Majesty" 
where the High Court of Calcutta had jurisdiction over European British 
subjects. Nepal, besides, was included in "dominions of princes and 
States in India in alliance with Her Majesty" for the purposes of noti­
fication under the Income Tax Act of 1886 and the Births, Deaths and Marr­
iages Registration Act of the same year, it was ruled in 1894 that an 
inhabitant of Nepal would he regarded as an inhabitant of India within 
the meaning of the Emigration Act of 1 8 8 3 . In contrast to this one could 
cite the Extradition Treaty pf 1855 between Nepal and British India con­
cluded, as between two independent states, on the basis of complete reci- 
14
procity.
In regard to foreign relations, both treaties and actual practices 
indicated that Nepal was not an absolutely independent state although, on 
occasions, the British did treat her as such for their own interests. The 
Treaty of Sagouli, for instance, obliged Nepal to submit her disputes
15
with Sikkim to t£^  British arbitration and to abide by it. Again, by an
engagement in 1839 the King of Nepal undertook not to have a n y  intercour-
16
se with the Indian feudatory states "beyond the Ganges". On the other 
hand, Nepal had fought wars and concluded treaties with China and Tibet 
quite independently of the British government; Nepal had an accredited 
agent at Lhasa; she received an annual tribute from Tibet and sent tri­
bute missions to China-and all this with the full knowledge of the British. 
But then, it was also true that the British had secured indirect but none-
14^ Aitchison, op.eit., pp.1 1 8 -2 0 . The supplementary Extradition Treaty 
p f  1866 had the same character. Ibid., pp.120*2-1.
15* Article VI, Ibid., p . 1 1 2 .
1 6 . Ibid., p p . l l 5 - 7 .  Ahadnama, 1 8 9 6 , Bhadra Vadi 9» R o j , 2 ,  Foreign Office, 
Kathmandu.
theless effective influence on Nepal's external relations; the Nepalese 
government had to reckon with Britain's reaction to Nepal's policy to­
wards Tibet and China• True, in Nepal's disputes with Tibet in the 19th 
tzentury S the British had not interfered directly and had, in fact, let 
Nepal accept the settlement made by China, but consideration of British d 
disapproval did serve as an effective restraint on Nepal's military 
ambitions in Tibet* British policy in Tibet in the first decade of the 
present century put further limitation on Nepal's ability to take inde­
pendent action in Tibet; and the Chinese forward policy in Uibet at this
17
time enabled the British to influence Nepal's relations with China*
Consequently, although unlike Afghanistan Nepal had no treaty formally
18
subordinating her foreign relations to the British, in pactice this 
subordination did exist* In fact, the British founfl that they could 
control the foreign relations of Nepal far more effectively than those 
of Afghanistan. The Rana rmlers of Nepal had to adjust their interests 
to those of the British government with the result that although Nepal 
did enjoy good deal of independence, there were some practical restric­
tions on it. ‘These restrictions were applied by the British government 
whenever they felt it necessary or expedient to do so. The result was 
that whatever the status of Nepal might have been in theory it was the 
attitude adopted by the British government to Nepal from time to time 
that mattered; and this attitude, which became increasingly apparent
17* See Chapters IV, V and VI.
18. Abdur Rahman accepted British control of Afghan foreign relations
in 1880 when he was recognised as the Amir by the British, and again
in 1893 when he signed the Durand Agreement. Habibullah, Abdur Rah­
man's son and successor, confirmed the undertakings of his father, 
in his treaty with the British in March 1905* Aitchison, op.eit*, 




after Jang Bahadur's death, was one of treating, though not openly 
declaring, Nepal as a frontier protectorate.
A masterful Viceroy like Lytton, for example, in challeng­
ing Nepalfs exclusive policy did try to undermine what the Nepalese 
government cherished as the very key stone of their integrity and inde­
pendence. From the Nepalese point of view Lytton's action was a wanton
interference with their state policy. Similar was the Nepalese reaction
20
to Lytton's pressure on Ranuddip for Gurkha recruitment. Ripon, on the 
other hand, was more tactful; he did not mind treating Nepal as an inde­
pendent state if thereby British interests could be furthered. As an 
example of this attitude his reaction to Nepal's dispute with Tibet in 
1883-4 could be cited. While denying that Nepal possessed any unrestric­
ted tight of waging war with a foreign country, Ripon saw that it had 
not been "our duty or our interest to interfere actively” in these dis­
putes. It was, he pointed out to the Home government,
unnecessary to discuss at length the exact footing 
upon which we stand in regard to Nepal or the rela­
tions between Nepal, Tibet and China .... ETepal is 
not absolutely independent in the fullest sense of 
the word, but in most respects we have treated her 
as an independent state, having power to declare 
war and to make treaties. 21
This non-interference policy was, in fact, justified to enable the Indian
22
government to supply arms to Nepal and obtain in return Gurkha recruits.
Dufferin treated Nepal as an independent state and refrain­
ed from interference in her internal affairs even when circumstances
19. The Indian government had in 1876 clearly declared that with Nepal's 
foreign relations they had nothing to do. See Chapter IV, pp.128-9.
20. Chapter ll# 1 ,. and Chapter III, ~ ,
21. PEF, Vol.26, 1912, Pt.3, File No.2067» India Secret Letter;', to 
Secy, of State, No.30, 30 May 1884.
22. See Chapter III, pp.84-5•
23
seemed favourable. It was in Lansdowne's and Elgin's viceroyalties
that the British secured indirect influence on Nepal's relations with
24
Tibet through the arms deal, it was now, too, that in the Indian Forei­
gn department there grew a tendency to regard Nepal as on par with 
the Indian states, althou^i for political reasons Nepal was not openly
treated as such. In 1894* for instance, the Foreign department, then
wheaded byfc’j.Cunningham, declared that the use of the word "ambassador” 
for Nepalese missions was incorrect both "conventionally and diplomati­
cally”, because the term could be used to designatefonly the representa-
25
tives from countries like France, Russia and Germany. Eowever, ■: -
$lgin, in order to avoid giving offence to Bir shamsher, did not want
26
to act on this principle. Curzon of all the Viceroys had the least
respect for Nepalese feelings; he considered it absurd that Nepal, a
frontier state and having long-standing delations with the British,
should remain a closed country. Hence, his keenness to visit Kathmandu
27
with full knowledge of Nepalese dislike of the idea, in a despatch, 
dated 27 February 1903♦ the Secretary of State referred to Nepal as 
"an independent state not in subordinate alliance with the British govern­
ment". Curzon wrote a lengthy reply to this despatch, urging Hamilton 
to expunge the statement. The Viceroy pointed out that although there 
was some ambiguity regarding Nepal's political status, "we consider that
it must be regarded as under the suzerainty of the British crown". Curzon
23^  See Chapter III, p.p.86, $6, 93*
24. See Chapter IV, p. 147*
25. PEF, Vol.26, 1912, Pt.3* File No.334t Cunningham to H.Wylie, Resident, 
8 January 1894*
26. See Chapter III, 0). 102-4*
27* See Chapter V, p.!52fn.3»
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explained the political status of Nepal thus :
It does not seem to be necessary to define the precise 
nature of our protectorate. It is less stringent than 
our relations with other native states; it is more 
stringent than our treaty protectorate over Afghanis­
tan, It approximates perhaps more closely to our conne­
ction with Bhutan than with any other native state,,.. 
Nepal should be regarded as falling under our exclusive 
political influence and control.
The definition of Nepal as an independent state, Curzon warned, was
not only at variance with the general attitude of the Indian govern-
28
ment but it could be in future politically "extremely embarrassing1*.
This set off a lively discussion at the India Office
regarding whether or not Nepal was really independent. Hamilton opined
that Curzon*s contention was "arguable", and that "argumentatively*’
the case for independence was stronger than that against. But Lee Warner
and Godley* the two very experienced members of the Political and secret
Committee, differed, holding that since Nepal was politically a part of
India, it was under the British paramountcy, its "sovereignty" having
been "clipped" by treaties and actual practices. Lee Warner elaborated
the point thus :
I have never regarded Nepal as "independent" except in 
certain attributes of sovereignty. Its internal soverei­
gnty is more complete than that of any other protected 
state of India. But it has no real international life.
The argument based upon the wars and treaties with Tibet 
does not invalidate the statement just made. For it is 
certain that the Government of India tolerated the exer­
cise of independence on these occasions and therefore 
gave a tacit assent to the action of Nepal. The argument 
based upon a profession of allegiance to China is weak­
ened by the fact that Ava, Bhutan and other kingdoms of 
China professed such allegiance but it was a profession 
or a fiction and not a fact. The fact is that Nepal habi­
tually defers to the British will and relies upon British 
protection. It is* therefore, in my opinion a glorified 
member of the protectorate.
28, PEF, Vol.27, 1912, Pt.6, File No.1755* India Secret Letter to 
Secy, of State, No.79t 11 June 1903.
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Godley wholly agreed : the term ’independent* was "clearly inapplicable" 
to Nepal, to which Denis Fitzpatrick, another member of the Committee, 
added-"I dare say Nepal would be willing to be considered under our 
’protection* if the word were properly explained to it." The last word 
was Ritchmond Hitc^e’s, the Secretary to the Political and Secret depart­
ment, who advised that althou^i much could be said for and against Nepal­
ese independence, politically, it was "clearly inexpedient to make a 
statement as to the status of Nepal", because it might, as Curzon rightly
held, embarrass the government of India, Ritchie added one word more s
29
Nepalese susceptibilities must be respected and reckoned with*
The Chinese activities in Tibet and intrigues with
Nepal after the Younghusbandf Mission’s return from Lhasa made the
British government more careful in dealing with Nepal. The Resident
from time to time strongly advised the Government against wounding the
Nepalese government’s sentiments about their status • The reference to
Nepal as a native state in the Imperial Gazetteer , according to Manners
Smith, was deliberate and not a slip, and considering the fact that the
references to Nepal and other frontier states were closely reviewed by
Curzon and the Foreign department, the Resident’s remark would seem not
unjustified. Such unfortunate statements, Manners smith warned, would
make dealings with the darbar all the more difficult,
as it will give a handle to those who already 
urge the Minister to take the line that it is 
not safe to make concessions of any kind to the 
Government of India or its Representative for 
fear of diminution of independence. 30
29. HC, Vol.210, No.22^ 3» Minutes of Hamilton, Lee Warner, Fitzpatrick,1%^  
W.PSLI, Vol.l54» Reg.No.86l, Minutes of Hamilton, Lee Warner, Godley,
Ritchie, August and November 1903*
30. FEF, Vol.26, 1912, Pt.3, File No.334» Resident to Govt., 29 November 
19105 also extract from same to same, 5 September 1907*
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During Chandra Shamsher*s trip to England in 1908 Minto, 
then anxious to keep Chandra Shamsher in good humour on account of 
the Tibetan situation, urged the Home government that the latter should 
be &iven a 19-gun salute and that he should have an audience with the 
King. The Home government refused to treat Chandra Shamsher on par 
with the ambassadors of France and Russia but agreed, on political 
grounds, to receive him as a M19-gun feudatory prince1*, and in view of
31
Nepal*s Mpeculiar status", an audience with the King was also arranged.
In 19$': Manners Smith again pointed out to the Government 
that the British attitude regarding salutes and arms were regarded by 
the darfrar as derogatory to Nepal's status. The Resident fully apprecia­
ted Chandra Shamsher1s position which was, indeed, "a difficult one" 
because
in the eyes of those whose opinions in Nepal affect 
him most, the successful Administrator is not that 
Prime Minister whose tenure of office is marked by 
the best government or by real improvement and prog** 
ress to the country and its people, but he who can 
succeed best in keeping Nepal*s position as a free 
and autonomps country iiTtact.
Therefore, Manners Smith strongly recommended "frankly conceding to
Nepal the fullest measure of freedom compatible with her duty to us 
32
as an ally." To this the government replied that the independence 
which ETepal had "hitherto enjoyed" would not be interfered with. This 
was clearly an ambiguous statement, since the Government well knew that 
this independence was not absolute. The Home government deliberately 
avoided an "ex-cathedra1 pronouncement"on the astactus1: of Nepal on the
31. PEF, Vol.35. 1908. File Nos. 872, 1394, 1&21, 1870, 2117. 2l6o, 
221071907, 169/1908.
32. Ibid., Vol.26, 1912, Pt.3, File No.324, Resident to Govt., 29 Nov- 
ember 1910.
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ground that it was "unnecessary and undesirable’.* Indeed, they noted ;
it is a very difficult question, rendered somewhat 
academic hy the essential fact in the situation which 
is that whatever the status may be on paper it is 
difficult to the point of impractibility to enforce 
anything on Nepal which we cannot persuade her to 
accept willingly. And as our claims should not outrun 33 
our means of enforcing them, the less said the better,
34
The British government , as already seen, made full use of Nepal fs 
uncertain status; sometimes they found it politically convenient to put 
her forward as an independent state and someCtimes as a satellite state 
whose security and interests were guaranteed by the British government.
There were two main reasons why the British would not 
admit that Nepal was a fully independent state. First, such admission 
would strengthen the Nepalese claim to unrestricted acquisition of arms 
and machinery; secondly, it might encourage Nepal to establish relations 
with other foreign powers, thereby weakening Britain*s position in that 
country, The British policy was to give arms to Nepal but not in an un­
limited quantity, and as for machinery requests frnr them were not enter­
tained because the British did not want Nepal to manufacture arms and be
35
too po^ rful to manage. Restrictions on Nep&l's armed strength were essen -^ 
tial for the additional reason that otherwise Nepal's military ambitions 
in Tibet would increase, exposing the British to the risk of involvement 
in international complications.
33. PEF, Vol.26, 1912, Pt.3, File No.324/1911* Political Secretary's M _
34* See Chapter VI, pp. 220, 224, 247, 254-8. Minute^
35* In 1894 8,000 rifles were given together with six mountain guns and 
ammunition; in I896 some more cartridges were given ; two years later 
100 tons of lead were given for the manufacture of bullets; in 1902 
permission was given to import material for such manufacture. In 1904
560,000 cartridges were given. However, far all these arms and ammu­
nition Nepal paid both to cover their purchase and transportation cos^ s. 
The first gift of arms made to Nepal was 25 Lee Metford rifles and
90 Martini Henry rifles in 1904. PEF, Vol.26JX’Pt.3» File No.2067/1906.
See Chapter V, p. 189.
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It was Manners Smith, again, who pointed out that this was
an erroneous policy. Nepalese grievances apperared to him genuine ; the
36
British had, incdeed, not matched Nepal's liberal supply of Gurkhas by 
an equally liberal supply of arms, The British government, the Resident 
pointed out, while setting out their new policy in 1884-of Gurkhas in
37
return for arms-had recommended the free gift of rifles with an annual 
supply of ammunition for target practice. Yet it was not until 1904 thazt 
Nepal was given any gift at all-a fact obviously illustrative of the 
"slow progress of mutual confidence”. Manners Smith, regarded the Nepal­
ese army as a reserve for the Indian army and, therefore, unless the 
former were made acquainted with the use of modern weapons it would prove 
useless when the British government wanted its services in an emergency.
In July 1906 Manners Smith recommended the immediate presentation of
5,000 rifles to Nepal. This, he said, should be followed by the training
38
of some Nepalese officers in the Indian Staff College. ‘The Resident 
asserted that
we shall have nothing to fear from Nepal and that by 
assisting her to raise her army to a higher level of 
efficiency we shall not only give feer the best possible 
proof of our faith in her as an ally but enable her to 
do her duty towards the Empire. 39
In September 1907 he fully supported Chandra Shamsher*s request to buy
40
from the British 20,000 rifles and machinery to manufacture rifles.
The Resident's proposals were too bold for the Government's
acceptance. However, Minto's attitude towards the arms issue was more
liberal than Curzon's. In October 1906 Chandra Shamsher was given a
36. For the number of Gurkhas supplied between 1901 and 1913 see p.*&7£n.3. 
37* See Chapter III, pp. 81-5.
38. REF, Vol.26, 1912, Pt.3, File ¥o.2067, Resident to Govt., 1 July 1906.
39. Ibid.
40. Ibid., File No.624, Resident to Govt., 26 September 1907, India Secret 
Letter, to Secy, of State, N0.5I, 5 March 1908.
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present of 2,500 rifles with ammunition* In 1907 followed another 2,500
41
rifles* Next year a further gift of 7*500 rifles was made, but only at 
the suggestion of the Military department of the India office. The secre­
tary of the department, General 0*Moore Creagh, agreed with Manners Smith*s 
argument that by increasing the efficiency of the Nepalese army the 
British government would really "sharpen a magnificient. weapon which we 
may one day wish to use"* Creagh wondered why the Indian government should 
"higgle" about such "a trifling matter" as giving some rifles to Nepal 
when "larger issues" like Gurkha recruitment were involved* The Gurkhas 
were an "offensive asset", and at a time when the Punjab was a centre 
of anti-British agitation, the Gurkhas were looked upon by creagh as a 
counterweight to the Sikh and Punjabi muslim elements in the Indian army.
In such circumstances, it seemed to Creagh
extremely impolitic to appear to behave ungenerously 
and with suspicions towards an independent state which 
in time of an emergency may be a factor in our salva­
tion.
Creagh, in fact, would "go further and dub as dangerously shortsighted
42
a policy which permits us to trifle with Nepal’s goodwill." in 1911 
Chandra Shamsher again asked for arms and machinery for Nepalese arms 
factories and once more Manners Smith lent his full support. The Govern­
ment gave 10,000 rifles but no machinery on the plea that it was a "diffi­
cult issue". The British policy was summed up thus :
On the one hand we don’t want to see Nepal too 
well-armed. On the other hand her friendship is 
too valuable to be endangered for the sake of a
41* P£g,^ yol.2S, 1912, Pt.3* File No.fe4> India Secret iLetter :- to Secy, 
of state, No.51* 5 March 1908; File N0.9O6, Ticeroy to Chandra, 5 Ap­
ril 1908.
42. Ibid., File No.624, Minute of O’Moore Creagh^  March 1908.
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few rifles more or less. We should never offer arms 
spontaneously and the Resident should understand that 
requests for them from Nepal should as far as possible 
be discouraged but should a point be reached at w&ich 
the refusal of arms would result in strained relations, 
the demand for arms should to some extent be met. 43
There were, then, two main questions in Anglo-Nepalese relations 
which, awaited satisfactory answer-first, whether or not Nepal was inde­
pendent in the fullest sense of the term; secondly, whether she, like 
all independent states, had the right to freely procure arms and machi­
nery. The British- answer to both, the questions was in the negative alth­
ough they would not categorically say this to Nepal. Chandra Shamsher 
had, therefore, reason to be irritated. He kept on pressing the British 
for a clear answer until he managed to get it after the fiyst world war. 
By his services in the war Chandra shamsher put the British under heavy 
obligation. And in view of the difficult internal and external situation 
both during and after the war, the British government, gor their part, 
could no longer afford to let the Nepalese discontent fester.
The war was the biggest event in Chandra Shamsher*s career, on 2 
August 1914* one day before Britain joined the way^the prime Minister 
declared the entire resources of Nepal at the disposal of the British 
government, in 1915~6 twelve thousand Nepali troops went to India $0 
do garrison duty on the North-West Frontier and to maintain internal 
security, thereby freeing the British and Indian troops for service over­
seas. In 1917 the Nepalese contingents did valuable service in the cam-
44
paign against the Mahsud tribes of the frontier. Most impoctant of all,
45*~PBFt Vol.26, 1912, Pt.31 File No.324/1911» Minute of Beauchamp puff, 
Military Secy., India office^  24 February 1911»
44* For this campaign see PiCF, V0I.5O, 1913* Pt.6.
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in the four years of the war 56*580 Gurkha recruits were supplied to 
the Indian army as against an annual average of 1,500 the pre-war
45
years* Altogether more than two lakhs or 25 per cent of the total male
population of the martial class served in the war in hoth combatant and
non-combatant capacities* The financial assistance in cash and kind was
46
to the tune of about a crore of rupees.
No sooner had the war ended than Chandra shamsher asked 
for his regard : the Kings of Nepal and the Prime Ministers should here­
after be addressed "His Majesty" and "His Highness" respectively instead 
of, as hitherto, "His Highness" and "His Excellency". This, he contended, 
would establish the clear distinction between Nepal and other Indian 
states* in April 1919 E.Hollamd, the Officiating Foreign secretary, visi­
ted Kathmandu and found Chandra Shamsher sore, anxious, grumbling* The 
Prime Minister reiterated his earlier allegations against the British 
attitude towards Nepalese independence and urged that the question be 
settled once and for all. He claimed to have gone out of his way to serve 
the British at times even at the cost of his country*s interest. As an 
example, Chandra Shamsher raised the Gurkha recruitment issue, Heavy 
recruitment, particularly in the war years, had drained Nepal*s population 
so much that agriculture in the hill districts especially had considerably 
suffered. Scarcity had been seen in some areas and grain had to be brou­
ght up from the Terai at an enormous cost to the government. The Nepalese
43* See yansittart, op*cit.,pp.174-77 for figures*
46. The Nepalese governments annual revenue was one and a half crores.
For Nepalfs role in the war see M.O'Dwyer, "India's Man Power in the 
War", The Army Quarterly, July 1921, p.253* W.F•O'Connor, On the 
Frontier and Beyond, pp.286-9* L&ndon, Nepal, n, pp. 158-45* CEP, 
Vol.22, Chelmsford to Chandra, 19 February, 18, 28 June 1919; Ibid., 
Vol.23, Same to same, 27 December 1919? Ibid., Vol.18, Chandra to 
Chelmsford, 12 January 1917* HP, Vol.121, Hardinge to Crewe, 22 Janu­
ary 1915* PEF, Vol.66, 1914, FE. 11,Memo on India's Contribution to the 
War, p.11.--
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government, the Prime Minister pointed out, were faced with another prob­
lem s they found it difficult to keep their army in full strength* The 
Nepalese hill men found service in the British Indian army more attractive 
with its better pay, pension and other amenities unavailable in the Nepal­
ese army* The Prime Minister had, therefore, been obliged to increase the
pay scale of the Nepalese troops which had pmt a strain on the govern-
47
mentfs limited resources* The British recruiting officers enlisted men
without even ascertaining whether they actually belonged to the martial
tribes or had given false names to pass themselves off as genuine Gurkhas.
Such "indiscriminate recruiting", Chandra Shamsher warned, would affect
the standard of the Gurkha regiments. Besides, lately the Jharwas, a hill
tribe of Assam, had been taken into these regiments. This was dangerous
because the mixture of any Indian element with the Gurkha ranks might
involve the infiltration of anti-British spirit among the Gurkhas which
the British themselves would deplore. Railways had been built bordering
48
the Nepalese territory, which in facilitating the large scale emigration
49
of Nepalese to India and to Sikkim as labourers in tea gardens, porters 
and watchmen had affected Nepalese agriculture; trade and the labour mar­
ket had been hit as well. Many Gurkhas after retirement did not return 
home but settled down in India in the hope of better opportunities of 
employment. Of 1 0 ,9 3 2  Gurkhas discharged after the war, only 3*838 retur-
47* FF* 1 9 2 0 , Vol.& , Reg. No.8149* Annual Report on Nepal, 1 9 2 0 -1 .
4 8 . The Bengal and North Western Rly passed along the entire southern
border of Nepal. There was, besides, the Darjiling Himalayan Rly on tre. 
south-eastern border of Nepal.
49* The number of Nepalese immigrants to India in 1901 was 243*037* in
1 9 1 1 , 2 8 0 ,2 4 1 , and in 1 9 2 1 , 273*932* These included 2 1 ,6 3 5  Gurkhas in
the Indian army. In 1891 nearly two-thirds of the total population of
Darjiling were born in Nepal, and about the same proportion was recor­
ded in the population of Sikkim, in 1 9 0 1 . J.T.Marten, Census of India, 
1 9 2 1 , Vol.I, Pt.l, pp.9 5 - 6 .  J.H.Hutton, Census of India, 1 9 3 1, vol. 1, 
Pt. I, p.76.
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ned home in 1919*
All this was intended to convince Holland that unless the 
British jjave some substantial reward to the Prime Minister he would no
longer be able to oblige them as generously as he had hitherto. The impre­
ssion, he added, had already been created in the darbar that the Prime 
Minister had failed to bring the country an adequate return for its
services and sacrifices for the British.
Chandra Shamsher then raised the arms issue, contending that
51
the existing restrictions regarding arms were both unwarranted and un­
necessary. The fear, he argued, that once the restrictions were lifted 
Nepal would pile up arms and threaten India was baseless, because Nepal*s 
limited means would not permit either the heavy importation or the exten­
sive manufacture of arms. Lack of technical skill was another handicap 
in manufacturing sophisticated weapons. Besides, when Nepalese interests 
were so "welded" with British interests, and the "very existence of Nepal 
is bound up with that of the British Empire", a break with the British 
government was "impossible", "unthinkable" and, indeed, "suicidal" for 
Nepal. There was, in fact, no Nepalese village in the hills from which 
men had not gone to British India for employment; there were, besides, 
hundreds of Gurkha pensioners in Nepal, indeed, the prime Minister asser­
ted, "the people of Nepal had become anglicised" to such an extent that
even if some successors of his were mad enough to 
attempt to fight the British government, his people 
would not follow him.
50* F«0., $66/l(D, Chandra to W.O’Connor, Resident, 7 December 1919«PEFT 
Vol.90, 1912, Pt.l, File No.2920, Notes of discussion between Holland 
and Chandra, 13, 15 April 1919* E.Candler, The Sepoy, p.21. Also IFP, 
Vol.9264, November 1913* No.8, Chandra*s Memorandum.
51. See Chapter m ,  pp. 99-101.
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The right to obtain arms and machinery freely was from the Nepalese
52
point of view just Ha question of izzut”.
In view of the existing internal and external situation the 
Indian government took a serious view of Chandra shamsher*s demands*
Unrest against British rule in Bengal, Bombay and the Punjab had given
53
Minto and Hardinge many anxious moments. After the war this unrest in­
creased apace. The terrorists of Bengal had an eye on Nepal, in 1907* 
one Prithiman Thapa, a dismissed Gurkha soldier and a suspected agent of 
the terrorists, tried to tamper with the Gurkha troops. Prithiman addre­
ssed meetings in 'Calcutta and raised a subscription to start a Nepali 
newspaper, his ostensible object being to foster an understanding bet­
ween the Bengalis and Nepalis. Prithiman wrote to Chandra shamsher for 
financial assistance. The Prime Ministerm however, ignored the letter 
and assured the Resident of his "strong aversion against the very name 
of Gurkha being associated with anything disloyal towards the British 
government.” In the same year Chandra shamsher banned a number of Indian 
newspapers which wrote anti-British, articles; the names of some more 
such papers were furnished by the British government and a strict watch
was kept on their subscribers; in Nepal. The Bengalis in the Nepalese
54
government’s employ were warned against having any truck with the Ben­
gal terrorists. In 1909 Chandra Shamsher agreed to let four detectives
52. Notes of discussion between Holland and Chandra,^>pTcit77
53* Hardinge of penshurst, IQf Indian gears, pp.116-7. Mary Countess of
Minto, India Under Minto and Morley, pp.122-34* 144-54* 230-61, 300-08. 
V.Lovett, A History of Indian Nationalist Movement, pp.70-124* A.P.* 
1 9 2 0 j East India : Progress and Condition, pp.6-12, 21-4* 30- 
48* HP* Vol.120, Hardinge to Crewe, 17 February, 10,26 March,22 April,
9 December 1914* J.Buchan, Lord Minto : A Memoir, pp.255-6, 274-81, 
289-94* S.R.tfasti, Lord Minto and the Indian Nationalist Movement.
M.N.Das, India Under Morley and Mintn. PP* 88 et 3gnr
54. The Bengalis were mostly doctors, engineers ana teachers. See also
Chapter VIII, P*35&fn.91.
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from India to track down some Bengali revolutionaries suspected to be
hiding in some remote areas of Nepal, in the same year he issued a notice
to control the ingress of aliens into the Nepal valley. During the war,
the Germans had tried to intrigue with Nepal through Raja Mahendra pra-
tap, the noted Indian revolutionary. The German Chancellor, Bethmann
Hollweg, wrote a personal letter to the King of Nepal addressing him as
"lour Majesty" and promising to recognise Nepal as a fully independent
state, if she rose against the British . Mahendra Paatap,who carried the
letter for its transmission to Kathmandu, incited the Prime Minister to
take advantage of the British involvement in the war, their anxiety over
56
the attitude of the Court of Kabul, where German agents were active,
and^is content in the tribal territory. Nepal, Mahendra pratap pointed
out in his letter to the Prime Minister, was the most powerful state on
the Indian border.' and could act as the leader of the Indian states who
looked to Nepal for inspiration and lead. Mahendra pratap offered to act
as a liaison between the Courts of Kathmandu and Kabul, in another letter
he urged Chandra shamsher that Nepal being the only Hindu state in the
world, it was her sacred obligation to support the Hindu revolutionary
movements in India. If these movements succeeded Chandra shamsher would
57
be made the premier of independent India. These intrigues and conspira­
cies failed because of Chandra shamsher*s loyalty. The British were con­
vinced that disaffected Nepal with her large army could make the problem
35* PSLI, Vol.203, Reg, No.1^ 31, Chandra to banners Smith, 13,14 June, 17 
July 1907* Govt, to Resident, 4 September 1907* Ibid.,Vol.231* Reg.
No.1372, Resident to Govt., 10 August 1909* Ibid., Vol.242, Reg. No. 
1203, Resident to Govt., 8 July 19&0.
56. Sykes, op.cit., pp.246-63.
57* PEF, Vol.21, I92O5 Vol.39t 1914» Pt.6. These files deal with Mahendra 
Pratap*s activities during the war and after,which are recorded also 
in his autobiography, iffy Life stmry of Fifty-five years (Dehra Dun, 
1947). pp.41. 56.
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of India*s internal and external security very grave. After the war 
the Indian Home Rule and Satyagraha movements, agitations against the 
Rowlatt Act and the Jallianwallabagh massacre were indications of the
53 *
worsening political state which led the Indian government robserve 
that the
recent internal troubles have emphasised that Nepal is 
next to the British garrison our sheet anchor in times 
of grave trouble in India.
In regard to the military position of the British after the war, the
Indian government felt "grave uncertainty" as to the future. Cases of
disaffection and desertion in the army-the result of political unrest-
59
had already been seen. Events like the dismemberment of Turkey and the
60
Khiiafat agitation in India, the Indian government feared, would unsettle 
the large Muslim elements in the army. In such circumstances, the Govern­
ment felt that
it was prudent to estimate our resources in worst 
contingencies on sole basis of British Gurkha and 
(if we can secure them)Nepalese units. 6l
Externally, the Indian governments main problem, was the attitude
of Afghanistan and the frontier tribes. The anti-British elements in
Kabul, headed by Prince Nasrullah, were suspected of having engineered
the assassination of Amir Habmbullah who had kept peace with the British
53. S*D«Waley, Edwin Montagu, pp.205-22. Rupert Furneaux, Massacre at
Amritsar. Lovett, op.oit., pp.125-257* Publications Division,
Govt, of India, The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi, XV, pp.192-
280; XVI,pp.378-81, 393“4. R,Coupland, The Indian Problem, 1835-1935, 
pp.44-81.
59* KP* Vol.30, H.Butler to Kitchner, 20 October 1915* Hardinge, op.cit.,
pp.117-8. Mary Countess of Minto, op.cit., p.151. PEF, Vol.90, 1912,
Pt.l, File No.2612, Viceroy to Secy, of state, Telg. 8 May 1919*
60. Collected works of Mahatma Ganghi , op.cit., XVI, pp.307-12, 320-24.
61. PEF, Vol.90, 1912, Pt.l, File No.2612, Viceroy to Secy, of state,
Telg. 18 April 1919* I JE.P.P.(Confidential), vol.64, February 1921,
No.345* KP* Vol.70, Butler to Kitchener, 20 October 1915*
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during the war. The third Anglo-.Afghan war which broke out in May 1919
sparked off serious disturbances in the neighbouring tribal territory,
62
resulting in the British loss of almost the whole of tfaziristan. Both 
during and after the Afghan war the British viewed Nepal as a valuable 
counterpoise to Afghanistan and the Pan-Islamic movement. On British 
request Chandra Bhamsher sent 2,356 troops for use against the A#gjaans, 
but since the war ended within four months, there was no occasion for
63
the employment of the Nepalese contingent.
Nepal was regarded as the very lynch-pin of the north-Bast 
frontier where affairs were far from stable, The uncertain situation in 
hi bet was an sl± abiding worry for the Indian government. China had rejected
64
the Bimla Convention mainly because the Sino-Tibetan frontier as deter­
mined by the Tibetan and British delegates to the Convention and the Bri­
tish plan of dividing Tibet into Inner and Outer Tibet with the latter 
enjoying full autonomy was totally unacceptable to her. Chinese attempts 
to reconquer eastern Tibet led to bitter fighting with the Tibetans until 
in ivUgust 1919 British mediation led to an armistice at Rongbatsa and Jino-
65
Tibejsan frontier provisionally settled. The Dalai mama made pressing
62. I.K.Fraser-Tytler, Afghanistan, pp.177? 192-201, 258-9. dykes, op.cit.,
pp.256-66, 2b3, 270-82.
63. Landon, II, pp.146-7•
64. The Tibetan and nritish delegates signed the Bimla Convention and und­
ertook in a declaration to abide by its terms, hew trade regulations 
followed,replacing the old ones of 1893 and 1903 and confirming the 
British right of direct dealings with the Tibetan government and their 
control of trade agencies in Tibet. In March 1914 the British and Tib-
etan plenipotentiaries, by an exchange of secret notes, settled the 850- 
mile long Indo-Tibetan frontier from the north-east corner of Bhutan 
to the Isu Razi pass north of Burma. The frontier so determined came 
to be known as the McMahon line after Henry McMahon, the British plen­
ipotentiary. PF, 1914» Vol.11, File No .2964» Tibet Conference : Final 
memorandum, by McMahon, 3 July 1914* a * Lamb, The McMahon nine, II, pp. 
459-566, 620-30. H.Richardson, Tibet and its History, pp.107-20.
65. m.Ieichman, Travels of a Consular Officer^ pp.47-58.
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requests for arms much to the embarrassment of the Home government 
whose acceptance of the League Covenant banning arms race between nations 
and active engagement in the easing of world tension by international 
disarmament made compliance with the Lamafs requests difficult. Japanese 
interest in Tibet was another matter of uneasiness for the Indian gover­
nment who were determined to keep the country free from, any foreign
influence. Japanese rifles had reportedly been procured by the Jjalai
66
Lama through Mongolia; the National Assembly at Lhasa was contemplating 
the despatch of a delegation to Japan to get arms; there were Japanese 
spies in the monasteries at Lhasa masquerading as students of Lamaism.
The Japanese press was critical of Britain fiaving made Tibet an Indian 
protectorate; it was the Japanese incitement again that was strongly 
suspected as being at the back of the persistent refusal by China to 
accept the Simla Convention and settle the Tibetan issue on terms accep-
67
table to the British.
Japanese influence if strongly established in Tibet 
could not but have a disturbing effect on Nepal, especially should the
66. Composed of three hundred and fifty ecclesiastical and secular offi- 
cials of the 'Tibetan government, the Assembly wielded great power, 
especially in foreign affairs. C.Bell, Portrait, pp.144-75 Tibet,
Past and Present, p.55*
67. In 1919“20 British diplomats in China, Jordan and B,Alston, made 
great efforts to settle the Tibetan issue by persuading the Chinese 
government,but in vain. PEF, Vol.88, 1913* File Nos.2640/1915i 4684/ 
1917; Vol.72, 1917, File No.5191/1919. FF, W W ,  Vol.5, File No. 
1362/1919* P3M, B.224 : Japanese policy in its bearing on India, 16 
May 1910* Tokai Toda, a Japanese,was the Dalai Lama•3 adviser on 
foreign affairs, The Thirteenth Dalai Lama, pp.87-97*
On the Tibetan situation in 1914*21 and the British poli­
cy see PEF, Vols.7,8, 1920; Vols.71*5i 1917* PSMf B.324* Bell, Tibet, 
op.cit.,pp.138-77? 244-70. Great Britain, Foreign office, Tibet, 
pp.43-4* Z-Ahmad, China and Tibet, 1708-1959> A Resumg of Facts, p.19* 
E.Teichman, Affairs of China, pp.225-7*
28a
latter "be disaffected, towards the British, The Nepalese had a high
regard for Japan*s military efficiency which had Been confirmed hy her
resounding victory over Russia in 1904-5* It was also significant that
Chandra Shamsher had sent in 1902 six students to Japan for technical
training instead of sending them to England, Japanese interest in Nepal
seemed growing, indicated hy the expressed desire of several Japanese
scholars to visit Nepal for study and travel , and behind this desire
the Indian government saw some sinister political object, Ekai Kawaguchi,
the greatest Japanese expert on Tibet and Nepal, who had visited Nepal
68
earlier in 1899 and 190&, again went to Kathmandu with a Japanese scholar 
of Buddhism, Kawaguchi had sympathy for the anti-British movements in 
India and was known to the Indian revolutionaries in japan, Taraknath 
Das, Ras Behari Bose and others. He was reported to have sounded the 
Nepalese authorities whether they would help India to free herself from
68a
the British rule and was disappointed to learn that they would not.
These incidents gave a new political complexion to the
British attitude towards Nepal, making Chandra Shamsher*s friendliness
a matter of vital necessity for the Indian government. Chelmsford, the
Viceroy, was, therefore, in favour of the immediate conferment of the
69
titles of His Majesty upon the King of Nepal; but the Home government 
had a mixed feeling about the matter, Thomas Holderness, the Under secre­
tary of state, for instance, wondered if this concession might not increse
68. See Chapter V* p.ltl?fn.26.
68A. PSLI, Vol.229* Reg.No.921, Resident to Govt., 4 May 1909* PEP* Vol.
88, 1913, File Nos.2802, 4855/1912, 392/1913, 1183, 2174, 2378, 2669,
2992, 3341/1914, 4749/1915, 4684/1917, 4814/1918. PSM, B*268, Draft 
of a Memo on the Employment of Japanese troops in Mesopotemia, 1917• 
69• CMP, Vol.9, Chelmsford to Montagu, the Secy.of State, Telg.22 Novem- 
ber 1918.
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Chandra shamsher*s "already sufficient sense of self-importance", making
him "a little less easy to deal with once the gratification has worn off?
It could, besides, make the Nizam-^ who too had set his heart on this title-
jealous. The Amir of Afghanistan who had been given this title in 1905
might also resent the loss of his distinction and ask for some compert-
satory favour-possibly the Garter. But the arguments in favour of the
concession were weightier. It was very likely, as Hirtzel pointed out,
that if Chandra Shamsher*s demand was rejected he would take it
as not so much a personal rebuff as a confirmation 
of his worst suspicions of our good faith as regards 
the independence of Nepal.
To Godley it seemed hardly any favour aljb.ll,
for after all Nepal is independent and we are 
giving nothing but admitting it in the gracious 
manner proposed.
The final decision of the India Office was : "It is not worthwhile to
70
risk the loss of so valuable an asset for the sake of a title"4 and the 
Viceroy was informed accordingly.
The British government tried to placate Chandra shamsher 
in other ways as|well. He was made a G.C-M-G., and an Honorary General of 
the British army. Neither, however, could quite satisfy the prime Minister 
who seemed ”hankering"after still higfrer honours-the Garter and a Field
71
Marshalship.
However, it soon became apparent that what Chandra Shamsher
wanted most was not "a mere redundancy of British honours" which, as he
70* PEF, Vol.901 1912, File No.39^ , Hirtzel’s Memorandum on Nepal, 6 Dec- 
ember 1918, File No.5180/1918, Minutes of Holderness, Godley and oth­
ers of the Political department. Also File No. 2371/1919* CMP, Vol.9, 
Montagu^ to Chelmsford, Telg.24 December 1918.
71* Ibid., Vol.11, Chelmsford to Montagu^ Telg.9 October 1919, Montague’s 
reply, 20 December 1919; Vol. 13, Chelmsford to Montagu^ , Telgs.20 Aug­
ust, 28 November 1920,Montague*s reply, felgs.6 August, 8 December 1920.
said, was "of little practical value to him", but a recognition of his
services in some tangible, substantial form. This Chelmsford could not
but admit was a perfectly legitimate claim; the Indian government were,
indeed, "honour-bound to offer a substantial reward, especially in view
of the Mutiny precedent". But since the Nepalese expected some territory
and the Indian government could offer none, as a substitute Nepal was
given a subsidy of ten lakhs of rupees to be paid annually as long as
72
she maintained her existing friendliness with the British.
In January 1920 Chandra shamsher submitted another 
demand : the British representative in Nepal should be designated Envoy 
so as io confirm Nepal’s distinction from the Indian feudatory states 
where the British representatives were called Residents or political 
Agents. The Government relented, hoping that Chandra Shamsher would drop 
his most embarrassing demand-the demand for arms and machinery.
The difficulty about the arms issue was that it was
mixed up with another issue : the deterioration ofn Nepal’s relations
with Tibet on account of the new British policy towards Tibetr—the policy
of cultivating the Dalai Lama’s friendship and strengthening him with
arms to frustrate the Chinese attempts at recovering their los£ control
over Tibet both by political pressure and military campaigns. Chandra
Shamsher was intensely jealous of the Dalai Lama’s friendship with the
British during^after the Simla Conference; and he repeatedly complained
72. PEF,^ Vol.90, 1912, Pt.l', File No .26)12/1919, Viceroy to Secretary of 
State, Telg.8 May 1919, Reply of the Secy, of state, Tel&.ll June 1919 
Pile No.5596, Resident to Govt., 30 June 1919* Also File No.990/1920. 
CMP, Vol.10, Chelmsford to Montagu^ , Telg.9 May 1919*
73* PEF, Vol.90, 1912, Pt.l, Pile No.3765, India External Letter to Secy, 




to the Resident that the British by giving arms to the Tibetans had un­
dermined Nepal’s position in Tibet which had hitherto rested on Nepal’s 
military superiority and the TibetanA’ fear of Nepal. Chandra Shamsher 
was vexed that he had not been invited to the Simla Conference although
75
his assistance to the British during the Tibetan crises entitled him to
such inVltatiom The Prime Minister, who knew that the British had
76
concluded a Convention with Russia regarding Afghanistan without con­
sulting the Amir, was anxious that the Simla Conference might result in 
an Anglo-Tibetan settlement prejudicial to Nepal’s rights and interests 
in Tibet. He asked, therefore, for a specific guarantee that the I856 
treaty on which these rights and interests were based would in no case 
be tampered with. British alliance with the Dalai Lama had strengthened 
him and, as Chandra Shamsher frankly told Manners Smith, the Nepalese 
could no longer bully the Tibetans as before. The Dalai Lama did not
comply with the Prime Minister’s demand for compensation for the loss
77
of Nepalese life and property in the disturbances at Lhasa in 1912-3, 
and the Lama’s proposal for British arbitration in the matter was 
rejected by Chandra Shamsher as an "absurd suggestion", obviously because 
it would set an undesirable precedent and would restrict Nepal’s free­
dom of action in 'Tibet. In 1915 Chandra Shamsher complained that the 
Tibetans "betrayed their arrogance beyond words" and intended "to flout 
Nepal by all means to override the rights and privileges sanctioned by
74* Shortly after the Simla Conference the British supplied arms to the
Dalai Lama to enable him to resist Chinese pressure from eastern Tibet. 
P3M, B„ 324, Tibet.
75* See Chapters V and VI.
76. ^  Fraser-'Tytler, op.cit.,pp.179-80* G.P.GrOoch,, and H.Temperley, 
ed., British Documents on the Origins of the War 1898-1914 sIV,
PP*337-8.
77* See Chapter VI, p. 252.
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treaty and long usages of centuries.** Nepalese traders, Manners Smith
was told, had been looted at Phati; supply of fuel to the Nepalese lega-
tion at Lhasa had heen stopped and paspral iands on the border violated.
The Nepalese Agent's remonstrances had brought forth the warning from
the Tibetans that the Nepalese in 'Tibet would meet with the same fate
that the Chinese had suffered-expulsion lock, stock and barrel. To impress
upon the Resident that Nepal would not put up with these insults, Chandra
Shamsher made some”quasi-military preparations" at Kathmandu. The Dalai
Lama, on the other hand, complained to the British that the Nepalese
government were trying to take advantage of the Tibetan preoccupation
78
with the Chinese in eastern Tibet.
What made the situation all the more awkward for the British 
government was the conflicting views of their own Tibetan and Nepalese 
experts; Charles Bell, for instance, argued the Dalai Lama's case as 
vigorously as Manners Smith did Chandra Shamsher*s. Bell blamed the 
Nepalese for their generally overbearing behaviour and disregard for the
79
religious sentiments of the Tibetans. The Nepalese Agent, Lai Bahadur, he 
said, was tactless and sent exaggerated and even false reports to Kath­
mandu; he was accused of abusing the extra-territorial rights of his
78. PEF, Vol.90, 19,lg0* Pt.l, File No.1111, Chandra to Manners Smith, 4 
December 1914;*i7°89» Same to same, 28 February 1915; File No.5188,
Same to same, 26 September 1916, Minute of Hirtzel; File No.640, Bell 
to Govt., 18 December 1916.
It was also believed in the Tibetan official circles 
that Nepal wanted China to be strong in Tibet so as to act as a coun­
terweight to Britain. Bell, Tibet, op.cit.,p.236. The Nepalese at any 
rate did not want the complete disappearance of China from Tibet for 
an appeal to the Amban and the latter*s pressure on the Tibetan gover- 
ment often ensured the latter's compliance with Nepalese demands. See 
also Chapter IV, pp.l42-3anfl Chapter Vi, p.262.Bell, Tibet, op.cit., 
79* The Nepalese shot 1 birds, caught fish and smoked in p.237*
public in defiance^ofATibetan laws against such practices. Ibid.,pp. 
234-5.
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government; he was, as the Tibetans told Bell, as unpopular with the 
official circles at Lhasa as his predecessor, Jit Bahadur, had been po­
pular, Bell warned the Government that
if we should support Nepal in an unjust cause against 
Tibet or in a cause which Tibet for serious reasons 
regards as unjust, we run the risk of driving Tibet 
into the arms of China.
And with the restoration of Chinese power in Tibet might recrudesce the
80
same problem in the North East frontier as the British had faced in 1910
together with similar danger to Nepal's own security and her Tibetan in- 
81
terests.
Manners Smith, on the other hand, maintained that Nepal had just 
reasons not only to worry about the Tibetan situation but to blame the 
British for it. It had been , in his view, a mistake not to anticipate
l/K
Nepalese reactions before/Dalai Lama was given arms, because Nepal was
k
"decidedly an interested, party in any measure which made Tibet militarily
82
strong". The Resident had full sympathy for Chandra Shamsher*s uneasiness 
about the Simla Conference. He had even suggested to McMahon that the 
Tibetans be persuaded to cede the border tracts which the Nepalese had 
coveted for long. Apart from increasing the Prime Minister's prestige,it 
would strengthen Nepal's border defence which was in the interest of the 
British themselves. McMahon had rejected this suggestion, and the Nepalese 
participation in t£e Conference, he had dismissed, as "out of the question
80. See Chapter VI, pp. 214 et seq.
81. PEF, Vol.90, 1912, Pt.l, File No, 64O, Bell to Govt., 18 December 1916, 
W.L^ Cajpbell, British Trade Agent, Gyantse, and D.Macdonald, British 
Trade Agent, Yatung, to Bell, 4 December 1916. Bell, Tibet,op.cit., 
PP*197-9* 233-43* Also PEF, Vol.7, 1920, File No.2470, Bell to Govt.,
22 April 1921.
82. Ibid., Vol.90, 1912, Pt.i, Pile No.“llll, Manners Smith to Grant,
Foreign secretary, 19 November 1914*
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63
and unnecessary. Manners Sniith advised the Government against strain­
ing relations with Nepal for the sake of Tibet because
there is no question in my mind as to the comparative 
value of Nepal versus Tibet as a friend and ally and 
I feel sure that the military authorities in India 
might have the same opinion, 84
It was patent to these authorities that Nepalese discontent during the 
world war would seriously affect Gurkha recruitment, Wile meeting Nepal­
ese demands for arms carried the risk of aggravation of her disputed with 
Tibet. In such circumstances the Government were "practically compelled 
to placate the Nepal darbar". in 1915 Chandra shamsher was given two ass- 
urances-first, that after the war the Nepalese troops in India would take 
home with them 3*000 modern rifles; secondly, that the Indian government
would "never for a moment” allow their arms to be used by the Dalai Lama
tz 85against the "legijnate interests of Nepal'*. This quietened Chandra sham­
sher, but not for long.
What Chandra shamsher really wanted was not gifts of rifles 
but the right to obtain arms and machinery whenever he felt their need.
He refused to be content with titles and honours for himself, nor would 
the subsidy make him change his mind. He even showed apparent disinterest­
edness in the "repeated openings" made for him by Holland for some perso-
86
nal gratification in the form of regular pecuniary grants.
85.F.0., 766/8, Manners Smith to Wood, Qffg.Seoy., 2 November 1913* McMahon
to Manners Smith, 8 November 1S13* In fact, Crewe had asked sazanov in 
September 1912 what he felt about the "rectification" of Nepal's border 
with Tibet. Sazanov1 s reaction left Crewe with the impression that 
Russia might in return ask for some compensation in Afghanistan, and 
this the British did not want to give. FF, vol.12, 1912, File NO.4092A. 
PEF* Vol.16, 1913* File No.1472, Hirtzel's Note, 27 Jan. 1913*Lamb
84. Ibid., Vol.90, 1912, File No. 1111, Manners smith to Grant, 19 November 
1914.
85. Ibid., Note of the Military Secretary, Govt, to Resident, 25 November 
1914, 19 February 1915*
86. Notes of discussion between Holland and Chandra, April 1919* op.cit.
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Chandra Shamsher in applying this pressure tactics was 
clearly exploitifcg the war-weariness of the British and their post-war 
problems in India. Two more events made the British position further 
vulnerable. In 1920 a British mission led by Bell Hisited Lhasa which 
was followed, although not without considerable hesitation on the part 
of the Home government, by a fresh supply of arms to the Dalai Lama.
The British took this step to keep up their influence with the Tibetan 
government who had been greatly exhausted by prolonged fighting with 
the Chinese in eastern Tibet; a section in the Natid^l Assembly even 
urged the Dalai Lama for a rapprochement with the Chinese and end the 
fighting; a Chinese mission from Kansu was also reported to have arri­
ved at Lhasa to make a settlement with the Tibetan government. Such a 
settlement without the British voice in it was wholly distasteful to
the Indian government, who, therefore, had to strengthen the Dalai Lama
87
as best as they could against the pro-Chinese elements in the Assembly.
The other event was the Anglo-Afghan Treaty of November
88
1921, by which the British recognised Afghanistan's independence, both
internal and external, with^right to keep a dipldatic reptesentative in
89
London, and to freely import arms and machinery.
The Bell mission and the supply of arms to the Dalai 
Lama aggravated Chandra Shamsher*s jealousy and suspicion, while the
87. PEF, Vol.75. 1917. Pt.6, File Mo. 1460, India Secret to 
Secy, of State, No.3* 23 March 1922, enclosing Bell's Report oh his 
Mission. PEF, Vol.74* 1917* ?t.5 also deals with this mission.
See also Bell, "The Dalai Lama; Lhasa 1921", J.R.C.A.3,Vol.Xi* 1924* 
pp.3t'S0; Portrait, op.cit.,pp.216-53* Tibet, op.cit.,pp.178-207* 
Richardson, op.cit., pp.121-5.
88. Aitchison, Treaties (1933 edn.), XIII, pp.288-96.
89. Sykes, op.cit., pp.283-94, 364-9*
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Afghan treaty and the concessions obtained by Amir Amanullah made the 
Prime Minister's demand for similar concessions irresistible. Chandra 
Shamsher constantly harped on one point-if Afghanistan could be allowed 
unrestricted importation of arms and machinery after her war with and 
defeat by the British, why should the concession be refused to Nepal 
with her long record of service and loyalty to Britain? The Indian gover­
nment could, indeed, have no answer when the Prime Minister asked 2 was
it not strange that the British government should accept Nepal's assis-
90
tance to fight the hostile ‘Tibetans and Afghans, but then, it was they 
who were favoured by Britain while Nepal was ignored? If then, the Nepal­
ese charged the British with distrust and discrimination, they were
91
justified. 'This was the view of the British Envoy, Colonel R,L.Kennion, 
who criticised the British policy regarding giving arms to Nepal both on 
moral and political grounds. Morally, Kennion argued, Nepal's claim, to 
arms was far stronger than either Afghanistan's or Tibet's; the "record 
of Nepal's dealings with the Government of India has been as white as 
that of Afghanistan has been black". Politically, it was extremely in­
expedient to treat Nepal unfavourably with Afghanistan because it would 
foster the impression in the Nepalese government that to obtain concess­
ions from Britain, they should abandon their erstwhile policy of loyalty 
and cooperation and adopt instead the Afghan course of hostility and war. 
There could be no comparison, Kennion pointed out, between Chandra Shams­
her and the Dalai Lama. While the former was a tested ally of long stand­
ing, the latter had chosen to be friendly with the British only recently
90. See Chapter V.
91. Kennion was tia® British Envoy in Nepal from January 1920 to October 
1921.
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and for no other reason than of defending himself against the Chinese. 
Kennion, like Manners Smith, urged that the Nepalese army should he 
strengthened as "an additional Indian reserve for purposes of internal
M
and external security". A "well and even exceedingly well armed Nepal"
92
would serve as a set-off to a well-armed Afghanistan.
Kennion, like Manners Smith again, wanted to convince 
Chandra Shamsher that the British government fully trusted Nepal. One 
way of doing this, he saw, was to abrogate the seventh article of the 
Treaty of Sagauli which banned the employment of Europeans by the Nepal­
ese government without the consent of the British. The restriction was 
originally intended to prevent foreign intrigues in Nepal, but now when 
the Rana government were firmly attached to the British, this restriction 
seemed to Kennion "unimportant", "superfluous" and even "useless". For 
Chandra Shamsher it had been a source of inconvenience and irritation
93
because even for employing doctors and engineers for a short time, he had
to obtain the British representative's sanction. The Prime Minister had
not formally represented against this, but he had brought the matter
"indirectly" to the Envoy's notice. Kennion had, therefore, no doubt that
the removal of this restriction would be welcomed by Chandra Shamsher
as a mark of trust and a sign that the independence 
about which so many assurances have been given by 
Britain is not to be a mere figure of speech. 94
The Indian government were impressed by these arguments.
Reading, the Viceroy, agreed that Nepal should be allowed to import arms
92. PEF, Vol.91* 1912, Pt.2, File No.520, Hennion to Govt., 29 September 
1921; File No.3317* Same to same, 26 April 1921; Vol.90, 1912, File 
No.4200, Same to same, 26 April, 27 June 1921.
93* See Chapter VIII, pp. 341-4*
94. PEF, Vol.91* 1912, Pt.2, File No.I860, Kennion to Govt., 11 January, 
18 February 1921. Also Ibid., File No*520, Same to same, 29 September 
1921.
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and machinery without restrictions provided Chandra Shamsher undertook 
to use the arms for defensive purposes alone and not to export them any 
where. Ihe Government had now seen what, in fact, was quite obvious all 
the while : that the concession would not "make much practical difference** 
in the situation because not only was Nepal too poor to buy vast quanti­
ties of arms, but the British could whenever they wanted stop the supply? 
and Nepal being a wholly land-locked country had no means of obtaining 
arms from any where other than through British India, In such circumstan­
ces Reading recommended to the Secrerary of State that Chandra Shamsher 
be given the arms concession, fhe Prince of Wales was at this time (1921)
95
scheduled to make a tiger shooting trip to the Nepal Terai, and the 
need for avoiding an embarrassing situation was another factor which infl­
uenced the Indian government's decision. If the arms concession coincided
with the Prince's trip, Reading believed, it could appear to the Nepalese
96
as a mark of **royal favout", Reading also recommended the annulment of 
the seventh article of the 'Breaty of Sagauli, Since the ban would conti­
nue on the Indian states, the British gesture would be all the more grati­
fying to the Nepalese. Ihe Indian government's policy, as they explained 
to the Home government, was to meet the "legitimate requests" of the
97
Nepalese, if it could be done "at little or no risk to ourselves".
Reading's proposals created mixed reaction at the India 
Office. It was admitted that the Nepalese claim was irrefutable and that
95. O'Connor, op,cit.,pp. 294-307* O'Connor was the British Representa­
tive in Nepal from December 1918 to December 1919 and again from
October 1921 to April 1924*
96. Arms were also given to Nepal in 1911 when King George V went to the 
Nepal Berai for tiger hunting. Landon, op.cit.,pp.131-6. PF, 1912* 
Vol. 27, File No.3136, Annual Report on Nepal, 1911-2.
97* PNF, Vol.911 1912, Pt.2, File No.2673* India S e c r e t 1
of State, No.49, 26 May 1921; File No.4957A, Viceroy to Secy.of State, 
felg. 8 November 1921.
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political wisdom dictatedJjacceptance of the proposals, but then, there 
were still lingering prejudices against Nepal in the Home government.
Here the general feeling was that enough had been given to Chandra Sham- 
sher, and so he should stop asking for more, The Home government did not 
like the Indian government to succumb to Chandra Shamsher’s pressure. The 
Political and Secret Committee of the India Office decided against the 
abrogation of the seventh article of the Sagauli treaty, The article, if 
interpreted literally, as Hirtzel admitted, was,indeed, an anomaly and 
did constitute a limitation on Nepal’s independence, but it should remain 
as it was , for it gave a "useful power" in British hands. The India Off­
ice had, in fact, not given up its ambiguous attitude towards Nepal’s 
political status. As Hirtzel explained, the Home government did not 
consider it
"necessary to go into the status of Nepal", for "we have 
not conferred any new independence on Nepal. Nepal was 
all along independent (unlike the native states in this 
respect) though the fact had become somewhat obscured 
by usage. This particular derogation from complete inde­
pendence was, however, part of the treaty on which all 
our relations with Nepal are based, and the independence 
which we have recognised has always been subject to that 
qualification".
Above all, if Chandra Shamsher had not formally raised the issue, the
98
Indian government had better leave the matter alone.
Arms were a more difficult issue. The India Office found itself
swayed by the conflicting considerations of political expediency and risk
involved in the matter. On the one hand, as Hirtzel clearly saw,
It is not possible to refuse Nepal which has served us 
so well what we have conceded-long ago-to Afghanistan, 
which has served us so badly.
98. PEF, Vol.91* 1912, Pt.2, Pile No.2673» Minute of Hirtzel, Secy of 
State’s Secret Despatch to the Governor-General, No.18, 18 August 
1921. Also Ibid., File No. 1860/1921, Mimute hy of HirtzeljAugust 
1921.
300
On the other, it was "most objectionable” to let Nepal import machinery
99
and build up arms factories.
Before the India Office took a final decision on the matter,
it was referred to Lord Curzon • Curzon, now the Foreign Secretary, had
the same distrust of Nepal as Curzon, the Viceroy,more than fifteen 
100
years ago. He had no doubt that the Nepalese were friendly less by choice
than by compulsion of circumstances; not genuine goodwill and gratitude
but their own self-interest had bound them to the British. He was as
101
before strongly opposed to giving arms to Nepal let alone allowing her 
unrestricted importation of them ; and the recognition of Nepalese inde­
pendence was to him an equally disagreable idea. The Nepalese, he warned, 
were just making a bogey of the growing Tibetan power to get arms from 
the British. Their policy, he explained,
is a tale of ceaseless pressure relentlessly applied 
and enforced by the immense weight of the assistance 
so opportunely and handsomely extended to us... in 
a series of wars.
British influence seemed to Curzon to have decreased lately in proportion
as the Indian government had succumbed to the Nepalese blackmail. He was,
therefore, both sad and surprised that the Indian government had not
yet realised this. In a spirit of mingled wrath, despair and anxiety,
the ex-Viceroy noted,
When I was in India, I still held the fortress. I see 
to my distress that the outworks have been abandoned 
one after the other. Titles of Majesty and Highness 
have been granted and all sorts of concessions made.
Now is the flag to be hauled down from the donjon keep
99* PBF, Vol.90, 1912, File Nos.4957* 4957A, Minutes of Hirtzel and 
Members of the Political Committee, November 1921.
100. See Chapter V.
101. Ibid., pp.169-72, 189, fn.77.
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and the hand that is to tear it down is apparently 
to he that of the Prince of Wales in the midst of 
a tiger s&oo$*
Curzon was "quite out of sympathy" with Reading^ proposals which appeared
to him to he the last stage "in the progressive abandonment of the condi-
102
tions which had hitherto regulated British relations with Nepal",
.These strong views had considerable influence on Montagu 
who was convinced that the Nepalese issue was quite complex and it needed 
very careful and thorough examination • Reading*s proposals, so they 
seemed to Montagug, had been put forth rather in haste and without ade­
quate consideration of all their implications, They were not rejected 
"in principle", but the Secretary of State wanted to consider them "with 
appropriate safeguards in the perspective of our whole relations with 
Nepal and other neighbouring states," However, to save the Indian govern­
ment from embarrassment during the Prince's trip to the ferai, Reading 
was authorised to make Chandra Shamsher a gift of arms, and if necessary 
to announce the British government's intention to review the general rela­
tions of the two governments. It was becoming clear to the Home government
that there will be no end to concessions to Nepal 
until we put our relations with it on a true basis 
suited to its independence;
and that basis, it was soon obvious, could only be a new Anglc-tNepalese 
103
treaty.
102. PEF, Vol.90, 1912, File No.4957A, Minute of Curzon, 24 November 1921. 
103* Ibid., File No.520, Montagu to Reading, Private Telg.6 December 1921.
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II
Meanwhile, Chandra Shamsher intensified his pressure, contend­
ing that the arms concession was hy no means a special favour he was 
asking for, but that it was Nepal's indefeasible right. In January 1922 
the Prime Minister asked for a new treaty, obviously hoping for the same 
terms as the Amir had got. The treaty, he explained to Captain W.F.O'Con­
nor, the Envoy, would place Anglo-Nepalese relations on a new footing;
without it, he was certain, the uncertainty regarding Nepal's status
104
could never be cleared up,
O'Connor saw that Chandra Shamsher's grievances were genuine.
He shared Manners Smith's and Kennion's admiration for the Prime Minister 
and, like them, wanted to treat him with complete trust and confidence.
He recommended to the Government that the seventh article of the Sagauli 
treaty be abrogated on condition that the Nepalese government undertook 
to inform the Envoy whenever any European were to be employed by them- 
this was, in O'Connor's view, a very necessary precaution "in these revo­
lutionary and Bolshevik times". O'Connor also proposed some concessions 
to Nepal regarding the customs duty levied on Nepalese goods at Raxaul on 
the border.
As for a new treaty, 0)Connor, so he claimed later, showed at 
first only a "tepid interest", for "I always prefer letting well alone 
and not raising any thorny questions unnecessarily". But Chandra Sham­
sher *s mood and repeated representations soon convinced him that the arms
104* PEP, Vol.90, 1912, File No.4199* Envoy to Govt., 4 January 1922.
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concession had to he made to Nepal, and that being so it seemed to him
much better that we should take the opportunity of 
thrashing out any other doubtfyl points which may 
exist and of getting anything we can in exchange. 105
Accordingly, he urged that a new treaty with Nepal be "taken seriously
in hand". He then drew up a tentative outline for a treaty-"a brief
business-like document", as he called it. The treaty would have five
articles, its main feature being an unqquivocal declaration of Nepal's 
106
independence. It would provide for the importation of arms and maohi-
107
nery by Nepal under "reasonable safeguards". O'Connor, like Manners
Smith and Kennion, did not view a well armed Nepal as a "very real orfr
very formidable menace" to India, nor did he fear that the increased
strength of Nepal would accentuate the tension between Nepal and Tibet,
because the British government could exert "direct and indirect pressure"
on both. The customs facilities which O'Connor wanted the Government to
108
give Nepal were provided for in the treaty he drafted together with, the
109
annual subsidy already given to Nepal.
‘The Indian government gave a frosty reception to O'Connor's 
suggestion for a new Nepalese treaty, which in their view was neither 
necessary nor desirable; it would cause them only embarrassment and earn 
no advantage at all. True, obtaining a definite control of Nepal's foreig 
gn relations by treaty was still a desideratum, but any such hope was 
"illusory" in view of Nepal's strong feelings against the idea. It was
105. PEP, Vol.91, 1912, Pile No.1578* O'Connot to Den*s Bray, Foreign
Secy., 11 December 1922, 15 January 1923*
106. Ibid., File No. 977, O'Connor to Govt., 8 February 1922. Article
I of O'Connor's draft treaty provided for the confirmation of Nepal's
independence, and Article II stated that all earlier treaties and 
engagements with Nepal were also confirmed by the new treaty.
107. Article III of O'Connor's draft.
108. Article IV of O'Connor's draft.
109. Article V of 0*Connor(s draft.
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certain that Nepal would never surrender her relations with Tibet to
the British; and as for British control of Nepal's relations with china,
110
although Chandra Shamsher's mood wa3 earlier favourable, it was no long­
er so now, because the disappearance of Chinese power from Tibet had 
removed^ fchinese threat to Nepal's security and her privileges in Tibet 
and so. there.rfr&s no; need for $ British protection of Nepal's interests.
In fact, the removal of China from Tibet had also removed the main British 
argument for controlling Nepal's relations with China; it would have been 
enough for them to get the "awkward" provision ih the Nepalese-Tibetan 
treaty (I856) allegiance to China annulled. But then, Chandra
Shamsher's views were quite clear on this point. He had pointedly told 
Holland in 1919 that
Reading could hardly take any exception to this attitude on the part of 
Chandra Shamsher, for it was perfectly understandable why he should not 
agree "publicly" to any "fettering1' of Nepal's independence when he saw 
that the British had explicitly recognised Afghanistan's external inde­
pendence and when it was the Afgfran treaty which would set the model for 
the Nepalese treaty. Reading was also certain that Chandra Shamsher ex­
pected at least as much-if not more-as the Amir had got from the British, 
and so he might raise another important question which the Indian govern­
ment wanted to keep "dormant"* Nepal's diplomatic representation in
if attempts were made to embody in a new treaty 
the mention of the fact that Nepal had thrown off 
allegiance to China, it would be regarded by his 
people asderogating from the independence of Nepal 
and as iming to outer world that Nepal had aban­
doned to e British government the control of her 
foreign relations. 111A
110. See Chapter VI, pp.206, 212, 217.
111. See Chapter IV, p.125*
111 A. Notes of discussion between Holland and Chandra, April 1919* op.cit.
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London. Chandra Shamsher had already given hints, and during negotia­
tions might press for this right perhaps for no other reason than just 
to satisfy himself that the British admitted that Nepal had the same 
international status as Afghanistan. And once the admission had Been 
made, Reading informed Lord Peel, who in the meanwhile had taken over 
from Montagu, it would he hard to prevent Chandra Shamsher from esta­
blishing diplomatic relations with foreign countries, most probably 
Japan. Again, if the subsidy were included in the treaty, as O'Connor 
had suggested, the Amir who had not been given such a subsidy might 
demand it. Any new treaty was unnecessary in the Indian government's 
view because Chandra Shamsher, they believed, could be satisfied by oth­
er means. In fact, Reading was confident that Chandra Shamsher wanted a 
treaty not for its own sake, but only as a means of getting the arms 
concession. It was significant that not before the Afghan treaty did 
the Prime Minister raise the question of a new treaty at all. Only two 
years ^ 0^, in 1919* he had expressly told Holland that he was perfectly 
satisfied with the existing treaties and engagements which, he added, 
did not impugn Nepal’s independent status. Obviously, the Afghan treaty 
had acted now as a powerful stimulant on Chandra Shamsher. In such cir­
cumstances, Reading ho^ ed that if the arms concession were immediately 
given, the Prime Minister's "new found desire for a fresh treaty" would 
disappear, fhe Viceroy, therefore, urged the Secretary of State that 
the concession must be given to Nepal and on the same terms as it had 
been giben to Afghanistan; else, relations with Jffepal would be seriously 
strained. Some other concessions in "minor matters" like the annulmento
of the seventh article of the Sagauli treaty and the abolition of the
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customs duties on the Raxaul route would, so Reading hoped, further placate
the Prime Minister. If in^pite of all this, Chandra Shamsher continued to
clamour for a new treaty the Indian government would mo3t reluctantly coh-
112
sider O'Connor's draft hut that, $00, not without some modifications.
The India Office saw the cogency of these arguments hut their 
decision was just the opposite of the Vicero/s 2 a new Treaty was not only
JL
desirable hut essential in the inter^ts of Britain herself. The British
government, as Hirtzel admitted, had no excuse to reject Chandra shamsher*s
demand for the arms cohcession when even the military experts at the India
Office adjudged it "quite safe" to meet the demand. However, there was
only one consideration preventing an immediate decision in Nepal's favour s
the Home government,who viewed Nepalese hostility to Tibet--far more serio-
usly-for its international implication-than the Indian govermment,wanted
a definite guarantee that arms supply to Nepal would not aggravate that 
113 
hostility.
Chandra Shamsher himself gave grounds for the Home government's 
fear. In May 1922, for instance, he came out with fresh allegations againit 
the Dalai Lama and the "marked change" in Tibetan attitude towards Nepalese 
interests in Tibet. He charged the Tibetans with "uppishness", "growing 
pride, inordinate self-importance and callous disregard for the honour of 
Nepal". Nepalese merchants had been assaulted at Gyantse; at Lhasa mili­
tary preparations were afoot, so reported Lai Bahadur. The Dalai Lama, 
Chandra Shamsher informed O'Connor, had procured fresh supplies of Japan­
ese rifles from Mongolia. The Prime Minister grumbled that the British
112. PEF, Vol.91, 1912, Pt.2, File No.3317* India Secret Letter to Secy, 
of State, N0.5A, 27 July 1922.
113. Ibid., Vol.90, 1912, File Nos. 4957* 4957A/1921j Political Dept.
Minutes, November 1921.
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were taking advantage of the landlocked position of Nepal and her exclusi-
114
ve dependence on India for arms. These allegations, as Bell pointed out, 
expressed Chandra Shamsher's jealousy that the Dalai Lama was stealing 
a march over him in obtaining British favours* But they also conveyed 
Chandra Shamsher*s feeling of uncertainty about Nepal*s privileged posi­
tion in 'Tibet and perhaps his desire to make good the loss of the posi­
tion by occupying the bordering Tibetan territory where Nepalese people 
could be settled; this settlement would relieve the pressure on Nepal*s
114*
land caused by her fast-growing population. Possibly he was seeking some
115
excuse. The Prime Minister's own statements strengthened this supposition.
In 1919> for instance, he had admitted to Holland tha*t the treaty of I856
did bear "too hardly” on the Tibetans and, so, he would not be surprised
if in future the Tibetans revoked the treaty. The Nepalese government
themselves, he added, found the maintenance of their extra-territorial 
116
rights in Tibet both difficult and inconvenient in practice; the deter­
mination of nationality of persons born of Nepalese fathers and 'Tibetan 
mothers was a vexed issue which had for long been a cause of much bitter­
ness between the two governments. In June 1921 the Prime Minister had 
hinted to Kennion that but for the British opposition the Nepalese would
1 1 7
have already annexed the coveted territories on the border.
Clearly, it was very uncomfortable for the British that
114* PEF, Vol.91» 1912, Pt.2, File No.5232, Chandra to O'Connor, 13 May 
1922, O'Connor to Govt., 26 June 1922; Pile No.255^1O'Connor to 
Bray, 16 May 1922; File No.3340, Same to same, 10 July 1922.
114A. ’The population of Nepal in 1920 was 5*573*791* Landon, I,.,
pp.256-7* No reliable figures are available Before this date.
113. PEP. Vol.7, 1920, File No.2470, Bell to Govt., 22 April 1921. Bell,, 
Tibet , op.oit.,pp.233-40; "‘The North-Eastern Frontier of India”, 
J.R.C.A.S., XVII, 1930, pp*2}i-5 5 "Tibet's Position in Asia Today",
Foreign Affairs, October 1931* PP*
116. Articles £11, VIII, JX of theotreaty,Aptchison,(1909.gdn*)* PP*?9-100*
117. PEF, Vol.90, I9I2, File No. 4200, Kennion Jo Govt., 27 June 1921.
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their policy of strengthening Tibet against China conflic^d with their 
equally important policy of cultivating Nepalese friendship. The crux 
of the problem was how to let Nepal obtain arms without restriction 
but at the same time insure Tibet1 s security as well as British interests 
in Tibet. The solution which the India Office could think of was to con­
clude a new treaty with Nepal which would give her the right to import 
arms and machinery and at the same time enable the British to control 
Nepal#s relations with 'Tibet.
The new treaty would explicitly recognise Nepalese 
independence and set at rest Chandra Shamsher*s long-standing doubts 
about the British sincerity. Much as the India Office still wanted it, 
it was, as Hirtzel admitted, "no longer possible to keep the issue of 
Nepali status "safely in an indeterminate condition". The new treaty
"would put an end once for all to the long series of 
representations and claims on the part of Nepaljduring 
the last twelve years" in the course of which, "we 
have yielded point after point in a manner satisfac­
tory to neither party. The Nepalese could have got 
away with the impression that they had wrung these 
concessions while the British fielt that their hands 
had been forced by the Nepalese government."
Matters had, indeed, reached such a pass that a treaty was"unavmidable'i
The Secretary of State did not agree with the Viceroy
that: Chandra Shamsher would d*op the ide§, of a treaty if he were given
the arms concession. Indeed, it was difficult to imagine that the Prime
Minister would not raise the issue again and embarrass the Government.
Therefore, Peel argued s
If there is to be a treaty at all I can imagine 
no more unsatisfactory method of approach than 
to be driven to it, after having made in the
vain efforts to avoid it, the concessions that
are most valuable to the other side.
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The great advantage of a treaty was that during negotiations
the British government could ask £ for some quid pro quo before meeting
the Mepalese wishes* The treaty would thus he of mutual advantage to
the two governments; it would spell out Nepal’s rights and at the same
time bind her to some obligations as well* It would be a"comprehensive
settlement** of all that Nepal expected of Britain and all that Britain
required of Nepal. This alone would, in the India Office’s view, place
118
Anglo-Nepalese relations on a "permanently satisfactory footing".
A draft treaty was accordingly prepare^d by Hirtzel and
sent for the Indian government’s consideration; O’Connor’s draft, in
earn
Hirtzel*s view, did not "go far enough", because it would^nothing for 
the British. The draft treaty had ei^ht articles. Its general objects 
were consolidation of the existing treaties and engagements between 
the two governments; making their commitments as far as possible reci­
procal in character; and giving the earlier pledges and assurances of
119
the Nepalese government a de jure form. The third article, for exam­
ple, obliged the two governments to mutual support and assistance in 
the event of an unprovoked external attack. Earlier, in 1910, the Bri­
tish had committed themselves to support Nepal in case of external 
120
aggression without committing Nepal to a corresponding obligation to 
assist the British in their external emergencies. This it was now rea-
118, PEP, Vol.91 * 1912, Pt.2, Pile No.3340, Minute of Hirtzel, 25 August 
1922, and other minutes of the Political department, Secretary of 
State’s draft reply to the Viceroy, 27 July 1922.
119* The First Article recognised Nepal’s independence, external and 
internal, and the Second confirmed all the earlier treaties and 
engagements.
120. See Chapter VI, p. 231*
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lised had been rather a one-sided arrangement. BeSides, if assisting
the British were made a treaty obligation for Nepal, Chandra Shamsher
or his successors could not trouble the British with claims for reward
every time they rendered such assistance. The British government’s
121
pledge, also given in 1910, to safeguard Nepalese interests in Tibet 
was embodied in the fourth article of Hirtzel*s draft treaty in a mo­
dified form. The idea was to make it clear to Chandra Shamsher that 
the British would defend Nepal’s treaty rights in Tibet provided Nepal 
accepted their advice in her disputes with Tibet. The fifth article of 
the draft provided for mutual security against intrigues and subversive 
activities by elements hmstile to the existing governments in India 
and Nepal. The British knew that Nepal was "a very tempting objective 
for the disaffected” Indians, and they had no desire to see Nepal being 
turned into a political Alsatia as the French establishments in India 
had already been. It was hoped that Chandra Shamsher would agree to
this provision as a measure of defence against mot only the Rana emi­
gres in India, bearing deep grudges against him and plotting to take 
122
his life, but also against a band of Nepalis in India who criticised 
the autocratic Rana regime for purposefully keeping the Nepalese peo­
ple in utter ignorance, poverty and backwardness and denying them any 
freedom at all. These Nepalis, some of them ex-soldiers, who were influ­
enced by the current political movements in India, were active among
121. See Chapter VI, p.231•
122. The exiled brother of Chandra Shamsher, Deb Shamsher, plotted 
against the Prime Minister’s life in 1903 when the latter was 
returning from, the Delhi darbar. D.R-Regmi, A Century of Family 
Autocracy in Nepal (1950 ed$.), pp.172-3. Khadga Shamsher, another 
exiled brother, made^similar attempt.
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the Nepalese population at Benaras, Darjiling and Dehra Dun, During the 
war they brought out a weekly, called Gorkhali, from Benaras in which 
several articles condemnatory of Chandra Shamsher and his regime were 
written, To Chandra Shamsher these activities appeared to be as dang­
erous as those of the Indian *seditionists* did to the British, and 
he thought that they required stringent measures for their suppression, 
jjhe publication of Gorkhali was stopped in 1922 by the British at the 
Prime Minister*s request who also launched a counter propaganda among
the Nepalese at Benaras, asking them not to entertain the opponents
123of the Rana regime and to stand solidly behind it. In 1922 a Bengali
employee at Kathmandu was expelled from Nepal for his suspected anti—
Rana leanings. The British authorities at Darjiling kept strict watch
on the local Nepali population to check activities prejudicial to the 
124
Rana regime. The sixth article of the draft treaty allowed the Nepal­
ese government(to freely import arms and machinery so long as other 
provisions of the treaty were faithfully observed by Nepal and provided 
that the British government were satisfied that the importation was for 
the "actual requirements of the state", and that it did not endanger 
I ndia * s own secuti ty • The seyehtb articlejprovided for- the- uninterrupted 
supply.of jGUrkha recruits^  sihce:-^ it-is^ hftdr* all mainly because of the 
Gurkha element in the army that we value the friendship of Nepal", it 
was considered wise to give this important matter a definite statutory
123. Ramprasad Satpal, 3ri Chandra Darsan; Nepalma Ramrajya. santinanda- 
na, Nepalma Chandrodaya.
124. On the growth of Anti-Rana movement see Aniruddha Gupta, politics 
in Nepal, pp.19-30. Regmi, op.cit.(1958 edn.), p.119. B.L.Joshi, 
and Leo Rose, Democratic Innovations in Nepal, pp.50-56. F.O., 
766/1, Note of Envoy, 7 May 1925*
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foundation inst^ead of letting it remain just a matter of understanding 
with the Nepalese government. Until the war the British had no complaints 
about the supply of Gurkhas, but the post-war years saw some misunder­
standing on the issue. While chandta shamsher grumbled that the British 
did not realise his difficulties and the feelings of the darbar in this 
matter, the Indian government suspected that the prime Ministerr was 
trying to use the Gurkhas as a lever to extract political concessions.
There were some other considerations as well. A change in the regime at 
Kathmandu might lead to a change in Nepal*s erstwhile cooperative policy. 
Anti-British elements in India and foreign powers like soviet Russia and 
japan might, with a view to weakening Britain, try to influence a future
Nepalese government against supplying Gurkhas. The eighth article of
125
the draft treaty dealt with customs facilities on the Raxaul route.
The question of Nepali diplomatic representation in 
London was a delicate one, and considerable discussion took place on the 
issue at the India office and Foreign Office. L.D.Wakely, the acting 
Political Secretary at the India office, believed that a Nepalese repre­
sentative in London would be "useless and perhaps occasionally something 
of a nuisance", while Curzon held it "most undesirable" to let foreign
powers being represented in Kathmandu. Afghanistan*s recent flirtations
126
with soviet Russia, the Foreign secretary pointed out, was a strong warn-
123. PEF, Vol.91t 1912, Pt.2, File No.3340/1922, Hirtzel*s draft treaty.
The draft, like O’Connor*s draft,did not elaborate the eighth article.
126. Amanullah exchanged missions with the Russians in 1919 and concluded
ajtreaty with them im 1921, establishing gooiproeat- diplomatic £ela«
tions between the two countries. An Afghan mission went to Europe im
1920-1, whereafter political and economic agreements were made with
Germany, Italy and France to the annoyance of the British government.
Sykes, op.cit.* pp.28^-94•
 Also P3M, A190, Afghanistan, 14 February 1921; A194,
Report on the Kabul Mission, by H.R.C.Dobbs, 9 January 1922.
ing against allowing the Indian frontier states any opportunity to deve­
lop their international personality. If Chandra Shamsher raised the issue 
Curzon would silence him by a "courteous and absolutely firm refusal".
The India Office, however, would not adopt such a firm tone, for it would 
stiffen Chandra Shamsher *s attitude and wrecjj the negotiations at the 
start, in view of the Afghan precedent, refusal of this right to Nepal 
was "impossible", especially when Chandra Shamsher regarded it as a 
"visible recognition" of Nepal*s independence, whether the Nepalese exer­
cised this right or not depended entirely on their own discretion, for 
as Wakely admitted, the British had "no right or at any rate no clearly 
established right to any voice at all in the matter", because Nepal was 
still-theoretically at least-independent in her external relations. The 
British control of Nepal*s foreign relations was still de facto and not 
de jure-"in fact nothing... except usage, that is the practice of the 
Nepalese to turn to the British government for advice", ultimately the 
India office got round this difficult issue thus : O’Connor would not 
raise the issue at all during the negotiations. If Chandra shamsher him­
self raised it, O’Connor should try to "ride him off" on "practical 
grounds". If the Prime Minister still insisted, pointing to the Afghan 
treaty, the concession would be made to him but only "in principle"; its 
practical application should be strongly resisted by the Envoy, who would 
warn Chandra Shamsher that the British viewed with "extreme disfavour" 
any admission of foreign government^*representatives in Nepal or 
Nepalese representatives being posted abroad, if necessary, in a note 
appended to the treaty-if not in the treaty itself-Chandra shamsher would 
undertake to accept British advice "before embarking on any new develop-
314
ments" in Nepal’s external contact* in the face of this warning it was
very unlikely, so the India Office believed, that the prime Minister would
127
exercise this right. The Indian government were also asked if Chandra
Shamsher could be persuaded to make one more concession to the British *
128
providing facilities for the exploration of Nepal.
Between the despatch of Hirtzel*s draft to the Indian
government in October 1922 and the conclusion of the treaty more than a
year passed-a year full of numerous exchanges of notes between London
and Delhi, ; Delhi and Kathmandu, and the British Legation at
Kathmandu and the simha parbar (Chandra shamsher’s official residence
and now the Nepalese government’s secretariat). Every article of the
draft treaty was subjected to threadbare examination at all levels; there
wo^smuch disagreement between the governments concerned, much persuasion
and pressure to arrive at a consesus. The Indian government, who were
against the treaty, expressed "serious doubts" about Hirtzel*s draft
which, Reading pointed out, would never be accepted by Chandra shamsher
and might even "scare"him. The Viceroy saw "practically no prospect" of
the Nepalese government’s accepting British control over Nepal’s relations
with Tibet,or undertaking any statutory obligation to supply Gyrkhas to
t/
the British, was it noil odd, Beading asked Peel, that the Home government 
would seek to take over Nepal’s external relations when the declared ob-
127. PKF» Vol.91> 1912, Pt.2, File No*4059» Note of Wakely, l£ October 
1922, Foreign Office to India office, 6 October 1922, India office to 
Foreign office, 9 November 1922. Also File No.3340, secretary of Sta­
te’s draft reply to Viceroy, 27 July 1922.
128. Ibid., File No.4059* Wakely to Bray, 9 November 1922.
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129
ject of the treaty, as set out in the first article of the draft, was 
to recognise Nepal's internal as well as external independence? Besides,
CpVM'
how could the Indian government overlook that anyABritish_ commitment to 
protect Nepalese rights in Tibet would give umhrage to the Tibetan gove­
rnment who resented these rights? As for Gurkha recruitment, Reading saw 
no hope of Chandra Shamsher*s accepting “any hard and fast agreement”, 
because the existing informal arrangement was advantageous to the Rana 
government, for it gave the impression that the British obtained Gurkhas 
not as a matter of right but as a special favour of the Ranas, who, in 
consequence, could claim special consideration for themselves and con­
cessions for^Svernmenti. Further, it was also quite possible for Chandra 
Shamsher to ask the extremely embarrassing question • why the British 
now wanted to include the Gurkha recruitment issue in a treaty when 
without any statutory agreement they had obtained sufficient number of 
recruits all these years? The fifth article, too, seemed to the Indian
government rather difficult to enforce* There was no weapon in the legal
(i-74
armoury of the Government-save the Regulation III of 1818-to suppress
political or other propaganda or agitation in the Indian territory
against a foreign government. And the Indian government, as they them-
130
selves made it clear later, did not want to use the Regulation too fre­
quently to repress "journalistic scurrility” and thereby provoke adverse 
comments in the Indian press and the legislatures. The subsidy was ano-
129. See p.Bo^V^and Appendix
129A. The Regulation empowered the Govt, to place individuals under "per­
sonal restraint” for"reasons of state embracing the due maintenance 
of the alliances formed by the British Govt, with foreign powers.”
130. PEF, Vol.Jl, 1912, Pt.2, File N0.25I6, Govt, to Envoy, 11 June 1923*
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ther diffic^t issue; although Hirtzel had excluded it from the draft, 
Chandra shamsher might insist on its inclusion in the treaty in order to 
convert "a purely Indian obligation" to an "imperial one"-in other words, 
to ensure its payment, unaffected by any change in the Indian adminis­
tration. such ehange in future, so Chandra shamsher believed, was not 
unlikely : political reforms and the gradual assumption of power by the 
Indians were indications. Indians in power, he thought, might not treat 
Nepal with the same consideration as the British had done; they could 
"urge the removal pf the annual drain to their exchequer" which tfee
subsidy involved. Already in the Indian press had appeared what Chandra
131
Shamsher condemned as "obnoxious" and "vitriolic" comments on the subsidy. 
Reading also knew it for certain that it was "practically impossible" 
to reject Nepal's right to diplomatic representation in London in 
principle, although Chandra Shamsher might not exercise the right imme­
diately. The Indian government were thus clearly unwilling to make a 
treaty, rejecting particularly the form in which the India office would 
like to have it. Articles regarding Nepal's relations with Tibet and 
Gurkha recruitment, Reading concluded, had to be "whittled down" or even
"jettisoned" fcefore Chandra shamsher could be asked to start negotiations 
132 
at all.
To reinforce their arguments the Indian government sent o*Connor's
views about Hirtzel's draft contained in a Memorandum he submitted to
131* PEF, Vol.90* 1912, Pt.3> File No.4199* Chandra to O'Connor, 3 August 
1922, Envoy to Govt., 18 August 1922. "The policy of subsidies as 
sops to political Cerberusses must once for all be knocked on the 
head. We must learn to swim - or sink. Indians must be prepared to 
guard the frontier". Letter to the Editor, The Englishman,10 Febru­
ary 1922. Earlier (14 August 1920) the same paper reported a sppech 
by B.C.Pal, the noted Bengali nationalist, criticising the subsidy. 
132. PEF* Vol.91* 1912, Pt.2, File No.4059* Viceroy to Secy.ofstate,
private Telg.23 November 1922; File No.619, Same to same, 26 Janu­
ary 1923.
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the Foreign department, ihe main burden of the memorandum was that 
Chandra Shamsher*s "reasonable wishes" regarding the arms concession 
should be forthwith met without the British governments wiiting to 
wring from him some quid pro quo,
"Our attitude", O'Connor pleaded, "in the present 
juncture should be one of generosity and friendli­
ness as from a great power to a small one which 
had stood by its big neighbour stoutly in time of 
trouble, and ••• we should endeavour to bring the 
matter to a conclusion suitable to our own dignity 
and symptomatic of’ our gesture, indicating rather 
our gratitude to Nepal than any desire to secure 
advantages for ourselves".
It was but natural, in 0*Connor*s opinion, that Chandra shamsher should
grumble that he had received far less rewards for his services than
Jang Bahadur had, and so he had suffered by comparison with his grand-
uncle. m  fact, O'Connor explained,
a recurring money grant liable in certain circumstances 
to cancellation or termination cannot be compared with 
large grants of land as a material security, and it 
certainly carries with it none of the moral prestige 
which accompanies an accession of territoty.
Nor could it be held, O'Connor argued, that by recognising Nepal as an
independent state, the British government were doing her a very great
favour, because it was
in reality no more than the recognition of a state 
of affairs which had always existed in reality but 
which we had always hesitated to admit openly and 
unequivocally and which had been limited by certain 
rather petty restrictions.
From Hirtzel*s draft O'Connor would drop the third, fourth, fifth and
seventh articles. "Rationally" and from the British point of view, they
were "useful", but "actually" they, in his opinion, were "unnecessary"
and even "would do more harm than good" to the Government. It seemed to
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O’Connor rather unfair to impose on Nepal "a small and very poor state 
an immense and indefinite obligation" as provided for in the third arti­
cle of Hirtzel*s draft; Chandra Shamsher was certain to point out that 
the Amir had no such obligation. Personally, O'Connor did not consider 
it "either necessary or even expedient" to bind Nepal "explicitly or 
formally" to help the British in times of need, when in the past such 
help had been rendered by the Rana government without any treaty provi­
sion and when in future their own interests would prompt them to conti­
nue to render such assistance. It also seemed to O'Connor equally un­
necessary to prescribe a "set formula" to control Nepal's relations with 
Tibet when the British had already secured a de facto influence over 
them. All that was necessary was to obtain from Chandra Shamsher a 
private undertaking not to use arms against Tibet, which undertaking, 
even if not embodied in the treaty, could be sufficiently binding on 
the Nepalese government for all practical purposes; and O'Connor did 
not think that it would be difficult to get such an undertaking from the 
Prime Minister, Yet, knowing the Home government's keenness about the 
matter, O'Connor suggested a formula which would not require Nepal to 
formally subordinate her relations with Tibet to the British but which, 
nevertheless, would ensure British voice in these relations and thereby 
a measure of control over them, O'Connor's formula ran thus : the fourth 
article of the treaty would provide that as Tibet was limitrophe to both 
India and Nepal, they should inform each other of any possible source of 
misunderstanding with Tibet,and each should exert its good offices to 
resolve the misunderstanding ; each should also prevent the other's 
existing interests in Tibet from impairment. As for the fifth article of
319
Hirtzel's draft, O'Connor, like the Indian government, held that it
would be difficult to enforce. He also knew that on the face of it, the
article regarding Gurkha recruitment seemed 1 reasonable”, but tfce Bhara-
dars might object to it and, hence, O'Connor suggested a revised draft
of the article which ran thus s
The British government, recognising complete independence 
of Hepal, internal as well as external, hereby agrees to 
conduct all its recruiting operations in Hepal in consul­
tation with Hepal government and undertakes also not to 
increase the present strengths of Gurkha recruitment cadres 
of Indian army without consent of that government. The
Nepal government will, on its part, as at present, place
no difficulties in their recruitment for Indian army in 
such numbers and in such manner as agreed upon: by the 
two governments.
133
Between O'Connor's and Hirtzel's draft of the article the only different 
ce lay in that the former made-and the latter did not-a ppeeific mention
of Nepalese independence. This difference, in fact, was hardly substan­
tial because in O'Connor's own words
The additional matter is all camouflage. We really 
bind ourselves to nothing more than we are bound
already l}34l* but it reads better, l think, and
might tend to save Nepalese amour propre.
During negotiations O'Connor, as he assured the Government, would make
it clear to Chandra Shamsherjthat he should not expect to obtain the
arms concession without making the British concession regarding Gurkha
recruitment, for ”it must be a mutual obligation”. As for asking Chandra
133* Hirtzel's draft provided that Nepal would place no obstacles to
Gurkha recruitment and that the British would undertake to conduct 
the recruiting operations in consultation with the Nepalese govern­
ment and their officers. File No.3340/1922, op.ci^.
134* That isjnot to recruit Gurkhas without the consent and cooperation 
of the Nepalese government.
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Shamsher for facilities for exploration, 0*Connor did not consider it 
necessary because, he said, thanks to the explorers of the the Survey
135
department "we know the country pretty well". 0'Coimor*s conclusion
was that the treaty should consist of only four articles of Hirtzel*s d
draft-the first, second, sixth and eighth-and the rest either dropped
altogether or amended and embodied in secret Kharitas to avoid publicity
136andAconsequent exposition pf Chandra Shamsher to the BharadarS* criticism*
Meanwhile Chandra Shamsher stepped up his pressure, 
warning O’Connor that every day’s delay in giving him the arms concessi­
on cost the Prime Minister’s prestige heavily* Reading hereupon strong­
ly urged Peel to let O'Connor immediately give Chandra Shamsher at least 
a verbal assurance that his demand would be met; any more delay in maki­
ng this clear to Chandra Shamsher was most "dangerous”* From O’Connor’s 
despatches Reading was led to believe that Chandra Shamsher,if given the 
arms concession, might., make some return concession to the British, if 
not in a treaty, at least in secret Kharitas. The Indian government 
themselves would prefer Kharitas , for the treaty, apart from involving
protracted negotiations and delay, had to be registered with the League 
136A
of Nations and made public, while political considerations dictated
that matters like the British control of Nepal’s relations with Tibet
137
and Gurkha recruitment should as far as possible be kept secret*
135* See Chapter II, p. £>8.
136. PEF, Vol.91* 1912, Pt.2, File No.1578* O’Connor to Bray, 11 Decem­
ber 1922, 15 January 1923* 23 February 1923* O'Connor’s Memorandum,
25 February 1923*
136a * The League Covenant forbade secret agreements between nations.
137* PEF, Vol.91» 1912, Pt.2, File No. 1094* Viceroy to secy.of state, 
Telg.23 March 1923* File No. 1313* O’Connor to Bray, 6 March 1923* 
Viceroy to Secy, of State, Private Telg.9 Match. 1923*
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O'Connor's and Reading*s arguments made the India office indig­
nant and Hirtzel, in particular, positively angry* Hirtzel strongly sus­
pected that the Indian Foreign department had a deep seated prejudice 
against a Nepalese treaty and that O'Connor had "been 11 talked over” by 
Bray* 0*Connor*s memorandum was dismissed as a "political cant”; he seemed 
to Hirtzel over-generous to the Nepalese, being Jall for *much giving and 
little or no taking”* His revised draft of the fourth article was reject­
ed as being ”of little value and possibly embarrassing"; the Political 
department regarded it a "nuisance" to be under an obligation to inform 
Nepal about any B/titish disputes with Tibet in future and to "accept with 
gratitude whatever turned out to be the Nepalese conception of good offi- 
ces'J O’Connor*s revised draft regarding Gurkha recruitment was also reject­
ed as "very doubtful politically" and as "impossible"; it was quite unnece­
ssary, in Hirtzel's opinion, to emphasise Nepalese independence in "such 
strong terms" as in O'Connor's draft. Hirtzel was both surprised and angry 
that the Indian government, instead of standing up to Chandra Shamsher,
"an artist in blackmail", were yielding to him.
'The Indian government's suggestion that Kharitas were prefe­
rable to a treaty also failed to impress the India Office where it was 
believed that since secret engagements had been banned by the League Cove­
nant, even Kharitas had to be registered with the League and made public. 
But Curzon, when consulted, thought otherwise; Kharitas, he fteld, were 
"in essence" private letters and so need not be submitted to the league.
The Foreign Secretary had not the "slightest objection" to the use of 
Kharitas which, in fact, seemed to him a far better means of settling 
"thorny and in some cases undesirable questions" than a "full-blown treaty".
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What Curzon was most anxious to avoid was any explicit recognition of
the international status of Nepal, which status would he established if
138
the Nepalese treaty were registered with the League.
The India Office was now thoroughly put out by the pros­
pects of abandoning the treaty which, as Wakely put it, was "the readiest 
and most satisfactory means ... of obtaining some quid pro quo" from Nepal. 
The India Office's decision was that if there was to be any treaty at all, 
it must be on the lines of Hirtzel*s draft and not a "lacerated treaty" 
as proposed by O'Connor "from which everything we want has been omitted 
while everything Nepal wants remains". Accordingly, Peel informed 
Reading that
While I still see advantage of treaty definitely 
regulating our relations with Nepal and securing 
de jure satisfaction of the legitimate desidecata 
of both parties, it seems clear that we have nothing to 
gain from one^which in the process of negotiation 
our own desiderata have entirely disappeared. 128a
But to relieve the Indian government of their anxiety, the India Office, 
with utmost reluctance, decided to concede to Chandra Shamsher the right 
to import arms, but not machinery. If, however, the Prime Minister press­
ed for machinery, he would be given the concession, but in that event 
the ban on the employment of Europeans would continue as the only means of 
checking the local production of sophisticated weapons. No other issue in 
the draft treaty, PdSl advised Reading , should be raised at all by O'Con­
nor. The India Office wanted to drive home to Chandra Shamsher that the 
British were not interested in an entirely one-s&ded treaty, and therefore 
he must be prepared to accommodate the British government's requirements
lg8. PEF, Vol.91» 1912, Pt.2, File No. 1313* Minute of Curzon, 23 March|l923. 
138A. Ibid.,Secy, of State to Viceroy, Telg.27 March I923.
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into his own demands. Otherwise, the British would not negotiate at all.
139
This firm attitude, it was expected, would work with Chandra Shamsher.
It did. On 2 April 1923 O’Connor informed Chandra Shamsher
that he could import arms freely, provided he used them for defensive
purposes and for the maintenance of internal order; besides, he should
see to it that Nepal’s military strength or her policy did not create
140
troubles for the Indian government. Chandra Shamsher was much exercised 
to find machinery excluded from the concession, but O’Connor remained 
firm until the Prime Minister caved in; he agreed to have a treaty and, 
in return for the right to import machinery, expressed his willingness 
to "generally meet" the British demands regarding control of Nepal’s 
relations with 'Tibet, Gurkha recruitment and mutual security through 
mutual assistance; the "exact form” in which the British demands would be 
met, he added, would, of course, be "a matter of negotiation". True to 
the Indian government’s belief, Chandra Shamsher did not press for Nepal's 
diplomatic representation in London, although he made no secret of the 
fact that the Nepalese did regard this right as a denominator of their 
country’s external independence. He accepted the fifth article of Hirt­
zel’ s draft, but his reaction to the third and fourth articles was the 
same as O’Connor had anticipated; the former, he said, would put an "un­
defined and undefinablc obligation" on Nepal : it would be an unbearable
139* PEF, Vol.91* 1912, Pt.2, File No.6I9/I923> Minute of the Political 
Committee, 5 March 1923? Wakely to Private Secy.to the Under secy.of 
State, 12 March 1923* Draft Telg. from Secy.of state to viceroy.
File No.1313* Minute of Hirtzel, 26 March 1923* Wakely to private 
Secy.to Under Secy.ofState, 13 March 1923* File No.1578* Political 
department’s Notes and Hirtzel’s minute, March 1923*
140. Ibid., File No.1710, O’Connor’s Note to Chandra, 2 April 1923*
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strain on her to undertake to help Britain in every war and campaign for 
the defence of her world-wide imperial interests and with which Nepal mig- 
ht not have any concern at all. £he Prime Minister agreed to sign a con­
fidential kharita embodying Nepal*s acceptance of British advice in sett­
ling her disputes with Tibe$, but he refused to give this undertaking in 
a treaty. As for Gurkha recruitment, Chandra shamsher saw no need for its 
inclusion in the treaty because both Ranuddip and Bir Shamsher had earlier 
given "formal declaration of the most binding character” to supply recrui­
ts, and since then the Nepalese government had not defaulted in their obli­
gation. At the most, the Prime Minister told O’Connor, he would in a 
Kharita give a guarantee that Ranuddip*s and Bir’s declarations wojtld be 
honoured by the Nepalese government. Chandra Shamsher urged that the seven­
th article of the Sagauli treaty and the engagement of November 1839-
141
”a petty and unnecessary restrict!on”-be forthwith rescinded.
O'Connor was fully satisfied that Chandra shamsher had 
taken quite a”reasonable view” of the British demands; he urged the Gover­
nment to conclude the treaty without any more delay, dropping the terms
142
unacceptable to the Prime Minister.
Chandra shamsher*s having agreed to discuss the British 
demands caused a welcome surprise to the Indian government, and it consi- 
dearbly influenced their subsequent attitude to the treaty. The prime 
Minister's acceptance of the main British demands "in principle" and £ 
his preference for kharitas to a treaty suggested that his real problem
141• PEF, Vol.91* 1912, Pt.2, Pile No.1710, O'Connor to Govt., Telgs.12,13 
April 1923*
142. Ibid., Pile No.1722, Same to same, 14 April 1923*
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was not the "substance” of the concessions in question but the "form" 
in which to make them to the British without irritating the; many "igno­
rant, suspicious and conservative" Bharadars. It was patent to the Indian 
government that Chandra shamsher had sufficiently climbed down, and a 
little more pressure could clinch the issue in British favour. The Indian 
government's tone was now similar to that of the India office; they reject­
ed O'ConnorJs "truncated treaty” because it was
so one-sided as to raise dangerous comment both in 
India and abroad; it would contain nothing to com­
pensate us for the disadvantages inherent in a pub­
lic declaration of Nepal's independence.
The Indian government would now make "no substantial modification" in 
Hirtzel's draft, but just rephrase the articles to accommodate the 
Nepalese amour prthpre. Thus the third article was so reworded as to 
assure the Nepalese government that their obligation to assist the Bri­
tish in emergencies was not "undefined and undefinable", but that it 
was limited to the defence of Britain's interests in the Indian Empire 
alone. The British, for themselves, would not lose much by this amend­
ment because it was their Indian interests more than anything else for 
which Nepalese assistance was necessary. From the fourth article the 
specific mention of Tibet was omitted and instead it was provided that 
"as the preservation of peace and friendly relations with the neighbour­
ing stateSjWhose territories adjoin" India and Nepal, was to the mutual 
interests of the two governments, they would keep one another informed 
of any "misunderstanding which may from time to time arise in such relati­
ons" and each would "exert its good offices to avert and determine such
friction and misunderstanding". Regarding Gurkha recruitment also the
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Indian government had now changed their attitude; they wanted its inclu­
sion in the treaty in an indirect and very subtle form. They suggested
it
the folding phrase s
Neither of the High Contracting Parties would employ 
subjects of the other without the previous general 
or special consent of the other High Contracting party, 
and each of the High Contracting Parties agrees to 
assist the other as heretofore with regard to the empl­
oyment of its subjects by the other High Contracting 
Party.
It was the second clause ("each ... party”) which the Indian government
143
believed would ensure the supply of Gurkhas.
Throughout April, May and June 1923 Chandra shamsher and 
O'Connor kept discussing the terms of the treaty. The prime Minister
144
accepted the fifth article of Hirtzel's draft with some modifications,
145
and O'Connor agreed to Chandra Shamsher*s amendment of the fourth and 
146
sixth articles The third and the seventhi articles of Hirtzel*s draft, 
even in the forms suggested by the Indian government, were rejected by 
Chandra shamsher who continued to regard the former article, in particular,
147
with "almost equal apprehension and dislike".
O'Connor, who by now had become thoroughly impatient,
kept insisting that since the two articles (the third and seventh) .v :
■had causecionly "suspicion, delay and difficulties" for both the
governments, they should not be pressed on Chandra shamsher any further.
143* Vol.91» 1912, Pt.2, File No.2232, Govt, to Envoy, 24 May 1923*
144* The article was embodied as the fourth article in the final treaty.
See Appendix, p.3QB.
145* Tii© article was embodied as the third article in the final treaty.
146. The article was embodied as the fifth article in the final treaty.
147* PEF, Vol.91, 1912, Pt.2, File No.2516, O'Connor to Govt., 8 June
1923* Govt, to O'Connor, 11 June 1923; File No.2573# O'Connor to
Govt., 18 June 1923* Viceroy to 3ec$. of state, Telg.6 July 1923;
File No.3910, O'Connor to Govt., 16 September 1923*
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It was better, he added, to show deference to the Nepalese governments 
prejudices and sentiments and to get in return whatever they conceded in 
good grace than to impose on them "an agreement constructed in commerc­
ial lines the provisions of which could always be rendered inoperative
148
by specious excuses”. O’Connor also referred to the opinion of Major 
Brook Northey, a veteran officer with long experience with the Gurkhas
149
and an authority on them, who held that the Gurkha recruiting arrange­
ment was "wotking very well and cannot be improved upon",and so any pre­
ssure on Chandra Shamsher for additional facilities was wholly unnecess- 
150
ary. And then, at last, the Government acquiesced. The third and seve­
nth articles were omitted from the final version of the treaty which was 
signed on 21 December 1923* Chandra Shamsher gave a formal confirmation 
of Ranuddip* s and Bir*s engagements regarding Gurkha recruitment,which 
he believed and O'Connor agreed, secured what the British wanted? ensu­
ring that the supply of Gurkhas from Nepal would remain unaffedted by 
any change of regime in the country or by intermittent pressures of the 
government at Kathmandu. In a note to the Envoy which was appended to 
the treaty, Chandra Shamsher also undertook to furnish detailed lists of 
the imported arms and machinery to the British to enable them to provide 
necessary facilities for the clearance of the consignments from ports 
and railway stations. In deference to Chandra Shamsher*s desire-that is, 
to further emphasise Nepal*s independent status-the treaty was ratified
by King George V, although the India Office would have preferred the
151
Viceroy to do it. The treaty was registered with the League in 1925*
148. PEF, Vol.91 >1912,Pt.2,File No.25l6>» 0*Connor to Govt.8 June 1923;
File No,3910, D.O.Telg.to Govt.,10 September 1923- 
149* For Northey's works on Gurkhas see the Bibliography.
150. PEF, Vol.91,1912,pt.2, File No.2002, O'Connor to Govt.2S)!lpril|l923*
151. ibid., FilelNos.2870,5033.3566,4090,4672,4939/1923;945/1924}35l6/1925. 
O'Connor, op.cit., pp.308-11.A.P«, 1924»XXVI; 1924-5*XXX*
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C H A P T E R  E I Gr H I
BRITISH IMPACT ON NEPAL
329
The British: influence on Nepal was limited both in extent and 
intensity-and for four main reasons. Nepal lay outside the administrative 
framework of British India and could, therefore, remain to a great extent 
free from British impact on her life. Secondly, there was for all prac­
tical purposes one agency through which this influence could operate- 
the Nepalese government. Thirdly, the Nepalese government were suspici-
-fce
ous of ^British government,and although they could not avoid the British 
influence altogether, they succeeded in keeping it to the minimum. Fina­
lly, the British themselves had limited objectives in Nepal which they 
wanted to realise with the minimum of friction with the Nepalese govern­
ment.
British interests in Nepal were mainly political and military and
their direct influence was seen mostly in these respects. Ever since
their contact with Nepal in the late eighteenth century, the British had
been a force in Nepalese politics. Internal dissensions in the court of
Kathmandu created openings for British influence,the effectiveness of
which depended upon the intensity of the power struggle there. Alliance
with the British was a political weapon which made and unmade the career
1
of Nepalese statesmen. Both Damodar Pande and Bhimsen Thapa provide the 
typical examples. The tide of anti-British feelings created by Damodarfs
policy swept Bhimsen on to power, and it was these feelings, again, which
2
swept him off it. For about a decade after Bhimsen1 s fall, one central
1. See Chapter II, p.50.
2. See Chapter I, pp. 26, 31, 3 3 .
330
i s s u e  k e p t  t h e  N e p a l e s e  c o u r t  a t  o n c e  d i v i d e d  a n d  t u r b u l e n t  :  w h e t h e r  o r
n o t  t o  e x p l o i t  t h e  B r i t i s h  d i f f i c u l t i e s *  A n g l o - N e p a l e s e  r e l a t i o n s  w e r e
s e r i o u s l y  s t r a i n e d  d u r i n g  t h e s e  y e a r s  w h e n  t h e  s t r e n g t h  a n d  i n f l u e n c e  o f
t h e  B r i t i s h  g o v e r n m e n t  b e c a m e  m a n i f e s t *  T h e  R a n a s  w h o  c a m e  t o  p o w e r  i n
t h i s  t u m u l t o u s  p e r i o d  w e r e  i m p r e s s e d ,  a n d  t h e r e f o r e  t h e i r  p o l i c y  w a s  t o
3
c u l t i v a t e  B r i t i s h  f r i e n d s h i p  a s  a  m e a n s  o f  s t r e n g t h *  T h e  R a n a s  d i d  n o t  
a l l o w  a n y  o n e  o t h e r  t h a n  t h a m s e l v e s  t o  h a v e  c o n t a c t  w i t h  t h e  B r i t i s h ;  i n  
o t h e r  w o r d s ,  t h e y  e s t a b l i s h e d  a  c o m p l e t e  m o n o p o l y  o v e r  N e p a l • s  r e l a t i o n s  
w i t h  B r i t a i n *
B r i t a i n *  s  p o l i t i c a l  i n f l u e n c e  i n  N e p a l  w o r k e d  t h r o u g h  t h e  R a n a  
r e g i m e *  T h e  R a n a s  g a v e  t h e  B r i t i s h  w h a t  t h e y  w a n t e d  :  a  s t a b l e ,  f r i e n d l y  
a n d  c o o p e r a t i v e  g o v e r n m e n t *  T h e  B r i t i s h  w e r e  r e l i e v e d  o f  a n x i e t y  r e g a r d ­
i n g  t h e  s e c u r i t y  o f  t h e  r i c h e s t  p a r t  o f  I n d i a .  L a t e r  b y  s u p p l y i n g  t h e  
G u r k h a s  t h e  R a n a  r e g i m e  s e r v e d  a s  a  v i t a l  e l e m e n t  i n  B r i t i s h  I n d i a  * s  
m i l i t a r y  s t r u c t u r e .  T h e  R a n a s ,  f o r  t h e i r  p a r t ,  g o t  w h a t  t h e y  e x p e c t e d  ;  
c o n s i s t e n t  s u p p o r t  o f  t h e  B r i t i s h  g o v e r n m e n t ,  t h o u g h  n o t  t h e i r  o p e n l y  
d e c l a r e d  a l l i a n c e *  T h e  R a n a s  s u c c e e d e d  i n  c o n v i n c i n g  t h e  B r i t i s h  t h a t  s o  
l o n g  a s  t h e y  r u l e d ,  N e p a l  w o u l d  r e m a i n  n o t  o n l y  a  g o o d  n e i g h b o u r  o f  B r i ­
t i s h  I n d i a  b u t  a  t r u s t e d  a l l y  i n  a l l  e m e r g e n c i e s *  B u t  t h e n ,  B r i t i s h  c o n n ­
e x i o n  w i t h  N e p a l  c o u l d  n o t  r e s u l t  i n  B r i t i s h  h e g e m o n y  b e c a u s e  o f  t h e  R a n a  
p o l i c y  o f  k e e p i n g  t h e  B r i t i s h  i n f l u e n c e  r i g i d l y  r e s t r i c t e d .
I n  N e p a l i  i n t e r n a l  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  t h e  B r i t i s h  d i d  n o t  i n t e r f e r e  
n o r  d i d  t h e y  q u e s t i o n  h o w  t h e  R a n a s  r u l e d *  T h e  R a n a  r e g i m e  w a s  a  f a m i l y  
o l i g a r c h y ,  i t s  h e a d  b e i n g  t h e  P r i m e  M i n i s t e r ,  w h o  w a s  t h e  b e g i n n i n g ,  t h e
3* S e e  C h a p t e r  I ,  p p .  33 et sea.
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m i d d l e  a n d  t h e  e n d  o f  a l l  g o v e r n m e n t a l  p o w e r s .  H i s  a u t h o r i t y  w a s  a b s o l u t e .
I t  w a s  a  p e r s o n a l  r u l e *  b u t t r e s s e d  b y  a  s t r o n g  a r m y  w h o s e  m a i n t e n a n c e
a n d  e f f i c i e n c y  w a s  t h e  f i r s t  c a r e  o f  t h e  P r i m e  M i n i s t e r  h i m s e l f .  T h e r e
w e r e  i n t e r n a l  s t r a i n s  i n  t h e  r e g i m e  c r e a t e d  b y  t h e  j e a l o u s y  a n d  a m b i t i o n
4
i n  t h e  f a m i l y  i t s e l f .  T h e r e  w e r e  K i n g s  i n  N e p a l *  c r o w n e d  p u p p e t s *  d i s p l a y ­
e d  b y  t h e  R a n a s  o n  o n l y  c e r e m o n i a l  o c c a s i o n s .  B u t  f o r  B r i t i s h  o p p o s i t i o n  
t h e  R a n a s  w o u l d  h a v e  d o n e  a w a y  w i t h  e v e n  t h e s e  t i t u l a r  K i n g s  a n d  a s s u m e d  
r o y a l t y  t h e m s e l v e s .  I t  w a s  o n e  o f  t h e s e  r o i s  f a i n e a n t s  o f  N e p a l ,  T r i b h u -  
b a n  V i r  V i k r a m  S h a h  (1906-1955)» t h e  f a t h e r  o f  t h e  p r e s e n t  K i u & »  M a h e n d r a
Vir Vikram Shah (b.1920-), who eventually became the rallying point of
5
t h e  a n t i - R a n a  m o v e m e n t  i n  N e p a l .
N e p a l *  u n d e r  t h e  R a n a s *  h a d *  p o l i t i c a l l y *  a  s t a b l e  g o v e r n m e n t *  
a n d  i t  w a s  t h e  B r i t i s h  i n f l u e n c e  w h i c h  m a d e  N e p a l ' s  d o m e s t i c  p o l i c y  g r a ­
d u a l l y  l e s s  s a n g u n a r y .  C o u r t  i n t r i g u e s  d i d  n o t  c e a s e *  b u t  t h e r e  w e r e  i n ­
c r e a s i n g l y  l e s s  b l o o d y  i n c i d e n t s .  T h e  B r i t i s h  m a d e  i t  q u i t e  p l a i n  t o  t h e  
R a n a s  t h a t  t h e y  d i s l i k e d  v i o l e n c e  a s  a  m e a n s  e i t h e r  o f  a c q u i e i n g  p o w e r  o r  
s a f e g u a r d i n g  i t  f r o m  a c t u a l  o r  i m a g i n e d  t h r e a t s .  T h i s  w a s  t h e  g r o u n d  o n
which Lftrd Hardinge delayed recognition of Jang Bahadur's regime in 1846
6
d e s p i t e  t h e  R e s i d e n t ' s  s t r o n g  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s .  W h e n  R a n u d d i p  w a s  m u r d e r e d
b y  B i r  S h a m s h e r *  D u f f e r i n  d i d  n o t .  h e s i t a t e  t o  s t r o n g l y  e x p r e s s  h i s  r e v u l -
7
s i o n  a n d  d i s p l e a s u r e  b e f o r e  r e c o g n i s i n g  t h e  n e w  r e g i m e .  N o  P r i m e  M i n i s t e r  
o f  N e p a l  h e r e a f t e r  s u f f e r e d  a  v i o l e n t  d e a t h *  a l t h o u g h  o n e - J u d d h a  s h a m s h e r -
4# For a scathing indictment against the Rana rule see D.R.Regmi* A Cen­
tury of Family Autocracy in Nepal.
5. Aniruddha Gupta* Polities in Nepal* p.43* B.L.Joshi and L.E.Rose, 
Democratic Innovations in Nepal * pp.36-9* Erika Leuchtag, With a King 
in the Clouds.
6. 3.C.* 31 July 1847» No.203* Hardinge's Memo on Nepal Affaira* 23 July
1847* Also 3.C.* 31 July 1847» Nos.188-9* 196.
7* S e e  Chapter I I I *  p. 91.
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v o l u n t a r i l y  r e s i g n e d  i n  1 9 4 5  a n d  a n o t h e r - P a d m a  S h a m s h e r - w a a  f o r c e d  t o
8
a b d i c a t e  i n  f a v o u r  o f  M o h a n  S h a m s h e r  i n  1 9 4 9 «  P o l i t i c a l  c r i m e s  c a m e  t o
b e  d e a l t  w i t h  e i t h e r  b y  e x p u l s i o n  t o  r e m o t e  r e g i o n s  o f  N e p a l  o r  t o  I n d i a
w h e r e  t h e  B r i t i s h  g o v e r n m e n t  t o o k  t h e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  o f  p r e v e n t i n g  t h e
e m i g r e s  f r o m  s u b v e r t i n g  t h e  r e g i m e  a t  K a t h m a n d u *
B r i t i s h  i n f l u e n c e  w a s  m a r k e d l y  s e e n  i n  N e p a l * s  m i l i t a r y  l i f e *
T h e  e a r l y  G u r k h a  r u l e r s  o f  N e p a l  r e o o g n i s e d  t h e  e f f i c i e n c y  a n d  s u p e r i o r
o r g a n i s a t i o n  o f  t h e  B r i t i s h  I n d i a n  a r m y  w h i c h  t h e y  s e t  a s  a  m o d e l  f o r
9
t h e  N e p a l e s e  a r m y *  A  g o o d  d e a l  o f  i m i t a t i v e n e s s  w a s  e v i d e n t  i n  d r e s s  a n d  
a c c o u t r e m e n t s ,  i n  t r a i n i n g ,  d i s c i p l i n e  a n d  w o r d s  o f  c o m m a n d *  T h e  B r i t i s h ,  
h a d  m a d e  G u r k h a  m i l i t a r y  e x p a n s i o n  i m p o s s i b l e ,  b u t  t h e  m i l i t a r y  s p i r i t  o f  
t h e  c o u n t r y  l i v e d  o n  a n d  e v e n  f l o u r i s h e d ,  d u e  p a r t l y  t o  t h e  B r i t i s h  c o n ­
t a c t  w i t h  N e p a l *  F e a r  o f  t h e  B r i t i s h ,  w a s  o n e  o f  t h e  r e a s o n s  w h y  t h e  N e p a l ­
e s e  g o v e r n m e n t  m a i n t a i n e d  a  l a r g e  a r m y  a t  a  c o n s i d e r a b l e  c o s t *  T h e r e  w a s  
n o  m e a n s  o f  b a l a n c i n g  t h e  c o s t  b y  t e r r i t o r i a l  a c q u i s i t i o n s ,  b u t  t h e n ,  i n  
N e p a l  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  o f  s e c u r i t y  p r e v a i l e d  o v e r  t h o s e  o f  e c o n o m y *  D u r i n g  
C h a n d r a  S h a m s h e r * s  r u l e  t h e  i n c r e a s e d  e f f i c i e n c y  o f  t h e  N e p a l e s e  a r m y  
w a s  d u e  t o  t h e  s u p p l y  o f  a r m s  b y  t h e  B r i t i s h *  T h e  N e p a l e s e  a r m y ,  f o r  i n s ­
t a n c e ,  c o u l d  n o t  d o  r e g u l a r  t a r g e t  p r a c t i c e  u n t i l  t h e  B r i t i s h ,  a g r e e d  t o  
m a k e  a n  a n n u a l  s u p p l y  o f  a m m u n i t i o n  f o r  t h i s  p u r p o s e *  T h e  r e t i r e d  G u r k h a  
s o l d i e r s  o f  t h e  I n d i a n  a r m y  b r o u g h t  w i t h  t h e m  h o m e  t h e i r  e x p e r i e n c e  a n d  $ 
s e r v e d  t h e  N e p a l e s e  a r m y  a s  i n s t r u c t o r s *  N e p a l e s e  t r o o p s  w h o  d i d  g a r r i s o n
8* A f t e r  C h a n d r a  s h a m s h e r * s  d e a t h  i n  1929, B h i m  s h a m s h e r ,  h i s  b r o t h e r ,
r u l e d  f o r  t h r e e  y e a r s ,  w h e r e a f t e r  J u d d h a  S h a m s h e r ,  t h e  n e x t  s u r v i v i n g
b r o t h e r ,  r u l e d *  M o h a n  S h a m s h e r ,  C h a n d r a  S h a m s h e r * s  e l d e s t  s o n , r u l e d  
u n t i l  1 9 5 1  w h e n  t h e  R a n a  r e g i m e  e n d e d *
9» L*S*Baral, Life and Writings of Prithvinarayan Shah, p*3H» Papers on
Nepal War, p.49, Captain Hearsey to Govt*, 24 August 1816* M s s *  Hodg ­
son, Vol*10, p*6, Note on Nepal Army, 1825♦ W .Kirkpatrick, Account of 
Nepaul, p.214«
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d u t y  i n  I n d i a  w e r e  t r a i n e d  b y  e x p e r t  B r i t i s h  o f f c e r s ,  a n d  t h e i r  e n g a g e -
10
m e n t  i n  t h e  f r o n t i e r  w a r f a r e  w a s  f o r  t h e m  a  w h o l e s o m e  e x p e r i e n c e ,  t h e  
m o r e  s o  b e c a u s e  t h e y  c o u l d  n o t  s e e  a n y  a c t i v e  s e r v i c e  a t  h o m e .
B r i t i s h  c o n t a c t  w i t h  N e p a l  l e d  t o  n o  t r a n s f o r m a t i o n  o f  h e r  e c o n o ­
m i c  l i f e ?  t h e r e  w a s  n o  p e a c e f u l  p e n e t r a t i o n  o f  B r i t i s h  f i n a n c e  c a p i t a l  
i n  t h e  c o u n t r y  n o r  a n y  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  B r i t i s h  e c o n o m i c  p r i n c i p l e s  b y  t h e  
N e p a l e s e  g o v e r n m e n t .  I n  f a c t ,  t & e  l a t t e r  s h o w e d  l i t t l e  i n i t i a t i v e  o r  e n t e r ­
p r i s e  t o  d e v e l o p  t h e  e c o n o m i c  l i f e  o f  t h e  p e o p l e .  T h e  a r t e r i e s  o f  t h i s  
l i f e - t h e  m e a n s  o f  c o m m u n i c a t i o n  a n d  t r a n s p o r t - w e r e  f e w  a n d  o f  a  p r i m i t i v e  
n a t u r e .  T h e  N e p a l e s e  e c o n o m y  w a s  p u r e l y  a g r a r i a n ,  l a c k i n g  v a r i e t y  a n d  
d y n a m i s m .
T h e  g e n e r a l  p o l i c y  o f  t h e  N e p a l e s e  g o v e r n m e n t  w a s  t o  a v o i d  c l o s e  
e c o n o m i c  c o n t a c t  w i t h  t h e  B r i t i s h  f o r  f e a r  t h a t  s u c h  c o n t a c t  w a s  t h e  p r e ­
c u r s o r  o f  p o l i t i c a l  d o m i n a t i o n .  T h e  e a r l y  B r i t i s h  a t t e m p t s  t o  d e v e l o p
N e p a l  a s  a  h i g h w a y  o f  I n d o - C h i n e s e  t r a d e  f a i l e d  b e c a u s e  o f  t h e  N e p a l e s e
11
g o v e r n m e n t ' s  o p p o s i t i o n .  T h e  l a t t e r  s h o w e d  n o  i n t e r e s t s  i n  a  d e f i n i t e
c o m m e r c i a l  a g r e e m e n t  e i t h e r ?  o n  t h e  c o n t r a r y ,  t h e i r  c o m m e r c i a l  p o l i c y
c a u s e d  t h e  B r i t i s h  i r r i t a t i o n  a n d  i n c o n v e n i e n c e .  T h e r e  w e r e  i n s t a n c e s  o f
I n d i a n  t r a d e r s  a t  K a t h m a n d u  b e i n g  h a r r a s s e d  f o r  w h i c h  t h e  R e s i d e n t  h a d  t o  
12
r e m o n s t r a t e .  A  s e r i o u s  h i n d r a n c e  t o  t r a d e  l a y  i n  t h e  p r e v a l e n c e  o f  d i f f e r ­
e n t  r a t e s  o f  c u s t o m s  d u t i e s  o n  t h e  s a m e  c o m m o d i t i e s  a l o n g  d i f f e r e n t  p l a c e s  
i n  t h e  t r a d e  r o u t e s .  T h e  N e p a l e s e  o f f i c e r s  o n  t h e  b o r d e r  w e r e  n o t  c o o p e r a ­
t i v e ,  a n d  m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g  w i t h  t h e i r  B r i t i s h  c o u n t e r p a r t s  w a s  n o t  r a r e .
_  3 e e  c h a p t e r  V I I ,  p .  2 ? 9 .
11. S e e  C h a p t e r  I , ^ p .  22-4.
12.  I n  1831 t h e r e  w e r e  t h i r t y  f o u r  I n d i a n  m e r c h a n t s  a t  K a t h m a n d u  w i t h  a
w o r k i n g  c a p i t a l  o f  t w e n t y  t h r e e  l a k h s  o f  r u p e e s .  P.C., 2 D e c e m b e r  1831,
N o .4? 3 A u g u s t  1835, N o s .39-45* W . W . H u n t e r ,  L i f e  o f  H o d g s o n ,  p p .115-6.
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For political reasons the British did not press the durbar for
commercial facilities and concessions, although Hodgson adduced powerful
economic and political arguments in favour of developing Indo-Nepalese -fefci
trade. Commerce, Hodgson urged, could alone cause the euthanasia of Nepal's
military spitit and relieve the British of their anxiety. The more the
Nepalese became trade-minded, he argued, and the more they earned profits,
12k
t h e  l e s s  w o u l d  b e  t h e i r  i n c l i n a t i o n  t o  t h e  h a z a r d o u s  a v o c a t i o n  o f  w a r .  
T h a n k s  t o  H o d g s o n ' s  p e r s i s t e n c e  t h e  N e p a l e s e  g o v e r n m e n t  s u b m i t t e d  i n  1 8 3 9  
a  s c h e d u l e  o f  d u t i e s  o n  i m p o r t s  a n d  e x p o r t s  a n d  e n g a g e d  n o t  t o  l e v y  a n y
1 3
d u t y  n o t  i n c l u d e d  i n  t h a t  s c h e d u l e .
T h e  R a n a  g o v e r n m e n t  m a i n t a i n e d  t h e  s a m e  g e n e r a l  d i s i n c l i n a t i o n  
t o  e c o n o m i c  i n t e r c o u r s e  w i t h  t h e  B r i t i s h ,  a l t h o u g h  t h e  a t t i t u d e  o f  t h e  
s e c o n d  g e n e r a t i o n  o f  R a n a s ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  o f  C h a n d r a  S h a m s h e r ,  w a s  t e m p e r ­
e d  b y  t h e  r e a l i s a t i o n  t h a t  n o  d e v e l o p m e n t  o f  N e p a l  c o u l d  t a k e  p l a c e  w i t h ­
o u t  B r i t i s h  a s s i s t a n c e .  O f  J a n g  B a h a d u r ' s  a t t i t u d e ,  t h e  R e s i d e n t ,  c o l o n e l  
G e o r g e  R a m s a y ,  i n f o r m e d  t h e  G o v e r n m e n t  t h a t  t h e  P r i m e  M i n i s t e r  w a s  s o
w a r y . . .  [ a n d |  s o  s u s p i c i o u s  t h a t ,  w e  a r e  m e r e l y  b i d i n g  o u r  
t i m e  w a r i l y  f o r  a n  o p p o r t u n i t y  t o  i n s e r t  ; t h e  p o i n t ;  o f  t h e  
w e d g e ,  t h a t  w e  m a y  g r a d u a l l y  o b t a i n  a  f i r m  f o o t i n g  i n  t h e  
c o u n t r y ,  t h a t  I t h i n k  h e  w o u l d  r a t h e r  c o u n s e l  t h e  c e s s i o n  
t o  u s  o f  a  c o n s i d e r a b l e  s l i c e  o f  i t  t h a n  c o n s e n t  t o  a  s y s t e m  
o f  f r e e  t r a d e  a n d  p e r m i t  E n g l i s h  m e r c h a n t s  t o  h a v e  t r a n s a c ­
t i o n s  i n  i t .  1 4
I n  I 8 5 6 - 7 ,  J a n g  B a h a d u r  r e f u s e d  p e r m i s s i o n  t o  o n e  C a m e r o n ,  a n  E n g l i s h  
m e r c h a n t ,  t o  t r a d e  i n  N e p a l ;  W i l l i a m  N o r r i s ,  a  t i m b e r  m e r c h a n t  o f  t h e  
N o r t h  W e s t e r n  P r o v i n c e s ,  w h o  a s k e d  f o r  s i m i l a r  p e r m i s s i o n  i n  1 8 5 8 - 9 ,  h a d  
n o  b e t t e r  l u c k  e i t h e r ,  a l t h o u g h  L o r d  C a n n i n g ,  t h e  V i c e r o y ,  p e r s o n a l l y
1 2 A .  P . C . ,  2 6  M a r c h  1 8 3 0 ,  N o . 2 4 ;  1 2  J u n e  1 8 3 4 .  N o . 1 4 0 #  H u n t e r ,  o p . c i t . .  
p p . 1 1 0 - 1 5 .  B . H o d g s o n ,  “ O n  t h e  C o m m e r c e  o f  N e p a l ” ,  E s s a y s  o n  t h e  
L a n g u a g e s ,  L i t e r a t u r e . . .  o f  N e p a l  a n d  T i b e t ,  P a r t  II, p p . 9 2 - 1 2 1 .
1 3 *  A i t o h i s o n ,  T r e a t i e s  a n d  E n g a g e m e n t s  ( 1 9 0 9  e d n . ) ,  II, p p . 1 1 6 - 7 *
1 4 .  P.O.. 2 6  August 1 6 5 9 *  N o . 2 1 l 7  Resident to Govt., 8  August 1 8 5 9 *
15
wrote to the King of Nepal for him. Jang Bahadur*s commercial policy 
was prejudicial to Indian merchants and Indo-Nepalese trade* Trade in 
oily tobaccoy sugar, grain of all sortSy cottony salty ghee, and other 
necessaries of life was monopolised by the Prime Minister, his family 
and favourites to the detriment of other traders. Prices rose high at 
Kathmandu : this led Ramsay to fear that the general well-being of the 
country was being "seriously and visibly affected" and that the mono­
poly system
m u s t  a c t  i n j u r i o u s l y ,  i f  i t  h a s  n o t  a l r e a d y  d o n e  s o ,  u p o n  
o u r  c o m m e r c i a l  i n t e r e s t s  b y  r e s t r i c t i n g  w i t h i n  e v e n  n a r r o ­
w e r  b o u n d s  o u r  p r e s e n t  t r a d e  w i t h  N e p a l •  1 6
T h e  I n d i a n  m e r c h a n t s  h a d  t o  p a y  b o t h  i m p o r t  a n d  e x p o r t  d u t i e s  a t ,  r a t e s  
f a r  i n  e x c e s s  o f  t h o s e  f i x e d  b y  t h e  e n g a g e m e n t  o f  1 3 3 9 ;  s o m e  h a d  e v e n  
t o  c l o s e  t h e i r  b u s i n e s s  a t  K a t h m a n d u .  R a m s a y  u r g e d  s t r o n g  p o l i t i c a l  p r e ­
s s u r e  a n d  e v e n  r e t a l i a t o r y  e c o n o m i s  m e a s u r e s .
" J a n g  B a h a d u r  i s  h i m s e l f  t h e  o b s t a c l e  t o  a l l  f r e e  i n t e r ­
c o u r s e  b e t w e e n  N e p a l  a n d  B r i t i s h  p r o v i n c e s " ;  R a m s a y  a l l e g e d ,  
" h e  i s  t h e  m a i n s p r i n g . . »  a l l  r e s t r i c t i o n s  e m a n a t e  f r o m  
h i m s e l f .  H i s  E x c e l l e n c y * s  p o w e r  i s  a b s o l u t e ;  h e  c a n  d o  
w h a t  h e  p l e a s e s ;  h i s  w o r d  i s  l a w ;  h i s  g o v e r n m e n t  i s  t h e  
m o s t  p e r f e c t  a u t o c r a c y  t h a t  c a n  b e  i m a g i n e d ;  h e  c o u l d  
t h r o w  o p e n  t h e  c o u n t r y  t o m o r r o w  t o  E n g l i s h  m e r c h a n t s  i f  1 7  
h e  s o  w i l l e d ,  a n d  w i t h o u t  a  d i s s e n t i e n t  v o i v e  b e i n g  h e a r d ?
The Indian government, however, did not want to make commerce
an issue with Jang Bahadur, and this remained their settled policy with
his successors. Girdlestone saw little prospect in the development of
Indo-Tibetan trade through Nepal by the British government*s efforts-
a project in which some British commercial concerns were interested in
1 5 ^  P . C . ,  3 1  December 1 8 3 8 ,  N o . 1 7 1 9 ; F . P - A ,  August 1 8 6 4 ,  N o . 3 1 *
1 6 .  P . C . ,  2 6  A u g u s t  1 8 5 9 *  No.2 1 1 ,  R e s i d e n t  to G o v t . ,  8  A u g u s t  1 8 § 9 «
1 7 *  F.P-A, August 1 8 6 4 *  No.5 1 *  Resident to Govt., 6  July 1 8 6 4 #
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t h e  l a t e r  d e c a d e s  o f  t h e  n i n e t e e n t h  c e n t u r y .  J a n g :  B a h a d u r  a n d  a l l  h i s
s u c c e s s o r s  w e r e  e x t r e m e l y  j e a l o u s  o f  B r i t i s h  a t t e m p t s  t o  o p e n  u p  T i b e t  
19
f o r  t r a d e .
B r i t i s h  r e l a t i o n s  w i t h  N e p a l  i m p r o v e d  d u r i n g :  t h e  r u l e  o f  t h e  s e c o n d
g e n e r a t i o n  o f  R a n a s - t h e  S h a m s h e r s .  T h e i r  c o o p e r a t i o n  w i t h  t h e  B r i t i s h  t o
i m p r o v e  l a w  a n d  o r d e r  o n  t h e  f r o n t i e r  g a v e  t h e  e c o n o m i c  l i f e  o f  t h e  r e g i o n
a  s e n s e  o f  s e c u r i t y *  T h e  c o n s t r u c t i o n  o f  I n d i a n  r a i l w a y s  o n  t h e  N e p a l e s e
20
b o r d e r  s t i m u l a t e d  t r a d e *  T i m b e r  f o r  t h e  r a i l w a y s  b e c a m e  a  p r o f i t a b l e  
i t e m  i n  N e p a l f s  e x p o r t  t r a d e *  T h e  t o t a l  v a l u e  o f  t h i s  t r a d e  w i t h  I n d i a  
i n  1884-5 w a s  14>073>870 r u p e e s ;  i n  1904-5 i t ,  i n c r e a s e d  t o  17>544,330 
r u p e e s ,  a n d  i n  1923-4 t o  62,724>000 r u p e e s .  T h e  f i g u r e s  f o r  t h e  i m p o r t  
t r a d e  i n  t h e  c o r r e s p o n d i n g  y e a r s  w e r e  9 > 8 5 7 > 5 1 0 ; 9 > 9 9 1 > 0 1 0  a n d  2 8 , 3 8 8 , 0 0 0
5l| ■ -
r u p e e s . i  v ; .  - '  f  ••
IS. Ibid* PSLIt Vol*26, Trade with Nepal, by Girdlestone, 13 July 1880*
P3M, D 70, Trade with Nepal, 1877* J.Inglis, Sport and Work on the 
Nepal Frontier, pp.215-8. A.Lamb, Britain and Chinese Central Asia, 
pp.1^ -5 3. D.Wright, History of Nepal, p. 7 6 *
19* S e e  also C h a p t e r  IV» p p .  144-5 •
20* T h e  B e n g a l  a n d  N o r t h - W e s t e r n  R a i l w a y  s k i r t e d  t h e  e n t i r e  s o u t h e r n  
f r o n t i e r  o f  N e p a l ,  s e r v i n g  a s  t h e  m o s t  i m p o r t a n t  c h a n n e l  o f  ^ t r a d e  
w i t h  I n d i a .  L . S . S . ^ M a l l e y ,  B e n g a l  D i s t r i c t  G a z e t t e e r s ,  p a r b h a n g a ,  
p.95;  C h a m p a r a n ,  p.104; M u z a f f a r p u r ,  p.945 P u r n e a ,  p p .122-5* J . B y r n e ,  
B h a g a l p u r ,  p .129* H . R . N e v i l l ,  D i s t r i c t  G a z e t t e e r  o f  t h e  U n i t e d  P r o v i n ­
c e s  o f  A g r a  a n d  Q u d h ,  G o n d a ,  p .535 B a h r a i t c h ,  p p .52-35 G o r a k h p u r ,  p p .  
75~9> P i l b h i t ,  p p .73-7; B a r e i l l e y ,  p . 6 9 ;  B a s t i ,  p p .62-67 K h e r i ,  p p . 5 6-7*
21. A.P., Statistical Account Relating to British India, 1890, Vol.
LXXTlil, pp. 230-1; 1910, Vol .CIV, pp.195-6; 1929-30, Vol. MIX, 
pp.562-5.
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N e p a l e s e  b o r d e r  t o w n s ,  B i r g a n j ,  B i r a t n a g a r ,  B h a i r w a ,  c h a n d a n -  
c h V k i ,  H a n u m a n n a g a r ,  J a l e s w a r ,  J a n a k p u r  a n d  N e p a l g a n j  w h i c h  w e r e  n e a r :  t h e  
I n d i a n  r a i l w a y  h e a d s ,  g r e w  u p  i n t o  c o m m e r c i a l  c e n t r e s *  T h e  T e r a i ,  w h i c h  
w a s  f o r m e r l y  a n  e x t r e m e l y  u n h e a l t h y  m a l a r i a l  t r a c t *  w a s  g r a d u a l l y  r e c l a i ­
m e d *  T h e  R a n a  g o v e r n m e n t  o f f e r e d  s p e c i a l  i n d u c e m e n t s  t o  s e t t l e m e n t  l i k e
22
t h e  r e m i s s i o n  o f  l a n d  r e v e n u e  a n d  o t h e r  c o n c e s s i o n s *  C u l t i v a t i o n  o f  r i c e  
s p r e a d ,  a l s o  o f  J u t e  a n d  s u g a r *  R a i l w a y s  o n  t h e  N e p a l e s e  b o r d e r  f a c i l i t a ­
t e d  t h e  q u i c k  m o v e m e n t  o f  f o o d  g r a i n s  f r o n t  a n d  t o  N e p a l  d u r i n g  s c a r c i t i e s *
5 o  t h e y  d i d  t h e  m i g r a t i o n  o f  t h e  N e p a l e s e  p o p u l a t i o n  t o  t h e  b o r d e r i n g
23
d i s t r i c t s  o f  I n d i a  a n d  t o  S i k k i m .  T h i s  s o m e w h a t  e a s e d  t h e  p r e s s u r e  o n  
l a n d  i n  t h e  h i l l s  o f  N e p a l  w h e r e  a r a b l e  l a n d  w a s  l i m i t e d *  T h e  e c o n o m y  o f  
t h e  T e r a i  w a s  c l o s e l y  i n t e r t w i n e d  w i t h  t h a t  o f  N o r t h e r n  I n d i a ?  a n d  t h e  
I n d i a n  r u p e e  w a s  t h e  s t a n d a r d  m e d iu m  o f  e x c h a n g e  i n  t h e  N e p a l e s e  T e r a i *
B u t  t h e n ,  i t  w a s  o n l y  i n  t h e  b o r d e r  r e g i o n s  o f  N e p a l  w h e r e  c o n ­
t a c t  w i t h  t h e  B r i t i s h  t e r r i t o r y  l e d  t o  s o m e  e c o n o m i c  g r o w t h ;  w h e r e  s u c h  
c o n t a c t  w a s  l a c k i n g  s u c h  g r o w t h  w a s  a b s e n t *  T h e  i n t e r i o r  o f  N e p a l ,  e x c e p t ^  
i n g  t h e  N e p a l  v a l l e y ,  h a d  n o  e f f e c t i v e  m e a n s  o f  c o m m u n i c a t i o n  a n d  t r a n s ­
p o r t , ;  t h e r e  w a s  n o  w h e e l e d  t r a f f i c .  T r a d e  w a s  r e s t r i c t e d  t o  n e a r b y  v i l l a ­
g e s  o r  a t  t h e  m o s t  t o  t h e  a d j a c e n t  v a l l e y s *  T h e  N e p a l e s e  g o v e r n m e n t  f o n d l y  
b e l i e v e d  t h a t  i n  t h e i r  c o u n t r y * s  i n a c e e s i b i l i t y  l a y  i t s  s e c u r i t y *  T h e  h i l l s  
w e r e  r e g a r d e d -  a s  f o r t s  a n d  wa  g o o d  r o a d  o v e r  t h e m  w o u l d  b e  • • •  a  s o u r c e  o f
a s  g r e a t  c o n c e r n  a s  a  b r e a c h  i n  h i s  w a l l s  t o  a  b e s i e g e d  g e n e r a l " ,  s o  o b s e r —
24
v e d  t h e  I n d i a n  F o r e i g n  D e p a r t m e n t *
T h e  s e c o n d  g e n e r a t i o n  o f  R a n a s  m a d e  s o m e  a t t e m p t s  t o  a d j u s t
t h e i r  t r a d i t i o n a l  p r e j u d i c e s  t o  t h e i r  e s s e n t i a l  p o l i t i c a l  a n d  e c o n o m i c
22* PSLI, Vol*104, Reg*No*693, Annual Rept.on Nepal, 1897-8*
23* T h e  n u m b e r ’ o f  N e p a l e s e  i m m i g r a n t s  t o  I n d i a  r e c o r d e d  i n  1931 w a s
3*27,028. C e n s u s  o f  I n d i a ,  V o l * I ,  Pt*I ,  p*76. S e e  a l s o  C h a p . V l i ,  p * 2 3 i f n * i f l .
2 M . See
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n e e d s *  T h e s e  R a n a s  w e r e  g e n e r a l l y  m o r e  e n l i g h t e n e d  t h a n  t h e i r  p r e d e c e -
2 5
s s o r s .  T h e y  w e r e  e d u c a t e d *  B o t h  B i r  a n d  K h a d g a  s h a m s h e r  w e n t  t o  E n g l i s h ;  
s c h o o l s  i n  I n d i a ;  C h a n d r a  s h a m s h e r  w a s  t h e  f i r s t  i n  t h e  R a n a  f a m i l y  t o  
o b t a i n  a  U n i v e r s i t y  d e g r e e .  T h e  S h a m s h e r  R a n a s  w e r e  i n t e r e s t e d  i n  t h e  
a m e n i t i e s  o f  t h e  m o d e r n  c i v i l i s a t i o n  a n d  w e r e  w i l l i n g  t o  o b t a i n  t h e m  w i t h  
B r i t i s h  a s s i s t a n c e .  I t  w a s  u n d e r  t h e s e  R a n a s  t h a t  a  r e g u l a r  a r r a n g e m e n t  
w i t h  t h e  B r i t i s h  w a s  m a d e  r e g a r d i n g  G u r k h a  r e c r u i t m e n t  w h i c h  p r o v i d e d  
t h e  m a r t i a l  p o p u l a t i o n  o f  N e p a l  w i t h  a n  a s s u r e d  m e a n s  o f  l i v e l i h o o d  f o r  
t h e m s e l v e s  a n d  t h e i r  f a m i l i e s .  I n  1 9 2 7 - 8 ,  w e  a r e  t o l d ,  t h e  I n d i a n  g o v e r n ­
m e n t  p a i d  a b o u t  t w e n t y  f i v e  l a k h s  o f  r u p e e s  a s  p e n s i o n  t o  r e i r e d  G u r k h a
26
s o l d i e r s  i n  N e p a l .
I n  C h a n d r a  S h a m s h e r * s  r u l e  t h e  N e p a l e s e  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  u n d e r ­
w e n t  s o m e  r e f o r m s  i n d i c a t i n g  t h a t  t h e  P r i m e  M i n i s t e r  w a s  i n f l u e n c e d  b y  
t h e  e x a m p l e s  o f  B r i t i s h  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  i n  I n d i a ,  t h o u g h  n o t  b y  i t s  u n d e r * -  
l y i n g  p r i n c i p l e s  s u c h  a s  t h e  p r o g r e s s i v e  d e v o l u t i o n  o f  g o v e r n m e n t a l  r e s ­
p o n s i b i l i t i e s  a n d  m a k i n g  t h e  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  m o r e  r e s p o n s i v e  t o  t h e  p u b l i c  
n e e d s  a n d  d e m a n d s .  C h a n d r a  S h a m s h e r  w a s  c a r e f u l  b e f o r e  y a k i n g  i n n o v a t i o n s ,  
f o r  f e a r  o f  o p p o s i t i o n  f r o m  t h e  p o w e r f u l  o b s c u r a n t i s t  e l e m e n t s  i n  t h e  
d a r b a r .  I n  s p i t e  o f  b e i n g  " v i r t u a l l y  a u t o c t a t i o " ,  C h a n d r a  S h a m s h e r ,  s o  
O ’ C o n n o r  o b s e r v e d ,  " w a s  t o o  w i s e  a  r u l e r  t o  s t r a i n  h i s  p o w e r s  u n d u l y  o r  
t o  r a i s e  u n n e c e s s a r y  d i f f i c u l t i e s  f o r  h i m s e l f " .  T h e r e f o r e ,  " a l t h o u g h  a t
2 5 .  K h a d g a  S h a m s h e r  p l o t t e d  a g a i n s t  B i r  S h a m s h e r ,  h i s  b r o t h e r ,  i n  1 6 6 7 , andl 
w a s  r e m o v e d  t o  F a p p a  i n  W e s t e r n  N e p a l ,  o f  w h i c h ,  a f t e r  b e i n g  p a r d o n e d ,  
h e  b e c a m e  t h e  g o v e r n o r .  L a t e r  h e  p l o t t e d  a g a i n s t  C h a n d r a  s h a m s h e r  a n d  
w a s  o b l i g e d  t o  e s c a p e  t o  I n d i a  w h e r e  h e  d i e d  i n  1 9 2 1 .  L a n d o n ,  I I ,  p p .ft , i°o .
2 6 .  H . W i l k i n s o n - G u i l l e m a w d ,  " N e p a l  a n d  h e r  r e l a t i o n s  t o  t h e  B r i t i s h  G o v e r n ­
m e n t " ,  T h e  A s i a t i c  R e v i e w ,  A p r i l  1 9 3 4 *  p . 2 1 4 *  The author was British 
Envo^ in Nepal between 1 9 2 4  and 1 9 3 1 *
24. F.P-A, December 1881, No.58, Dept.Notes.
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a pinch he can and does override”these elements, "he naturally seeks the
27
line of least resistance"• Besides, his desire to modernise Nepal was 
balanced by his apprehension that modern ideas which would follow as an 
inevitable consequence might be detrimental to his autoctatia rule * In 
fact, the nature of the Rana government-centralised and military-remained 
unchanged during Chandra Shamsher*s rule* There was no attempt at libera­
lising the regime or broadening its power base* Not any spitit of public 
weal, duty or responsibility but administrative convenience dictated 
Chandra shamsher*s reforms* The efficiency of the administration was the 
object and the tendency was towards some extension of the governmental 
functions*
The departments of the state were reorganised, giving the officers 
security of tenure and thus providing them with an incentive for efficien­
cy* The police system and the jails were reformed and some modern prac­
tices introduced* A criminal investigation department was set up; a few 
officers were sent to the Indian Police Training College at Patna* in the 
jails provisions were made for the registration of finger prints and tea­
ching the prisoners a variety of crafts* The remission of a part of the
sentences for good conduct and grant of a small sum. to the discharged men
2 8
were some other new measures* Changes were made in the Army department,
too* A set of drill books modelled on similar books in the Indian army
29
was compiled in the Parbatiya language as a measure of coordinating the
2 7 * PEF, V o l * 9 1 »  1 9 1 2 ,  File N o » 2 5 1 6 ,  Q « C o n n o r  t o  G o v t * ,  8  June 1 9 2 3 *
2 8 *  Landon, op*oit*, pp*158» 1 9 4 - 5 *  F F f  1 9 2 1 ,  Yol*7* File N o . 8 1 4 9 »  Annual 
Report on Nepal, 1 9 1 9 - 2 0 *
2 9 *  The language of the people in the Nepalese hill districts, such as 
the Magats and Qurungs*
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training of the troops. Examinations were introduced for the selection 
and promotion of officers, but. the higher ranks of the army continued 
to be the exclusive preserves of the Hanas and their close kind; the 
Nepalese army continued to have generals in their teens, brigadiers, 
babes in arms, and colonels in/sucking stage of infancy. The army commi­
ssariat, transport, ammunition, store and other departments were also 
improved. A new service code replaced the old military law of the land.
The pay scale of the troops was increased, and the system, of payment in
3 0
cash, instead of in land, gradually adopted.
Large scale economic development was neither Chandra sham­
sher fs object nor was it possible. The construction of the means of 
communication and transport in an extremely hilly terrain with numerous 
rivers and streams was an enormously expensive undertaking for a state
3 1
with an annual revenue of only fifteen million rupees. Taxation was
an unpopular measure; it would hit the poorer section hardest, because
the vested interests of the nobility, both lay and ecclesiastical, main-
3 2
ly in the form of free-holds, could not be pouched* Technical skill was
lacking too, while political reasons wouM prevent too much dependence
on British skill for the economic debelopment of the state. The main-
3 3
tenance of a p large standing army-44 %000 strong-took too great a share 
of the state revenue to permit undertaking more than a few public utility 
services. Besides, the Ranas believed that high economic standards and 
3 0 .  Landon, op.cit., pp.1 8 6 - 9 0 .
3 1  • W.B.Northey and C.J.Morris, The Gurkhas, pp.8 2 - 3 *
3 2 .  Called Birta. M.P.Regmi, Land Tenures in Nepal, I, pp.2 5 - 7 *
3 3 *  C.Bruce, Foreward to Morris and Northey, op.cit., pp.xxvi, 86..
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abject subservience to authority had an inberse relationship.
The construction of a light railway from Raxaul to Amlekhganj 
in the foothills of the Terai-a distance of twenty nine miles-was the 
most: important communication project in Chandra Shamsher's rule. The 
road from Raxaul to Bhimphedi (51-J- miles) was made motorahle with the 
assistance of Indian engineers. Prom Bhimphedi to Kathmandu ( 1 4  miles) 
an aerial ropeway was constructed in 1925 for the conveyance of goods, 
but for three years it-was only "partially in action". The materials 
were supplied by an English firm and an English engineer' was in charge 
of the project. The cartroad between Thankot and Kathmandu ( 7  miles) 
was metalled. A number of bridges were built. An electric supply insta­
llation was set up near Kathmandu under the direction of an English
engineer. A telephone line was opened in 1 9 1 5  between Kathmandu and
3 4
Birganj ( 7 4  miles). An internal postal service existed since 1 8 7 5 *  hut 
for communication with India and other countries, the Residency post 
office was used. The exploitation of Nepal*s natural resources was ano­
ther scheme in which the British government's help was obtained. Geolo­
gical exploration was put in charge ot an Indian mineralogist. A depart­
ment of Forestry was created, and the services of the Indian Forest Depart­
ment were requisitioned by Chandra Shamsher for profitable utilisation 
of Nepal's vast forest wealth. In the river irrigation projects in the
35
Terai the British and Indian engineers were engaged as consultants.
Certain other economic reforms were put through. The register
of land ownership was regularised; a standard unit for revenue assessment
34l PF, 1 9 2 2 ,  Vol.9 *  File No> 3 1 6 0 ,  Annual Report on Nepal, 1 9 2 1 - 2 .
Morris and Northey, op.cit.,p.1 4 3 *  Landon, op.cit., p p . l 9 7 “ 2 0 4 *
Regmi, op.cit., (Second ed*. 1 9 5 ® ) *  P * 1 3 3 *
3 5 *  Landon, op.cit., pp.2 0 4 - 5 *  Annual Report on Nepal, 1 9 2 1 * 2 .  Tek Baha­
dur Khattri, Nepal s A glimpse, p.4 4 *  P F ,  1 9 1 5 *  Vol.ll, File No.
3 5 9 6 ,  Annual Report on Nepal, 1 9 1 4 - 5 *
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was created to avoid the complications of many different measurements 
of area according to the quality of the land* Corvee was abolished; the 
ryots of the Birta lands could no longer be evicted at will by the Birta 
holders* Octroi duties were abolished on goods entering the Nepalese 
valley* Tolls were made uniform; local duties levied on goods in trans­
port between the hill districts were also done away with* Customs duty 
on exports and imports was regularised and made uniform throughout the 
border* in 1923 the first Nepalese joint stock company was formed with
a Board of Directors* Kathmandu had a tannery, an electroplating and
36
polishing plant and aerated water manufacturing unit*
The Rana government had a very limited programme of public 
health, sanitation and hygiene, and in this som9 influence of the Bri­
tish government was noticeable* The British Residency dispensary ever 
since its establishment in 1$16 was a popular institution which the 
Rana government subsidised* The Ranas often availed themselves of the
services of the Residency surgeons* Drs.H.Oldfield and Daniel Wright
37
were given ^200 rupees as monthly allowance by Jang Bahadur* Chandra
Shamsher and his sons went, to Calcutta for medical treatment and brought
38
specialists from London, if necessary* At first the Ranas were apathetic
to the making of essential sanitary arrangements , and the Residency
surgeons faced great difficulties in checking the spread of epidemics*
For instance, in 1886, Dr.Gimlette reported the "disgustingly insanitary
condition of Kathmandu and other towns" in the valley, regretting that
3<n Annual Report on Nepal, 1920-1, op*cit* S.C.Das Gupta, "Modern 
Nepal”, The Modern Review, August 19251 pp*198-206* PEF, Vol*35» 
1908, File No*1939/1908. Landon, op.cit*, pp.205-7•
37 • Commandari Kitab Khana, Nizamati Phant, Registers forAl919 and 1932 
(1862 and 1875)* Oldfield, Sketches from Nipal, I, pp*24^ -50» 252-5* 
38. PEF, Vol.91, 1912, Pt.2, File Nos.24b2*25b)» Envoy to Govt*, 23 April 
T921. Landon, op.cit*, pp.301-05*
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" n o  e f f o r t s  t o  r e m e d y  i t  a r e  i n  t h e  l e a s t  l i k e l y  t o  h e  m a d e  b y  t h e
d a r h a r ” .  " T h e  f o u n d a t i o n s  o f  t h e  c i t y " ,  h e  a d d e d ,  w e r e  " s a t u r a t e d  w i t h
f i l t h  a n d  t h e  a i r  i s  t h i c k  w i t h  s t e n c h e s "  •  A  s e v e r e  c h o l e r a  b r o k e  o u t
i n  t h e  s u m m e r  o f  1 8 3 3  w h e n  t h e  m o r t a l i t y  r a t e  w a s  a s  h i g h  a s  s i x t y  t o
seventy a day# The darbar not only made no arrangements to fight the
e p i d e m i c  b u t  e v e n  r e f u s e d  t o  a s s i s t  D r . G i m l e t t e  i n  g e t t i n g  t e m p o r a r y
a c c o m m o d a t i o n  f o r  t h e  p a t i e n t s #  T h e  m a t t e r  h a v i n g  b e e n  r e p o r t e d  t o  t h e
G o v e r n m e n t ,  t h e  R e s i d e n t  w a s  a s k e d  t o  d r a w  t h e  a t t e n t i o n  o f  t h e  M i n i s t e r
39
t o  t h e  n e e d  f o r  s a n i t a r y  a r r a n g e m e n t s  A t  K a t h m a n d u #  T h e  R e s i d e n c y  
s u r g e o n s  i n t r o d u c e d  v a c c i n a t i o n  a n d  i n o c c u l a t i o n ,  a n d  t h a t  n o t  w i t h ­
o u t  s o m e  i n i t i a l  d i f f i c u l t y #  T h e  v a c c i n a t i o n  o f  t h e  K i n g  o f  N e p a l  i n  
1 8 9 4 *  w r i t e s  D r # A r m s t r o n g ,  w a s  " a n  i m p o r t a n t  l o c a l  e v e n t * 1 •  B r a h m i n s  
w e r e  c o n s u l t e d  a n d ,  a s  c o u l d  b e  e x p e c t e d ,  t h e y  w e r e  d i v i d e d  i n  t h e i r  
o p i n i o n s ; A r m s t r o n g  h a d  t o  w a i t ;  f o r  a n  a u s p i c i o u s  m o m e n t ;  i n  s h o r t ,  
t h e  w h o l e  a f f a i r  w a s  " a  r e g u l a r  s t a t e  p e r f o r m a n c e " #  T h e  G o v e r n m e n t  
l o o k e d  u p o n  t h e  i n c i d e n t  a s  h a v i n g  b o t h  " a  p o l i t i c a l  a n d  a  m e d i c a l
a s p e c t " ,  a n d  e n c o u r a g e d  A r m s t r o n g  i n  " o b t a i n i n g  a  f o o t i n g  i n  t h e  m e d i -
4 0
c a l  p r a c t i c e  o f  t h e  d a r b a r " #  B i r  S h a m s h e r  s t a r t e d  a  s y s t e m  o f  d r a i n ­
a g e  a n d  c o n s e r v a n c y  f o r  K a t h m a n d u ,  u n d e r  t h e  s u p e r i n t e n d e n c e  o f  a  B e n g a l i
4 1
e n g i n e e r ;  i n  1 8 9 9  K a t h m a n d u ,  h a d  s e w e r s #  B i r  s h a m s h e r  e s t a b l i s h e d  t h e
f i r s t  m o d e r n  p u b l i c  h o s p i t a l  a t  K a t h m a n d u  i n  1 8 9 0  b u t  p u l l e d  i t  d o w n
4 2
n i n e  y e a r s  l a t e r  t o  m a k e  a  p a l a c e  f o r  h i m s e l f  o n  t h a t  s i t e #  D u r i n g  
C h a n d r a  s h a m s h e r « s  r u l e  t h e r e  w e r e  e i g h t e e n  h o s p i t a l s  a n d  f o u r t e e n
3 9 *  I F P ,  Vol# 2 7 8 3 ,  F e b r u a r y  1 8 8 6 ,  Nos# 1 0 3 - 1 2 #
4 0 .  Ibid., Vol.4 8 1 5 ,  January 1 8 9 5 *  Nos.9 0 - 9 2 .
4 1 .  P S L I ,  V o l . 1 1 5 ,  R e g # N o . 7 3 3 *  A n n u a l  R e p o r t  o n  N e p a l ,  1 8 9 8 - 9 #
4 2 #  I b i d .
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c h a r i t a b l e  d i s p e n s a r i e s  i n  t h e  k i n g d o m *  T h e r e  w a s  o n e  f e m a l e  h o s p i t a l
4 3
i n  t h e  c a p i t a l ,  a  b a c t e r i o l o g i c a l  l a b o r a t o r y  a n d  a n  X - r a y  u n i t *  H o s p i t a l s
4 4
w e r e  s t a f f e d  b y  d o c t o r s  a n d  n u r s e s  f r o m  B e n g a l  a n d  l a t e r  b y  N e p a l e s e
d o c t o r s  w h o  r e c e i v e d  t h e i r  t r a i n i n g  i n  I n d i a n  m e d i c a l  c o l l e g e s *  V a c c i n a -
l 4 5
t i o n  w a s  n o t  compiujsory, b a t .  w a s  a v a i l a b l e  f r e e .  For t h e  s u p p l y  o f  p i p e
w a t e r ,  a n  E n g l i s h  e n g i n e e r  w a s  e m p l o y e d  w h o  c o n s t r u c t e d  N e p a l f s  f i r s t
w a t e r  works a t  K a t h m a n d u  in 1892* L a t e r  u n d e r  D e b  a n d  C h a n d r a  s h a m s h e r
w a t e r  w o r k s  w e r e  s e t  u p  a t  P a  t a n ,  B h a t g & o n ,  B i c h i a k o h ,  B h i m p h e d i ,  p o k h r a ,
D h a n k u t a  a n d  B i r g a n j *  T w o  N e p a l e s e  e n g i n e e r s ,  e d u c a t e d  a t  R u r k i ,  w e r e  i n
c h a r g e  o f  t h e s e  w o r k s *  K a t h m a n d u  h a d  a  m u n i c i p a l i t y  a s  w e l l ,  h a v i n g  b o t h
o f f i c i a l  a n d  n o n - o f f i c i a l  m e m b e r s ;  t h e  c h a i r m a n  w a s  K a i s e r  S h a m s h e r ,
4 6
Chandra Shamsher *s third son*
I t  w a s  i n  N e p a l * s  s o c i a l  l i f e  t h a t  t h e  i n f l u e n c e  o f  t h e  
B r i t i s h  w a s  l e a s t .  T h e r e  w a s  h a r d l y  a n y  s c o p e  f o r  i t .  T h e  r u l e r s  o f  N e p a l  
b e i n g  H i n d u s ,  m a d e  H i n d u i s m  t h e  s t a t e  r e l i g i o n *  i n  c o u r s e  o f  t i m e  t h e  
H i n d u  s o c i a l  p r a c t i c e s ,  i n  v a r y i n g  d e g r e e s  o f  r i g i d i t y ,  t o o k  r o o t  i n  t h e  
l a n d *  T h e  s t a t e  n o t  o n l y  u p h e l d  t h e  H i n d u  s o c i a l  s y s t e m  b u t  r i g i d l y  e n ­
f o r c e d  i t s  p r o v i s i o h s - t h e  d i v i s i o n s  a n d  r e s t r i c t i o n s  o f  c a s t e ,  t h e  a c c e p t ­
a n c e  o f  t h e  s u p r e m a c y  o f  t h e  B r a h m i n s  i n  t h e  s o c i a l  h i e a r a r o h y ,  t h e  e x c l u ­
s i o n  o f  C h r i s t i a n  i n f l u e n c e s *  T h e  N e p a l e s e  l a w s  h a d  c o d i f i e d  c a s t e  r u l e s  
a n d  s h a s t r i c  i n j u n c t i o n s ,  v i o l a t i o n s  o f  w h i c h  r e s u l t e d  i n  s o c i a l  d e g r a d a ­
t i o n ,  w h i c h  w a s  o n e  o f  t h e  f i v e  s e v e r e  p u n i s h m e n t s ,  t h e  o t h e r s  b e i n g  t h e  
c o n f i s c a t i o n  o f  p r o p e r t y ,  b a n i s h m e n t ,  m u t i l a t i o n  a n d  d e a t h *  T h e  t a k i n g  o f  
p r o h i b i t e d  f o o d  a n d  d r i n k  w a s  g e n e r a l l y  p u n i s h e d  b y  s o c i a l  d e g r a d a t i o n *
4 3 l  D a s  G u p t a ,  o p * c i t * , p * 2 0 4 *
44* J.M.Das, Banger Bahire Bangali, Uttar Bharat, pp*550-52.
/Sc> 43• A.P*, I9Q&T"nr^ fferS * East India (Progress and Condition), p. 181*
KJ 46. Das Gupta, op.cit*, pp.204-5*
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C a s e s  o r  e x c o m m u n i c a t i o n  w e r e  d e c i d e d  b y  t h e  l a w  c o u r t s ,  a n d  t h e  p r i m e
M i n i s t e r  w a s  t h e  f i n a l  c o u r t ,  o f  a p p e a l *  C o n v e r s i o n  w a s  a  p u n i s h a b l e
47
o f f e n c e ,  a n d  C h r i s t i a n  m i s s i o n a r i e s  w e r e  b a r r e d  f r o m  t h e  c o u n t r y *  E v e n  
H i n d u  r e f o r m i s t  a c t i v i t i e s  w e r e  d i s c o u r a g e d *  I n  1909* f o r  e x a m p l e ,  o n e  
M a d h a b r a j  J o s h i  w a s  p u b l i c l y  l a s h e d  a n d  e x i l e d  f o r  h i s  b e i n g  a  f o l l o w e r  
o f  S w a m i  D a y a n a n d ,  t h e  f o u n d e r  o f  t h e  A r y a  S a m a j  m o v e m e n t  i n  I n d i a *  
A n o t h e r ,  K a r t i c k  P r a s a d ,  a n  I n d i a n  d o c t o r ,  w a s  d i s m i s s e d  f r o m  t h e  N e p a l ­
e s e  g o v e r n m e n t ,  s e r v i c e  f o r  h i s  l i n k s  w i t h  B h a i  P a r a m a n a n d  a n d  t h e  A r y a  
S a m a j i s t s  w h o s e  e g a l i t a r i a n  a n d  a n t i - c l e r i c a l  i d e a s  w e r e  a n a t h e m a  t o  
t h e  p r i e s t l y  c o m m u n i t y ,  i n  t h e  1920 * s  M a d h a b r t a j f s  s o n s  w h o  w e r e  e d u c a t e d
i n  t h e  A r y a  S a m a j  s c h o o l s  i n  I n d i a  r e t u r n e d  t o  N e p a l ,  b u t .  w e r e  s o o n  
48
e x p e l l e d  a g a i n *  I n t i m a t e  c o n t a c t  w i t h  t h e  B r i t i s h  w a s  d i s l i k e d  b e c a u s e  
i t  w o u l d  b r i n g  s o c i a l  a n d  c u l t u r a l  i n f l u e n c e s  w h i c h  m i g h t  u n d e r m i n e  t h e  
i n t e r e s t s  o f  t h e  d o m i n a n t  c l a s s e s ,  c h i e f l y  t h e  B r a h m i n s .
T h e r e  w a s  n o  E u r o p e a n  c o m m u n i t y  i n  N e p a l ,  e x c e p t  t h e
49
R e s i d e n t  a n d  h i s  s t a f f *  V i s i t s  o f  E u r o p e a n s  t o  N e p a l  w e r e  f e w *  N o t  o n l y
47* I n  1913 o n e  o f  t h e  l e a d i n g  m i s s i o n a r i e s  i n  K a l i m p o n g  a t t e m p t e d  t o  
s e t t l e  w i t h  h i s  f a m i l y  i n  N e p a l  f o r  d o i n g  m i s s i o n a r y  w o r k  t h e r e *  H e  
w a s  s u m m o n e d  b y  t h e  P r i m e  M i n i s t e r ,  g i v e n  s o m e  p r e s e n t s  a n d  a s k e d  
t o  l e a v e  N e p a l  f o r t h w i t h *  C h a n d r a  S h a m s h e r  d i d  n o t  a l l o w  t h e  s a l e  o f  
C h r i s t i a n  g o s p e l s  i n  N e p a l ,  b u t  p e r m i t t e d  t h e i r  t a k i n g  f o r  p r i v a t e  
u s e *  S e v e r a l  m i s s i o n a r y  o r g a n i s a t i o n s  w e r e  a c t i v e  o n  t h e  b o r d e r i n g  
d i s t r i c t s  o f  B i h a r  a n d  U t t a r .  P r a d e s h  a s  w e l l  a s  a m o n g  t h e  N e p a l e s e  
t e a  g a r d e n  w o r k e r s  a t  D a r j i l i n g  a n d  K a l i m p o n g *
T h e  e a r l i e s t  C h r i s t i a n s  t o  g o  t o  N e p a l  w e r e  t h e  J e s u i t s  
a n d  t h e  C a p u c h i n s  w h o  e s t a b l i s h e d  t h e i r  m i s s i o n  a t  p a t a n  i n  t h e  
N e p a l  v a l l e y  i n  1 7 1 5  •  ^ J e s u i t s  J o a o  C a b r a l  a n d  G r e u b e r  o n  t h e i r  w a y  
f r o m  T i b e t  t o  I n d i a  t o o k  t h e  K u t i - K a t h m a n d u  r o u t e  i n  1628 a n d  1662* 
S o  d i d j C a p u c h i n  I p p o l i t o  D e s i d e r i  i n  1721* T h e  C a p u c h i n s  w e r e  e x p e l l  
e d  b y  P r i t h v i n a r a y a n  i n  1769* T h e  s e r a m p u r  m i s s i o n a r i e s  w e r e  t h e  
f i r s t  t o  t r a n s l a t e  t h e  N e w  T e s t a m e n t  i n t o  N e p a l i  i n  1821. A . M c l e i s h ,  
T h e  F r o n t i e r  P e o p l e s  o f  I n d i a ,  A  m i s s i o n a r y  s u r v e y ,  p p .  126-8, 182-3# 
F . D e  F i l t y p i ,  e d # ,  A n  A c c o u n t  o f  T i b e t ,  p p .22-3, 30, 130-1, 316, 36O- 
61, 384, 428. C . W e s s e l s ,  E a r l y  J e s u i t  T r a v e l l e r s  i n  C e n t r a l  A s i a ,  1 
1603-1721, pp*157, 192-7# L a n d o n ,  o p . c i t * ,  p p .231-3, 235-8.
48. B a l c h a n d r a  S h a r m a ,  N e p a l k o  A i t i h a s i k  R u p r e k h a ,  p .388#
49* B e t w e e n  1881 a n d  1925 a b o u t  153 E u r o p e a n s  v i s i t e d  N e p a l .  L a n d o n , T O P #  
298-305.
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w a s  t h e  B r i t i s h  c o n t a c t  l i m i t e d  t o  t h e  R a n a  f a m i l y  a l o n e ,  b u t  e v e n  t h i s  
c o n t a c t  t h e  P r i m e  M i n i s t e r s  d i d  n o t  a l l o w  t o  r a m i f y  b e y o n d  t h e m s e l v e s  
a n d  t h o s e  o n  w h o m  th e y  c o u l d  s a f e l y  r e l y *  N o n e  c o u l d  s e e  t h e  R e s i d e n t  w i t h ­
o u t  t h e  k n o w l e d g e  a n d  e x p r e s s  a u t h o r i t y  o f  t h e  P r i m e  M i n i s t e r - n o t  e v e n  
h i s  b r o t h e r s  a n d  s o n s *
T h e  R a n a s  w e r e  a q q u a i n t e d  w i t h  w e s t e r n  l i f e  b u t  t h e m s e l v e s  d i d  
n o t  l e a d  s u c h  a  l i f e *  T h e y  w e r e  i n  n o  s e n s e  a  w e s t e r n i s e d  c o m m u n i t y  e a g e r  
t o  i n f u s e  t h e  s o c i a l  a n d  o t h e r  i d e a s  o f  t h e  w e s t  i n t o  N e p a l *  T h e y  w e r e  
o r t h o d o x  H i n d u s ,  o b s e r v i n g  t h e  c a s t e  r u l e s  r i g i d l y ,  m a k i n g  l i b e r a l  e n ­
d o w m e n t s  t o  t e m p l e s  a n d  g o i n g  o n  p i l g r i m a g e s  t o  s h r i n e s  i n  I n d i a *  T h e y  
p r o t e c t e d  a n d  p r o m o t e d  t h e  s o c i a l  a n d  e c o n o m i c  p r i v i l e g e s  o f  t h e  p r i e s t l y  
c o m m u n i t y *  T h e  B r a h m i n s ,  w h a t e v e r  t h e i r  c r i m e ,  w e r e  im m u n e  f r o m  c a p i t a l  
p u n i s h m e n t .  I n  t h e  N e p a l e s e  s t a t e  c o u n c i l  ( B h a r a d a r i  S a b h a )  t h e  R a j  g u r u ,  
o r  t h e  C h i e f  P r i e s t ,  h e l d  g r e a t  i n f l u e n c e *  H e  a d v i s e d  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t  o n  
s o c i a l  a n d  r e l i g i o u s  m a t t e r s  a n d  p r e s c r i b e d  t h e  f i t t i n g  p e n a n c e  a n d  p u r i ­
f i c a t o r y  r i t e s  f o r  t h e  v i o l a t i o n  o f  t h e  c e r e m o n i a l  l a w  o f  p u r i t y .
T e m p o r a l  a u t h o r i t y  b e i n g  u n d e r  s a c e r d o t a l  i n f l u e n c e ,  i t  w a s  h a r d  
f o r  t h e  R a n a  r u l e r s ,  e v e n  i f  t h e y  w a n t e d ,  t o  d e p a r t  f r o m  t h e  e s t a b l i s h e d  
s o c i a l  c u s t o m s  a n d  p r a c t i c e s ;  i t  w a s  h a r d e r  t o  m a k e  s o c i a l  c h a n g e s .  J a n g  
B a h a d u r ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  w a s  b o l d  e n o u g h  t o  c r o s s  t h e  s e a  a n d  t e  g o  t o  
E u r o p e ,  b u t  o n  t h e  s h i p  a n d  i n  f o r e i g n  l a n d s  h e  a n d  a l l  w h o  w e n t  w i t h  
h i m  s t r i c t l y  o b s e r v e d  t h e i r  c a s t e  r u l e s  i n  m a t t e r s  o f  f o o d  a n d  o t h e r  
s o c i a l  h a b i t s .  B e f o r e  r e t u r n i n g  h o m e  h e  u n d e r w e n t  a  p u r i f i c a t i o n  c e r e m o n y  
a t  t h e  t e m p l e  o f  R a m e s h a w a r a m  i n  M a & r a s  a n d  m a d e  l a r g e  g i f t s  t o  t h e  t e m p l e s
49A
a t  P u r i  a n d  M a d u r a  t o  e x p i a t e  h i s  s i n .  S o  d i d  C h a n d r a  S h a m s h e r  w h o  w e n t
to Europe fifty eight years later. Regarding food and housing arrangements 
49A-P«J#h.Rana, Life of Jang Bahadur, pp*121-5, 128, 148-9, 153#
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t h e  B r i t i s h :  g o v e r n m e n t  f o u n d  h i m  a s  f a s t i d i o u d  a s  h i s  g r a n d  u n c l e  h a d  
b e e n  a n d ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  a s  i n c o n v e n i e n t *  V . G a b r i e l ,  t h e  P o l i t i c a l  O f f i c e r  
a t t a c h e d  t o  C h a n d i a  S h a m s h e r ^  p a r t y ,  f o u n d  t h e  J o u r n e y  Ma  v e r y  q u a i n t  
p r o c e e d i n g ” .  T h e  N e p a l e s e  w o u l d  n o t  t a k e  m e a l s  o n  t h e  t r a i n s  a n d  i n s i s ­
t e d  o n  s t o p p i n g  t h e m  a t  f r e q u e n t  i n t e r v a l s  s o  t h a t  t h e y  c o u l d  t a  g e t  
d o w n ,  p i t c h ,  t e n t s  b e s i d e  t h e  r a i l w a y  t r a c k ,  c o o k  a n d  e a t *  T h e  a u t h o r i ­
t i e s  i n  F r a n c e ,  S w i t z e r l a n d  a n d  I t a l y  w e r e  n a t u r a l l y  “ m u c h  m y s t i f i e d ”
b y  t h e i r  N e p a l e s e  g u e s t s  t a k i n g  ” e l a b o r a t e  p r e c a u t i o n s ”  a g a i n s t  c o n t a c t
50
w i t h  E u r o p e a n  f o o d *  P e r c e v a l  L a n d o n  i n  h i s  a d u l a t o r y  b i o g r a p h y  o f  
C h a n d r a  S h a m s h e r  o b s e r v e s  t h a t  t h e  P r i m e  M i n i s t e r  w a s  a  " H i n d u  o f  t h e  
s t r i c t e s t  s e c t ,  n o t  o n l y  b y  b l o o d ,  b u t  b y  i n s t i n c t ,  t r a i n i n g  a n d  e x p e r i -
5 1
e n o e *
T h e  o b j e c t i o n  o f  t h e  N e p a l e s e  d a r b a r  t o  t h e  G u r k h a  t r o o p s  b e i n g  
s e n t  f o r  o v e r s e a s  s e r v i c e  w a s  a n o t h e r  e x a m p l e  o f  t h e  r i g i d  s o c i a l  c u s ­
t o m  i n  N e p a l ;  i t  p o s e d  a n  a n n o y i n g  p r o b l e m  f o r  t h e  B r i t i s h  g o v e r n m e n t .
T h e  i s s u e  f i r s t  c a m e  u p  w h e n  t h e  4 t h  G u t k h a s  r e t u r n e d  f r o m  C h i n a  a f t e r  
t h e  B o x e r  r e b e l l i o n .  C h a n d r a  S h a m s h e r  h a d  t o  p l e a d  h a r d  b e f o r e  t h e  
B h a r a d a r s  d e c i d e d  n o t  t o  e x c o m m u n i c a t e  t h e  G u r k h a s *  T h e  P r i m e  M i n i s t e r  
q u o t e d  t h e  S h a s t r a s  t o  p r o v e  t h a t  s e a  v o y a g e  w a s  n o t  u n k n o w n  t o  t h e  
a n c i e n t  H i n d u s ,  a n d  t h e r e f o r e  i t  c o u l d  n o t  h a v e  b e e n  a  t a f c o o .  H e  u r g e d  
t h e  B h a r a d a r s  t o  t a k e  a  l i b e r a l  v i e w  o f  t h e  m a t t e r  a n d  t o  i n t e r p r e t  t h e
r e l i g i o n  ” i n  t r u e  s p i r i t  t a k i n g  i n t o  a c c o u n t  a l l  t h e  c h a n g i n g  c i r c u m s t a n -
5 2
c e s  o f  t h e  t i m e s . ”  O t h e r w i s e ,  h e  p o i n t e d  o u t ,  t h e  G u r k h a s  w o u l d  n o t  s e r v e
5 0 .  G a b r i e l  t o  C u r z o n ,  2 5  M a y  1 9 0 9 *  C R P ,  V o l . 4 2 8 .
5 1 .  L a n d o n ,  o p . c i t . » p . 1 8 2 .
5 2 .  C h a n d r a  S h a m s h e r * s  a d d r e s s ,  s e n t  b y  M a n n e r s  S m i t h  t o  L . D a n e ,  F o r e i g n  
S e c y . ,  9  M a y  1 9 0 6 .  F J O . ,  7 6 6 / 1 1 .
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i n  t h e  I n d i a n  a r m y  a n d  N e p a l  w o u l d ,  i n  c o n s e q u e n c e ,  l o s e  o n e  o f  t h e
m a i n  p r o p s  o f  h e r  e c o n o m y *  T h e  q u e s t i o n  w a s  a g a i n  r a i s e d  i n  1 9 1 1 - 2
5 3
w h e n  t w o  G u r k h a s , w h o  w e n t  t o  E n g l a n d  a s  o r d e r l i e s  o f  K i n g  G e o r g e  V  
d u r i n g  h i s  c o r o n a t i o n , w e r e  p r o m p t l y  o s t r a c i s e d *  C h a n d r a  S h a m s h e r  f r a n k ­
l y  t o l d  M a n n e r s  S m i t h  t h a t  h i s  p e r s o n a l  s y m p a t h y  f o r  t h e  t w o  m e n  a l o n e  
w a s  n o t  e n o u g h ;  h i s  h a n d s  h a d  t o  h e  s t r e n g t h e n e d  h y  t h e  m o r a l  s u p p o r t
■I
o f  t h e  B r i t i s h  g o v e r n m e n t  t o  o v e r c o m e  t h e  " s t r o n g  a n d  s t u b b o r n  o p p o s i ­
t i o n  o f  t h e  d e e p - s e a t e d  c o n s e r v a t i s m  p r e v a l e n t  i n  t h e  c o u n t r y  i n  m a t t e r s
5 4
o f  c a s t e  a n d  r e l i g i o n * "  I t  w a s  o n l y  w h e n  G e o fe e  V  p e r s o n a l l y  i n t e r v e n e d
a
a n d  t h e  I n d i a n  g o v e r n m e n t  p r e s s e d  C h a n d r a  S h a m s h e r  t h a t  t h e  B h a r a d a r s
5 5
r e v o k e d  t h e i r  d e o i s i o n ,  r e a d m i t t i n g  t h e  t w o  G u r k h a s  i n t o  c a s t e *  B u t  
w h e n  C h a n d r a  S h a m s h e r  p r o p o s e d ,  a t  t h e  s u g g e s t i o n  o f  t h e  R e s i d e n t ,  t h a t  
a  g e n e r a l  a r r a n g e m e n t  b e  m a d e ,  g u a r a n t e e i n g  t h a t  G u r k h a s  w h o  w e n t  o v e r ­
s e a s  f o r  s e r v i c e  w o u ld L  n o t  l o s e  c a s t e ,  s t r o n g  p r o t e s t s  w e r e  v o i c e d  f r o m
56
" a l m o s t  e v e r y  q u a t t e r ?  C h a n d r a  S h a m s h e r  p l e a d e d  h e l p l e s s n e s s ,  a d m i t t i n g  
t o  M a n n e r s  S m i t h
" t h a t  i n  m a t t e r s  l i k e  t h e s e  w h a t e v e r  m y  p e r s o n a l  
v i e w s  m a y  b e  I  m u s t  c o n f o r m ,  t o  t h e  o p i n i o n  o f  
t h e  p r i e s t h o o d  a n d  t h e  p e o p l e * "
I t  w a s  a  q u e s t i o n  o f  " v e r y  g r e a t  i m p o r t a n c e " ,  h e  a d d e d ,  b e c a u s e  o f  i t s
" i n t i m a t e  b e a r i n g  u p o n  t h e  v i t a l  r e l i g i o u s  a n d  s o c i a l  c u s t o m s  a n d  b e l i e -
5 7
f s  o f  t h e  c o u n t r y "  •  T h e  p r o b l e m  w a s  f a r  g r e a t e r  w h e n  d u r i n g  t h e  W o r l d  
W a r  h u n d r e d s  o f  G u r k h a s  h a d  t o  g o  o v e r s e a s .  A f t e r  a  g o o d  d e a l  o f  p e r s u a ­
s i o n  b y  t h e  P r i m e  M i n i s t e r  t h e  B h a r a d a r s  a g r e e d  t o  r e a d m i t  t h e  G u r k h a s
5 3 *  O n e  o f  t h e m ,  S h e r  S i n g h  R a n a ,  k e p t  a  d i a r y  o f  t h e  j o u r n e y  a n d  p u b l i ­
s h e d  i t .  R a j t i l a k  Y a t r a ( B e n a r e s *  1 9 1 3 )
5 4 *  C h a n d r a  T o  M a n n e r s  S m i t h ,  2 4  D e c e m b e r  1 9 1 3 *  F » 0 * , 7 6 6 / 1 1 *
5 5 *  I b i d . ,  C . W i g r a m ,  P r i v a t e  S e c y *  t o  K i n g  t o  M a n n e r s  S m i t h ,  6  J a n u a r y  1 9 1 4 *
5 6 *  I b i d . , C h a n d r a  t o  M a n n e r s  S m i t h ,  2 4  D e c e m b e r  1 9 1 3 *
5 7 *  I b i d * . C h a n d r a  t o  M a n n e r s  S m i t h ,  6  N o v e m b e r  1 9 1 3 *
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■ ^ j ^ v S t e c f  t h e y  u n d e r w e n t  p u r i f i c a t i o n  c e r e m o n y  a n d  r e c e i v e d  d i s p e n s a t i o n ,
called Panipatya; it was decided that Nepalese priests would go to India
58
t o  c o n d u c t  t h e  p u r i f i c a t i o n  c e r e m o n y *  I t  w a s  a l s o  r u l e d  t h a t  i n  f u t u r e  
G u r k h a s  c o u l d  g o  o v e r s e a s  f o r  " b o n a f i d e  a c t i v e  s e r v i c e "  o n l y ,  a n d  t h a t  
t h e y  m u s t  o b t a i n  a  c e r t i f i c a t e  f r o m ;  t h e  a p p r o p r i a t e  B r i t i s h  o f f i c e r s  
t h a t  t h e y  h a d  s t r i c t l y  o b s e r v e d  c a s t e  r u l e s  i n  f o r e i g n  l a n d s ;  a n d  t h i s  
a l o n e  w o u l d  e n t i t l e  t h e m  t o  P a n i p a t y a ,  f o r  w h i c h  s o m e  m o n e t a r y  p a y m e n t
5 9
h a d  t o  b e  m a d e  t o  p r i e s t s  c o n d u c t i n g  t h e  c e r e m o n y *  I n  1 9 1 9  t w o  G u r k h a s  
w h o  w e n t  t o  L o n d o n  t o  p a r t i c i p a t e  i n  t h e  v i c t o r y  c e l e b r a t i o n  w e r e  d e c l a ­
r e d  o u t c a s t s *  S i n c e  t h e y  w e r e  n o t  o n  a c t i v e  s e r v i c e ,  C h a n d r a  S h a m s h e r
refused to intercede on their behalf with the Bharadars, despite the
60
Indian government’s requests* The British government were always care­
ful that the religious and social susceptibilities of the Gurkhas were
61
n o t  r u f f l e d  i n  a n y  w a y *
I n  s u c h  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  t h e  B r i t i s h  c o u l d  h a r d l y  h a v e  a n y  
d e s i r e  o f  s e t t i n g  t h e  p a c e  o f  s o c i a l  r e f o r m s  i n  N e p a l *  B u t  w h e n e v e r  t h e  
R a n a s  t h e m s e l v e s  t o o k  s o m e  h e s i t a t i n g  s t e p s  t o w a r d s  s o c i a l  r e f o r m s ,  t h e  
B r i t i s h  g o v e r n m e n t  s u p p o r t e d  a n d  e n c o u r a g e d  t h e i r  m o v e s *  T h e  B r i t i s h  
t o o k  a  k e e n  i n t e r e s t  i n  t h e  m o r a l  a n d  m a t e r i a l  p r o g r e s s  o f  N e p a l ,  a l t h o ­
u g h  i t  w a s  n o t  u n d e r  B r i t i s h  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ;  a s  e a r l y  a s  1 8 8 9  t h e  H o m e
government had asked the Indian government to furnish an annual report on 
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such progrees* Relations with the British did give the Ranas a sort of
58* Chandra to O’Connor, March 1919* F.Q«, 7&>/ll»
5 9 *  Northey and Morris, op*oit*, pp* 1 0 5 - 4 *  £ ? *  1 9 1 5 $ Vol.ll, File No, 
3 5 9 ^ ,  Annual Report on Nepal, 1 9 1 4 - 5 *
6 0 *  O . C o n n o r  t o  C h a n d r a ,  1  J u l y  1 9 1 9 t  C h a n d r a ’ s  r e p l y ,  3  J u l y  1 9 1 9 ?  a l s o  
h i s  l e t t e r  t o  R e s i d e n t ,  2 6  J a n u a r y  1 9 2 0 ,  F » 0 » ,  166/11•
6 l  •  T h e  r e c r u i t m e n t  o f  B r a h m i n s  w a s  n o t  a l l o w e d  b e c a u s e  i f  t h e y  c r o s s e d  
t h e  s e a  t h e y  w e r e  n o t  g i v e n  P a n i p a t y a  a n d  s o  b e c a m e  o u t c a s t s *  H o w ­
e v e r  m a n y  B r a h m i n s  p a s s e d  t h e m s e l v e s  o f f  a s  K h e t t r i s  t o  e n r o l  th e m ^ -  
s e l v e s ,  H * R . K . G i b b s ,  T h e  G u r k h a  S o l d i e r ,  p * 7 ^
6 2 *  S e e  t h e  n e x t  p a g e * *
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m o r a l  s t r e n g t h  i n  t a c k l i n g  s o m e  s o c i a l  p r o b l e m s  l i k e  S a t i  a n d  s l a v e r y .  
T h e  v i s i t s  o f  t h e  B r i t i s h  d i g n i t a r i e s  t o  K a t h m a n d y  w e r e  m a d e  u s e  o f  
b y  C h a n d r a  S h a m s h e r  b o t h  t o  i m p r o v e  h i s  s t a n d i n g  i k i t h  t h e  B r i t i s h  g o v ­
e r n m e n t  a n d  t o  s h o w  h i s  p e o p l e  t h a t  t h e  B r i t i s h  s u p p o r t e d  h i s  r e f o r m  
p r o j e c t s .  D u r i n g  K i t c h f i e r * s  v i s i t  t o  K a t h m a n d u  i n  1 9 0 6 ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  
t h e  P r i m e  M i n i s t e r  a d d r e s s e d  t h e  B h a r a d a r s  , t e  u r g i n g  t h e m  t o  l o o k
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" k i n d l y  o n  r e f o r m s  a n d  i n n o v a t i o n s "  h e  h a d  s t a r t e d .  O n  r e t u r n i n g  f r o m
h i s  E u r o p e a n  t o u r  a  s i m i l a r  m e e t i n g  w a s  h e l d  w h e n , i n  t h e  p r e s e n c e  o f
t h e  B r i t i s h  R e s i d e n t ^ B l i i m  S h a m s h e r ,  t h e  P r i m e  M i n i s t e r ’ s  b r o t h e r ,  r e f e -
64
r r e d  t o  t f e e C h a M r a * ©  v a r i o u s  r e f o r m s .
S a t i  a n d  s l a v e r y  w e r e  t h e  t w o  w e l l - e s t a b l i s h e d  s o c i a l  
i n s t i t u t i o n s  o f  N e p a l .  A l t h o u g h  J a n g  B a h a d u r  w a s  u n a b l e  t o  s t o p  t h e  
p r a c t i c e  o f  S a t i  i n  t h e  f a c e  o f  t h e  o p p o s i t i o n  o f  t h e  o b s c u r a n t i s t s  
i n  t h e  d a r b a r .  h e  s u c c e e d e d  i n  p r e v e n t i n g  i t  i n  h i s  o w n  f a m i l y .  I n
s'
1 8 5 7  a n d  1 8 6 3 ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  h e  d i d  n o t  l e t  t h e  w i d o w s  o f  h i s  b r o t h e r s ,
65
B a m  B a h a d u r  a n d  K r i s h n a  B a h a d u r ,  u n d e r g o  t h i s  c r u e l  r i t e .  I n  M a y  1 8 7 6 ,
h e  s u c c e e d e d ,  w i t h  t h e  a c t i v e  s u p p o r t  o f  t h e  R e s i d e n t ,  G i r d l e  s t o n e ,  i n
s a v i n g  h i s  d a u g h t e r  f r o m  t h e  f u n e r a l  p y r e  o f  h e r  h u s b a n d .  L y t t o n ,  t h e n
G o v e r n o r - G e n e r a l ,  h e a r t i l y  c o n g r a t u l a t e d  J a n g  B a h a d u r ,  a s s u r i n g  h i m  t h a t
" b o t h  t h e  Q u e e n  o f  E n g l a n d  a n d  t h e  P r i n c e  o f  W a l e s  w o u l d  l e a r n  w i t h  t h e
l i v e l i e s t  s a t i s f a c t i o n  h i s  e n l i g i t e n e d  a n d  e n e r g e t i c  a c t i o n " .  J a n g
B a h a d u r  w a s  e n c o u r a g e d  t o  a b o l i s h  t h e  p r a c t i c e  o n c e  f o r  a l l - a n  a c t
6 3 .  P E F .  V o l . 2 6 .  1 9 1 2 .  P t . 5 .  F i l e  N o . 1 8 5 / 1 9 0 7 .  R e s i d e n t  t o  G o v t . .  2 5  
N o v e m b e r  1 9 0 6 .
6 U .  I b i d . ,  V o l . 3 5 *  1 9 0 8 ,  P i l e  N o . 1 9 3 9 / 1 9 0 8 .
65* S.C., 25 September 1857* No.470; F«P-A, September I863* No.179* 
Wright, op.cit., pp.31*68.
* 6 2 .  P o l i t i c a l  D e s p a t c h  f r o m  t h e  S e c y ,  o f  S t a t e  t o  G o v e r n o r - G e n e r a l  i n  
C o u n c i l ,  N o . 3 9 *  H  J u l y  1 3 8 9 ,  c i t e d  i n  P S L I ,  V o l . 1 9 1  ( 1 9 0 6 ) ,  R e g .
N o . 1 4 0 2 .
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which, Lytton added, was "sure to honour his 0ang Bahadur's]administra­
tion with the approbation of the whole civilised world” . He was also
asked to make adequate provisions for the maintenance of the rescued 
66
widows. Dr .Oldfield informs us that during Jang Bahadur's life time
there was a considerable diminution in the number of Satis; they were
67
seen, but "very rarely" However, a reaction soon set in after Jang
Bahadur's death when two of his wives committed Sati. This was hardly
surprising in view of the fact that his successor, Ranuddip, was under
strong priestly influence. Bir Shamsher sought to control the practice
by declaring that the Prime Minister's or, in his absence, the highest
legal authority's sanction had to be procured before Sati could be per-
68
formed. But this declaration had no effect. It was Chandra Shamsher
who by a proclamation on 28 June 1920 banned the practice throughout 
69
the kingdom.
Slavery prevailed only in the hills. It was absent in the
Terai as well as among the Newars who lived in the Nepal valley. There
were three classes of slave owners-the aristocrats, who had inherited
slaves and maintained them as personal retainers; agriculturists, who
depended on slaves as labourers in the fields; and those who reared
70
slaves like cattle and dealt in them for profit. Slaves in Nepal, both
male and female, were "usually kindly treated, fed and clothed and not 
71
overworked”• The Nepalese nobles procured slaves from among the poor
66. ff.P-A. May 1877* No.55* Keep With, Lytton's Note.
67. Sketches from Nipal, I, pp.251-2. Wright, op.cit.. pp.31-2.
68. Landon, op.cit.. p.172.
69. Ibid.
70. R.L.Kennion, "Abolition of Slavery in Nepal”, The Nineteenth Century 
and After. September 1925* PP*381-9•
71. F.P-A. April I867* No.124* Also Wright, up.cit.,p.45* Mss.Hodgson. 
Vol.7, p*67.
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peoples of the adjacent districts of Bihar and the North Western Provin­
ces, and during scarcity large numbers of such slaves were sent to Kath­
mandu by the slave dealers in the Teaai. In 1 8 6 6 - 7 , for example, through 
the efforts of Jang Bahadur and the Resident, Ramsay, many such newly 
brought slaves were liberated, and orders were issued by the Prime
Minister to the Nepalese officers in the Terai against indulging in 
7 2
slave trade* Jang Bahadur made a law forbidding any person to sell him­
self to slavery; it was also illegal for a parent to sell his children*
It was further declared that: a fugitive slave who had settled in the 
72k
Naya Mulk and Morang in the Terai could not be enslaved again* These
enactments were, however, of little use* Deb Shamsher during his brief
7 3
rule set the female slaves of Kaski and Lamjung free, but his project
of liberating all slaves met with the serious opposition of vested 
7 4
interests*
Chandra Shamsher moved cautiously* He started with a rigid
enforcement of the laws passed under Jang Bahadur*s rule prohibiting
the inclusion in the ranks of slavery of anybody who was not a born
slave* Next, he took several measures to improve the lot of slaves and
to reduce the distinction between them and the freemen* It was provided
in an enactment in 1920 that fugitive slaves who resided for ten years
or more in India would be treated on return home as free men; those
who escaped to India and lived there for three years could become free
7 2 *  F*P-A, April 1 8 l> 7 »  Nos* 1 2 4 - 7 ;  July 1 8 ^ 7 ,  No* 1 3 9 ?  August 1 8 ^ 7 *  Nos* 
1 7 8 - 8 1 ;  September 1 8 6 7 ,  Nos* 6 2 - 4 ;  October 1 8 6 7 ,  Nos* 2 2 5 - 6 *
72k* The western Terai given to Nepal after the Mutiny* See Chap*I, p*37« 
7 3 *  These were the Prime Minister* s two personal duchies in central Nepil • 
7 4 «  Landon, op * cit * * pp *1 6 4 - 5  * Regmi, op.cit*,( 1 9 5 0  edn.), pp.1 5 9 - 6 0 ,  1 6 5 .
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if they paid reasonable ransom to their masters, slaves were given the 
right of preemption too; it was followed in 1921 by the right of owner­
ship of property and of devolution by succession. Another enactment 
made it a legal offence to prevent a slave from going to and settling 
in Chitwan, a district in the Terai, where he would live as a free man. 
In 1911 and 1920 census of slave population was taken; a third census 
followed in 1923-4 which showed the total number of slaves as 51*419
75
and that of slave owners as 1 5 ,7 1 9 *  in. November 1924 the Prime Minis­
ter took the final step. He made an appeal seeking the country's
support to completely abolish the practice. The appeal which was later
76
printed in English is a unique document in the history of social refor* 
ms in Nepal, it contained powerful arguments, moral social, religious 
and economic,to establish that there was no justification for the con­
tinuance of the institution. Although slavery was referred to in the 
ancient Hindu literature, Chandra Shamsher argued, it formed no part 
of the Hindu religion, while trading in slaves was repugnant to its 
spirit and teaching. The Prime Minister's appeal was successful. Of 
all the slave owners only 467 desired the retention of slavery. A new 
law was then enacted which made slavery a penal offence; it also pro­
vided for compensation to the slave owners, since the Bharadars were 
as a body opposed to the immediate emancipation of all slaves, it was 
decided that the freed slaves would render their masters "volutary 
service** for seven years, whereafter the masters would have no claim 
upon their men. All Children under seven were immediately set free.
75* Kennion, op.cit., pp.382-4*  Landon, op.cit., p.1^5* Northey and 
Morris, op.cit., pp.1 0 7 -1 2 .
76. An Appeal for the Abolition of Slavery made on 28 November 1924 
(Kathmandu, 1 9 2 5 )•
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The liberation of slaves scheme cost the Nepalese government a sum of
3*670,000 rupees, an average of seventy rupees per slave. Of the total
slave population, 59*873* compensation had to be paid for 51*782;
4*651 slaves were freed by their masters without compensation; 1*984
7 7
died; 1*342 fled and 114 paid for their release. There remained* how­
ever a kind of forced labour, called Begari, Jhara and Bethi, to meet
78
official requirements at the local level.
The Nepalese law and judicial system were reformed in the
Rana regime, and here, too, some influence of the British was seen.
One of the first measures of Jang Bahadur after his return from the
European tour was to codify the law and humanise the severe penal code.
Jang Bahadur fs Ain came into force from January 1854* The number of
crimes involving capital punishment was greatly reduced, and mutila-
79
tion was abolished. Dalhousie approved of Jang Bahadur’s reforms and 
gave him every moral support. In 1851, for example, Jang Bahadur reques­
ted that the British government take charge of the conspirators against 
80
him, or else he could not save them from either execution or mutilation
81
for which the Bharadars pressed the Prime Minister. Dalhousie agreed 
to take the "very troublesome charge", because Jang Bahadur might "with 
reason remind us that if he fails now in saving from mutilation or from 
death the brojher of the sovereign and his own kindred, there will be 
little chance in obtaining those measures of amendment by which he 
hopes to moderate the severity of the martial law". If such moral support
7 7 *  Ibid.,Kennion, op.cit., pp.385-9* Landon, op.cit., pp.1 6 7 - 7 2 .  D.R.
Banaji, Slavery in British India, p.55* Kathleen Simon, Slavery,pp.123- 
78. Northey and Morris, op.cit.,p.113* 34*
79* Oldfield, op.cit.,I, pp.244-5*
80. The King’s younger brother, one of Jang Bahadur’s own brothers and 
his cousin were implicated in the conspiracy.
81. 3.C., 28 March I85I, Nos.10-14* P.J.B.Rana, op.cit.,pp.155-8.
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were denied, Dalhousie minuted, Jang Bahadur would not only lose heart
hut reproach the British government*s Mindifference or selfishness** as
responsible for
the postponement of those great measures for the improve­
ment, of national institutions and for the future happi­
ness of his race, which amidst such obloquy and, I fear, 
with imminent danger to himself, he is resolved to 
attempt in Nepal* 82
The Resident made "remonstrance in the strongest terms'* against the
punishments which the Bharadars wanted to inflict on the offenders*
Although Dalhousie was averse to interference in the domestic politics
of Nepal-"a foreign state which is entirely independent of us, neither
tributary to us, nor subordinate in any way1'-with his reforming spirit
he viewed it as the British government's "duty" to morally support
Jang Bahadur in the interest of "increasing civilisation and*** tem^ *
pering the ferocity and smoothening the rudeness of law and custom" of
83
an "allied state"* Ripon also followed Dalhousie*s example when agree­
ing to take charge of Prince Narendra Vikram and Bam. Vikrant, alleged
84
conspirators against Ranuddip Singh, as s$ate prisoners* Since even 
petty offences were punishable by mutilation according to Nepalese law, 
the British government, on humanitarian grounds, consistently refused
85
to extradite runaway Nepalese offenders to the darbar.
Nepalese laws were further revised and systematised by 
Bir Shamsher; Chandra Shamsher did this thrice* The Nepalese code was 
printed and made easily available to all; formerly the officers of the 
government alone had access to the code, while the people remained
82. S.C»,25 April 1851, Dalhousie*s Minute, 9 April 1851*
83* Ibid*
84* See Chapter II, p.70.
85* The Court of Directors specifically instructed the Indian government 
against such surrender, political Letter to India , No.3 or 1834*
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ignorant of the successive changes made in the law* In the new code 
a careful distinction was made between offences against state, person 
and property and those against the religious laws of the country* Cri­
minal and civil Jurisdiction/were separated* A High Court was set up
with Dharma shamsher, Bir Shamsher*s second son, as the Chief Justice;
06
the prime Minister continued to he the highest court of appeal*
English, education had been one of the main channels of 
western influence on Indian society and politics; in Nepal , facili­
ties for this education was extremely limited. An intelligentsia was 
absent; there was nothing like an western educated class of people with 
advanced social, political and economic thinking* English education was 
looked upon by the lianas rather as an essential means of dealing with 
the British government than as an instrument of popular enlightenment 
and progress* Jang Bahadur employed a few Englishmen and Bengalis as
87
private tutors of his sons and nephews* The Shamsher Ranas went to
schools in Calcutta, in the pre-Rana period there was nothing like
state initiative or state responsibility for the promotion of public
education. There were educational institutions, of course, but they
were run on traditional lines, privately financed and managed* The
Ranas established government primary schools at Kathmandu and other
places-there were sixty such schools in 1928 built over the last thirty
years* There was only one High English School (established in 1880)
affiliated to the University of Calcutta, it was purely an aristocratic
institution, catering to the needs of the Ranas and other noble families
86* Landon, op.cit*,pp*174-9* D&3 Gupta, op*oit*,p*20QT Amblka Prasad 
Upadhayaya, Nepal K6 Itiha3, pp*195“201*
87* Commandari Kitab Khana, Nizamati phant, Registers forA19l6, 1921, 
1923 and 1928 (corresponding to 1859*1864*1866 and 1871)
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alone. In 1901 the number of new students admitted to the English depart­
ment in the government schools at Kathmandu was 17 $ in 1919 the figure 
was 142. An intermediate college-named Tribhuban-Chandra, after the 
King andAPrime Minister-was started in 19195 it was raided to the B.A. 
standard in 1924• Chandra Shamshere created a Directorate of public 
Instruction . A  few Nepalese, mostly of the Rana family, went to the 
engineering and medical institutions in India with, state scholarships.
Two Nepalese engineers were members of the engineering associations of 
England and U.S.A. In 1925 there were five Nepalese M.A.s of the Uni-
88
versity of Calcutta and three M.B.B.S. from the Calcutta Medical College.
Chandra shamsher also set up a committee for the improvement of the
Gorkhali language, it published translations from English books for
89
use as school texts in Nepal.
The progre«s|of education in Nepal was inhibited by tradition,
the opposition of the vested interests and religious orthodoxy. Deb
Shamsher had a scheme of mass education which failed on account of the
BharadarS? strong opposition ; many schools set up by him had also to 
90.
be closed down. Six Nepalese students were sent to Japan for technical 
training and not to England because of the belief that in an oriental 
Buddhist state the risks of moral degradation were less than in a wes­
tern Christian state; the students were enjoined to rigidly observe their
88. Landon, op.cit., p.180. Morris and Northey, op.cit., Foreword by
C.Bruce, p.xxix. Das Gupta, op.cit., pp.202-3* Hemalata Devi, Nepale 
Banganari, pp.3*14, 101-3* P3LI, Vol.87, Reg.No.293, Annual Report 
on Nepal, 1895-6.
89* Das Gupta, op.cit.,p.203*
90. Landon, op.cit.,pp.179* Regmi, op.cit., pp. 165-6. M«K*3hrestha,
A Handbook of Public Administration in Nepal, pp4*
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religious and social habits. In 1905 the Bharadars rejected Chandra 
Shamsher9 s suggestion that students should be sent to Europe and Ame­
rica and instead advised, what became hereafter the Nepalese government9s
91
policy, the employment of a larger number of Bengali teachers in Nepal. 
Personally the Prime Minister was well-informed, particularly on inter­
national events. In 1908 he received from Oxford an Honorary Doctorate 
in Civil Law; to the Indian institute of the University he presented 
valuable Sanskrit manuscipts. His third son, Kaiser Shamsher9s private 
library contained more than forty thousand works of mostljs western 
authors.The policy of exclusion of the Europeans notwithstanding, prof­
essor Cecil Bendall, Sylvain Levi, Percy Brown and others were allowed
entry into Nepal for literary and archaelogical researches; even some
92
Japanese schoalrs9 applications for such purposes were not refused.
Education in Nepal had no popular and,therefore, broad 
basis. The Ranas disfavoured any rapid extension of western education 
for fear of creating influences prejudicial to the established social, 
economic and political order of the country. Chandra Shamsher, in fact, 
told the British Residents and Envoys that agitation in India against 
British rule was the result of English education. He also referred to
93
the swelling ranks of educated unemployed in India as a social menace.
There was nothing like a popular movement in Nepal; there was no means
of organising or ventillating public opinion. Gorkhapatra, the only 
94
newspaper was government controlled; there were few readers of Indian
91 • For the names of prominent Bengalis, teachers, doctors and engi­
neers see J.M.Das, Banger Bahire Bangali, Uttar Bharat, pp.550-52. 
92. F.O., 766/1, Note of Envoy, 7 May 1925* J.K.Das Gupta, "Nepal9s
Relations with the Outer Horldy The Calcutta Review, July 1930, p.
C.Bendall,A Journey of Archaeological and Literary Research 101.
in Nepaland Northern Tndia. during the winter of 1884-5 
93* if•0*706/11, Note of Envoy/ 7 May 1925* Wilkinson-Guillemand, op.cit., 
^Started in 1901. “ 3.
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95
newspapers in Nepal. The Prime Minister, as has already been seen, was 
anxious about the effects of political unrest in India which led him 
to take precautions to check the infiltration of political ideas from 
India into Nepal. The entry of undesirable persons into Nepal was res­
tricted by the introduction of a passport system; even Indian traders
96had/obtain passports every year from the Nepalese authorities at Birganj.
V^cYThe British Residents and visitors to Nepal were^aH praise 
for Chandra Shamsher, and with reason; he had left the British govern­
ment with little cause for complaint; he was cooperative and obliging.
The journey to Kathmandji for the Envoys was no longer an ordeal, and 
living in Nepal was a romantic experience. While Hodgson and Henry
97
Lawrence reached the Nepalese capitaljon doolies (litters), Geoffrey 
9 8
Betham covered the first twenty{three miles of the journey in 1938 by 
the Nepalese "special”train; for the last lap of seven miles, from 
Thankot to Kathmandu, the Prime Minister! (Buick’stood ready. There were 
rest houses all along the road where European delicacies could be had 
on request. The arrival of the Resident to Kathmandu was "almost a 
ritual", writes Kennion; and "elaborate ceremonial" was observed when 
he took office. Nepalese officers escorted him from the Terai; the 
troops at Kathmandu paraded and presented arms; mass bands played the
tfsA-British and Nepalese national anthems;AUnion ^ ack fluttered. In full
95* See Chapter VII, pp.283-4, 310-11.
9 6 .  P F ,  1 9 1 9 *  V o l , 5 *  F i l e  Nos* 1 2 9 8 / 1 9 1 9 »  3 7 1 3 / 1 9 2 8 .
9 7 *  L a w r e n c e  w a s  R e s i d e n t  f r o m  D e c e m b e r  1 8 4 3  t o  D e c e m b e r  1 8 4 5 *
9 8 .  Betham was British Minister in Nepal from 1 9 3 8  to 1 9 4 4 • See his 
article, "Nepal", in J«R.C.A,S», January 1 9 4 8 ,  pp.1 8 - 2 5 *  After 
July 1 9 3 4  the British representative in Nepal was designated 
Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary. A Nepalese repre­
sentative was posted at the same time to London with similar status.
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darbar the Prime Minister presented the Resident, or the Envoy as he 
came to be called after 1920; both then made speeches, emphasising the 
indissoluble link between the existing regimes in Nepal and India. Life 
in Nepal for the British representatives was a welcome change from that 
in India. Here there was no political or other problems, no agitation, 
unrest or excitement; life was easy, placid and restful. A visitor to 
Kathmandu went so far as to remark that in Nepal "one sees more smiles
9 9
in a day than in India in a month". Chandra Shamsher was courteous and 
polished, treating the British representatives as "honoured guests" and 
exuding "extraordinary charm of manner". His wide knowledge of world 
affairs and shrewd judgment made conversation with him an "instructive 
and deli^itful experience", so Kennion tells, us. He was an autocrat, 
we are told, but an enlightened autocrat; his was a personal but pater­
nal rule. There was no economic affluence in Nepal, but no economic 
discontent either. People appeared to be happy and contented, well fed 
and well housed. Showers, for instance, saw in his one and a half year's
s t a y  i n  N e p a l  ( A p r i l  1 9 1 2  t o  O c t o b e r  1 9 1 3 )  " n o t h i n g  i n  t h e  s h a p e  o f  a
100
mean, tumble down tenement". But then, he as well as all those who pre­
ceded and succeeded him had personal knowledge of only the Nepal valley, 
the Terai and the road from Raxaul to Kathmandu; the rest of the country, 
especially the hill districts,was closed to the Europeans.
L i f e  a t  K a t h m a n d u  w a s ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  e n j o y a b l e ;  t h e  c a p i t a l  
h a d  a l l  t h e  a p p u r t e n a n c e s  o f  m o d e r n  c i v i l i s a t i o n  a n d  a l l  i t s  a m e n i t i e s .  
H e r e  t h e r e  w e r e  n u m e r o u s  p a l a c e s ,  f u r n i d h e d  b y  M a p l e s  a n d  H a m p t o n s ,  w i t h  
w e l l - l a i d  g a r d e n s - m o n u m e n t s  o f  e x t r a v a g a n c e  r a t h e r  t h a n  e x p r e s s i o n s  o f  
9 9 *  Q u o t e d  b y  M c l e i s h ,  o p . c i t . ,  p . 1 2 6
100. H.L.Showers, "Eighteen months in Nepal", Blackwood's Magazine, May 
1 9 1 6 ,  p * 5 9 7 *
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the artistic taste of their builders-the Shamsher Ranas. There were 
equestrian statues of the Ranas, made by British craftsmen. There were 
broad roads, electricity, some sanitary arrangements, sewers and covered 
drains. Pipe water was also available; there were hospitals and dispen­
saries, doctors and trained nurses. Most of the things found in London 
and Paris, says Showers, could also be had at the Nepalese capital. On 
the roads could be seen mo tar cars of the latest make, huge cranes, 
steam rollers and other heavy building materials-and all had arrived at 
Kathmandu on human backs. For the British representatives and visitors 
there was no dearth of entertainment; the Prime Minister invited them
101
to parties to celebrate the birthdays of his numerous sons and relatives;
there was big game hunting in the Terai, besides Polo, golf and tennis;
the billiard room in the residency, Kennion and 0fConnor inform us, used
to be always "nearly full". The birthdays of the Kings and Queens of
Britain were celebrated in all pomp and ceremony. Chandra Shamsher lent
films for the Residents' private exhibition; but there were no cinema
houses at Kathmandu, for the Prime Minister would not permit anything
to affect the peoples* morals. Naturally with all this, Showers, for
example, could not imagine if
anyone can ever have performed official duties 
among more novel and interesting surroundings 
or under happier and pleasanter circumstances.
So felt his wife, too, who could recall fortyjnine years later how much
she had been impressed by the "perfect English" of Chandra shamsher and
his sons and enjoyed the fire works display on the eve of Manners Smith's
101. In 1923 tii© Rana family had/fg| members. Landon, op,cit.,l, 
Geneological Tables at the end of the book.
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d e p a r t u r e  f r o m  K a t h m a n d u  o n  f u r l o u g h ,  t h e  g a r d e n  p a r t i e s ,  s p o r t s  a n d ,
f o r  a  c h a n g e ,  a  q u i e t  s o j o u r n  i n  t h e  h i l l  b u n g a l o w  a t  N a g a r k o t ,  t b  t h e
e x t r e m e  e a s t  o f  t h e  N e p a l  v a l l e y ,  w h i c h  t h e  P r i m e  M i n i s t e r  w a s  g o o d
e n o u g h  t o  l e n d  h e r .  T h e  w i v e s  o f  t h e  R a n a s  w e r e  a  p l e a s a n t ,  c o m p a n i o n a b l e
102A
l o t  w h o  c o u l d  p l a y  t h e  p i a n o .  F o r  0 * C o n n o r ,  N e p a l  w i t h
" i t s  a n c i e n t  t e m p l e s ,  i t s  e x c l u s i v e  h i g h  c a s t e  
a r i s t o c r a c y  a n d  t h e  g l i t t e r  a n &  g l a m o u r  o f  i t d  
C o u r t ,  t h e  m a r b l e  s t a i r w a y s  a n d  h a l l s  a n d  t h e  
f a b u l o u s  j e w e l s "  w a s  " l i k e  a  s e t t i n g  f r o m  t h e  
A r a b i a n  N i f e h t s "  1 0 3
T h e  t r a d i t i o n a l l y  e x c l u s i v e  p o l i c y  o f  t h e  N e p a l e s e  g o v e r n m e n t  
w a s  n o  d o u b t  t h e  m o s t  s e r i o u s  i m p e d i m e n t  t o  t h e  d e v e l o p m e n t  o f  N e p a l  
o n  m o d e r n  l i n e s .  B u t  p a r a d o x i c a l  a s  i t  m i g h t  a p p e a r ,  t h e  B r i t i s h  t h e m ­
s e l v e s  w e r e  p a r t l y  r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  i t .  T h e  N e p a l e s e  p o l i c y  o f  e x c l u s i o n  
a n d  n o n - i n t e r c o u r s e  w i t h  f o r e i g n e r s  w a s  f r o m  t h e  B r i t i s h  p o i n t  o f  v i e w  
a n  i n s u r a n c e  a g a i n s t  f o r e i g n  i n t r i g u e  i n  t h i s  s t r a t e g i c a l l y  i m p o r t a n t  
s t a t e ,  a n d  s o  t h e y  d i d  n o t  a l l o w  N e p a l  t o  e s t a b l i s h  c o n t a c t  w i t h  a n y  
w e s t e r n  p o w e r .  I n  1 9 6 ^ ,  f o r  e x a m p l e ,  w h e n  J a n g  B a h a d u r  w i s h e d  t o  m e e t  
t h e  r u l e r s  o f  F r a n c e ,  A u s t r i a  a n d  R u s s i a  a s  a n  a m b a s s a d o r  o f  a n  " i n d e ­
p e n d e n t  s t a t e " ,  t h e  I n d i a n  g o v e r n m e n t  w a r n e d  h i m  t h a t  p o l i t i c a l  r e l a t i o n s
102. In April 1912.
102A. Notes on her life, by Christian Showers Stirling.
1 0 3 *  b U E . 0 * C o n n o r ,  T h i n g s  M o r t a l ,  p p . 1 ^ 2 - 7 2 .  A l s o  H , L » K e n n i o n ,  " R e c o l l e c
t i o n s o f  N e p a l " ,  B l a c k w o o d ' s  M a g a z i n e ,  M a y  1 9 3 1 t P P * 6 6 5 - 7 8 *  S h o w e r s ,
o p . c i t * ,  p p . 5 9 5 - ^ 1 3 * ~ ~ 0 * C o n n o r ,  O n  t h e  F r o n t i e r  a n d  B e y o n d ,  p p . 2 7 7 -  
8 6 .  H . J . E l w e s ,  M e m o i r s  o f  T r a v e l ,  S p o r t  a n d  N a t u r a l  H i s t o r y ,  p p .  
2 5 1 - 7 *
w i t h  f o r e i g n  p o w e r s  w e r e  p r e j u d i c i a l  t o  N e p a l ' s  i n t e r e s t s  " w i t h o u t  a n y
1 0 4
p r o s p e c t  o f  c o u n t e r v a i l i n g  a d v a n t a g e " .  S e v e n t y  t h r e e  y e a r s  l a t e r ,  d u r i n g
n e g o t i a t i o n s  f o r  a  n e w  t r e a t y ,  w e  f i n d  t h e  B r i t i s h  g o v e r n m e n t ' s  a t t i t u d e
105
r e g a r d i n g  N e p a l ' s  c o n t a c t  w i t h  f o r e i g n  p o w e r s  u n c h a n g e d .  T h e  I n d i a n  g o v e r n ­
m e n t  d i s c o u r a g e d  E u r o p e a n s  f r o m  v i s i t i n g  N e p a l ,  a n d  t h e  N e p a l e s e  g o v e r n ­
m e n t ' s  r e p u g n a n c e  t o  s u c h  v i s i t s  w a s  a  c o n v e n i e n t  e x c u s e .  I n  t h e  w a r  a n d  
p o s t - w a r  y e a r s  g r e a t e r  r e s t r i c t i o n s  w e r e  i m p o s e d  o n  s u c h  v i s i t s ;  a p p l i ­
c a t i o n s  w e r e  s u b j e c t e d  t o  c o n f i d e n t i a l  e n q u i r y  t o  m a k e  s u r e  t h a t  n o  
G e r m a n  a g e n t ,  J a p a n e s e  s p y  o r  B o l s h e v i k  i n t r i g u e r  g o t  i n t o  N e p a l  a s  a  
s o i  d i s a n t  s t u d e n t  o f  B u d d h i s m .  T h e  R e v e r a n d  W a s s *  a p p l i c a t i o n  w a s  
r e j e c t e d  o n  t h i s  s u s p i c i o n  i n  1 9 1 9 *  t h e  C z e c h o s l o v a k  C o n s u l  i n  B o m b a y
w a s  r e f u s e d  e n t r y  i n t o  N e p a l ,  a l t h o u g h  h i s  d e c l a r e d  p r a  p u r p o s e  w a s
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s c i e n t i f i c  r e s e a r c h e s .  I t  w a s ,  i n  f a c t ,  i m p o s s i b l e  f o r  a  f o r e i g n e r  t o
g o  t o  N e p a l  w i t h o u t  b e i n g  s p o n s o r e d  b y  t h e  I n d i a n  g o v e r n m e n t .
T h e  l a t t e r  w h i l e  c o n d e m n i n g  N e p a l ' s  e x c l u s i v e  p o l i c y ,  i n
f a c t ,  n e v e r  w a n t e d  t h e  c o u n t r y  t o  b e  o p e n e d  u p  e v e n  f o r  B r i t i s h  v i s i t o r s .
A l f r e d  L y a l l ,  t h e  F o r e i g n  S e c r e t a r y ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e , n o t e d  t h u s  :
I  d o  n o t  f i n d  t h a t  t h e  G o v e r n m e n t  o f  I n d i a  e v e r  
e x p r e s s e d  a n y  d e s i r e  t h a t  N e p a l  s h o u l d  b e  o p e n e d  
t o  B r i t i s h  v i s i t o r s  g e n e r a l l y . .  •  I  s h o u l d  v e r y  
m u c h  d o u b t  t h e  e x p e d i e n c y  o f  t h u s  o p e n i n g  N e p a l ,  
e v e n  i f  i t  w e r e  i n  o u r  p o w e r  b y  d i p l o m a t i c  p r e s s u r e  
t o  a c c o m p l i s h  t h i s .  1 0 7
F . P - A ,  M a y  1 8 6 2 ,  N o . 2 4 *  G o v t ,  t o  R e s i d e n t ,  5  M a y  1 8 6 2 .  I n  I 8 5O ,  
h o w e v e r ,  J a n g  B a h a d u r  w a s  a l l o w e d  t o  m e e t  L o u i s  N a p o l e o n ,  t h e n  
P r e s i d e n t  o f  F r a n c e .  P . J . B » R a n a ,  o p . c i t . ,  p P »  1 4 2 - 6 .
S e e  C h a p t e r  V I I ,
P E F ,  V o l . 5 0 *  1 9 1 6 ,  F i l e  N o . 2 0 9 6 / 1 9 1 3 .  P F ,  1 9 1 9 *  V o l . 5 *  F i l e  N o s .  
1 2 9 8 / 1 9 1 9 *  4 9 2 7 / 1 9 2 2 ,  1 5 7 7 , 1 7 1 1 / 1 9 2 3 *  7 0 8 / 1 9 2 4 .  A l s o  H C ,  V o l . 1 3 3 ,  
( 1 8 9 2 ) ,  N o . 9 4 6 .  P S L I ,  V o l . 2 8 ,  1 9 1 2 ,  R e g . N o , 3 4 0 0 .  P E F ,  V o l . 2 6 ,  1 9 1 2 ,  
P t . 5 ,  F i l e  N o . 2 9 4 9 *  P o l i t i c a l  D e p t .  M i n u t e ,  F e b r u a r y  1 9 1 1 *
F . P - A ,  O c t o b e r  1 8 7 9 *  N o s . 4 9 “ 5 4 *  K e e p  W i t h ,  D e p t .  N o t e .  S e e  a l s o  
L y a l l ' s  v i e w  i n  C h a p t e r  I I ,  p . 6 l .
1 0 4 .




What alone the Indian government then wanted was to secure the Resident's 
free movement in the interior of Nepal to collect political and military 
intelligence • Even this was less necessary when in the late nineteenth1 
and twentieth centuries relations with Nepal improved considerably and 
confidence grew. In such circumstances the Residents did not want to 
press the Nepalese government ; they appreciated the latter*s sentiments 
regarding the issue. One of them, Colonel F.W.P.Macdonald went so far 
as to say thus s
From our point of view... I cannot see that it will 
benefit us at all to press him.Chandra Shamsher) to 
let us go beyond the limits now laid down... I see 
no good to be got out of it for Government. 108
The British regarded Nepal as a breakwater of the Indian 
nationalism and had every interest in keeping Nepal closed to the infl­
uence of Indian politics; naturally, they took measures to this end.
"As a matter of fact", Macdonald noted, "the people of 
Nepal are happy, contented and uncommonly well off, and 
it will be a thousand pities if Indian 'civilisation* 
and its accompaniments in the shape of education, forward 
movement and sedition were to penetrate into Nepal-the 
longer it is kept back the better." 109
This was Chandra Shamsher*s own views, too, based as they were on his
determination to keep the anti-British influences in India away from
Nepal. In 1922, for example, he rejected the application of one K.P.
Chattopadhaya, a lecturer in Cambridge, for anthropological research in
Nepal because the British intelligence reports discovered Chattopadhaya*s
110
links with the Indian revolutionaries in Berlin and Communists in Moscow.
1 0 8 .  F « 0 » ,  $ 6 6 / 1 3 *  M a c d o n a l d  t o  H.V»Cobb, Offg. S e c y  . F o r e i g n  D e p t . ,  9  
M a r c h  1 9 0 9 *
1 0 9 .  I b i d .
1 1 0 .  E F ,  1 9 1 9 ,  V o L . 5 ,  F i l e  N o s .  4 9 2 7 / 1 9 2 2 ;  1 1 9 7 ,  1 7 4 ,  1 5 7 7 ,  1 7 1 1 / 1 9 2 3 .
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C h a n d r a  S h a m s h e r  t o l d  H ,  W i l k i n s o n ,  t h e  B r i t i s h  E n v o y ,  t h a t  n o t  t h e
111
B r i t i s h  h u t  t h e  B e n g a l i s  w e r e  h i s  r e a l  e n e m i e s .
C h a n d r a  S h a m s h e r  a l s o  a s k e d  t h e  B r i t i s h  t o  k e e p  t h e  G u r k h a s
a w a y  f r o m  t h e  a n t i - B r i t i s h  e l e m e n t s  i n  I n d i a .  S o m e  G u r k h a s  a f t e r  s e r v i c e
112
o v e r s e a s  h a d  i m b i b e d  m o d e r n  i d e a s  o f  p r o g r e s s  a n d  r e f o r m .  I n  1 9 2 1 ,  f o r
i n s t a n c e ,  o n e  T h a k u r  C h a n d a n  S i n g h  e s t a b l i s h e d  a t  B e h r a  B u n ,  w h e r e  t h e r e
w e r e  m a n y  G u r k h a  s e t t l e r s ,  t w o  w e e k l y  J w t p e r s ,  G o r k h a  S a n s a r  a n d  T a r u n
1 1 3
G o r k h a ,  a n d  p r o p a g a t e d  f o r  s o c i a l  r e f o r m s  i n  N e p a l .
E x p o s u r e  o f  t h e  G u r k h a s  t o  a n t i - B r i t i s h  s e n t i m e n t s  i n  I n d i a  
w a s  a  d a n g e r  o f  w h i c h  t h e  B r i t i s h  w e r e  f o r  l o n g  a w a r e ,  a n d  n e c e s s a r y  
p r e c a u t i o n a r y  m e a s u r e s  w e r e  a l r e a d y  e x t a n t .  I n  f a c t ,  s i n c e  t h e  f o r m a t i o n  
o f  t h e  G u r k h a  r e g i m e n t s  i n  1 8 1 5 1 t h e  B r i t i s h  h a d  k e p t  t h e m  i s o l a t e d  f r o m  
t h e  r e s t  o f  t h e  I n d i a n  t r o o p s  a s  a  m a t t e r  o f  d e l i b e r a t e  p o l i c y .  fi !h e  G u r ­
k h a s  w e r e  r e g a r d e d  a s  a  s a f e t y  v a l v e  a g a i n s t  a  m u t i n y  b y  t h e  l a t t e r .  (Che  
B r i t i s h  f o s t e r e d  t h e  G u r k h a s *  i n n a t e  s e n s e  o f  s e p a r a t e n e s s  f r o m  t h e  I n d ­
i a n  s o l d i e r s  b y  " p u r p o s e l y  a l l o w i n g  t h e m  t o  b e c o m e  a  c u l t ,  a  s e r v i c e  
1 1 4
a p a r t " .  G u r k h a s  h a d  t h e i r  o w n  e x c l u s i v e  c o l o n i e s  i n  t h e  h i l l  s t a t i o n s ;  
t h e y  w e r e  n e v e r  b r i g a d e d  w i t h  I n d i a n  t r o o p s  e x c e p t  d u r i n g  a c t i v e  s e r v i c e ;  
t h e i r  c o m m a n d s  w e r e  n e v e r  g i v e n  t o  I n d i a n s .  G e n e r a l  F r a n c i s  T u k e r ,  a
1 1 5
r e c o g n i s e d  a u t h o r i t y  o n  t h e  G u r k h a s ,  t e s t i f i e s  t h u s  s
E v e r  s i n c e  w e  h a d  f i r s t  r a i s e d  t h e  N a s s i r i  b a t t a l i o n  
a n d  t h e  S i r m o o r  a n d  t h e  K u m a o n  b a t t a l i o n  i n  1 8 1 5  i t
1 1 1 .  F « 0 « ,  7 6 6 / 1 ,  N o t e  b y  E n v o y ,  7  M a y  1 9 2 5 *
1 1 2 .  T h e s e  G u r k h a s  a l l  s e t t l e d  d o w n  i n  I n d i a .
1 1 3 .  B a l c h a n d r a  S h a r m a ,  o p . c i t . ,  p . - ? 5 5 . f i e g m i ,  o p . c i t . ,  p p . 2 1 9 - 7 6 ,  d i s c u s s e s  
a t  l e n g t h  t h e  a n t i - R a n a  m o v e m e n t  i n  I n d i a  a n d  i t s  l i n k s  w i t h  t h e  
a n t i -  B r i t i s h  e l e m e n t s  t h e r e .
1 1 4 *  G .M a c M u n n ,  S h e  M a r t i a l  R a o e s  o f  I n d i a ,  p . 1 9 8 .
1 3 -5 *  F o r  T u k e r f s  w o r k s  s e e  t h e  b i b l i o g r a p h y .  T u k e r  s e r v e d  f o r  
y e a r s  w i t h  t h e  G u r k h a  r e g i m e n t s  i n  I n d i a .
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had been agreed, perhaps unwisely, that Gurkha 
regiments in our service would never be officered 
by Indians. For one hundred and thirty odd years 
that rule has been carefully kept.... Thus the 
Gurkha connection, though it has been through 
the Indian army, has been with Britain, and al­
ways with the British rather than with India.
I t  m a y  b e  t h a t  b e c a u s e  o f  t h i s  t h e  m e n  r e g a r d e d  
t h e m s e l v e s  a s  b e l o n g i n g  t o  a  f o r c e  a p a r t  f r o m  
t h e  I n d i a n  a r m y  • • • •  I n  f a c t ,  t h e y  c a m e  t o  l o o k  
u p o n  t h e m s e l v e s  a s  b e i n g  i n  I n d i a  a s  m e r c e n a r i e s  
t o  s e e  t h a t  t h e  I n d i a n s  d i d  n o t  m o l e s t  e a c h  o t h e r  
. . . .  T h e  B r i t i s h  G u r k h a  r e g i m e n t s  h a d  c l o s e  a f f i l i a ­
t i o n s  w i t h  B r i t i s h  r e g i m e n t s  a n d  t h e  y e a r  r o u n d  
t e l e g r a m s  o f  g r e e t i n g  s p e d  b a c k  a n d  f o r t h  b e t w e e n  
G u r k h a s  a n d  t h e  B r i t i s h . . . .  T h u s  w h e n e v e r  p r o g r e s s i v e  
s t e p s  t o  I n d i a n i s e  t h e  I n d i a n  a r m y  w e r e  t a k e n  b y  
i n c r e a s i n g  t h e  n u m b e r  o f  I n d i a n  o f f i c e r s  i n  u n i t s ,  
t h e  G u r k h a  b r i g a d e  w a s  s p e c i f i c a l l y  e x c l u d e d  f r o m  
t h e  s c h e m e  a n d  r e m a i n e d  i n  t a c t  w i t h  t h e i r  B r i t i s h  
o f f i c e r s .  N o  w r i t t e n  p r o m i s e  w a s  e v e r  m a d e  t o  t h e  
G u r k h a s  e x c e p t  p e r h a p s  b y  L o r d  L i n l i t h g o w  t o  t h e  
M a h a r a j a  o f  N e p a l ,  b u t  t h e  r u l e  w a s  w e l l  k n o w n  
t h r o u g h o u t  t h e  I n d i a n  a r m y  t h a t  I n d i a n s  w o u l d  n o t  
b e  p o s t e d  a s  o f f i c e r s  t o  G u r k h a  b a t t a l i o n s .  1 1 6
However, there was another side of the Nepalese exclusive policy 
to which Kennion drew attention. Kennion argued that the policy was 
harmful to the interests of the Ranas and of the British • The isola­
tion of Nepal, however justified politically, was from the economic point 
of view a "drag". "Civilisation " in Nepal, Kennion pointed out, was only 
"court deep"; outside Kathmandu there was no sign of a modern life, "so 
that the country may be likened to an organism with an active brain but 
a partly paralysed body". Large scale emigration of Nepalese to India, 
Which wawe causing Chandra Shamsher "great uneasiness", manifested ecoho- 
mic discontent and insecurity. Raising the general standard of living 
of the Nepalese people, in Kennion*s opinion, was a measure in which the
1 1 6 > . F . T u k e r ,  W h i l e  M e m o r y  S e r v e s ,  p p . ( > 3 1 - 2 .
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British should actively help Chandra Shamsher , because this would
check the migration of population and prevent what looked like Nepal*s
117
"slow death by exhaustion". Economic discontent in Nepal would create 
political problems m for the Rana government, and this certainly was not 
in the interests of the British themselves. Therefore, Kennion urged, 
the British government must help in the economic development of Nepal.
The Country needed roads, telegraph, efficient postal service, exploi­
tation pf her natural resources; also foreign capital and foreign experts. 
Kennion suggested the abolition of all duties on exports to Nepal throu­
gh the Raxaul route so that the Prime Minister by bringing things cheaply 
into Nepal could raisew(the general standard of comfort" of his people.
It was in the interest of the British themselves, Kennion pointed out, 
that Chandra Shamsher should be encouraged to make economic reforms 
because
a backward state that is conterminous with a progressive 
one is in the greater danger, for civilisation produces 
its own resisting anti-toxins. 118
Kennion, however, did not want political reforms in 
Nepal. In fact, he regarded Chandra Shamsher*s regime as "perhaps of 
all forms of government the sanest". He was in complete agreement with 
the Prime Minister that the progress of a country need not necessarily 
be measured by whether or not it had a democratic form of government.
In 1 9 3 1  w e  f i i n d  t h e  e x - E n v o y  w o r r i e d  o v e r  t h e  f u t u r e  o f  B r i t a i n ' s  r e l a ­
t i o n s  w i t h  N e p a l  s h o u l d  " t h e  B r i t i s h  n a t i o n "  c o m m i t  " t h e  c r i m e  o f  
o f f e r i n g  t o  I n d i a  t h e  p o i s o n e d  c l o a k  o f  c o m p l e t e  i n d e p e n d e n c e  a n d  I n d i a
117* R.L.Kennion, "England and Nepal", The Nineteenth Century and After", 
January 1922, pp.53~4« IFP» Vol.10890, June 1920, No.l.
118. Ibid. The Govt, rejected this suggestion , but in the treaty of
1923 allowed Nepal customs facilities. Aitchison,(1929 edn.), XIV, 
p.76, Art.VI of the treaty.
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were mad enough to accept it". Kennion had no doubt that the Rana regime 
was the best the British could have in Nepal. So far as the British gover­
nment were concerned, he said, it hardly mattered if Nepal was too slow 
in absorbing western ideas; rather "the danger is that false ideas about
progress should penetrate across the frontier from India to the detriment
119
of this brave, docile and attractive people". General Bruce, another
authority on the Gurkhas, echoed this s
It really would be a terrible disaster (BJnice heldl 
to find the one country in the world which entirely 
lives its own life modernised and vulgarised. At 
the same time it is an anomaly and the only possible 
method of keeping it^ts present excessively inter­
esting though anomalous condition is to continue the 
policy so long established. 120
119* Kennion, Recollections, op.cit., pp.675-7* %
120. C.G.Bruce, Himalayan Wanderer, p.186. Ihe policy Bruce refersAtilas 
that of let alone and non-interference. See also Patrick Balfour, 
Grand Tour jDiary of an Eastward Journey;, p.168.
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C O N C L U S I O N
[
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British policy in Nepal was evolutionary in character, 
and its underlying objectives not only changed in importance and urgency 
but were to a great extent conditioned by the internal situation in 
Nepal over which the British government had little control, in fact, 
while implementing their policy and realising their objectives, the 
British had to reckon with one important fact : the Nepalese government, 
too, had their own policy towards British India.
Several phases can be identified in the development of 
Anglo-Nepalese relations. During the first phase-1767-1804-the main aim 
of the British was to develop Bengal's Himalayan trade for which Nepal 
provided both the customary route as well as the most important entrepot; 
the means adopted by the British to achieve their object were military 
intervention to forestall the Gurkha conquest of the Nepal valley followed 
by the conciliation of the Gurkha rulers and the despatch of commercial 
missions to Kathmandu, and finally, the attempts at establishing British 
influence in the unsettled court o$ Kathmandu. None of these measures, 
however, proved successful, their net result being only to sow in the 
Nepalese darbar a feeling of deep distrust and hostility towards the 
British which lay at the root of Nepal*s policy of jealous exclusion of 
and non-intercouree with the foreigners. The next phase-1804-18l6^was 
dominated by the British anxiety for the security of their territory 
against Gurkha expansion. The war (1814-16) and the treaty that followed 
aimed at putting a definite limit to this expansion and restraining the 
Gurkha military power. The British then sought to translate their military 
victory into permanent and stable relations with Nepal; the treaty of 
Sagauli secured this object. The British- policy was just to keep the
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Nepalese government to the terms of the treaty-neither to press them 
for any commercial concession nor for any subordinate alliance. The war 
had cost the British much, in men, money and morale, creating in them a 
healthy respect for their defeated enemies. The British would not have 
another war except as a last resort. The risk of provoking the freedom- 
loving Nepalese to a war served as a major influence on the British atti­
tude to Nepal in subsequent years.
The war and the loss of one-third oftheifc territory sobered 
ANepalese government, who realised that mountains were no impregnable 
defence against a determined enemy of superior resources. The Nepalese 
respect for British arms increased; so did their fear. The treaty of 
Sagauli was a galling restraint on Nepalese military ambitions, but it 
had to be borne for fear of another and possibly a more disastrous war.
The British in India were a compelling phenomenon and Nepal had to 
reconcile herself to it; Nepal's history would from now on be dominated 
by her relations with British India. None was convinced of this more 
than Bhimsen Thapa himself. Both the Nepalese and the British governments, 
for their own reasons, wanted to live in peace with one another. The 
British hands were full with campaigns against the Indian powers, like 
the Marathas; and the Nepalese government needed a breathing spell to 
recover from the shock of the war.
During the thfirty years following the war the British 
learnt from their experience that a strong regime at Kathmandu was essen­
tial to political stability in Nepal, the lack of which was invariably 
accompanied by the recrudescence of Nepalese military aspirations and 
their eagerness to exploit the internal and external troubles of the
Indian, government. So long as Bhimsen ruled, Anglo-Nepalese relations 
were peaceful, though not cordial. Bhimsen was cold, resentful and afraid 
of the British, to escape whose domination he perfected the Nepalese poli­
cy of isolation and non-intercourse • From the Nepalese point of view the 
policy was a defensive measure against the power whose relations with the 
Indian states had ultimately cost them their military strength, territorial 
integrity and even independence. The British resigned themselves to Nepal's 
haughty aloofness, expecting time and circumstances to gradually change 
this attitude. It proved a vain hope; the Nepalese attitude did not change. 
The British policy of winning Nepalese confidence by conciliatory forbear­
ance had, thus, failed. This and the serious external crises and internal 
difficulties of the Indian government in the fourth decade of the 19th 
century led them to adopt a different, a more forceful policy s confirming 
British influence in Nepal by active involvement in her internal affairs 
and strengthening the Resident's position as the main channel of that 
influence. For the advocates of this policy, it was just a political ex­
pedient to tide over the existing emergencies, a pis aller. The fall of 
Bhimsen, partly the result of this policy, was expected to be a British 
gain, but it proved just the reverse. Almost a decade of internal strife 
and political chaos followed together with bitter anti-British feelings 
at Kathmandu, a serious risk of violation of British territory by the ex­
cited Nepalese army and ultimately of a war, which the Indian government 
averted by relentless pressure on the King of Nepal reinforced by threats 
of invasion.
The experience of both the British and the Nepalese governments 
during these turbulent years was bitter, but the lessons learnt were whole­
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some* The Nepalese government saw how their internal dissensions created 
opportunities for British intrigues and intervention and how an ambitious 
Resident could create problems* The British, for their part, realised 
that active involvement in Nepalese court politics accentuated political 
confusion at Kathmandu; that it intensified rather than removed anti- 
British feelings in the darbar; that these feelings led to excitement in 
the Nepalese army, for every aspirant to power encouraged its cherished 
ambition to conquer the opulent British territories; and finally, that 
disturbed dituation in British India created repercussions in the Nepalese 
politics* The policy of intervention was, therefore, abjured, and that of 
disengagement from the internal affairs of Nepal adopted*
Political stability returned to Kathmandu when the Ranas 
came to power in 1846-a great divide in the history of Nepal *s relations 
with British India* The Ranas ruled Nepal with absolute power for one 
hundred and five years, drawing strength from British support. Jang Baha­
dur initiated the Nepalese government in the policy of active cooperation 
with the British and benefited thereby* His role during the Mutiny indi­
cated that the Nepalese government had abandoned their earlier policy of 
taking advantage of British troubles. With the consolidation of the Rana 
regime, the British had attained one important political objective : the 
Nepalese were now not only safe neighbours but cooperative allies*
Jang Bahadur*s friendliness held out for the British the 
ho|>e that Nepal would cease to be a closed/to them-or at least to their 
Resident-so that between the two governments more intimate intercourse, 
both political and economic, would follow* This hope was not fulfilled, 
and because Jang Bahadur, with all his effusive cordiality and cooperation,
shared the Nepalese government's traditional belief that intimacy with the 
British was prejudicial to Nepal's independence, and that the exposure of 
the interior of Nepal to the "prying eyes" of the Resident hastened the 
loss of this independence. Jang Bahadur maintained peace and amity with 
the British, but the latter should not expect a greater degree of attachment 
than he could safely allow them. The Indian government, particularly the 
advocates of a forward policy, resented this, and when Jang Bahadur died, 
they saw their opportunity. They wanted to effect a change in the Nepalese 
policy by pressure and to improve the Resident's position as a means of 
strengthening British influence in Nepal. This influence was looked upon 
by Lytton, Durand, Henvey and Girdlestone as the only insurance against a 
change in the Nepalese government's erstwhile friendly attitude towards the 
British caused by a change in regime at Kathmandu. However*, Ranuddip's and 
Dhir Shamsher's stubborn resistance to the Resident's pressure left the 
British government in no doubt that the Nepalese government would never 
abandon their exclusive policy which in their view was the only defence 
against a neighbour whose influence spread as much by a conscious effort 
on its part as by its sheer position and overwhelming power and resources. 
This was the strongest susceptibility of the Nepalese, and hereafter the 
British always took care not to ruffle it.
From the last two decades of the 19th century, owing 
to political and military exigencies of the two governments, their rela­
tions developed towards greater interdependence and closer understanding.
The Russian menace and the frontier expeditions obliged the Indian govern­
ment to strengthen their army by enlisting a large number of Gurkhas in it
to
andAkeepi»g on good terms with; the Rarxa government to ensure regular supply
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of Gurkha recruits. Another factor influencing British policy towards 
Nepal at this time was their realisation that China's relationcs with 
Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim conflicted with the Indian government• s policy of 
keeping these border states exclusively under British influence. The import­
ance of Nepal as a frontier state and its military resources, both, actual 
and potential, were now appreciated as never before, resulting in an adjust­
ment of British attitude towards the Nepalese government and the adoption 
of a new policy : winning Nepalese confidence by liberal concessions and 
progressively increasing their dependence on the Indian government. Thesc^ .^  
of supplying arms to the Nepalese government in return for Gurkha recruits 
was an expression of this policy. Henceforth Nepal's military resources, 
particularly her man power, were looked upon by the British as an essential 
accessory to the Indian government's own armed strength. The Rana govern­
ment, on the other hand, found in the Gurkha recruitment scheme, apart 
from its economic and other benefits, a means of ingratiatihg themselves 
with the British as well as keeping the restless martial tribes of Nepal 
gainfully engaged and contented. By the turn of the century the British 
had thus achieved another pbjective 5 Nepalese friendliness enabled them 
to not only strengthen the Indian army for meeting external emergencies 
but to minimise any risk of internal threat to British rule caused by 
mutiny in that army. The Gurkha mercenaries under British command who would 
fight ferociously against the Russians and the restless Pathans of the 
frontier were expected to show no sympathy for any rebellious Sikh or 
Punjabi muslim contingent of the Indian army, The Gurkhas were naturally 
looked upon as the most satisfactory guarantee of the continued good rela­
tions between the British and Nepalese governments.
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With the years the growing, internecine jealousy and bitter 
rivalry for power weakened the Rana family, proportionately increasing its 
vulnerability to British influence and pressure. Alongside improved politi­
cal relations was seen the increased economic interdependence between Nepal 
and British India : there was expansion of trade; Nepalese in large numbers 
found employment in India; the volume of capital invested by the Ranas in 
Indian industries and commercial establishments grew-all this made the 
Nepalese governments stake in British friendship correspondingly heavy.
Isolating Nepal and restricting hen external contact was one 
important feature of British policy. The British discouraged Nepal from 
having any relations with any foreign power other than themselves. Nepalfs 
desire to have diplomatic representation at the Coufct of St.james was not 
met until 1934* for fear that foreign powers might establish relations with 
Nepal through her embassy in London. When Chandra Shamsher sent a few Nepal­
ese young men to Japan for technical training, there were not a few in the 
India Office who felt uneasy. It was, in fact, . held as an axiom that the 
political and military requirements of the Indian empire could not allow 
Nepal to pass out of the British sphere of influence to that of any other 
power. Nepal*s land-locked position and economic dependence on India and 
the lack of any power in her neighbourhood sufficiently strong to prevent 
her gravitation towards India enabled the British to exercise this virtual 
monopoly on Nepal*s diplomatic relations. Nepal could not play the same 
role as Afghanistan between Russia and Britain, she did serve as a buffer 
state when China was powerful in Tibet; but the breakdown of the Chinese 
power and the emergence of a Tibetan government theoretically independent 
but really under British influence, made India’s North-East frontier safe,
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and correspondingly Nepal*s importance as a “buffer state decreased.
The Nepalese governments interest in the political and 
military events in India roused disfavour and even alarm in the Indian 
government who took all measures to keep the anti-British elements in 
Imdia-be they disaffected Indian princes, as in the 19th century, or 
Indian nationalists, as in the 20th-away from contact with Nepal. An 
important element in the Indian governments North-Eastern frontier policy 
lay in isolating Nepal from her Himalayan neighbours so as to prevent the 
formation of a large Himalayan kingdom under Nepalese hegemony. Sikkim 
was taken under British protection with the avowed object of preventing 
her and Bhutan*s absorption into Nepal. In early British policy towards 
Bhutan and Sikkim, Nepalese reaction was an element for consideration, 
although British influence in the two states was increased in the second 
half of the 19th century despite NepalS known dislike.
British influence on NepalS relations with Tibet and China 
was a later development in Anglo-Nepalese relations, its main result being 
to cause a diminution in the Nepalese government*s freedom of action in 
this sphere, in the late 18th and 19th centuries, in the absence of definite 
diplomatic relations with the Nepalese government, the British could hardly 
expect to control Nepal's relations with China and Tibet, although-as the 
result of Nepal*s war with Tibet (1788-92) showed-the lack of this control 
did prove injurious to British interests. But even after the British had 
defeated Nepal and established regular relations with her, they did not 
interfere with her traditional relationship with China and Tibet for fear 
of possible Chinese annoyance and resultant damage to Britain's commercial 
interests in China.
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The progressive decline of Chinese power from the second 
half of the 19th century acted as a stimulus to Nepalese military ambi­
tions in Tibet which were whetted by the Rana government*s expectation of 
British support or at any rate their protection in case China retaliated. 
Nepal's relations with Tibet became very strained during the last decades 
of the 19th century, and war was averted by China's diplomatic pressure 
on Nepal and Tibet and the Rana government's failure to commit the British 
to Nepal's defence against China.
For several reasons the British disapproved of Nepalese 
ambitions in Tibet and yet refrained from putting any great pressure on 
the Ranas to abandon them. A  war between Nepal and Tibet, besides, result­
ing in the inevitable restriction in the supply of Gurkha recruits by the 
Nepalese government, would have involved not only China but Sikkim and 
Bhutan as well-thus spreading tension along the entire North-East fron­
tier. Another result would have been the impairment of Britain's relations 
with China and injury to her trade there resulting from the Chinese impre­
ssion that the British were using "their Rana allies as a cat's paw to 
further their own objectives in Tibet-and these objectives China had strong 
reasons to dislike and therefore frustrate. But then, the knowledge that 
the Nepalese government resented any pressure on them as an unwarranted 
interference with Nepal's external relations limited the Indian govern­
ment's action during Nepal's disputes with Tibet to the offer of friendly 
advice to the Ranas to peacefully settle these disputes.
British policy in Tibet from, the 1880's onwards had an impor­
tant bearing on Nepal's relations with Tibet and China. Britain's commer­
cial schemes in Tibet of which the opening of the Sikkim route was an
important result, proved detrimental to the Nepalese merchants* virtual 
monopoly of indo-Tibetan trade, of which a large volume had hitherto 
been carried on mainly through the Nepalese route. Nepal became an impor­
tant element in British policy towards Tibet in the first decade of the 
present century; in their object of keeping Tibet free from foreign ifcflu- 
ence, the British made political use of Nepal and her anxiety to maintain 
her privileged position in Tibet, which was threatened by the Dalai Lama*s 
ambitious policy, the alleged Russian intrigues with the Dalai Lama and 
the Chinese scheme of absorption of Tibet. But the British, considering 
adverse international reaction to what would appear as the violation of 
the territorial integrity of the Chinese empire by a British protectorate, 
did not let the Nepalese government realise their long^-cherished territo­
rial aspirations in Tibet. The cessation of Russian intrigues with the 
Dalai Lama and the removal of Chinese power from Tibet did not end the 
Nepalese anxiety regarding their position in Tibet, because they saw a 
new threat to that position in the British policy of establishing friendly 
relations with the Dalai Lama and of strengthening him militarily, the 
policy which made it hard for Nepal to maintain her erstwhile military 
superiority on which was based her privileged position in Tibet. The British 
did not interfere with the normal relations between Nepal and Tibet, but 
their influence on both w a s *  effective enough to prevent any active host­
ility between them, if not. to remove their age-old jealousy and ill-feelings.
As for Nepal*s relations with China, they appeared to the 
British more as a political embarrassment than a serious military danger, 
necessitating watchful interest rather than any vigorous action. The only 
exception to this attitude was seen in the British reaction to China *s
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emphatic assertion of her suzerainty over Nepal in 1906-11 and her 
intrigues with Nepal, Bhutan and Bikkim, the result of which did China 
no good whatsoever. Nevertheless, not so much British policy as China's 
own weakness, her inability to manage her client states, &er ambitious 
policy in Tibet in the last years of the Manchu rule, the disappearance 
of this rule itself-all of which cost China her prestige, reduced in 
the Nepalese eyes her efficacy as a counterpoise to the British and 
ultimately showed her as a menace to Nepalese interests-which had the 
decisive effect on Nepal's traditional relations with China.
The 20tn century saw, under stress of several circum­
stances, the areas of agreement between the governments of India and 
Nepal considerably widened, their respective interests closely identi­
fied and mutual obligation further increased. The development of this 
trend was in no small measure due to the British representatives in 
Nepal, Ravenshaw, Manners Smith, Showers, Bayley, O'Connor and Kenni- 
on, whose amicable relations with the Nepalese government prmved that 
the policy of gentle handling worked far better with the latter than 
attempts at cowing them into quiescemce-the method either advocated or 
adopted by Hodgson, Ramsay, girdlestone, Henvey and Durand, of the 
Viceroys in the period under review Lytton's and Curzon's distrustful 
attitude towards Nepal was in contrast to the policy of all the other 
7iceroy3-Ripon, Dufferin, Lansdowne, Elgin, Minto, Hardinge, Chelms­
ford and Reading-who chose not to pressurise the Nepalese if conciliation 
and soft-pedalling could earn the desired result. This also was the gene­
ral attitude of the Home government where strong secretaries of State
like Kimberley, Morley and Montagu wanted to keep the Indian government
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to the beaten, and* therefore* safe track* and where old India hands like 
Lee Warner* Lyall and Fitzpatrick and cautious civil servants like Godley, 
Ritchie and Wakely held a moderating influence on their more zealous 
colleagues, Barnes and Hirtzel* for instance*
Nepal fs contribution to the World War as a British, ally 
increased her claim to British favour* The War met with the high hopes 
of the Rana government; it earned them an important means of economic 
sustenance in the form of an annual subsidy; it also won them a great, 
political object s the treaty of 1923 removed the ever-present danger of 
Nepal*s absorption in the British empire* while enabling the Ranas to make 
the fullest use of the British alliance. The British* for their part* had 
at first considerable doubt as regards both the necessity' and the proprie­
ty of recognising Nepal’s internal and external independence by a treaty,
but ultimately they saw that, in fact, the treaty was no more than a 
necessary formality-a means to satisfy the Rana government’s amour propre*
to further strengthen their rule at home and to ensure their continuance
of their friendly policy towards the Indian government* in fact* the 
recognition of Nepal’s de jure independence made little change in her de 
facto subordination to the British government. Nepal had definitely come 
within the political framework of the British empire in India, being lookdd 
upon by the Indian government as a political and military outpost of that 
empire. Nepal’s internal autonomy was guaranteed by the British government, 
but her external relations had* in effect, if not in so many words* been 
adjusted to the requirements of British policy, and her independence in 
this respect was clearly limited to the extent allowed by the British.
In fact, the Ranas were no better than loyal partners of the British in
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protecting and furthering the latter*s imperial interests in India*
This he came apparent when the nationalist movement in 
India intensified* For this and other disturbing circumstances such as 
Britain*s growing rivalry with Japan in Asia, the uncertain situation 
in Tibet created by the Chinese policy, the rise of Bolshevik Russia, 
the disturbed situation in Afghanistan and the restless* among the neigh­
bouring pathan tribes, the Indian government considered it prudent to 
keep the Ranas in good humour. The latter*s loyalty and cooperation 
came,in fact, tm be valued as the very sheet-anchor of British rule in 
India when assailed by several internal and external forces. A review 
of Britain* s military position in India established that in the event 
of a serious emergency, the Indian government could bank upon the loyal­
ty of none but the Gurkha troops already in India and those in Nepal 
which the Rana government were expected to supply in request. It was 
also recognised by the British government that Nepal being a powerful 
Hindu state could exert considerable influence on the Hindu anti-British 
elements in India; and the more articulate these elements became the 
greater became the need for dependence on the Rana government. The Ranas, 
for their part, actively assisted the British in suppressing anti-British 
forces in India and keeping them away from Nepal in order to prevent 
their contact with the local anti-Rana elements.
The British policy in Nepal was one of tactful management 
of a proud, sensitive, freedom-loving government which acquiesced in the 
loss of de facto independence when an appearance of their de Jure sove­
reignty was maintained by profuse professions to that hffect, by the 
aboidance of interference in the internal affairs of the state, by provi-
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sion for economic security for its martial population and by the besto­
wal of honours, titles and subsidies on its rulers* That the British 
policy paid off was due to four main reasons-an understanding of the 
Nepalese governments sentiments, prejudices and susceptibilities; an 
appreciation of the fact that Nepal had a personality of her own and 
quite a strong one at that; an adjustment of British needgs to Nepalese 
expectations; and the political isolation or Nepal under exclusive Bri­
tish influence.
British influence on Nepal was limited by the fact that it 
could operate through practically one agency alone-the Nepalese govern­
ment, whose policy was to keep this influence rigidly restricted. Bri­
tish influence had both a stabilising and a retarding effect on Nepal. 
British support to the Rana regime ensured peace and stability in a 
country where geographical eonditions and ethnic diversity impeded poli­
tical unity and where the tradition of changing regimes by violence 
bred political insecurity and uncertainty. But then, this support also 
made the setting up of any other tule impossible, let alone any other 
form: of government. The Nepalese could, therefore, have no experience of 
political experiments, and this was no small handicap for them when the 
Rana regime collapsed in 1951* The Nepalese had no training in constitu­
tional or any liberal form of government, and, so, small wonder they had 
considerable difficulty in running this form of government in the 
post-Rana period.
In Nepal*s social life the British could hardly act as a cata­
lytic agent or force the pace of modernism in the country. But they en­
couraged the Ranas in effecting social reforms; they wanted the Ranas
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to travel in India and to go to England with a view as much to impre­
ssing them with the power and resources of the British empire as to en­
larging their mental horizon. However, geographical obstacles, lack of 
communication facilities and the resultant immobility in life, the Nepal­
ese government*s policy of isolation and the British acquiescence in this 
policy-all this prevented the dissemination of even a limited degree of 
the liberal ideas which swept India in the 19th and 20th centuries.
The Ranas in their own interest perpetuated the Nepalese belief that the 
modernisation of their country with British assistance would inevitably 
lead to the latter*s economic and eventually political ascendancy. Beneath 
this apparently lofty patriotic spirit lurked the apprehension that edu­
cation and the enlightenment that would follow would weaken the autocra­
tic Rana regime. Vehicles of modern ideas were unknown in Nepal; an 
intellectual elite was conspicuous by its absence; the small number of 
educated men at Kathmandu were either absorbed in government offices or 
purged out of the country at the slightest suspicion of hostility to the 
government. The Gfmrkha soldiers who had served in India and elsewhere re­
turned home with nothing but memories of battles and fond expectations of 
similar opportunities in future. Their economic dependence on the British 
government was a strong deterrent to the growth of any hostile feelings 
against the latter.
Indo-Nepalese relations during the period under review thus 
had a very narrow base; it was a relationship of a family oligarchy in 
Nepal and an alien government in India, both of which became in course 
of time unpopular. The forces opposed to the Ranas naturally looked to 
the anti-British forces in India for support. The Indian nationalist press
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a&taked the Rana regime, particularly when the Gurkhas were employed 
by the British government to put down the nationalist movement in India. 
In the late 1930’s anti-Rana forces were organised into parties which 
looked to the nationalist elements in India for encouragement and inspi­
ration. During the Quit India movement (1942) a number of prominent 
Nepalese were arrested in India, in the same year anti-Rana elements at 
Saptari in the Nepalese Terai broke open the Hanumannagar jail where 
Jayprakash Narayan, Rammanohar Lohia and other Indian leaders had been 
kept interned by the Rana government after their escape to Nepal for 
political asylum. The opponents of the Ranas in the Terai became a strong 
force in 1946-7. compelling the Rana government to make administrative 
reforms. The relationship between the Rana regime and the British appear­
ed to them an unholy alliance, a partnership in the exploitation of the 
Nepalese people; the British were condemned as a prop of an autocratic 
and corrupt regime. When the British left India the Ranas found it diffi­
cult to adjust themselves to the new government of India who wanted a 
different, a broader basis of relationship between Nepal and India. The 
British with their limited political and military objectives in Nepal 
tolerated a regime very different from their own in India. The Nehru 
government with fckeir democratic ideals not only treated this regime as 
a political anachronism but actively assisted the opponents of the regime 
to effect its fall.
The disappearance of the Rana rule and of the British from 
India has,on the one hand, freed Nepal from years of Indian political 
tutelage and, on the other, created for her the problem of managing her 
defence and developing herself with extremely limited resources and
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under backward economic conditions. Assistance from neighbouring India 
and China apparently offers a ready, but, from the Nepalese point of 
view, not always a safe, solution, for its inherent risk of involving 
Nepal in the current Indochinese strained relations.
In Indian eyes Nepal*s importance as a buffer state stems from 
the propinquity of the Communist Chinese menace to India, political and 
strategic needs are the important motivations of the Indian government*s 
policy towards Nepal, as they had been of the British in the past. But 
in their approach there lies a difference; while the British could rea­
lise their objectives by aligning themselves with a particular regime 
and strengthening it militarily to meet internal challenges, the cjhnged 
connotation of a country*s real strength today obliges the present 
Indian government to assist the Nepalese people to adjust themselves, 
politically, economically and socially, to the demands of modern times- 
and thereby to make the country less vulnerable to either ideological 
subversion or a violent revolution. Yet, the same main reason-Nepalese 
sensitivity to independence-which had made the British government observe 
caution in dealing with Nepal has also influenced the present Indian gov­
ernment* s approach. While the British had to stretch their policy of let 
alone too far, even if it arrested Nepal's progress, tie present Indian 
government have to realise their objective without exciting the Nepal­
ese suspicion that India is overdoing her role as Nepal's guardian 
and pace-setter.
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.Vhereas peace and friendship have now existed between the 
British government and the Government of Nepal since the signing of 
the Treaty of Segowlie on the second day of December, one thousand 
eight hundred and fifteen; and whereas since that date the Government 
of Nepal has ever displayed its true friendship for the British government 
and the British government has as constantly shown its goodwill towards 
the Government of Nepal; and whereas the Governments of both the countries 
are now desirous of still further strengthening and cementing the good 
relations and friendship which have subsisted between them for more than 
a century; the two High Contracting Parties having resolved to conclude 
a new Treaty of Friendship have agreed upon the following articles j-
ARTICLE 1
There shall be perpetual peace and friendship between the 
Governments of Great Britain and Nepal, and the two Governments agree 
mutually to acknowledge and respect each other’s independence, both 
internal and external.
ARTICLE 2
All previous Treaties, Agreements and Engagements, since 
and including the Treaty of Segowlie of 1815, which have been concluded 
between the two governments are hereby confirmed, except so far as they 
may be altered by the present Treaty.
ARTICLE 3
As the preservation of peace and friendly relations with the 
neighbouring States whose territories adjoin their common frontiers is 
to the mutual interests of both the High Contracting Parties, they here­
by agree to inform each other of any serious friction or misunderstanding 
with those States likely to rupiure such friendly relations, and each to 
exert its good offices as far as may be possible to remove such friction 
and misunderstanding.
ARTICLE 4
Each of the High Contracting Parties will use all such 
measures as it may deem practicable to prevent its territories being 
used for purposes inimical to the security of the other.
ARTICLE 5
In view of the long standing friendship that has subsisted 
between the British Government and the 'Government of Nepal, and for the 
sake of cordial neighbourly relations between them, the British Government
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agrees that the Nepal Government shall be free to import from or 
through British India into Nepal whatever arms, ammunition, machi­
nery, warlike material or stores may be requited or desired for the 
strength and welfare of Nepal, and that this arrangement shall hold 
good for all time as long as the British Government is satisfied that 
the intentions of the Nepal Government are friendly and that there is 
no immfliate danger to India from such importations. ‘Hie Nepal government, 
on the^other hand, agrees that there shall be no export of such arms, 
ammunition, &c., across the frontier of Nepal either by the Nepal Govern­
ment or by private individuals.
If, however, any Convention for the regulation 
of the Arms Traffic, to which the British Government may be a party, 
shall come into force, the right of importation of arms and ammunition 
by the Nepal Government shall be subject to the proviso that the Nepal 
Government shall first become a party to that Convention* and that such 
importation shall only be made in accordance with the provisions of 
that Convention.
ARTICLE 6
No Qustoms Duty shall be levied at British Indian Ports on 
goods imported on behalf of the Nepal Government for immediate transport 
to that country provided that a certificate from such authority as may 
from time to time be determined by the two Governments shall be presented 
at the time of importation to the Chief Customs Officer at the Port of 
import setting fortfcr that the goods are the property of the Nepal Govern­
ment, are required for the public services of the Nepal Government, are 
not for the purpose of any State monopoly or State trade, and are being 
sent to Nepal under orders of the Nepal Government.
The British Government also agrees to the grant in respect of 
all trade goods, imported at British Indian Ports for immediate transmi­
ssion to Kathmandu without breaking bulk en route of a rebate of the full 
duty paid, provided that in accordance with arrangements already agreed 
to between the two Governments, such goods may break bulk for repacking 
at the port of entry under Customs supervision in accordance with such 
rules as may from time to time be laid down in this behalf. Rebate may 
be claimed on the authority of a certificate signed by the said authority 
that the goods have arrived at Kathmandu with the customs seals unbroken 
and otherwise tampered with.
The Prime Minister of Nepal, to the British Envoy at the Court 
of Nepal, 21 December 1923
Regarding the purchase of arms and munitions which the Govern­
ment of Nepal buys from time to time for the strength and welfare of Nepal, 
and import to its own territory from and through British India in accorda­
nce with article 5 of the Treaty between the two Governments, the Govern­
ment of Nepal hereby agrees that it will, from time to time before the 
importation of arms and munitions at British Indian Ports, furnish detai­
led lists of such arms and munitions to the British Envoy at the Court of 
Nepal in order that the British government may be in a position to issue
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instructions to the port authorities to afford the necessary facilities 
for their importation in accordance with article 6 of this Treaty*
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B, 203 Tibet Narrative of Recent
Events 1913
B 204 Tibet Affairs, by W.O'Connor 1912
B 210 Tibetan Boys in England 1915
B, 212 Tibet Tripartite Convention 1914
B 224 Japanese Policy in its bearing
on India 1916
B 266 Tibet 1917
B 268 Draft of a Memo on the Employ­
ment of Japanese troops in
Mesopotamia 1917
B 300 'Tibet ^ 1918
B 324 Tibet the Proposed Negotia­
tion 1917
B 344 Tibet Question of Supply of
Arms 1920
C 106 Russia and the Indian Empire,
by W.Lee Warner 1902
D 70 Trade with Nepal 1877
D 91 Native States and Armies, by
O.T.Burne 1873
D 143 internal Condition of China 1891
D 169 Note on Native States, Sove­
reignty and Suzerainty 1904
D 170 Native States 1904
D 174 Report on the Chinese Fron­
tiers of India, by A. Rose 1911
(13) Political and Secret External S^ubject) Files :
Vol. 4 1906 Sikkim : Marriage of Maharaj1
kumar.
Vol. 21 1908 The Dalai Lama
Vol. 22 190b ‘Tibet
Vol. 23 1908 ■Tibet
Vol. 24 1908 Tibet
Vol. 25 1908 ■Tibet
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Vol. 35 1908 Nepal : Prime Minister's
Visit to England.
Vol. 13 1910 North-East Frontier
Vol. 14 1910 North-East Frontier
Vol. 15 1910 North-East Frontier
Vol. 19 1910 Tibet
Vol. 20 1910 'Tibet
Vol. 22 1910 Tibet
Vol. 22 1912 'Tibet
Vol. 25 1912 Nepal, Bhutan, China
Vol.26 1912 Nepal, Bhutan, China
Vol. 27 1912 Nepal, Bhutan, China
Vol. 69 1912 China and Tibet
Vol. 90 1912 Nepal
Vol. 91 1912 Nepal s Treaty of 1923
Vol. 7 1913 China and Tibet
Vol. 16 1913 China and Tibet
Vol. 17 1913 China and Tibet
Vol. 18 1913 China and Tibet
Vol. 19 1913 China and Tibet
Vol. 20 1913 China and Tibet
Vol. 69 1913 Tibet
Vol. 88 1913 Travellers in Nepal and
Vol. 108 1913 Eastern 'Tibet
Vol. 109 1913 Eastern Tibet






















111 1913 Eastern Tibet
112 1913 Eastern Tibet
64 1914 German War : Offers of Native
Chiefs•
66 1914 German War : Offers of Native
Chiefs
74 1914 North-East Frontier, Assam,
Burma Border
14 1915 Tibetan Students in England
15 1915 Tibetan Students in England
16 1915 'Tibetan Students in England
17 1915 'Tibetan Students in England
18 1915 ‘Tibetan students in England
19 1915 Tibetan Students in England
71 1917 Tibet Convention ; Proposed
Revision
72 1917 Tibet Convention : Proposed
Revision
73 1917 Tibet Convention : proposed
Revision
74 1917 Tibet Convention : proposed
Revision
75 1917 Tibet Convention : Proposed
Revision
20 1918 'Tibet : Repatriation of Chinese
soldiers
49 1918 Indian States, Nepal • status
of Subjects
50 1918 Exploration of Mount Everest,
1921-2










Tibet Situation, 1920-21 
Sino-Tibetan Frontier 
Mahendra Pratap
Tibet s Travellers and Missionaries 
China : Annual Report
(14) Political and Secret Department Library.
D. 10 Report on the Northeast Frontier
of India, by J.F.Mitchell 1883
D. 66 Routes in Sikkim* by W,0fConnor 1900
D. 163 Routes in 'Tibet 1910
D. 169 Routes in Sikkim 1910
D. 187 Leading Personages in Re pal,
with Memorandum on Nepal 1914
G. 10 Cabinet Papers, 1839-62 2
Vol.3 Nepal : Narrative of
Political Events, 1830-
40, by J.Tickell, 21 January
1841
H. 115 Rotes on the Indian Frontiers 1912
In the Public Record Office
(1) Foreign Office Records.
F*0. 371 General Correspondence : Political
/176-7 Case No.303 Tibet Affairs, 1906
/382 Case No.303 Tibet Affairs, 1907
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F.Q. 405 Confidential Prints s China
/171 Annual Reports on China, 1906
/178-9 Annual Reports and Memoranda on
China, 1907
/I87 Annual Memoranda on China, 1908
/195 Annual Reports on China, 1909
/201 Annual Reports on China, 1910
F.O# 766 Embassy and Consular Archives 3 Nepal 
(Correspondence)
/I 1880-1929 Nepal : Miscellaneous
/2 1916-20 Nepal : Independent Status
/3 1889-1918 Kings of Nepal : succession
/4 1886-1925 Prime Ministers of Nepal : Heredi­
tary Succession
/5 1901 Maharaja Deb Shamsher s Flight to
India
/6 1901-12 China ; Nepalfs Relation to
/7 1903 fibet s Younghushand Expedition
/8 1912-22 fibet
/10 1916-31 Gurkha Recruitment
/II 1902-32 Gurkhas : Panipatya
/12 1919 Indian Unrest : Nepalese Offer of
Help
/13 1908-9 Mount Everest : Major Bxuce
(2) Cabinet Papers 1880-1914
Cab, 37/68
Paper No, 18 fibet, January 1904
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Cab• 37/70
Paper Wo. 71 Tibet, May 1904
Paper Wo. 100 Tibet, July 1904
Cab. 37/73
Paper Wo. 149 Tibet, November 1904
Paper No. 153 Tibet, December 1904
Cab. 37/130
Paper No. 4 Memorandum on the External 
and Internal situation of 
India consequent on the War, 
June 1915
(3) War Office Records.
W.O. 106 War Office Miscellaneous : Directorates 
of Military Operations and intelligence 
Papers.
/143 Report on Nepal, by Major Elies, 1884
In the National Archives of India, New Delhi
(1) Foreign Political Consultations for the years 1J99 
to 1859.
(2) Foreign Secret Consultations for the years 1785 
to 1859.
(3) Foreign Political and Secret A Proceedings for the 
years I860 to 1880.
(4) Foreign Political B Proceedings for the years I860 
to 1880.
(5) Ootacamaod Political Proceedings for 1834.
(6) Foreign Miscellaneous Series ;
Nepali and
Several Volumes dealing withADemi-Official 
Letters from the Resident to the Secretary, 
Foreign Department, 1830-43.
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(7) Nepal Residency Records s
Several Volumes on different subjects covering 
the years 1817-1873,
In Uttar Pradesh State Archives, Allahabad
Pre-Mutiny Records of the Kumaun Collectorate 3 
Political Letters Issued and Received, 1814-6, 
and 1840-42.
B . Government Records and Documents : Nepali
These records when I saw them in 1961 had no index, no 
number and no arrangement.
In the Foreign Office, Kathmandu
(1) Letters from the Chinese Amban in Tibet to 
the King of NepalvAl872-3 (I8I5-6 A.D.)
(2) Secret Report from Major Raghubir Singh and 
Jamadar Manna Singh (Nepalese secret Agents 
At Lahore) to the King of Nepal, 1895* Sravan 
Sudi 15, Roj 1 (August 1838)
(3) Ahadnama, I896, Bhadra Vadi 9» Roj 2 ( Agreement,
6 November 1839)
In the Commandari Kitabkhana, Nizamati and Jangi 
Phant, Kathmandu.
(1) Registers of the civil and military officers of the 
state and their salaries for the years 1903 to 1934
(1846-77)
(2) A Register giving details of Nepal*s wars with Tibet, 
1847-9 and 1912-3 (1790-92 and 1855-6)
In the Ministry of Law
Muluki Ain compiled under Jang Bahadur, 1910 ( The 
Law of the Land, 1853)
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G. Private Papers ; English
in the India office Library
(1) Ampthill Papers (Mss.Eur. E,233)
Correspondence of Lord Ampthill,
Acting Viceroy of India (Hay-December 
1904) with the Secretary of state for 
India, Lord Curzon, and persons in India,
(2) Barnes Papers (On Microfilm No.603)
Correspondence of Sir Hugh Barnes,
Foreign Secretary, India;(1900-03)
(3) Bell Papers (Hss,Eur. F.80)
Various papers, official and private 
of Sir Charles Bell, Political officer 
Sikkim (1908-1918) relating to Affairs 
in Tibet, Sikkim, Bhtan and Nepal,
(4) Chelmsford Papers (Ms s.Eur. B.264)
Correspondence of Lord Cheimsford,
Viceroy of India (1916-21) with the 
Secretary of State, persons in India 
and England,
(3) Christian Showers Stirling, Notes on her
Life (Phote Eur. 36)
Reminiscences of Nepal, 1912-4 • Mrs, 
Showers* husband, Lt.Col, H*Showers, 
was the Acting Resident at the time,
(6) Cross Papers (Mss,Eur, E,243)
Correspondence of Lord Cross, the 
Secretary of State for India (1886-92), 
with Lords Dufferin and Lansdowne.
(7) Curzon Papers (Mss.Eur. F*lll)
Correspondence and Papers of Lord 
Curzon, Viceroy of India (1899-1905)* 
with the Secretary of State for India, 
persons in India and England; Memoranda, 
Notes, Minutes and other official papers.
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(8) Dufferin Papers (On Microfilm Nos.510-18)
Correspondence of Lord Dufferin, Viceroy 
of India (1884-8), with the Secretary of 
State for India, persons in India and 
England #
(9) Durand papers (Uncatalogoued)
Correspondence of Sir Mortimer Durand,
Foreign secretary, India (1885-94)» with 
Lords Dufferin and Lansdowne, and with 
many officials including Sir Alfred Lyall 
and Major E.L.Durand, Resident in Nepal.
( 1 0 )  Elgin papers (Mss.Eur. F . 8 4 )
Correspondence of Lord Elgin II, Viceroy 
of India ( 1 8 9 4 - 9 ) * with t h e  Secretary of 
State for India and persons in India.
( 1 1 )  Hamilton papers (Mss.Eur. C . 1 2 5  D . 5 0 9 )
Correspondence of Lord George Hamilton, 
the Secretary of State for India (1895- 
1903)*with. Lord Elgin.
(12) Hirtzel«s Diaries (On Microfilm No.740)
Diaries of Sir Arthur Hirtzel as private 
Secretary to Lord Morley (1906-08).
(13) Hodgson Manuscripts
Papers deposited hy Brian Houghton Hodgson, 
Officiating Resident and Resident in Nepal 
(1829-43); the papers deal with various sub­
jects like the army of Nepal, its judicial 
system and institutions, agriculture, land 
revenue, religion, ethnography and genealogy.
(14) Kilbracken Papers (Mss.Eur. F.102)
Correspondence of Sir Arthur Godley (Lord Kil­
bracken), Permanent Under Secretary of State 
for India (1883-1909)» with several viceroys 
and officials in India.
(15) Lansdowne papers (Mss.Eur. D.558)
Correspondence and papers of Lord Lansdowne,
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Viceroy of india (1888-94), with the secretary of 
State for India and persons in India; Selections 
from his official despatches, Notes and Minutes*
(16) Lawrence Papers (Mss.Eur. P.85;
Diaries of Sir Henry Lawrence while Resident 
in Nepal (1844-6) ; and Diaries of his wife, 
Mrs.Honoria Lawrence.
(17) Lee Warner Papers (Mss.Eur* P.92)
Minutes and Official Papers of Sir William 
Lee Warner, the Political Secretary, India 
Office (1895-1903)* and Member, India Council 
(1903-12).
(18) Lytton papers (Mss.Eur. S.218)
Correspondence and Papers of Lord Lytton,
Viceroy of India (1876-80), with the Secre­
tary of State for India; Minutes and Notes.
(19) Morley Papers (Mss.Eur.. D.573)
Correspondence of Lord Morley, the Secretary 
of State for India (1905-10), with Lord Minto II.
(20)Napier. Papers (Mss.Eur. F.114)
Papers of Lord Napier, Commander-in-Chief,
India (1870-76), relating to military affairs.
(21) Salisbury Papers (On Microfilm Nos.811-6, 818-22)
Correspondence of Lord Salisbury, the Secretary 
of State for India (1874-8), with Lords North­
brook and Lytton.
(22) Temple Papers (Mss.Eur. F.86)
Correspondence of Sir Richard Temple, Lieutenant- 
Governor of Bengal (1874-7), with Lord Lytton.
(23) White Papers (Mss.Eur. F.108)
Correspondence and Papers of General sir 
George White, Commander-in-Chiefl, India (1893-8)
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In the British Museum
(1) Auckland Papers ( Additional Mss. 37689-713)
Private Letter Books and Minute Books of 
Lord Auckland, Governor-General of India 
(1836-42).
(2) Ripon Papers (Additional Mss. 43574-87 and 43602-12)
Correspondence and Official Papers of Lord 
Ripon, Viceroy of India (1880-84)
  1.3. 290
/4-8 Correspondence of Ripon with 
the Queen, the Secretary of 
State for India and persons 
in India and England.
In the Public Record Office
(1) Ardagh Papers (P.R,0. 30/40)
Box Nos.10-12 Correspondence and papers of
Sir John Arda^i, private Secre­
tary to Lords Lansdowne and 
Elgin, regarding Indian Affairs.
(2) Balfour Papers (P.R.0. 30/60)
49 Official Papers of Lord Balfouc, prime
Minister of England : Cabinet Papers 
and Confidential Prints regarding India, 
1902-05.
(3) Grey Papers (P.O. 800/97)*
Correspondence of Sir Edward (Viscount) 
Grey, the Secretary of state for Foreign 
Affairs, with the India Office and Lord 
Hardinge (in India), 1910-13,
% Ihe Volume recently renumbered stands now as 
F.0. 800/98
(4) Jordan Papers (F,0. 350)
1-2, 11-2 Correspondence of Sir John Jordan, 
British Minister in Peking with 
Foreign Office, 1910-14.
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(5) Kitchener Papers (P.R.CU 30/57)
26, 29-50, 35* Official Papers and Private
35, 69, 70, 109 Correspondence of Lord Kitche­
ner, Commander-in-Chief, India 
(1903-09),and the Secretary of 
State for ftar, with Lords Curzon, 
Minto and Roberts, and with 
other individuals including sir 
Harciurt Butler, the Dalai Lama, 
Maharaja Chandra Shamsher and 
Amir Habibullah*
(6) Lansdowne Papers (F.O.800/114-5» 119-21)
Correspondence of Lord Lansdowne as &he Secretary 
of State for Foreign Affairs; Correspondence with 
Sir Ernest Satow, British Minister in Peking, 
regarding Bibetan affairs, 1900-05#
% Bbe Volumes recently renumbered stand now as
F.O. 800/115-6, 120-22*
(7) Satow Papers (P.R.O. 30/33)
7 s 1-5 Correspondence of Sir Ernest satow
regarding Chinese and BLbetan affairs 
with Foreign Office, 1900-06*
In the National Library of Scotland, Edinburgh
Minto Papers
Correspondence of Lord Minto II, Viceroy of 
India (I905-IO), with persons in India and 
England•
In the Bodleian Library, Oxford
Hodgson Manuscripts
Correspondence, Papers and Diaries of B«H.Hodgson, 
Resident in Nepal, containing references to Nepa­
lese affairs*
In the Cambridge University Library, Cambridge 
Hardinge Papers
Correspondence of Lord Hardinge II, Viceroy of
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India (1910-16), with the King, the secretary 
of state for India, persons in India and Eng­
land.
In the Army Museums (Qgilhy Trust)
Roberts Papers
Minutes, Notes and other official papers of 
Lord Roberts, Commander-in-Chief, India (1885- 
93)* and his Correspondence with Lords Dufferin, 
and Lansdowne, persons in India and England.
In the National Archives of India
Hobhouse Papers (On Microfilm)
Correspondence of Sir John Cam Hobhouse (Baron 
Bcoughton), President of the Board of Control 
(1835-41 and 1846-52), with Lords Auckland, 
Hardinge and Dalhousie.
'Lhese papers in original are in the British 
Museum (Addl. Mss. 36473-7)•
D, Private Papers s Nepali
In the possession of Mr.Baburam Achaya, Kathmandu
(1) Copies of many Government documents relating to 
subjects like Nepal’s relations with British India, 
BLlaet and China in t&e 19th century and the internal 
history of Nepal during the same period.
(2) Guru Hemraj Vamsavali, 1947 (1890)
(3) Suba Buddhiman Vamsavali, 1935 (1878)
In Madan Puraskar Pustakalaya, Patan, Kathmandu




A* Accounts and papers Presented to Parliament












1890 LXXVIII 0 6123
1904 LXVII C 1920
1904 LXVII C 2054
1905 LVIII C 2370
Description
Minutes of Evidence 
taken Before the 
Select Committee 
on the Affairs of 
the East India 
Company, pt.VI.
East India : Sikkim 
Expedition.
East India : papers 
Relating to Bhutan.
East India : Further 
papers Relating to 
Bhutan.
Afghanistan : Return 
of the Amont of money 
ammunition, guns and 
rifles given to the 
Amirs of Afghanistan 
since the time of 
Dost Muhammad.
East India ; Army 
System.
Statistical Abstract 
Relating to British 
India.






19 06 LXXXII 175 East India : progress 
and Condition.
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1910 LXVIII C 5240
1910 CIV C 5345
1920 XXXIV C 950
1924 XXVI
1924-5 XXX
1929-30 XXIX c 3610
Further papers Relating to 
Tibet.
East India : statistical 
Abstract Relating to British 
India.
East India : progress and 
Condition.
C 2112 ( Treaty be*een United Kingdom 
0 and Nepal together with a note 
C 2453 5 respecting the importation of 
$ arms and ammunition into Nepal.
Statistica^Abstract Relating to 
British India.
B. Reports, Memoranda, Gazetteers etc.
Annual Report on the External Trade of Bengal with 
Nepal, Sikkim and Bhutan (Calcutta) for the years 
1880-1911.
Annual Report of the Foreign Trade of the North-Western 
Provinces and Oudh (Allahabad) for the years 1877 to 
1900.
Annual Report of the Foreign Trade of the United Provin­
ces of Agra and Oudh (Allahabad) for the years 1905 to 
1922.
Annual Report of the Trans-Frontier Trade of Bihar and 
Orissa with Nepal (Patna) for the years 1913 bo 1922.
Bengal District Gazetteers :
Bhagalpur (Calcutta, 1911) by J .Byrne.
Champaran (Calcutta, 1909) by L.3*S.0#Malley.
Darbhanga (Calcutta, 1909) by L.S.S.O^ tfalley.
Darjiling (Calcutta) 1907) by L.S.3.O'Malley.
________ (Alipore, 1947) by A.J.Dash.
Muzaffarpur (Calcutta, 1907) by L.S.S.O'Malley.
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Purnea (Calcutta, 1911) "by L.3.5.O’Malley.
District gazetteer of the United Provinces of Agra 
and Oudh :
Bahraich (Lucknow, 1921') By H.R.Nevill.
Bareilley (AllahaBad, 1911) By H.R.Nevill.
Basti (AllahaBad, 1907) By H.R.Nevill.
Gronda (Nainital, 1905) By H.R.Nevill*
Gorakhput (AllahaBad, 1909) By H.R.Nevill.
Kheri (AllahaBad, 1909) By H.R.Nevill.
Pi IBM t (AllahaBad, 1909) By H.R.Nevill.
phe Imperial Gazetteer of India :
Vol. VII (London, 1881) By fl.w.Hunter.
Vol. XIX (New Series, Oxford, 1908).
_______ Afghanistan and Nepal (Calcutta, 1908).
Gazetteer of Sikkim (Calcutta, 1894) ed. By H.H.Risley.
Ihe Boundary Question Between China and T i b e t  (Peking, 1940)
Calendar of Persian Correspondence s
Vol. VI (Delhi, 1958)
Vol. VII (Calcutta, 1940)
Vol. IX (New Delhi, 1949)
Vol. X (Delhi, 1959)
Census of India :
1911. Vol.V, Part I s Bengal, Bihar, Orissa and
Sikkim (Calcutta, 1915) By 
L.S.S.O’Malley.
1921.Vol.I, Part I : India,General Report
(Calcutta, 1925) By J.T. 
Marten.
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1931 *Vol. I, Part I : India, General Heport
(Delhi, 1933) "by J.H.Hutton.
A Collection of Ireaties, Engagements and Sannads
Relating to India and Neighbouring Countries by C,U*Aitchison -
Vol. II (Calcutta, 1909)
Vol. XI (Calcutta, 1909 )
Vol. XIII (Delhi, 1933)
Vol. XIV (Calcutta, 1929)
Frontier and Overseas Expeditions from India compiled by 
the Intelligence Branch* Army Head Quarters, India*
Vol. IV : North and North-Eastern Frontier Tribes 
(Simla, 1907).
General Report on the great prigonemetrical Survey of India 
(Dehra Dun) for the years 1871-4*
General Report on the Survey of India (Dehra Dun) for the 
years 1878-1907*
Report on the Exploration in Sikkim and Bhutan and ffibet 
(Dehra Dun, 188&) containing
Reports of Lama Serap of Gyatsho, 1836-68.
Reports of Explorer K»P«, 1880-84.
Reports of Lama U,G-., 1883«
Reports of Explorer R,N,, 188$-6.
Reports of Explorer P«A«» 1885-6.
Report on the Exploration in Great Bibet and Mongolia made 
by A.K. in 1879-82 prepared by J„B-N,Hennessey (Dehra Dun, 
1834)
Report on Exploration in Nepal and Jibet by Explorer M-H, 
1885-6>, prepared by C.Wood (Dehra Dun, 1887)
Report on the Brans-Himalayan Explorations in connection 
with the Great Trigonometrical Survey of India During 1865-7 
prepared by T.C.Montgomerie (Dehra Dun, n.d.).
/ Minute by the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal on the Mutinies
/ as they affect)edL the Lower Provinces under the Government of
^4 Bengal icaicutta, isbb)
411
Narrative of the Political Relations of the Government of 
India with Native States (Calcutta, 1862)
Nepal and the Gurkhas (London, 1965) by the United Kingdom 
Government, Ministry of Defence.
Papers Relating to the Nepaul War grinted in conformity to 
the Resolution of the Court of Proprietors of East India 
Stock of 3rd March 1824*
Political Missionsto Bootan, Comprising the
Reports of the Honourable Ashley Eden, 1864;
_____  of Captain R.B.Pemberton, 1837? 183Q»
with pr .W» Griffiths Journal %
and the Account by Baboo Kishen Kant Bose (Calcutta,
1865)
Report on Bootan (Calcutta, 1839) hy Captain R.B.Pemberton.
Report of a Mission to Sikkim and the Tibetan Frontier with 
a Memorandum on our relations with Jibet (Calcutta, 1885) by 
Colman Macaulay.
Military Report on Sikkim and Chumbi Valleys with some Notes 
on ld.bet (Simla, 1900) by Captain W.F.O’Connor.
Military Report on Tibet (1910) by General staff, India.
Report on Tibet (Calcutta, 1903) by Captain y.F.O*Connor.
Report oh the officials of the Governments of India and of 
the Chinese People1s Republic on the Boundary Question (New 
Delhi, 19^ 1)
•Jibet s Peace Handbook No.7 0  (London, 1920) by Great Britain, 
Foreign Office.
Ill PRIN'JKD BOOKS : ffnglish
Ahmad, Zahiruddin, China and Bibet, 1708-1939 : A Resume
of Facts (Oxford, I960).
Alder, G.J., British India*s Northern Frontier 1865-
1893 (London, 19^ 3)*
Bahadur, purna, Nepal behind the screen (Kathmandu, 1957)*
412
Bailey, F.M., China, Bibet, ussam : a journey, 1911 (London, 1945) •
__________ , No Passport to jibet (London, 1957)*
Baird, J.G.A. (ed.), private Letters of the Marquess of palhousie





Grand jour : Diary of an eastward Journey 
(jjondon, 1934)*
History of the Indian Mutiny, 2 vols.
(London and New York, n.d.).
On India*s Frontier : Or Nepal, phe Gurkhas*
Mysterious Land (New York, 1895)*
Slavery in British India (Bombay, 1933)• 








Bishop, R.N• i i•, 
Black, C.E.D.,
Memorandum on the Lines of Approach to 
the Nepal Valley (Simla, 1334).
Some Account of the Public Life and A 
Selection of the Unpublished writings 
of the Earl of Macartney, 2 Vols.
(London, 1807).
Princes of India ; with a chapter on Nepal
(London, 1934)•
Dorje-Ling (Calcutta, 1838).
Kathmandu, the Capital of Nepal (Calcutta, 
1918).
Jibet Past and Present (Oxford, 1924). 
phe People of Jibet (Oxford, 1923). 
phe Portrait of the Dalai Lama (London,
1946).
A Journey of Literary and Archaeological 
Researches in Nepal and Northern India 
during the winter of 1864-5 (Cambridge, 
1336).
Unknown Nepal (London, 1952).





















The Marquis of Dufferin and Ava 
(London, 1903).
Gurkhas (London, 1967).
The Happy Warriors (Dorset, 1961).
pictureque Nepal (London, 1952).
Himalayan Wandeeer (London, 1934).
Twenty Years in the Himalayas (London,
1910).
Lord Minto s a Memoir (London, 1924).
Simla past and present (Bombay, 1925).
Bengal under the Lieutenant-Governors,
2 Vols. (Calcutta, 1901).
Dictionary of Indian Biography (London,
1906).
Sketch of the Geography and Geology of 
of the Himalayan Mountains and Tibet,
4 Vols. (Delhi, 1907).
‘Trade through the Himalayas (ptinceton,
1951).
The Unveiling of Lhasa (London, 1905).
The Sepoy (London, 1919).
Land and polity in Tibet (Seattle, 1959).
Rough Notes on the state of Nepal, its 
Government, Army and Resources (Calcutta, 
1851).
Reminiscences of an Indian Official 
(London, 1884).
yerelsfs Rule in India (Allahabad, 1939). 
Anglo-Nepalese Relations (Calcutta, I960). 






Lord Eihlenborough in his Correspondence 
with the puke of Wellington (Loudon, 1874)*
Imperial Military Geography (London, 1937)*
Journal of an overland journey from China 
towards India (Calcutta, 1869).
Travels of a pioneer of commerce (London, 
1871).
The Indian problem |.833-1935 (Oxford,
1943).
Ladak, physical, statistical and Historical 
(London, 1854).
Curzon, George Nathaniel, Russia in Central Asia in 1889 and the
Anglo-Rmssian Question (London, lp89).









The Fire Qx and Other Years (New York, 1940).
The Rise of Russia in Asia (London, 1950).
India Under Morley and Minto (London, 1964).
The Commerce of Tibet (Calcutta, 1883).
Narrative of a Journey to Lhasa (Calcutta, 
1885).
Journey to Lhasa and Central Tibet (ed. 
ff.N.Rockhill, London, 1904).
Selections from Unpublished Correspondence 
of the Judge-Magistrate and the Judge of 
Patna 1790-1857 (Patna, 1954).
The Problem of the North-ffest Frontier 










Edwardes, H.B., and 








Fillipi, F. De. (ed,),
Fisher, Margaret, and 
Rose, Leo,
Nepal, Land of Mgrstery s Adventures 
in Burma, China, India and the King­
dom of Nepal (London, 1942).
The Perfumed Tigers, Adventures in the 
Land of the Maharajahs (London, 1931)*
135T> A Friend in Need; 1887, Friend­
ship Forgotten. An Episode in the 
Indian Foreign Office Administration 
(London, 1890).
Honoria Lawrence (London, 1936).
Qur Viceregal Life in India, 2 vols. 
(London, 1889).
Frontiers (London, 1932).
Report on a visit to Sikkim and the 
Tibetan Frontier (in October, Novem­
ber and December 1873)> (Calcutta, 1874)*
Life of sir Henry Lawrence(London, 1873)*
Journal of a winter«s tour in India; 
with a visit to the Court of Nepaul,
2 Vols. (London, 1852).
Guide to Nepal ( London, 1963)*
journal of the proceedings of the 
late Embassy to China (London, 1817).
Memoirs of Travel, sport and Natural 
History (London, 1930)*
The Last jtrongholds (London, 1934)*
Trade and Diplomacy on the China 
Coast, 2 Vols* (<wW^e>*a953).
Frontiers, A Study of political 
Geography (Oxford, 1913).
An Account of Tibet : The Travels of 
Ippolito pesideri ... 1712-1727 
(London, 1937)*
England, India, Nepal, Tibet, China-wjr 















Ganguly, D.C., (ed.), 
Gawler, J.C.,
Himalayan Battleground ; sino-indian 
Rivalry in Ladakh (London, 1963)*
The Chinese View of their place in 
the world (London, 1964).
Bayonets to Lhasa (London, I96I).
The Administration of the Marquis 
of Lansdowne as viceroy and Governor- 
General of India 1888-1894 (Calcutta, 
1894).
History of the British Army, Vol.IX 
(London, 1930).
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